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v 
Do we really mean to take shelter from our jouissance in 
the order of utility, to become “a branch of the service of 
goods,” in the mistaken hope that the “human sciences” 
will be rewarded for doing so? 
L.O. Aranye Fradenburg, “Group Time, Catastrophe, 
Periodicity” 
As for what motivated me, it is quite simple . . . . It was 
curiosity—the only kind of curiosity, in any case, that is 
worth acting upon with a degree of obstinacy: not the 
curiosity that seeks to assimilate what it is proper for 
one to know, but that which enables one to get free of 
oneself. After all, what would be the value of the passion 
for knowledge if it resulted only in a certain amount of 
knowledgeableness and not, in one way or another and 
to the extent possible, in the knower’s straying afield of 
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himself? There are times in life when the question of 
knowing if one can think differently than one thinks, 
and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely nec-
essary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. . . . 
[W]hat is philosophy today . . . if it is not the critical 
work that thought brings to bear on itself? In what does 
it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to 
what extent it might be possible to think differently, in-
stead of legitimating what is already known? 
Michel Foucault, The Use of Pleasure 
 
We are beings who can neither live nor die without art-
ful signification. 




I SIT IN ONE OF THE DIVES / ON FIFTY-SECOND STREET / 
UNCERTAIN AND AFRAID 
 
In 1981, Michel Foucault gave an interview in the French 
gay press, Le gai pied (he had mistakenly believed his 
identity would be cloaked, but the interview concluded 
with “Merci, Michel Foucault”), in which he freely sketched out 
what he saw as homosexuality’s “historic occasion to reopen 
affective and relational virtualities, not so much through 
the instrinsic qualities of the homosexual, but due to the 
biases against the position he occupies; in a certain sense, 
diagonal lines that he can trace in the social fabric permit 
him to make these virtualities visible” (Foucault 1996a, 
311). More important, Foucault believed, than the ques-
tions of “who am I?” and “what is the secret of my de-
sire?” would be to ask, “What relations, through homosexu-
ality, can be established, invented, multiplied, and modulated?” 
(Foucault 1996a, 308). It is important to note that, for 
Foucault, the possibly utopic potential of homosexuality 
would be available to anyone, gay or straight or whatever, 
who might experiment with new “affective intensities,” new 
friendships, and new modes of living that could “yield intense 




relations not resembling those that are institutionalized” (Fou-
cault 1996a, 310). 
 It was at this same time, and following from his ongo-
ing work on the history of sexuality (but with what can be 
described as a significant, and often overlooked, detour 
within that work),1 that Foucault became interested in re-
habilitating ascesis, and ascetics, as a practice of the care 
of the self: 
 
the work that one performs on oneself in order to 
transform oneself or make the self appear which, 
happily, one never attains. Can that be our prob-
lem today? We’ve rid ourselves of asceticism. Yet 
it’s up to us to advance into a homosexual ascesis 
that would make us work on ourselves and in-
vent—I do not say discover—a manner of being 
that is still improbable. (Foucault 1996a, 309–
310)2 
 
Foucault was at pains in many of his lectures to distin-
guish care of the self from knowledge of the self (i.e., the 
Delphic dictum: “know thyself”), partly because he did 
not believe in an ascetic praxis in which the ultimate aim 
was to “discover” and perhaps also regulate, surpass, and 
even renounce a self that was always already there (a pre-
occupation of later Christian culture, to be sure); rather, 
ascesis would name a set of practices or daily exercises (as 
in late classical Stoicism) aimed at what David Halperin 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 See, for example, Davidson (1994), Deleuze (1986), and Tuh-
kanen (2005/06). 
2 In 1981, when Foucault gave this interview, he had already 
embarked on a series of lectures that he would continue (until 
his untimely and tragic death in 1984) at the Collège de France, 
the University of Vermont, UC-Berkeley, New York University, 
and other sites on the hermeneutics of the subject, technologies 
of the self, care of the self, and freedom; see Martin at al. (1988), 
Foucault (1996b), Foucault (1999), Foucault (2001), and Fou-
cault (2005).  
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has described as a continual process of becoming-queer: 
“an identity without an essence, not a given condition but 
a horizon of possibility, an opportunity for self-trans-
formation, a queer potential” (Halperin 1995, 79). One 
never arrives at the self, but instead, continuously works 
upon processes of self-transformation. This is, important-
ly, an aesthetic project, an “art of living,” a “style of life,” a 
tekhnē aimed at producing a self-always-becoming as a 
“beautiful and good work” (Foucault 2005, 424). 
 This work upon the self that one “happily never at-
tains,” which is also a concern for and care of the self, has 
something to do with freedom as well—a term not often 
associated with Foucault’s thought, especially by those 
who oversimplify his entire ouevre as being only about 
the ways in which various structures and techniques of 
power produce knowledge and individuals, with appar-
ently no escape route out of the power-knowledge nexus. 
And yet much of Foucault’s late writings were precisely 
concerned with “the definition of practices of freedom” 
and ethics as “the conscious practice of freedom” (Fou-
cault 1996b, 433, 434)—with freedom here to be distin-
guished from the idea of liberation (the setting free of 
selves that have supposedly always been there and were 
simply repressed, in hiding, etc.). For Foucault, freedom 
was “the ontological condition of ethics” and ethics is 
“the form that freedom takes when it is informed by re-
flection” (Foucault 1996b, 435).3 And what this also means is 
that, for Foucault (as well as the late classical writers, such 
as Epictetus, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius, whom he was 
reading at the time), ethics is a practice (an ascetics, or set 
of exercises) of freedom that revolves around the funda-
mental imperative: “Take care of yourself.” One of the 
tragedies, I would argue, of social and cultural life in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 It is important to note here that, for Foucault, as for the an-
cient Greek writers he was studying, an ethos named modes of 
being and behavior—of living—as opposed to naming some sort 
of prescriptive morality. 
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present (and of gay life, more narrowly), is that we have 
never really taken up, collectively, Foucault’s call to work 
on ourselves in order to invent improbable manners of 
being, new modes and styles of living, polymorphous 
affective intensities, and new relational virtualities and 
friendships. Instead, as Joshua Glenn has written, 
 
[e]verything today encourages us to see the dark 
side, the folly, the impossibility, not just of utopia 
but of an anti-anti-utopian social order where we’d have 
a project in common besides selling our commodi-
fied labor, intellectual or otherwise. Everything en-
courages us to think we face a choice between de-
tached houses in a row, where we cook our din-
ners in private, or else the gulag. . . . Sure, the 
company of misfits would make you feel bad 
sometimes; but it also feels bad to have nothing to 
look forward to but marriage, work and TV. (Glenn 
2009) 
 
Some of us have devoted much of our lives to cultivating 
new relational modes and the company of misfits (an 
agonistic yet joyful venture, to be sure, in which we exult 
in the exquisite difficulties of becoming-with-others), but 
when I re-read Foucault’s 1981 interview, as I often do, I 
mourn that, as Adam Phillips has written, we have “not 
had the courage of [our] narcissism”—we have not found 
“a version of narcissism that is preservative at once of 
survival and pleasure,” which “would be to have the cour-
age of one’s wish for more life rather than less” (Phillips 
2008, 98). 
 
ACCURATE SCHOLARSHIP / CAN UNEARTH THE WHOLE OF-
FENCE / FROM LUTHER UNTIL NOW / THAT HAS DRIVEN A 
CULTURE MAD 
 
It can be argued that the entire oeuvre of Aranye Fraden-
burg has been concerned with this sort of courage for 
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“more life rather than less” (with all of its attendant risks, 
its sufferings as well as its joys), and with the sort of queer 
work that Foucault called for—this “techne” or disciplin-
ing of the self as a “beautiful and good work”—and more-
over, with this care of the self, and thus her work, “com-
posed of eros and dust,” has served as a sort of lighthouse 
for Auden’s “affirming flame.”4 This work (this career) 
culminates now in Staying Alive, a book that can be de-
scribed in précis as an elegant and erudite defense of the 
humanities (and more largely, of the public university, 
with all of its ruly and unruly knowledge disciplines) as 
the very site par excellence of the practices of the care of 
the self, and of other selves (for Fradenburg, as literary-
historical scholar and psychoanalyst, attends more than Fou-
cault ever did to the arts of intersubjectivity and therapeu-
tic care that contribute to a more general eudaimonia, or 
flourishing). This is to speak, as Fradenburg does here 
and elsewhere, of the university as reservoir and genera-
tor of styles of living and selves (and groups) as works of 
art and desiring-assemblages (ever contingent packs and 
multiplicities, always on the move, and creating “break-
flows out of which desire” continuously pours forth),5 
without which, our lives (intellectual and personal, and 
who can tell the difference sometimes?) would be vastly 
impoverished.  
 Indeed, there has been no voice within premodern studies 
more insistent on the subject of the ways in which disciplinarity, 
desire, enjoyment, work, groupification, and care of the self 
intersect in always risky (and even melancholy), yet neces-
sary and productive fashion, and with the ways in which 
aesthetics, signifying, intersubjectivity (intimate and ex-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 From W.H. Auden, “September 1, 1939”: “Defenseless under 
the night / Our world in stupor lies; / Yet, dotted everywhere, / 
Ironic points of light / Flash out wherever the Just /Exchange 
their messages: / May I, composed like them / Of Eros and of 
dust, / Beleaguered by the same / Negation and despair, / Show 
an affirming flame” (Auden 1979, 95–97).  
5 Deleuze and Guattari 1983, 37. 
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timate), and self- and world-building are importantly 
enmeshed. Fradenburg’s work has never been just about 
medieval studies, although it may appear as such to 
some—rather, it has always concerned itself with living 
and enduring, with creaturely attachments to meaning-
making as a form of thriving and flourishing, as well as 
with the ways in which institutional and disciplinary life 
(university life) are bound up with desires that are “unac-
countable” and “always on the move” (Fradenburg 2002b, 64), 
despite all of the attempts of the university’s managerial 
technocrats (and methodologically uptight scholars) to 
say otherwise. Fradenburg insists that we can never fully 
know ourselves (personally or institutionally), and there-
fore unknowing becomes (has to become) an important 
component of what we do in here. In this sense, Fraden-
burg’s entire body of work fleshes out what Geoffrey 
Bennington has claimed (by way of Derrida) is the prima-
ry work of the University—that it has “a responsibility to 
foster events of thought that cannot fail to unsettle the 
University in its Idea of itself” (Bennington 2010, 28; see 
also Derrida 2002). Indeed, the future (our personal fu-
tures, our group futures, our institutional futures) is not 
really possible without not knowing for sure, and as Fra-
denburg argues further, 
 
To be able to anticipate, plan, project a future or 
into a future, we have to not know for sure, be-
cause we have to suspend judgment even while ex-
ercising it, knowing that we don’t know (every-
thing). Ethics—and ultimately psychoanalysis—
emerges from a willing of this suspension, a para-
doxical knowing of non-knowing. (Fradenburg 
2009, 96; my emphasis) 
 
Fradenburg’s work is, pace Bennington, an “event of 
thought” that draws important attention to “the contin-
gency and changefulness of living” (Fradenburg 2011a,  
596), and outside of premodern studies, her thinking and 
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writing sits alongside the work of theorists such as Lauren 
Berlant whose work pays important attention to “the 
emotional time of being-with, time where it is possible to 
value floundering around with others whose attention-
paying to what’s happening is generous and makes live-
ness possible as a good, not a threat” (Berlant 2011, 85–
86).6  
 Refusing to jettison loose and fuzzy pleasures in favor 
of a supposedly austerely rigorous disciplinarity (where 
one opts for supposedly objective truths over subjective, 
or increasingly, intersubjective feelings and pleasures) and vice 
versa, Fradenburg has insisted in her work, over and over 
again, that enjoyment and disciplinarity have a critical 
relationship, one that we who are situated within the uni-
versity decouple at our peril. As she wrote in her book 
Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer, 
 
Discipline does not teach us the identity of pleas-
ure with the good; rather, it drags desire out into 
the open, pours gasoline on it, and sets it on fire, 
which is why it so easily becomes desire’s object as 
well as its means. (Fradenburg 2002b, 7) 
 
For Fradenburg, the “passional and technical coincide in 
the register of our jouissance,” and most importantly, dis-
cipline “enhances jouissance; it multiples and extends its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 I would note here, too, as an aside, that Fradenburg’s more 
recent focus on the ways in which scientific method and the 
humanistic arts of interpretation, as she writes in this volume, 
“actually enhance one another (in practical as well as theoretical 
ways),” admirably takes up Abraham Maslow’s call in the 1960s 
for “rehumanizing (and trans-humanizing) science” and for 
biology to “shake itself loose from a pure physical-chemical re-
ductiveness” (Maslow 1966, ii). Indeed, what Staying Alive 
demonstrates is that, more recently, the sciences themselves, 
such as neuroscience, are “now establishing, however (at times) 
unintentionally, the importance of artistic and humanist train-
ing to mental functioning.” 
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possibilities, its potential for the remaking of identities” 
(Fradenburg 2002b, 252, 7).7 Put another way, desire and 
the sorts of passions and compulsions that lead to certain 
intensely ecstatic experiences are integral to the work of 
the academy, which often does not admit the importance 
of (disorganized) subjective life to its “proper objects” of 
study. I use the term “disorganized” here purposefully, 
and have lifted it from Lauren Berlant’s essay “Starved” 
(cited above), where Berlant writes that what we are 
“starved” for right now (in social life) is not necessarily 
sex or romantic intimacy, but something like sex, or like 
affect—in short, “the collaborative risk of a shared disor-
ganization” (Berlant 2011, 86). We might reflect, too, that 
the university is one important form of social life—it is 
not just a place where we study, think, and develop 
knowledge apart from our “real lives.” The university is a 
form of life, a habitus, and we live (and desire and ago-
nize) there with others. As Donna Beth Ellard writes in 
this volume, the university can sometimes “feel as inac-
cessible as a luxury estate in Montecito,” yet Fradenburg’s 
work here in this volume “offers theory and praxis for 
staying alive, personally and professionally, by encourag-
ing living practices that double as reading practices.” 
 Within the setting of the university, with its disciplines that 
often jostle against and compete with each other for ever-
dwindling resources, and within specific disciplines them-
selves, where different groups of scholars often square off 
against each other over methodological and other divides, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 In Sacrifice Your Love, Fradenburg defines jouissance (an al-
most unbearable intensity that is also a transgressive excess of 
pleasure) this way: “Jouissance is the point at which pleasure and 
pain crisscross, when there are no more objects, and the only 
thing left for desire to desire is the unknowable beyond of insen-
tience. With the loss of its objects, the I also loses its self-
presence—or, at least, the vulnerability of its self-presence be-
comes felt experience. Pleasure protects us from jouissance by 
delivering as much jouissance as the I can bear and still be there 
to bear it” (Fradenburg 2002b, 18). 
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Fradenburg’s thinking becomes vitally important for see-
ing how 
 
[g]roup desire makes what we call knowledge. There is 
no other kind of knowledge than this; this is what 
knowledge is and we make it. It is neither illusory 
nor objective; it is an artifact, carefully crafted, 
tested, debated, within groups, between groups, 
over time, and across cultures. (Fradenburg 2002b, 
10; her emphasis) 
 
Because of the ways in which Fradenburg has always in-
sisted on the productive (if also agonistic) enmeshment of 
desire and discipline, I catch in her writings an echo with 
Jonathan Lear’s argument, in “Eros and Unknowing” (a 
beautiful reading of Plato’s Symposium), that we should 
not, in our intellectual life, “leave the human realm be-
hind,” but should  
 
get deeper into it—its smells, feels, textures, and 
the imaginary feelings we give to them. Whatever 
‘higher’ or ‘deeper’ meanings there may be, they 
do not transcend human life, but lie immanent in 
it. The body, its drives, and the bodily expression 
of mind all lend vitality to ‘higher’ mental func-
tions and to social life. It is to this particular sub-
jectivity with which we are pregnant; and it is from 
this that we give birth in beauty. (Lear 1998, 166) 
  
As Fradenburg herself has more recently argued, “The 
embodied, and therefore affective, nature of cognition is 
not a figment of the psychoanalytic imagination, but is 
asserted everywhere in contemporary neuroscience.” As 
to beauty, and its importance, “[a]esthetic form is a spell-
binding (or not) attempt to transmit and circulate affect, 
without which not much happens at all” (Fradenburg 
2010, 66). Further, aesthetic experience “is grounded in, 
indeed is the ground of, ‘attachment,’ and we do not be-
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come ‘human’ without it” (Fradenburg 2010, 67). 
 In addition to demonstrating, throughout her work, 
the ways in which knowledge is shaped by the continual 
(and risky) dance between enjoyment (affect, feeling, and 
drive) and discipline (the rigors and constraints of study 
and work), especially with relation to the work of the sig-
nifier and signification (the primary matter of the hu-
manities, but also of the biological sciences),8 Fraden-
burg’s work has also everywhere affirmed (perhaps in a 
lighter mood) the importance of play, over necessity, as 
the mother of invention (see, for example, Fradenburg 
2011a, 597), where “[p]lay is about signifying and there-
fore about becoming,” and becoming “in turn is about 
process, in particular about processes of transformation 
of states of mind and body” (Fradenburg 2011b, 57). Fur-
ther,  
 
Interpretation and relationality depend on one 
another because all relationships are unending processes 
of interpretation and expression, listening and signi-
fying.  In turn, sentience assists relationality: we can’t 
thrive and probably can’t survive without minds open 
to possibility, capable of sensing and interpreting 
the tiniest shifts in, e.g., pitch and tone. (Fraden-
burg 2011a, 602) 
 
Ultimately, “[p]lasticity, stylistics, enrichment are not 
embellishments of living process but are inherent in it” 
(Fradenburg 2011b, 45), and thus the humanities play an 
important role in helping us to develop certain arts of 
living and aliveness that not only allow us to want more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 As Fradenburg puts it in Sacrifice Your Love, “our jouissance 
extends itself by means of the signifier’s power to (re)distribute 
life and death” (Fradenburg 2002b, 63). And in “Living Chau-
cer” she reminds us that, “scientific signifiers have the same 
wayward intersubjective, intertextual, intergenerational lives as 
do ‘literary’ signifiers” (Fradenburg 2011b, 47). 
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rather than less life, but also help us to develop a reper-
toire for what Sara Ahmed has called “the politics of the 
hap,” which is “about opening up possibilities for being in 
other ways, of being perhaps,” and about working “toward 
a world in which things can happen in alternative ways” 
(Ahmed 2010, 222; my emphasis). This is a critically im-
portant project in an era where neoliberal capital turns 
our dreams and other forms of resistance into commodi-
ties in the space of a nanosecond, and where our every 
move is surveyed, digitized, and sold as data to whoever 
wants to purchase the information necessary to plot our 
moves in advance of our arrival at desires we no longer 
own. Should the university not be, on some level, a haven 
for resistance to such techno-capture of every aspect of 
our lives? Will success (and happiness) only be measured 
by the dollars we pile up and the gadgets for distraction 
we accumulate, or shall we wish, rather, for a laboratory-
imaginarium in which one’s life (and all of knowledge) 
undergoes processes of invention and re-invention (with-
out end) in the company of like-minded seekers who val-
ue surprise and unsettlement over certain answers? Such 
is one image, for me, of an ideal university, and while few 
would argue that the university today is not broken in 
some sense (it is not ideal, in other words, in Fraden-
burg’s or anyone else’s terms), as Michael Snediker writes 
in this volume, Fradenburg’s emphasis on “our swerving 
attention to the fuzzy world we’re making takes some 
sting out of this being the case.” 
 It is important to note here as well that, for Fraden-
burg, the university—and the humanities, more particu-
larly—is a shared, intersubjective project, and the signifier 
(for example, poetry) has played no little part in a form of 
sociability (and even companionability) that is critical for 
self-transformation and progressive social change: “sym-
bols enable living process” and what “enables us to risk 
change is the feeling that we are understood and (there-
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fore) accompanied” (Fradenburg 2011b, 45, 60).9 As Fra-
denburg has argued in many places, play and shared at-
tention are so important to so many species, including 
humans, that they may even be an end in themselves, and 
this is something the humanities and sciences have in 
common that they do not always readily acknowledge or 
see. As Ruth Evans explains about Fradenburg’s method 
in this volume, “[i]t’s not a choice between a scientific 
explanation on the one hand and a semiotic one on the 
other; we need both.” We might call this sort of play and 
shared ludic attention learning, or the university: the end-
less (playful, but also at times, sorrowful) processes we 
must commit ourselves to, with their open-ended and 
poetic and rowdy mutliplicity of perspectives, and their 
cultivation of the non-utilitarian arts of life, which may 
have more to do with personal and social well-being than 
we have previously imagined. Or, as Daniel Remein 
writes in this volume, “Many artifacts indeed do repre-
sent, or mimic, or encode—but some ornaments just dec-
orate, an appointment for which they are no less needful 
in the physical wonder of sentience.” For these, and many 
other reasons, Fradenburg’s work has long hailed us to a 
cross-temporal pedagogical-artistic project that asks us, 
not just to innovate our scholarship accordingly, but to 
reclaim the humanities itself as the site of desire and 
knowledge, of care and attachment, of new relational 
modes, and thus, of love itself. Put another way, her work 
creates a space similar to the meeting-places of the cities 
of ancient philosophy, such as the banquet hall in Plato’s 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 It should be noted here as well that the longest possible histori-
cal perspectives upon processes of signification (such as those 
crafted by Fradenburg in her work as a premodernist) are criti-
cal, for as she has also written, “Signifiers are remarkably muta-
ble, but they can also be very persistent—and persistent does not 
mean timeless. Signifiers enable repetitions, revivals, and resur-
gences; they mark the spot where things have gone missing, 
hence where we begin to look for them (again)” (Fradenburg 
2009, 89). 
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Symposium, which “are the sites of a metaphysical socia-
bility sympathetic to the beneficent madness of love” 
(Bersani 2008, 81). 
 
DEFENCELESS UNDER THE NIGHT / OUR WORLD IN STUPOR 
LIES; / YET, DOTTED EVERYWHERE, / IRONIC POINTS OF 
LIGHT FLASH OUT 
 
The three terms most richly productive (and ubiquitous) 
in Fradenburg’s work of the past fifteen or so years—even 
as she has moved from a focus on literary narrative and 
poetics (especially Chaucer) and on “discontinuist” histo-
ries (national, courtly, aesthetic, sexual, queer, psycho-
analytic, and so on) to what I would call a more public 
intellectual mode of writing about the arts more broadly, 
under the aegis of various neuro-cognitive, biological, 
anthropological, and psychoanaytic discourses and prac-
tices10—are probably (and as elaborated above) desire, 
discipline, and jouissance (with various associated terms 
never far behind, such as love, enjoyment, wonder, beau-
ty, excess, sublimity, feeling, sentience, affect, violence, 
pain, anxiety, loss, separation, suffering, trauma, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Although it has to be noted here that Fradenburg’s longstand-
ing romance and companionship with Chaucer never ends, and 
as she wrote in her recent essay “Beauty and Boredom in the 
Legend of Good Women,” much of her work has been concerned 
with seeing more clearly the tragic side of Chaucer’s work, while 
also attending to its therapeutic comedy (Fradenburg 2010, 74; 
see also Fradenburg 1999). This resonates with Fradenburg’s 
own writings which, although resolutely insistent on the neces-
sity of enjoyment, feeling, pleasure, and aliveness (on, frankly, 
refusing to let go of our desires or to have them “disciplined” 
away by various Others, to stop moving—which is to say, to stop 
living), are also everywhere suffused with the notice and marks 
of melancholic longing, “angsting,” the various endangerments 
of vulnerability, and the spectres of loss, mourning, and death. 
Her work thus possesses a dark and complex beauty that (thank-
fully) does not lend itself to easy calculations. See, especially, in 
this vein, Fradenburg (2009). 
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death, among others), which in turn are always related to 
“techniques of living” (Fradenburg 2002b, 4, 9). In es-
sence, no matter which text of hers we might be reading, 
Fradenburg seems to be always talking about something 
she says more explicitly in “Group Time: Catastrophe, 
Periodicity, Survival,” where she wrote that “enjoyment is 
the matrix of knowledge, and knowledge is not dimin-
ished thereby.” Further, “Interpretation and explanation 
are activities central to libidinal structuration and vice 
versa. . . . We thereby reclaim our technical work [the 
humanities, for example] as the work of desire, and desire 
as that which makes the world” (Fradenburg 2002a, 
232).11  
 There is probably no better introduction than the 
lines cited above to the current work you are now holding 
in your hands (or viewing on a retina or liquid display 
screen), which joins a growing body of work on the 
state(s) of the University, best described as critical self-
reflections and public intellectual polemics on the state(s) 
of higher education by those who know it very well from 
firsthand experience, either as tenured professors, college 
administrators, adjunct instructors, or graduate students 
and members of the ever-growing academic precariat12 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 In this respect, I see real affinities and important (heretofore 
un-noted) linkages between Fradenburg’s thinking and that of 
Jane Bennett in her book The Enchantment of Modern Life 
(2001), especially with regard to Bennett’s argument in that 
work that the will to social justice is “sustained by periodic 
bouts of being enamored with existence.” Further, “[a]ffective 
fascination with a world thought to be worthy of it may help to 
ward off the existential resentment that plagues mortals, that is, 
the sense of victimization that recurrently descends upon the 
tragic (or absurd or incomplete) beings called human.” Ulti-
mately, for Bennett, “one of the tasks proper to ethics is to en-
joy the world” (Bennett 2001, 12, 13). 
12 Aaron Bady springs most notably to mind in this latter cate-
gory—see his collected writings at his zunguzungu blog at The 
New Inquiry: http://thenewinquiry.com/blogs/zunguzungu/—although it 
xvi JOY: HANDS OFF OUR JOUISSANCE 
	  
(occasionally critiques of the university also come from 
think tanks and policy institutes, mainstream journalism, 
cultural criticism, and the like). These reflections can be 
narrow-mindedly conservative—Allan Bloom’s The Closing of the 
American Mind (1987) and Dinesh D’Souza’s Illiberal Ed-
ucation (1991) spring to mind, as does David Horwitz’s 
The Professors: The 101 Most Dangerous Academics in 
America (2006)—or they can be more progressively liber-
al, such as Marc Bousquet’s How the University Works 
(2008), which addresses labor inequities in higher educa-
tion; Derek Bok’s Universities in the Marketplace (2003), 
which outlines the commercialization of the university 
and its disciplines; Christopher Newfield’s Unmaking the 
Public University (2011), which shows how unequal ac-
cess to higher education for Americans is a result of con-
servative campaigns to thwart the university’s democra-
tizing functions; and Benjamin Ginsberg’s The Fall of the 
Faculty (2011), which demonstrates the detriments to 
higher education that have been caused by the rise of “all-
administrative” universities, just to name some of the 
more notable examples of the past ten or so years.13  
 The most compelling and philosophically provocative 
work in this vein up until now, for me, has been Bill 
Readings’ The University in Ruins (published two years 
after Readings’ untimely death in 1994), partly because it 
offers a vision of a university-to-come (or an always un-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should be noted that in the past five or so years there has been a 
veritable explosion of weblogs authored by graduate students and post-
grads, contingent faculty, and members of the academic precariat 
that are focused on what might be called the ills and travails of 
higher education and the increasing lack of equitable access to 
the university, whether as student or faculty member. 
13 And in the vein of horrifically depressing accounts of the dis-
mantling of public higher education, by way of the UK system, 
especially in terms of access, quality of instruction, and research 
funding, see McGettigan (2013), and for the implications of 
what is happening in the UK for US system, see Newfield’s 
(2013) review of McGettigan’s book. 
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realized-yet-possible institution) that I feel I can believe 
in and work on behalf of, and with which Fradenburg’s 
current work has no little solidarity. In his book, Read-
ings argued that, partly due to certain processes of trans-
national globalization, whereby “the rule of the cash nex-
us” has replaced “the notion of national identity as a de-
terminant in all aspects of social life,” the University (cap-
italized to indicate its historical status as an idealized institu-
tion) has become a “transnational bureaucratic corporation” 
and “the centrality of the traditional humanistic disci-
plines to the life of the University is no longer assured” 
(Readings 1996, 3). Because “the grand narrative of the 
University, centered on the production of a liberal, rea-
soning subject, is no longer available to us,” it is “no long-
er the case that we can conceive the University within the 
historical horizon of its self-realization” (Readings 1996, 
9, 5). Readings prefers the term “post-historical” over 
“postmodern” for the contemporary University, “in order 
to insist on the sense that the institution has outlived it-
self, is now a survivor of the era in which it defined itself 
in terms of the project of the historical development, af-
firmation, and inculcation of national culture” (Readings 
1996, 6; his emphasis). Ultimately, the University is “a 
ruined institution, one that lost its historical raison 
d'etre,” but which nevertheless “opens up a space in which 
it is possible to think the notion of community otherwise, 
without recourse to notions of unity, consensus, and 
communication” (Readings 1996, 19, 20; his emphasis). 
This is a space, moreover, where the University “becomes 
one site among others where the question of being-
together is raised, raised with an urgency that proceeds 
from the absence of the institutional forms (such as the 
nation-state), which have historically served to mask that 
question” (Readings 1996, 20). 
 Indeed, the University, however “ruined,” must strive, 
in Readings’ view, toward building a “community that is 
not made up of subjects but singularities”: this communi-
ty would not be “organic in that its members do not share 
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an immanent identity to be revealed,” and it would not be 
“directed toward the production of a universal subject of 
history, to the cultural realization of an essential human 
nature” (Readings 1996, 185). Rather, this would be a 
community “of dissensus that presupposes nothing in com-
mon,” and that “would seek to make its heteronomy, its 
differences, more complex” (Readings 1996, 190). In this 
scenario, the post-historical University would be “where 
thought takes place beside thought, where thinking is a 
shared process without identity or unity”—this is ulti-
mately “a dissensual process; it belongs to dialogism ra-
ther than to dialogue,” and instead of a new interdiscipli-
nary space that would reunify the increasingly frag-
mented disciplines, there would be a “shifting disciplinary 
structure that holds open the question of whether and 
how thoughts fit together” (Readings 1996, 192). 
 Readings’ thinking accords well with Derrida’s in his 
essay “The University Without Condition,” where Derri-
da argued for a “new humanities” and “unconditional 
university” that would “remain an ultimate place of criti-
cal resistance—and more than critical—to all the powers 
of dogmatic and unjust appropriation” (Derrida 2002, 
204). This unconditional university, further, would pro-
vide harbor for “the principal right to say everything, 
even if it be under the heading of fiction and the experi-
mentation of knowledge, and the right to say it publicly, 
to publish it” (Derrida 2002, 205). The humanities would 
have a privileged place in this unconditional university, 
because the very principle of unconditionality “has an 
originary and privileged place of presentation, of manifes-
tation, of safekeeping in the Humanities. It has there its 
space of discussion and reelaboration as well” (Derrida 
2002, 207). 
 Although Readings’ argument in The University in 
Ruins has been subject to carefully considered counter-
critique,14 it remains today, I would argue, a powerful 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 See, for example, LaCapra (1998), where he argues that the 
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spur to thought and action for those of us working within 
or on behalf of the public university who are concerned 
with the future of humanistic teaching and scholarship, 
and with the increasing numbers of persons who are be-
ing treated as the “bare life” of the academy—our non-
tenure-track instructors, for example, but also our stu-
dents. These are also the lives for which we must “take 
care.” While Readings gave us a highly trenchant critique 
of the ways in which the American university has become 
a transnational bureaucratic-managerial corporation, thus dis-
rupting and weakening the role of traditional humanistic dis-
ciplines (and we might pause to consider how prescient 
he was), more importantly, he also suggested ways in 
which this situation might (perversely? positively?) open 
new (heterotopic and post-historical) spaces “in which it 
is possible to think the notion of community otherwise”: 
this community would not be “organic in that its mem-
bers do not share an immanent identity to be revealed,” 
and it would not be “directed toward the production of a 
universal subject of history, to the cultural realization of 
an essential human nature” (Readings 1996, 185). One 
might argue (and I will) that Readings’ ultimate hope for 
the University as a space in which the question of “being-
together” and disciplinarity itself would be permanently en-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
contemporary American academy is not as much a “transna-
tional bureaucratic corporation” as it “is based on a systematic, 
schizoid division between a market model and a model of cor-
porate solidarity and collegial responsibility” (LaCapra 1998, 
32). Further, LaCapra argues that Readings’ insistence on the 
fact that “the older ideals of culture, Bildung, the liberal subject-
citizen, and the nation-state are no longer relevant” in the con-
temporary academy belies the fact, in LaCapra’s view, that these 
things were always phantasms or idealizations, “made to cover a 
much more complex and changing constellation of forces that 
varied with nation, region, and group” (LaCapra 1998, 38, 39). 
LaCapra also wonders, “with respect to the present,” if “culture, 
ideology, and the nation-state are as evacuated or obsolete as Readings 
believes” (39). See also Royle (1999) and LaCapra (1999). 
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tangled and left purposefully open and unsettled, and where we 
would work to make our heteronomic differences more 
complex, has never really been put into serious practice. 
It would be too open-ended, of course, too experimental, 
risky, and perhaps, non-practical (and really messy in 
terms of administration), and yet, nothing strikes me as 
so necessary. Happily, Fradenburg’s new work takes up 
the mantle of Readings’ hope and extends it with im-
portant new research and reflection on the importance of 
the humanities’ role in the arts of intersubjectivity so crit-
ical for making anything happen at all, and for a vision of 
the university as a shared (if dissensual) enterprise. 
 A lot has happened since Readings’ book was pub-
lished—his critique certainly appears dead-accurate and 
the “ruinous” situation he sketched, especially in terms of 
the university’s corporate-managerial structure and the 
concomitant assaults on the humanities, has intensified. 
And since the financial crises of 2008 onward, the idea 
(long-valued) that the university should be an important 
public (and publicly-funded) concern, especially for its 
vital role in securing various forms of social egalitarian-
ism and a broad-based meritocracy for the greatest num-
bers of persons possible (not to mention, in order to en-
hance cognitive and technical innovations of all varieties, 
for the pure advancement of knowledge and practices of 
making, regardless of cost-based outcomes), no longer 
appears to be either viable or what might be termed a 
common concern. All across the country, states are slash-
ing university budgets and expecting institutions of high-
er education to figure out more and more ways to pay for 
themselves, and to be “profitable,” whatever that might 
mean—MOOCs, or Massive Open Online Courses, are 
one prominent and lamentable outcome of this type of 
thinking (see, for example, Bady 2013a). This may be an 
oversimplification (because I can't do justice in this Prel-
ude to all of the myriad examples in Fradenburg’s book, 
which itself supplies plenty), but let’s just say that the 
foregoing state of affairs has led to all sorts of jockeying 
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within the university today to both winnow down and/or 
eliminate disciplines that appear non-utilitarian or to 
dress up traditionally philosophical disciplines (such as 
literary studies) in more utilitarian and applications-
based clothing. In addition, protocols of oversight and 
accountability have intensified to the point of leaving 
faculty little time and room to actually do the work they 
were hired to do: teach and research and mentor, and 
direct and innovate their own curricula and disciplinary 
collaborations. Most harmful of all, and in direct propor-
tion to the budget-slashing maneuvers of state legislatures 
(and the dearth of progressive federal amelioration of 
such), tuition and student debt levels are at unsustainably 
crippling levels, and the ranks of tenure-track faculty 
have shrunk to something around thirty percent of all 
teaching positions (see, for example, June 2012 and Edi-
tors 2012). 
 The university system in the state of California, where 
Fradenburg works as a professor of English, clinical psy-
choanalyst, and educational activist, has represented an 
important battleground in this current situation, partly 
because the state’s economic woes have been so severe 
since 2008 (and more importantly, because of Governor 
Jerry Brown’s and former UC President Mark Yudof's 
dismantling of the UC Master Plan, whereby all eligible 
California citizens had been entitled to a place within the 
University of California, regardless of means),15 but also because 
the state has long been internationally admired for its 
public research institutions (their quality and also their 
broad access) and also has a long and enduring history of 
faculty and student activism on behalf of the notion of a 
free, open, democratic, and public university.16 Fraden-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See “Brown and Yudof Bail on the Master Plan,” KeepCalifor-
niasPromise.org, July 1, 2012: http://keepcaliforniaspromise.org 
/2628/brown-and-yudof-bail-on-the-master-plan. 
16 See, for recent examples, Bady (2013b), Michael Meranze and 
Christopher Newfield’s blog Remaking the University (http:// 
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burg herself has long been an outspoken activist on behalf 
of the public humanities (and against administrative mal-
feasance in all of its guises), but she has been extremely 
busy since 2008 helping to organize and lead critical and 
activist interventions within the UC system: she founded 
the group ‘Saving UCSB’ and organized a faculty walkout 
at UC-Santa Barbara in 2009, and among many other 
activities too numerous to mention here, she is a tireless 
letter writer and public speaker on behalf of academic 
freedom, the value of the humanities, and the importance 
of open access to public higher education.  
 Thus we are fortunate that Fradenburg has decided to 
devote an entire monograph, Staying Alive, to an insight-
ful and laser-like diagnosis of the various neoliberal and 
technocratic forces currently assailing and undermining 
the public university, and to a fierce polemic on behalf of 
the humanities as the critical site for fostering forms of 
artfulness critical to the future of the keeping open of the 
question of our “being-together,” both within the institu-
tion and outside of it. And she has generously decided to 
publish it with an open-access and para-academic press 
(punctum books), because she agrees (thankfully) that 
work within the humanities, and especially public intel-
lectual work, needs to have the widest purchase possible 
upon the public commons and should not be kept locked 
behind corporatized and other paywalls. And in the spirit 
of collaboration that we at punctum and the BABEL 
Working Group certainly hold dear, she has crafted the 
book to include companion “fugue” essays by myself (this 
Prelude), Donna Beth Ellard, Ruth Evans, Julie Orleman-
ski, Daniel C. Remein, and Michael D. Snediker, so that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
utotherescue.blogspot.com/), Robert Samuels’s blog Changing 
Universities (http://changinguniversities.blogspot.com/), and California 
Scholars for Academic Freedom (http://cascholars4academicfreedom. 
wordpress.com/), just to cite a few examples of UC’s robust 
student and faculty advocacy and activism on behalf of the pub-
lic university. 
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the book is part-scholarly monograph, part-poetic-activist 
desiring-assemblage. The four chapters by Fradenburg can be 
read as a complete book (or “monograph”), and they can 
be read individually as stand-alone, broadsheet-style po-
lemics. Each “fugue” chapter can be read in tandem with 
the chapter by Fradenburg to which it responds—a work 
in “two voices,” as it were—or as a “flight” that “chases” 
after Fradenburg’s thought, or as a well-lit “connecting 
passage” between the small yet expansive “rooms” (the 
“stanzas”) of her writing (all associated meanings of 
“fugue,” in music and beyond). Similar to what Deleuze 
and Guattari said about their work together, “Since each 
of us was several, there was already quite a crowd. . . . We 
have been aided, inspired, multiplied” (Deleuze and 
Guattari 1987, 3, 4). Again, this book is “an assemblage. 
It has nothing to do with ideology. There is no ideology 
and never has been” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 5). 
Rather, this is a (loving) labor of becoming-world. 
 Ultimately, and as outlined in detail above, Staying 
Alive—as a labor of public intellectual advocacy for the 
humanities, and the public university more largely—does 
not represent a departure for Fradenburg’s oeuvre, for 
she has always been concerned with defining and valuing 
the work (and importantly, the jouissance) of the liberal 
arts against the “order[s] of utility.” To briefly revisit her 
book Sacrifice Your Love, in the Epilogue to that work, 
Fradenburg discussed the importance of resisting, from 
within the humanities, the “utilitarian rhetorics that sus-
tain the jouissance of capitalism,” and she urged us to take 
up 
the question of the jouissance of the academy, ra-
ther than assuming it is our task to discipline joui-
ssance out of the academy. For one thing, we can-
not discipline jouissance out of the academy, be-
cause discipline is always permeated with enjoy-
ment. So why give ground on our enjoyment? (Fraden-
burg 2002b, 247) 
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Why, indeed? In fact, in her more recent forays into cog-
nitive studies, animal behavioral research, neuroscience, 
evolutionary biology, biosemiotics, and the like (all of 
which disciplines inform the arguments of this book, 
along with psychoanalysis and literary-historical analysis, 
and cultural critique), Fradenburg has amassed an in-
credible body of scientific and other evidence for why we 
should not only not “give ground” on this enjoyment 
(with all of its positive and negative implications—i.e., 
enjoyment is a messy affair but no less necessary for life 
as a result), but also for the ways in which living itself is 
an art and the humanities provide the deepest reservoir of 
the non-utilitarian, excessive, ornamental artfulness so 
necessary, not just for surviving, but for thriving in this 
world. Contrary to recent polemics that simply urge the 
humanities to become more scientistic or technology-
focused, to demonstrate their utility or even trophy their 
uselessness, Staying Alive does something remarkably dif-
ferent: it argues for the humanism of a new scientific par-
adigm based on complexity theory and holistic and eco-
logical approaches to knowledge-making. It urges us to 
take the further step of realizing not only that we can 
promote and enhance neuroplastic connectivity and so-
cial-emotional cognition, but also that the humanities 
have always already been doing so. In this sense, Fraden-
burg’s work and thought exemplifies what Michael O’Rourke 
has called a queerly “roguish relationality” that is open to 
“an infinite series of [disciplinary] encounters,” which is 
also an opening to futurity (O’Rourke 2006, 36). 
 As Fradenburg writes in this volume, “Nature always 
exceeds itself in its expressivity”—which is to say artful-
ness is necessary for adaptation and innovation, for forg-
ing rich and varied relationships with other minds, bodies 
and things, and thus, again, for thriving—whether in the 
boardroom or the art gallery, the biology lab or the re-
cording studio, the alley or the playground, the book or 
the dream. Bringing together psychoanalysis, science, aes-
thetics, and premodern literature (from Virgil to Cha-
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ucer to Shakespeare), Fradenburg offers a bracing polem-
ic against the technocrats of higher education and a vi-
brant new vision for the humanities as both living art and 
new life science. For me, especially, the book matters so 
profoundly, because—even if not overtly—it takes up and 
further exemplifies the necessity of Bill Readings’ vision 
of the university as a critical site for play, for non-util-
itarian experimentation, for keeping knowledge unset-
tled, where, in Readings’ words (again), “thinking is a 
shared process without identity or unity.” And it further 
exemplifies the case for the critical value of the type(s) of 
intersubjectivity crafted through artful processes of signi-
fication that I really believe are the only route out of the 
greed, selfishness, fear of the Other, and violence that 
currently grips our world. And thus Fradenburg’s work 
also shares with Leo Bersani a deep and abiding invest-
ment in the question of whether the work of art might be 
able to “deploy signs of the subject in the world that are 
not signs of interpretation or of an object-destroying joui-
ssance, signs of . . . correspondences of forms within a 
universal solidarity of being” (Bersani 2010, 142). 
 What this book also demonstrates—along with the 
important body of work known as “university studies” 
that this book now joins—is that those of us who work 
within the humanities must commit some of our most 
valuable resources (primarily, our always-encroached-upon 
time, and some part of our inner emotional lives) to academic 
activism, whether through letter writing, blog polemics, 
organized protests and strikes, collectivist agitation and 
intervention, mutual aid initiatives, and books such as 
these. We cannot just bide our time within the university, 
hoping things will get better, or even assuming they will 
(“all storms pass” is what many people seem to believe). 
The powers-that-be always want you to be patient and 
wait for things they never intend to give you (Martin Lu-
ther King Jr.’s “Letter From Birmingham Jail” never ceas-
es to be instructive on this point). As long as we have 
shelter of any kind, and are willing to make room in that 
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shelter for those more vulnerable than we are, there is no 
reason to wait. Do we want to know what kind of univer-
sity we want? Let us simply enunciate our institutional 
and disciplinary desires, as this book does, and in make-
shift shelters. We are in Lear’s company now, and we 
have to seize hold of the university—as an institution, but 
also as a public trust—as our concern, and we must be 
willing to fight for that concern. As Julie Orlemanski 
writes in her contribution to this volume, 
 
Academic-activist writings not only deliver dis-
patches from the numerous battlegrounds of high-
er education. They also call upon those who care 
to read them—those who might defend the insti-
tutional homes of speculation, imagination, and 
historical understanding. These writings are the 
communiques that circulate within the “army of 
lovers” and also pass beyond them, to unpresup-
posed outposts and new readers. . . . mobilizing re-
flections about learning in the present. 
 
THE SPACE IN WHICH WE LIVE, WHICH DRAWS US OUT OF 
OURSELVES, IN WHICH THE EROSION OF OUR LIVES, OUR 
TIME AND OUR HISTORY OCCURS, THE SPACE THAT CLAWS 
AND GNAWS AT US . . . A HETEROGENEOUS SPACE 
 
In some sense, this book constructs what Hakim Bey 
called a “temporary autonomous zone”: a site where some 
of us might gather (as authors and readers, friends and 
strangers, teachers and students, lovers and fighters) to 
practice our work as rogue agents in search of new means 
for the development of a certain institutional amour fou 
and “clockless nowever,” a “politics of dream, urgent as 
the blueness of the sky” (Bey 1985). The fact of the matter 
is—whether we inhabit student desks, tenure lines, ad-
junct positions, or post-/never-graduate, somewhere-other-
than-here positions—now might be the time to take a bit 
more seriously the development of new and alternative 
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spaces (both within and without the university) for learn-
ing, for inquiry, and for knowledge-culture production. It 
turns out (and didn't we already know this?) that the fu-
ture actually has to be constructed, and let’s remind our-
selves that this is the work of the present, and we need to 
enlarge our scope of collaboration beyond our specific 
institutions (if we have institutional homes), beyond our 
disciplines, beyond our so-called position and rank (fac-
ulty vs. adjunct, professor vs. student, etc.), and beyond 
the University proper. The real University should com-
prise everyone who wants to be a part of it, whether or 
not they have an official position or desk. And it will be in 
this work—the present-ing of the future, the future-ing of 
the present—that we will manifest ourselves. For this vol-
ume of Fradenburg’s is also a collective manifesto, and it 
is to manifesting ourselves (making ourselves more pre-
sent to each other, which is to also say, more responsible 
to each other) in some sort of collective endeavor that 
works on behalf of the future without laying any posses-
sive claims upon it, that we might craft new spaces for the 
University-at-large, which is also a University that wan-
ders, that is never just somewhere, dwelling in the parti-
tive—of a particular place—but rather, seeks to be every-
where, always on the move, pandemic, uncontainable, 
and yes, precarious, always at risk, while always being 
present/between us (manifest). At the same time, we insist 
on perversely-hopefully laying claim to specific institu-
tions and subject areas—the University of California, or 
premodern studies, for example—as collocations of ob-
jects and trajectories of thought that we desire to hold 
close to us, while also placing them in certain perpetual 
tensions with everything else (even ourselves).  
 Manifestos can be hackneyed, and even dangerous, 
especially when they assume a ground-clearing maneuver 
(i.e., whatever exists now must be destroyed to make way 
for the new), but I think we increasingly need them, be-
cause they help us to outline our commitments and de-
sires in a writerly action that presences those commit-
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ments and desires. That is Step 1. Step 2 would be doing 
something about it, and here again Fradenburg’s career, 
as scholar, public intellectual, and activist, is exemplary. 
In the manifesto (albeit, the manifesto that does not de-
sire the violence of erasing the past or the Other), we ex-
press in an always-fleeting yet still phenomenologically 
palpable present a radical form of desire that seeks an 
alteration of the status quo, and while the manifesto often 
looks silly and hyperbolic and always unaware of the de-
mise of its (vain?) hopes in the future (the retrospective-
melancholic view), there is something sincere about it. It 
presents a radical opening to (or window upon) the risk 
of a fragile yet necessary honesty. We could do worse 
than to be honest with each other. We could do worse 
than to actually want things that we haven’t been told in 
advance to want. This is also a matter of contributing to 
the political imaginary that some believe is withering 
away (see, for example, Srnicek and Williams 2013 and 
Wark 2013). This volume is an important contribution, I 
want to argue, to the political imaginary. 
 
*  *  * 
 
Is it possible that “heterotopia” might be one term (or 
route) by which to rethink the space of the university as 
both “closed” and productively “open” to alternative knowledge 
practices, inventive lives, and new relational modes that 
would allow us to take care—of ourselves, of others, and 
of this fragile institution we call a university, that has no 
little relation to the world? For Foucault, who coined the 
term, a heterotopia (which might be a psychiatric hospi-
tal, a cemetery, a mirror, a theater, a colony, a museum, a 
brothel, a library, a garden, and I will say, a university) “is 
capable of juxtaposing in a single real space several spac-
es, several sites that are themselves incompatible,” and 
thus opens onto “heterochrony” (Foucault 1986, 25, 26). Fur-
ther, heterotopias “always presuppose a system of opening 
and closing that both isolates them,” but also “makes 
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them penetrable” (Foucault 1986, 26). The university 
seems an apt example in Foucault’s schema, for it both 
exists apart (in some important respects) from the na-
tions, provinces, and cities within which it resides, as a 
sort of independent “colony,” and also comprises within 
itself separate spheres, or little other worlds—departments, 
schools, disciplines, and the like. In addition, because of its 
geographical placement, often either directly within ur-
ban centers or adjacent to them, and also its public func-
tions, the university is somewhat permeable to the Out-
side, while also performing certain gatekeeping functions 
(these are lamentable, I might add). It is both set apart, 
comprising its own miniature heteroverses, and also wo-
ven into the fabric of the polis, which it reflects, like a 
cracked mirror. 
 Perhaps, like Foucault’s favorite example of a hetero-
topia, the ship—even the pirate ship—the university might be 
reconceptualized as “a floating piece of space, a place with-
out a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself 
and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the 
sea and that, from port to port, from tack to tack, from 
brothel to brothel” goes in search of “the most precious 
treasures”—in short, the university as “the greatest re-
serve of the imagination,” the heterotopia par excellence, 
without which, as Fradenburg demonstrates here in this 
volume, “dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of ad-
venture, and the police take the place of pirates” (Fou-
cault 1986, 27). In which case, let us set sail. 
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We must . . . provide resources and guidance to an elite 
which can take up anew the task of enculturation. . . . 
The coming age of such elites has provided the current 
leadership of the conservative revival. . . . [T]he con-
servative movement is now mature enough to sustain a 
counter-offensive on that last Leftist redoubt, the college 
campus. 
T. Kenneth Cribb, Heritage Foundation Lecture 
 
 
Today, all around the world, the future of the humanities 
stands on the edge of a knife. The value of the liberal 
arts—its generous range of subjects and methods, its em-
phasis on teaching students how to think—seems to have 
plummeted; what’s wanted instead is technical education 
and job training avant le fait, or rather, what’s wanted is 
the prestige of a liberal arts degree for programs that are 
normally to be found in vocational, technical and online 
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schools, from ITT to M.I.T. If there are not enough, or 
not good enough, opportunities in the U.S. for technical 
and job training, one wonders why we don’t focus on im-
proving the institutions already engaged in that work, or 
create new ones, instead of complaining that liberal arts 
institutions do not do what they were never meant to do. 
Since there is no sign of that kind of rationality on the 
horizon, in Europe or America at least, perhaps we could 
be forgiven for suspecting that attacks on higher educa-
tion mean to make the liberal arts scarce, not to address 
scarce or incompetent technical training.  What makes the 
liberal arts so threatening? Is it simply because their utili-
ty is so difficult to quantify? (Which, of course, does not 
mean they have none; neither are many sought-after and 
well-advertised commodities obviously useful, like expen-
sive soccer uniforms for five-year-olds, or monumental 
death-ray televisions.) Is it because they produce exactly 
the kind of citizenry needed in today’s “knowledge econ-
omy”—broadly educated people, who do not fear exper-
tise since they have the fundamental knowledge and ana-
lytical agility needed to explore its claims (see Nussbaum 
2010)? Whatever the reasons—and many will be explored 
in this chapter and throughout this book—we must con-
tinue to uphold the value of exploration, knowledge pro-
duction, and deliberation. This is, after all, a country (the 
U.S.) that advertises freedom of speech and assembly and 
habeas corpus—even if the latter no longer pertains to 
American citizens who are tagged as ‘enemy combatants,’ 
and even if our universities have once again become prac-
tice grounds for new, and very very old, exercises of 
emergency powers (see Hedges 2012).  
The fetishizing—and profitability—of security goes 
on apace in our time, and on campuses may well do so 
until the injudiciousness of some Chancellor somewhere, 
perhaps Linda Katehi of the University of California-Davis, 
orders measures that result in the deaths of students, as 
happened many years ago at Kent State. Universities are 
now contracting private security forces (in the case of the 
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University of California, Kroll Security) that carry de-
structive weaponry vastly out of proportion to any possi-
ble threat posed by unarmed protesters.1 “Security ser-
vices” promise to keep the peace, but their actual efficacy 
is the creation of insecurity—a state of mind actively so-
licited by the defense industry in general. (One wonders, 
sometimes, what the Pentagon is thinking, or if it’s think-
ing at all; it has historically been the case, in British histo-
ry at least, that the leaders and communities who engage 
mercenary armies not only cannot manage them, but 
usually fall prey to them.) The increasing use of such ser-
vices by university administrators—including the out-
sourcing of employee surveillance techniques and payroll 
and “human resource” management—is both sign and 
instance of contemporary capitalism’s attempts to rede-
sign the very experience of mind for the knowledge econ-
omy. 
In 2011, the UC-Davis Academic Senate demanded 
the resignation of Linda Katehi because of brutal “police” 
treatment of students and faculty who were protesting fee 
hikes (as everyone knows, UC fees have risen exponen-
tially, driving the young into further debt and barring 
thousands of middle- and working-class students from 
access to one of the best systems of higher education in 
the world). After the incident, Katehi apologized for fail-
ing to communicate more clearly to security forces that 
the protesters were not to be harmed, and initiated an 
“investigation,” conducted by none other than Kroll Se-
                                                                            
1 Kroll Security is eager to assist in the militarization of everyday 
life. Their 2011 forecast of security trends “predicted” that, “In-
cident Response Teams will get a permanent seat at the table 
when it comes to standard business operations. Historically, 
incident response teams were made of employees from across 
the organization. . . . [But] to remain competitive in today’s 
market companies need to upgrade incident response teams to 
day-to-day operations. Effective incident response teams can 
include a team of outside consultants (via a third party) hired 
for 24/7 incident response support” (see PRWEB 2011). 
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curity, that found no evidence of abuse of authority. But 
Katehi still insisted on pressing very serious charges 
against a dozen protesters arrested for “blocking access” 
to (i.e., standing in front of) university buildings.2 Was 
this an atavistic response? A return of the repressed? 
Katehi was a student at Athens Polytechnic University in 
1973 when the Greek military junta sent a tank through 
the university gates in hopes of crushing, at whatever ex-
pense of blood and shame, the massive student protests 
ongoing therein against their regime. Katehi has refused 
to clarify whether, at the time, she was pro-democracy or 
a fascist sympathizer (“I have never been political”), but 
her complaints about the degradation of Greek higher 
education during the post-fascist “asylum” period (when 
all security forces were prohibited from entering universi-
ty grounds) may give us an indication of her current posi-
tion on freedom of assembly.3 It’s good to know some-
thing about history, though if Katehi and her ilk have 
their way, only those who can afford private schools and 
universities will be able to study it.4  
As a consequence of Greece’s recent financial naugh-
tiness, a panel of North American and European techno-
crats was commissioned to advise the Greek government 
on how to improve the performance of Greek universities 
(Ames 2011). Though one of the panel members had a 
background in religious studies, otherwise not a single 
                                                                            
2 Yolo County prosecutors dropped the charges, saying there 
was “insufficient information” to proceed; see Lee and Fagan 
(2012). 
3 In case anyone thinks Greek old history is history, the new 
pro-“austerity” government boasts a number of fascists and 
neo-Nazis, including at least one former pro-junta Athens Poly 
student notorious for wielding an axe against the pro-demo-
cracy protesters (see Ames 2011). 
4 The appointment of Janet Napolitano as President of the UC 
system in July 2013 should not have been as big a surprise as it 
was. Her links to the security industry were, at this point in his-
tory, the only credentials she needed. 
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humanist or artist was included. But Linda Katehi was. 
Citing the decline of the Greek universities as a central 
reason for the country’s financial woes, the panel argues 
that “politicization of the campuses—and specifically the 
politicization of students—represents a beyond-reason-
able involvement in the political process. This is contrib-
uting to an accelerated degradation of higher education” 
(International Committee on Higher Education in Greece 
2011). In the U.S., of course, reasonableness (being, by 
definition, open to debate) cannot limit prima facie the 
constitutional right to freedom of expression and assem-
bly—though legal scholar and former UC President Mark 
Yudof, who appointed Katehi to her Chancellorship, has 
been a longtime advocate for flexible interpretations of 
academic freedom (see, for example, Yudof 1987). This 
theme is repeated throughout technocratic reports on higher 
education: neither students nor faculty have any business 
being openly “political,” and if they are, what results (it is 
claimed) is grade inflation and students who spend their 
time reading the Communist Manifesto instead of study-
ing for their electrical engineering exams. But where is the 
evidence that interest in politics degrades higher educa-
tion? The freedom to argue and deliberate and then think 
again—to engage in thoughtful reflection—is vital to the 
human mind/brain’s capacity for innovative thinking and 
hence to the well-being, financial and otherwise, of the 
citizenry the panel putatively wants to foster. (Creativity 
is the result of both “generative and analytical thinking.”)5 
The panel’s claim that the university is resistant to change 
may have merit; but it matters which changes are on of-
fer. Not all are good, and few have the inevitability claimed for 
them by highly interested parties (statements like “tenure 
is over” are performative utterances, not descriptions of 
                                                                            
5 “[C]reativity is a complex thought process that calls on many 
different brain regions in both hemispheres [of the brain]. Left 
brain/right brain theories of learning are not based on credible 
science and are unhelpful in understanding creativity, especially 
when used to categorize individuals” (Howard-Jones 2010, 160). 
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present realities). Further, the kind of Thatcherite ac-
countability the panel proposes has already proved, in the 
UK, to divert an enormous amount of time, energy, and 
money from the educational and research missions of the 
universities. According to one of the former directors of 
the British Library, the Library’s administrative costs 
went up by 60% when Thatcher’s “reforms” were imple-
mented. Strangely, no one seems to think accountability 
should account for itself; but it is not at all apparent that 
massive investment therein is producing a better academ-
ic “product.” Independent audits are in order here, too.  
We are witnessing technocratic “capture,” in the 
Deleuzo-Guattarian sense, of academic culture and its 
campuses, on behalf of an increasingly globally-network-
ed capitalism quite careless of the well-being of any par-
ticular nation, including the U.S. Far from depoliticizing 
the universities, these forces are pursuing a reactionary, 
top-down, hyper-politicization of the university. We might 
wonder why the world’s financial powers would bother. 
The simplest answer is that power always wants to control 
and generate what counts as knowledge; we have learned 
that much from Foucault. Another simple answer is capi-
talism’s unending frenzy for new markets and commodi-
ties irrespective of effectiveness. The best studies of online 
education show that it is most effective in the context of 
live classroom education; by itself, it compounds the dif-
ficulties of the very at-risk students (including males of all 
ethnicities) that its proponents claim to be serving (see 
Xu and Jaggers 2013a, 2013b). Investing in online courses 
outside the context of embodied or “live” classroom edu-
cation is a mistake financially and a disservice to students, 
families, and taxpayers. Folly, of course, is nothing new; 
but it is sobering to witness how aggressively and menda-
ciously it can now be marketed.  
Universities have served historically not only as pur-
veyors of hegemonic ideologies but also as significant 
points of resistance to capture and mystification.  Cam-
pus unrest, moreover, has been a global phenomenon at 
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least since the 1960s, as Joe Califano argued in The Stu-
dent Revolution (Califano 1970).6 Its international reach 
is a big problem for the world’s financial and state pow-
ers, if their habitual overreaction thereto is any indica-
tion. But this is not a simple rebellion/repression situa-
tion. As noted, while “security” may succeed in intimidat-
ing troublemakers, it works just as hard to provoke them 
(cf. the CIA’s fondness for “destabilizing” regimes con-
sidered unfriendly to the U.S. and its international inter-
ests). The financial powers are doing their best to de-
stabilize academic culture everywhere, through the time-
honored method of pauperization—sharply raising fees, 
starving faculty and student budgets, relying on poorly-
paid part-time itinerant lecturers instead of creating more 
ladder-track faculty positions, legislating on behalf of 
online for-profit courses, ignoring conflicts of interest, 
and staffing administrations with grotesquely well-com-
pensated technocrats who often know little to nothing 
about academic professionalism—all in the name of “sol-
ving” the funding crisis they have themselves induced. 
The desired result is to add both faculty and students to 
the “precariat”—the ever-growing numbers of people 
across the globe who teeter on various verges of tenuous 
and “contingent” employment and thus are vulnerable to 
exploitation of the most old-fashioned sort (see Butler 
2004; Scott 2012). 
California Governors seem to be particularly fond of 
(in)security. Not to be outdone by his predecessors, in-
cluding himself, Jerry Brown agreed not long ago with 
former UC President Mark Yudof that the University of 
California should no longer be obliged to demonstrate 
compliance with its Master Plan.7 This was an autocratic 
end-run around the legislature, the thousands of Califor-
                                                                            
6 The arts faculties and students in medieval universities were 
also troublemakers; see Lipton 1999, 99, fig. 70 for an image of 
the medieval arts faculty as a contemporary Babel. 
7 On the Master Plan for Higher Education in California, see: 
http://www.ucop.edu/acadinit/mastplan/mp.htm. 
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nians who have petitioned to preserve the Master Plan, 
the many faculty who have worked diligently (and, of 
course, pro bono) on UC’s Commission on the Future, 
and the UC Council of Faculty Associations’ tireless ef-
forts to ensure compliance (see Meister 2012). One of the 
provisions of the Master Plan is to guarantee a place for 
every Californian who can meet UC’s entrance require-
ments. As a consequence of Brown’s action, however, UC 
will now be free to admit many foreign as well as out-of-
state students without fear of having its feet held to the 
fire. Not only will this further hamper Californians’ ac-
cess to their own university system; it will likely also fur-
ther erode public support for higher education. Both 
Brown and Yudof are well aware that Californian taxpay-
ers have historically reacted badly to increases in the 
numbers of out-of-state students. Brown’s unilateral set-
ting-aside of the Master Plan amounts to a decision to cut 
UC loose from considerations of public confidence and 
the state funding that follows from such. Like many of its 
counterparts, UC is less and less a public university, and 
more and more a university that uses taxpayer money 
(about 20% of its overall funding) to serve ends having 
little to do with the public good. So what UC will gain in 
tuition dollars from admitting foreign and out-of-state 
students, it will almost certainly lose in public confidence 
and state funds. We can always hope that, instead of per-
petuating this vicious circle, Californians will decide to 
take back their University from the global financial inter-
ests it increasingly serves. Having already experienced 
some blowback from the citizenry on the problem of di-
minished access, however, Brown and various powers in 
the California State Assembly are now posing as defend-
ers of the people by trying to impose the outsourcing of 
online learning modalities from the “public” university to 
private alternatives (see Chapter 2 in this volume)—in 
other words, another two turns of the screw, because the 
action is really one of infiltration. 
  I am not arguing for parochialism; “diversity,” unlike 
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Udacity,8 is a precondition for enriched experience of 
mind and the making of new knowledge. But foreign ex-
change programs are being cut at UC, just like language 
departments, which would suggest that international di-
versity is not the motive driving the opening of UC to 
unprecedented numbers of foreign students. The tuition 
dollar is a central motive; but internationalizing will also 
lead to yet more administrators, yet more funding of their 
corporate salaries and fostering of their ties to global 
business interests, and more and more diversion of re-
sources away from the departments that actually do the 
work of teaching and mentoring all students. Efficiency 
and cost-saving are not as high on capitalism’s list of pri-
orities as some think; its real goal, where the academy is 
concerned, is transferring money from faculty, students, 
parents and taxpayers to administrators who serve inter-
ests antipathetic to the vigorous circulation of new and 
complex ideas. These are the labor costs taxpayers should 
be worried about.   
Internationalizing will also put further pressure on 
the curriculum, traditionally (in the U.S. at least) a faculty 
prerogative and responsibility, now under attack from 
people who have dollars rather than students in mind. 
The Bologna Process documents recommend that univer-
sities across Europe facilitate migration for education by 
homogenizing their programs of study. But when did mi-
gration for education become a higher good than educa-
tion itself? The Bologna Declaration calls for the “adop-
tion of a system of easily readable and comparable de-
grees . . . in order to promote European citizens [sic] em-
ployability [and mobility]. . . . The degree awarded after 
the first cycle shall also be relevant to the European labor 
market as an appropriate level of qualification” (Europe-
an Ministers of Education, “Bologna Declaration,” 2003). 
The implication of these papers on higher education—in-
                                                                            
8 Udacity is a private, for-profit corporation that offers massive, 
open online courses (MOOCs); see http://www.udacity.com. 
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sofar as they hope to identify the problem they purport-
edly want to solve, at any rate—is that employment has 
been compromised in Europe and the U.S. because the 
universities are failing to produce employable students. 
Surely that would mean the technical schools are failing 
even more miserably; and yet they are barely mentioned 
in current debates about the proper role of higher educa-
tion.  
But one must demur in any case. If the universities 
are in fact failing to produce employable students, that is 
at least in part because the world economy is failing to 
produce employment of any kind, which is hardly the 
fault of the academy. Trickle-down economics has been 
shown for the second time in my lifetime to be complete-
ly without merit; yet we seem to be surprised, to the point 
of casting about for scapegoats, that anti-labor policies 
might have had depressive effects on hiring. The chief 
factors that have produced the current economic crisis 
are: 1) the shenanigans of international financiers (espe-
cially the big banks); 2) at the turn of the century, Alan 
Greenspan’s famous “bubble”-breaking decision to raise 
interest rates because the labor market was too “hot,” i.e. 
too many people had jobs; 3) “out-sourcing” of white- as 
well as blue-collar employment to the rest of the world; 
and 4) overemployment.9 It’s true that many academics—
like many attorneys, doctors, businesspeople, secretaries, 
factory-workers, farmers, and homemakers—are interest-
ed in politics. (This is why industries hire lobbyists, after 
all; they are well aware of their vulnerability to political 
developments, and so are a lot of academics.) By compar-
ison with the madness of financial capitalism, however, 
the political awareness of academics has not been much 
of a factor in, for example, the downfall of the U.S. hous-
ing market and the construction industry.  
                                                                            
9 “Overemployment” in this case means demanding excessive 
(and, in the professions, often unpaid) work from one employee 
instead of simply hiring two. 
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If nothing else, then, let us consider that unemploy-
ment may not necessarily be the fault of the political lean-
ings of the world’s universities. We are also entitled to 
wonder how the (cultural and economic) aggrandizement 
promised by the Bologna Process could be served by ho-
mogenizing European regionalism, since the power of 
said regionalism to derail the world economy is no more 
impressive compared to that of the banks than the power 
of academic political awareness. In truth, contemporary 
capitalism is happy to regulate everything but itself. 
So why does technocracy remain so resistant to the 
idea that a good liberal arts education helps to produce 
good employees, especially when it is supported by so much 
research (neuroscientific and otherwise)? A course of study in 
classics will have trouble justifying its appropriateness to 
any labor market; but, at least in the U.S., classics majors 
(and language and literature majors) have typically gotten 
better grades in law school, and made law review more 
often, than students who major in a variety of popular 
“pre-law” fields (such as economics, political science, and 
business) (Engell and Dangerfield 1998, 50). Students 
who pursue occupational majors—like “Security Systems” 
—are typically outstripped in said occupations by their 
liberal arts peers, because the latter are capable of making 
better use of the learning they do on the job. It is all so 
self-defeating; even if we did decide to evaluate education 
exclusively on the basis of its ability to produce useful la-
bor, these attempts to rationalize courses of study would 
not be the way to do it. Good employees need many skills 
that apply across the board, like the ability to write, read, 
speak, think, imagine, argue, and put issues into various 
kinds of perspectives, e.g. local, global, and historical. The 
objective of “mobility” mentioned in so many of the doc-
uments of the Bologna Process does not, as noted, refer to 
the value of experiencing diverse cultures; it wants to get 
rid of diversity, in the name of comparability (quantifiabil-
ity, accountability, etc.), as is true of most of the “flexibili-
zation” (read “homogenization” and “helplessness”) false-
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ly heralded by neo-liberal capitalism.  
  Furthermore, the level of international student mobil-
ity thus envisioned may transform student bodies from 
enfranchised, acculturated, politically aware groups into 
disenfranchised, deportable, culturally diffident groups 
with limited investments in the political process, cut off 
from the legal systems they know best and the families 
who might complain should their sons or daughters be 
bashed on the head by Kroll Security. It is, of course, true 
that job mobility in Europe has created exciting changes 
in the lives of people and cultures: one can now eat well in 
the UK; design is more sophisticated. These improve-
ments, however, such as they are, have depended on a real 
mobility of persons across national borders, not just capi-
tal. As long as national boundaries continue to confine 
labor to local markets, mobility will simply mean state-
lessness and precarity. One can imagine that insecure 
“mobility” might be mobilized nonetheless to serve the 
internationalization of student power. But the risks will 
be considerable for newly itinerant students. The desire of 
the authors of the Bologna Protocol and their ilk does not 
even run to protecting foreign students by organizing 
them into “nations,” as happened in the medieval Euro-
pean universities. Further, top-down, managerial homog-
enization of courses of study not only threatens what’s 
special about a centuries-old university with distinctive 
traditions and local ties; it also squelches academic free-
dom and self-governance, wherein the people who actual-
ly develop our knowledge of mitochondria or cetaceous 
intelligence or dark matter decide how these subjects 
might best be taught, and students are encouraged to pur-
sue, as much as possible, their specific talents and inter-
ests. Should we really evaluate our universities on the ba-
sis of how many biddable and employable laborers they 
can graduate? Haven’t our universities given us the ge-
nome? Lumosity.com? New treatments for autism, and 
new ways of thinking about it? God particles (the Higgs 
boson particle)? Haven’t they introduced us to synthesiz-
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ers and digital archives? To online education? Is it really 
demonstrable that universities don’t know what they’re 
doing?  
Underlying the Bologna Declaration is the assum-
ption that people ought not to be allowed to explore for 
themselves what they want to learn, teach, be, and do. 
Again: conservatives and technocrats do love a plan, as 
long as it’s their plan.10 Jesper Hoffmeyer associates “the 
separation of planning from execution in a master-slave 
relationship” characteristic of the industrial revolution, 
with separation of the “genetic master plan (the DNA) 
from the mundane [and obedient] operations of the cyto-
plasm”—and finally with the “privileging of digital in-
formation,” where input and design seem to “dwarf vari-
able outputs in importance” (this privileging usually for-
gets that language is also a digital sign system) (Hoffmey-
er 2008, 79). A few qualifications come to mind—as to 
whether the separation of plan from execution is particu-
lar to the industrial revolution, for example—and it must 
be said that our freedoms are always limited by the histor-
ical and social contexts, including hopes for the future, in 
which they develop. But while I would not want to deval-
ue conscious decision-making—it is a great gift, acquired 
at the cost of deep time—our “executive functions” must 
also respect the freedom of drift, the creativity of open 
systems, and the ability to tolerate creaturely vulnerabil-
ity, anxiety, surprise, and wonder (see Jacobs 1985, 221 
ff.). These are also great gifts, which make use of other 
parts of the brain/mind equally important to our surviv-
ing and thriving. I am not speaking against “vision”; I am 
saying that vision must be accompanied by respect for the 
irreducible complexity and non-conscious aspects of human 
knowledge-making, sociality, and their histories. The con-
                                                                            
10 See, again, the “Bologna Declaration” (1999) or the Heritage 
Foundation’s 1,093-page public policy blueprint, “Mandate for 
Leadership: Policy Management in a Conservative Administra-
tion” (http://www.heritage.org/about/our-history/35th-anniver 
sary). 
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tempt for academic freedom of expression and govern-
ance demonstrated by the new corporate managers of 
North American public universities is worrying, to say 
the least, both because of what it reveals about the status 
of constitutional protections in corporate culture, but al-
so because it encroaches upon one of the few institutions 
left which, because of the nature of the work it does, culti-
vates power streams that move bottom-up and sideways 
as well as top-down.  
If this treatment of our universities is not intended as 
capture (or “acquisition”), that is its effect, and it is also a 
rehearsal for limiting citizens’ rights in other contexts. 
The Government of Quebec recently responded to stu-
dent protests against fee hikes by introducing “emergency 
laws” to close down the universities there. Allan Gilmour, 
formerly of the Ford Motor Company and now President 
of Wayne State University in Detroit, has recently, in the 
course of negotiations with his faculty’s union, “pro-
posed” that he be granted the right to fire tenured faculty 
at will, without benefit of peer review and due process, 
should he decide (for and by himself) that said faculty 
were “intentionally causing injury to persons and/or 
damage to property, forcibly interrupting the normal dai-
ly teaching, research or administrative operation of the 
University or directly inciting others to engage in such 
actions.”11 In 2012, the Office of the President of the Uni-
versity of California proposed changes to the Academic 
Personnel Manual (‡16) that would make faculty subject 
to “administrative” rather than faculty discipline should 
they violate “the general rules and regulations and poli-
cies of the University; these include, but are not limited to 
. . . health and safety, and use of University facilities.”12 
                                                                            
11 I am quoting a personal copy of Gilmour’s proposal shared 
with me by Charles Parrish; for an account of the proposal, see 
Kozlowski and Hicks (2012). 
12 See the University of California, Office of the President’s Aca-
demic Personnel Manual (2012), available here: http://www. 
ucop.edu/academic-personnel/academic-personnel-policy/.  
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Campus unrest, modest as it’s been in recent years, is be-
ing exploited as a pretext for the cultivation of local, na-
tional and international states of emergency and “excep-
tion,” wherein the authority of the law is founded on the 
power to suspend it when “necessary” (see Agamben 2005). The 
UC Regents, however, recently agreed (July 13, 2013) to 
enhance the protection of the faculty’s right to speak 
freely about all administration policies. Many faculty don’t 
know how these protections stand at their schools, but they 
can easily find out, and make a fuss; most universities 
don’t want to appear to be despotic, so we need to use their 
concerns about “image” to guarantee as much openness as 
possible. 
Academic freedom has its own history, and its histo-
ry suggests that “new” criticisms of tenure are actually 
attempts to turn back the clock. According to John Sav-
age, tenure began 
 
in response to decades of public discussion of the 
arbitrary dismissal of faculty members for holding 
unpopular views. . . . Late in the 19th century, 
[Benjamin Andrews, President of Brown Universi-
ty] advocated the free coinage of silver as a means 
to stop deflation in the American economy. This 
angered members of the Brown Corporation many 
of whom were creditors benefiting from deflation. 
. . . Francis Wayland, Brown Corporation member 
and Dean of the Yale Law School, said that Presi-
dent Andrews’ position threatened donations to 
Brown and that money was the life blood of uni-
versities. . . . Prof. Josiah Royce of Harvard . . . [re-
plied] that freedom, not money, is the life blood of 
the university. . . . But the censorship of unpopular 
economic ideas did not stop. . . . in the late 1940s, 
the University of Illinois at Urbana fired a group 
of untenured economists, all of whom subsequent-
ly had distinguished careers, for teaching the “her-
esy” of Keynesian economics. (Savage n.d.) 
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The Koch brothers’ attempt to weigh in on the hiring of 
faculty for two endowed chairs in economics at Florida 
State University is only the latest in a long line of financi-
ers’ efforts to cultivate academic compliance with their 
own economic interests (see Hundley 2011).13 
 Whether students and faculty will develop their po-
tential for global influence is another question. (It has to 
be said that one of the best arguments against the notion 
that the universities are hotbeds of revolutionary senti-
ment is that, in the U.S. and the UK, at least, tenured fac-
ulty have been so willing to jump on the trains.) As has 
happened so often in the past, distortions of the perils 
posed by student and faculty unrest provide distraction 
from the chaos and pillaging set loose by global capital-
ism’s attempts to capture everything from universities to 
national governments. What capital wants is immunity 
from accountability, as Roberto Esposito has argued in 
Immunitas (2001); and it is tired of being held to account 
by people who actually know something about causal par-
ity or economic behavior. But the more capitalists try to 
make themselves immune to contagion and otherness, the 
more vulnerable they will in fact become. Knowledge 
matters, and reports now coming in from universities of-
fering the kind of online courses favored by Richard 
Blum, Senator Steinberg and their ilk, are presaging some 
embarrassment for said ilk: no one signs up for them. 
Why should anyone, especially the taxpayer, subsidize the 
University of California’s “partnerships” with for-profit 
companies (such as Coursera and Udacity), when univer-
sity faculty have always-already been integrating such 
online offerings into university curricula? Who will reim-
burse the students and families who spent money seeking 
“access” to UC through online courses they would, as 
                                                                            
13 According to Bruce Benson, Chair of the Florida State Uni-
versity Economics Department, the faculty thereof ultimately 
worked out a hiring process whereby the Koch brothers’ foun-
dation could only approve candidates from a list generated by 
the department; see Strauss (2011). 
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studies have predicted, most likely never complete? May-
be such courses really will stay “free” for some time; if so, 
what’s in it for the investors? The answer is data-mining, 
through mechanisms (like keystroke collection) that un-
dermine students’ rights to privacy, including those (if 
they have any in the first place) of the aforementioned 
greatly-sought-after foreign students.  Capital seeks the 
freedom to render life precarious, unstable, and in need 
of “protection,” which it will then sell back to us in the 
form of private security forces, and it also seeks the free-
dom to shut down quality public educational opportuni-
ties in order to conceal the shoddiness of their offerings 
and then sell them to the disadvantaged.  
The rhetoric is always about emergency. Regents with 
investments in online education drive up tuition costs 
dramatically while state legislatures refuse to fund low-
cost high-quality education for their constituents. Then 
the State Assembly begins to cry crocodile tears over their 
constituents’ loss of access to high-quality public educa-
tion, and tries to legislate the adoption of certain text-
books and for-profit online courses as though these were 
solutions rather than expensive and ineffectual measures 
profiting no one but the interests responsible in the first 
instance for the very loss of access being bemoaned. Eve-
rybody knows this, but apparently it can never be pointed 
out too often. 
The discourse of crisis is also at work when assaults 
on academic freedom are leveled (as they so often are) 
against criticism of Israeli national policies. Here too rea-
sons of “national security” try to legitimate the suspen-
sion of academic freedom and civil liberties. The current 
proliferation of security industries and techniques is thus 
both pretext and prophylactic. The privatization of secu-
rity, payroll, employee surveillance, and human resource 
functions does not mean that anything is going “out” (as 
in “out”-sourcing); it means, as noted earlier, that some-
thing is “coming in” to (infiltrate) the institutions and 
companies that contract with such companies (see note 1 
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above). The U.S. government does not “outsource” to 
Blackwater; Blackwater (and Haliburton) take over the 
functions and funding of the Defense Department. This is 
the action of capture. Bizarrely—but then again, maybe 
not—Blackwater is trying to obscure its real nature by 
appropriating the “brand” of the Academy and renaming 
itself “Academi”; in yet another turn of the screw, it has 
been sued by a Texas sporting goods company, Academy 
Ltd., for trademark infringement (Sizemore 2012). So, 
also, do the for-profit online schooling bosses even more 
desperately want to acquire the brands of real universi-
ties: because those brands still signify integrity. 
Altegrity, Inc. (an ironic brand-name, if ever there 
were one) is the holding company for Kroll Advisory, 
Kroll OnTrack (recipients of three security contracts 
from the University of California), HireRight, and USIS 
(who provide information and security services to the 
U.S. federal government, such as employee background 
investigations and biometric capture for the Depts. of 
Homeland Security and Immigration Services). Hire-
Right’s “Drug and Health Screening Services” include “in-
house medical, legal and compliance expertise”; that is to 
say, government agencies and corporations can contract 
HireRight’s personnel to conduct drug (and other kinds 
of) surveillance on their own employees (see HireRight. 
com). Joe Califano, Jr., author of the aforementioned The 
Student Revolution, is also the founder of the National 
Center on Addiction and Substance Abuse at Columbia 
University (CASA) (the work of which has been much 
criticized). Califano and one of Altegrity’s CEO’s, Sharon 
T. Rowlands, have both served as directors for Automatic 
Data Processing, Inc., a “business process outsourcing” 
company (which is in fact a business-process infiltrating 
company).14  
Califano, one of LBJ’s cronies and former Secretary 
                                                                            
14 See the agenda for ADP’s annual stockholder meeting in 2000: 
http://www.investquest.com/iq/a/adp/fin/proxy/audx00.pdf. 
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of the U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, is 
also a Director of Willis Group Holdings, the world’s 
third-largest insurance brokerage, specializing in “risk 
management” and “human resource consulting.” Yes, this 
is the same Joseph Califano Jr. who, while describing the 
putative takeover of the federal government by Students 
for a Democratic Society in the 1960s, lamented the re-
sistance of “young scientists” to the development of anti-
ballistic missiles “and their involvement on a major scale 
in opposition to government policy they consider wrong. 
Business and labor have not yet had their share of anti-
government revolutionaries,” but “they will,” according 
to Califano—though he also opined that “radicals” had 
already taken “control [of] Local No. 41 of the American 
Federation of Government Employees (the union with 
jurisdiction over . . . most of the Public Health Service”: 
“SDS is willing even to shave in order to bore the corpo-
rate and worker establishments from within” (Califano 
1970, 88–89).  Ah, the Old Mole—very long-lived, it ap-
pears.  
This is indeed a biopower struggle. Who really 
threatens our lives and livelihoods? Who promises us sal-
vation by technology? Who gets to exercise the power of 
life and death over other human beings? Not the Black 
Panthers, who, besides being badass political activists, re-
ally did run soup kitchens for the poor, before some of 
the nation’s finest shot them down. Not Lyndon La-
Rouche, controversial early critic of speculative capital-
ism and founder of the American Labor Party in 1973, 
jailed for mail fraud by the Reagan Administration—a 
longtime target of conservatives of all stripes (including 
those in the Democratic Party), as well as seekers after 
racial justice.15 But neither is LaRouche what we are seek-
                                                                            
15 LaRouche’s inflammatory attack on monetarism in The Ugly 
Truth about Milton Friedman (e.g. Chapter 4, “Oxford Mone-
tarism and Hitler’s Vienna,” in LaRouche and Goldman 1980) 
makes for stimulating reading in these economically post-
apocalyptic times. LaRouche’s politics have always been compli-
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ing today, given that he himself is something of a messi-
anic exceptionalist, and that is the form of power under 
scrutiny in this chapter.  
When the CIA is not available, private security and 
surveillance services have usually been the means by 
which technocracy and capitalism have gone global, in 
the form, for example, of the corporate goon squads that 
“break up” resistance and nascent unionization in South 
America, Asia and Africa. The current effectivity of risk-
and-security biopower has been enhanced beyond the be-
yond by computerization and the internet,16 but its basic 
function—to crush life while appearing to advance it—
has changed little, despite the fact that devitalization is 
inescapably enervation for all. (Epidemiological studies 
show that a drop in the health and well-being of the poor-
er members of a given community inevitably means a 
corresponding drop in the health and well-being of those 
who can afford to buy good care; see Wheeler 2006). 
Philippe Carrel’s Handbook of Risk Management (Katehi 
is one of the directors of its publishing house, John Wiley 
& Sons, Ltd.) begins with this sonorous observation: 
“Risk is the essence of free enterprise in liberal econo-
mies” (Carrel 2010, 1). He goes on: “the discipline of 
managing risk has always existed,” at least “[s]ince the 
eighteenth century’s industrial revolution”—a bald state-
ment indeed, given the development of merchant capital, 
banking, finance and insurance during the Middle Ages, 
and the global “ventures” of early modern enterprise. But 
                                                                            
cated and, on the question of race, most unhappy. But these 
flaws hardly set him apart from many of our recent presidents 
and presidential candidates. In fact, it makes him an excellent 
screen for right wing projections. For a sample of the latter, see 
Copulos (1984); Copulos was the director of energy studies at 
the Heritage Foundation who advised the Reagan administra-
tion on energy resources, especially domestic oil development.  
16 See, for example, Coley and Lockwood (2012), Galloway 
(2006), Galloway and Thacker (2007), Thacker (2004), and 
Virilio (2006). 
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let us not expect too much. The carelessness of Carrel’s 
historical formulations—whereby “always” turns out to 
be two hundred years—is matched by the fuzzy-
mindedness of his appeals to biology and evolutionary 
theory: “[t]he very few [corporations] that survive, ex-
pand and thrive usually evolve at a staggering pace, 
through organic and inorganic growth, continuously adapting 
and innovating from core business to new market niche”; 
“[i]t is the evolution of risks, the unexpected ones in par-
ticular, that seems to be pushing the boundaries of inno-
vation by changing the conditions for survival” (Carrel 
2010, 1).  
But evolutionary theory today—see, for example, 
Lynn Margulis’s (1988) pioneering work on the role of 
symbiosis in organic change—even the evolutionary theo-
ry of many yesterdays ago, does not view the “struggle for 
survival” or “survival of the fittest” as the prime motor of 
life’s many histories. Darwin’s law of “survival of the just-
barely-fit-enough,” Conrad Pritscher remarks, “makes 
altruism a virtue. That species which is cooperative, 
which . . . helps [the weak and disabled] to survive, will 
attain the greatest degree of variation of characteristics 
possible in a particular environment and will thus have a 
better chance of survival as a species. . . . Not competition 
but cooperation is the behavior blessed by evolution” 
(Pritscher 2010, 226). Carrel’s rhetoric means to vitalize 
business enterprises, as a way of aggrandizing the im-
portance of their births and deaths, and rationalizing the 
lengths to which they are prepared to go to “survive”; if 
they’re predators, at least they’re still down here with the 
rest of us chickens. But while it is true that few corpora-
tions last longer than fifty years—a fact that should have 
given the U.S. pause when it began glorifying corporate 
management techniques and “efficiency” in the 1980s—
their infrastructures, resources and holdings rarely crum-
ble and vanish like the lost continent of Atlantis.  
So who is “they”? I am not speaking of conspiracy; I 
am speaking of an “emergent” phenomenon, which cer-
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tainly has concentrations of forces, but no single central 
point from which domination radiates. Historical com-
plexity, however, does admit of the reverberating power 
of particular agents. As noted, Linda Katehi has attribut-
ed the degradation of higher education in Greece to the 
period after the fall of the military junta, in the 1980s. It 
was also in the 1980s that the U.S. right wing propaganda 
machine found new energy (funded by Richard Mellon 
Scaife and his ilk; see the epigraph to this chapter), and 
began to complain about the breakdown of higher educa-
tion, especially the take-over of the Ivies by liberal faculty 
who imposed their “distorted views” on future rulers of 
the world.17 The Dartmouth Review, funded generously 
by defense industry boss John Olin’s (non-profit) founda-
tion, was the first of the Ivies’ unofficial “student” news-
papers; its student moles made off with faculty members’ 
intellectual property by taping classes without permis-
sions, and defamed faculty in ad hominem and quite vul-
gar fashion (for such pious lasses and lads, anyway; one 
Women’s Studies professor was called, in print, a “quim-
queen.” The University did nothing because it didn’t want 
to “stoop” to the level of the Dartmouth Review, or digni-
fy it with a response. At roughly the same time, in 1986, 
Lynne Cheney became head of the National Endowment 
for the Humanities (a post she held until 1993).18 Oh 
                                                                            
17 See the National Committee for Responsive Philanthropy’s 
Report “Targeting the Academy” (available at www.media 
transparency.org/targeting_academy.htm), Johnson (2003), and 
Messer-Davidow (1993).  
18 See Nash, Crabtree and Dunn (2000) for an account of Chen-
ey’s antics vis-à-vis the National History Standards, and also 
SourceWatch (Center for Media and Democracy) for a list of 
articles by and about Cheney: http://www. sourcewatch.org/ 
index.php?title=Lynne_Cheney. “Telling the Truth,” her final 
report as NEH Chair (1992), achieved notoriety for its distor-
tions and fabrications of evidence for the claim that liberal poli-
tics were controlling the minds of American academics; see 
Schwartz (1992).  
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“dirk and drublie” day, as William Dunbar might have 
said.19 
In response to the insouciance of the best-educated 
generation in American history, the Heritage Foundation 
included in its right-wing agenda an assault on public ed-
ucation—as Dick Armey put it in the summer 1994 issue 
of the Foundation’s Policy Review, “the end of the public 
school monopoly.” Monopoly? No one has to go to public 
school; they just have to go to some kind of school. The 
whole “voucher” movement in the secondary school sys-
tem was an attempt to raid the local and national treasur-
ies so that ordinary taxpayers would fund private educa-
tions for the wealthy—just as the “corporatization” of 
public universities means using taxpayer money to fund 
research for Novartis.20 Public schools were meant not to 
“monopolize” anything but to make sure that American 
children who could not afford private schooling could 
still get a decent education. Public education began in the 
U.S. shortly after the nation’s founding, beginning in the 
Northeast (it went countrywide by the 1870s). John Ad-
ams—one of the wealthiest and most conservative of our 
founding fathers—wrote in a letter to John Jebb in 1785 
that, 
  
The whole people must take upon themselves the 
education of the whole people and be willing to 
                                                                            
19 The reference is to William Dunbar’s poem, “In to thir dirk 
and drublie dayis” (http://www.scottishpoetrylibrary.org.uk/ 
poetry/poems/thir-dirk-and-drublie-dayis). 
20 It is an article of faith amongst scientists that their extramural 
grants fund their research projects in toto, and in fact “bring 
money into the university” since parts of their grants are taken 
to fund their “indirect costs” (the cost to the university of sup-
porting said projects). In fact, scientific research relies on Uni-
versity resources beyond what extramural grants can subsidize, 
for infrastructure development, maintenance, and takedown, as 
for the admissions, registration, accounting, and many other 
administrative services on which the sciences depend equally 
with other disciplines. 
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bear the expenses of it. There should not be a dis-
trict of one mile square, without a school in it, not 
founded by a charitable individual, but maintained 
at the public expense of the people themselves. 
(Adams, 1854, 540; my emphasis) 
 
Even in Georgia there were ten grammar schools by 1770, 
most of which had government funding, and were free for 
both male and female students. The Far Right’s “new” 
ideas on education are in fact far older than the nation 
itself and do not respect its founding principles. Perhaps 
we need a constitutional amendment to clarify that the 
right to education is on a par in this country with the 
right to bear arms. Both are crucial means for the citizen-
ry to defend itself against tyranny. At least, that’s how the 
“forefathers” saw it. 
 A great champion of studying American history, 
Lynne Cheney has never seemed to think freedom of 
speech is one of the American freedoms that have made 
American history worth studying. In the 1990s, her 
American Council of Trustees and Alumni (ACTA, founded 
with Joe Lieberman in 1995) published a “report” called 
“Defending Civilization: How Our Universities Are Fail-
ing America.” Described by many critics as a “blacklist,” 
the first, unbowdlerized version named the names of pro-
fessors who professed “anti-American sentiments,” such 
as: suicide bombers are among “the desperate, angry and 
bereaved”; or, “war created people like Osama Bin Laden, 
and more war will create more people like him.”21 One 
wonders what Cheney and Lieberman thought had creat-
ed suicide bombers and the phenomenon of Osama bin 
Laden. Satan again? It is grotesquely absurd to defame as 
anti-American scholarly attempts to understand (not to 
justify) why human beings do horrible things to other 
                                                                            
21 The bowdlerized version, revised and expanded in February 
2002, can be accessed here: https://portfolio.du.edu/portfolio/ 
getportfoliofile?uid=85865. 
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humans.22 If we don’t try to find out the reasons why people 
become terrorists, and address those reasons, there will for-
ever be terrorists. And we have every right to question the 
nation-state’s monopoly on violence; that’s why we have 
the right to bear arms. The violence inflicted on the world 
by the U.S. government, and its allied mercenaries, de-
fense contractors, arms dealers and security specialists, 
far outstrips in all categories (quantity, destructive power, 
non-combatant casualties) that of the worst of terrorist 
attacks. We have loved the bomb, and profited from it. 
We also have the distinction of being number one in sell-
ing arms to troubled regions of the world. Of course, we 
do have some significant competitors in Russia, China, 
France, Germany, and the United Kingdom. The problem 
is global. There are Olin Industries and Haliburton and 
“Academi,” but also Glock, BAE Systems, IMBEL, Arse-
nal, Norinco, Soltam Systems, and many many more. All 
thrive in “crises,” because critical moments are the mo-
ments in which covert operations—the suspension of the 
law for the sake of the law—are afforded legitimacy. The 
points made above are not new, but their relevance is sad-
ly undiminished at a time when privatization (a misno-
mer for “taxpayer subsidization”), disregard for the Ge-
neva conventions, and the militarization of everyday life 
have been galloping forward unchecked.  
 ACTA and the American Enterprise Institute, Lynne 
Cheney’s most recent nests, are funded by, among others, 
the Scaife foundations (Carthage and Sarah Scaife, both 
non-profits). Think tanks and foundations give each oth-
er a lot of money—it is a kind of laundering, the deleteri-
ous effects of which on the national fisc far outweigh the 
public “good” implied by tax-exempt status. (We need, at 
least temporarily, to withdraw non-profit status—i.e., 
taxpayer assistance—from all the think tanks, of whatever 
                                                                            
22 In fact, the terrorist demographic is typically young men re-
cently transplanted from rural, traditional villages to large 
towns and cities: see Pape (2005) and Reuter (2004). 
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political stripe.) Scaife’s (non-profit) Allegheny Founda-
tion gave the Heritage Foundation over a million dollars 
in 2010. Allegheny, in turn, funds the Koch brothers’ Bill 
of Rights Institute; the Center for Equal Opportunity, a 
right wing think tank opposed to bilingual education; the 
Free Enterprise Education Foundation, led by Tea Partier 
John Trombetta; and the Counterterrorism and Security 
Education and Research Foundation. Another patron of 
the latter organization is Sheldon Gary Adelson, the self-
professed Zionist and casino tycoon (is gambling encour-
aged in Hebrew Scripture somewhere?), who has traveled 
to Israel to hawk a DVD warning against the spread of 
Islam in the West. His company, the Las Vegas Sands 
Corporation, has been investigated by the Department of 
Justice for possible violations of the Foreign Corrupt 
Practices Act, and by the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Los 
Angeles for possible money laundering. He was also the 
chief bankroller of the 2012 Romney-Ryan presidential 
campaign (is gambling also encouraged in the Book of 
Mormon?).23 
 Ronald Reagan, who began his political career and 
collaboration with J. Edgar Hoover by informing on fel-
low members of the Screen Actors Guild in the late 1940s, 
consolidated his political position while Governor of 
California as the dragonslayer of “student radicals” in the 
UC system. Despite the fact that McCarthy finally fell be-
cause his accusations couldn’t be substantiated—perhaps 
Reagan didn’t give him the right information—the latter 
remained loyal to his idol’s smear tactics, and represented 
California’s campuses as full of violent Communist sub-
versives plotting the overthrow of the United States.24 Re-
                                                                            
23 See the op-ed piece in The New York Times, August 17, 2012, 
“In Thrall to Sheldon Adelson”: www.nytimes.com/2012/08/17/ 
opinion/in-thrall-to-sheldon-adelson.html. 
24 Contrary to right-leaning popular accounts of the later twen-
tieth century, hippies, yippies, radicals and Students for a Dem-
ocratic Society, though powerful change agents, were always in 
the minority and never in charge of anything except their own 
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cently, the right-wing California Association of Scholars 
published a “report,” “A Crisis of Competence,” blaming 
the supposed “decline” of the UC system on—no surprise 
here—“the corrupting effect of political activism” there-
in.25 (The arguments and rhetoric of this report are virtu-
ally identical to those of the ACTA report and the report 
of Katehi et al. on the decline of education in Greece). 
Now, it is true that many (certainly not all) university 
professors believe that we should address urgent issues 
(like enormous fee hikes and budget cuts) in the class-
room, because it is our responsibility to teach our stu-
dents how to think about and study these matters, in ad-
dition to having feelings and opinions about them. Where 
else will American youth be asked to read, write, and de-
bate calmly and comprehensively the very topics contro-
versial enough to diminish our rational capacities in the 
first place? The skills taught thereby, it is true, have not 
been too fashionable recently: patience, and self-control. 
But educating our students to think about their passions, 
rather than simply giving way to them, does not require 
apology. 
As the above remarks about think tanks have already 
indicated, the academy is far from being the only hub of 
mentation, political or otherwise, that accepts taxpayer 
support. Think tanks of all stripes are far more motivated 
by partisan political agendas than is the academy, and yet 
                                                                            
activism. The phenomena of post-1970s avarice, de-regulation, 
financialization, and immiseration are more properly laid at the 
feet of the “silent majority” (Nixon’s phrase) and their bully 
heirs, who partied their way through the Vietnam War (immun-
ity again) and achieved a repulsive exemplarity in the father/son 
Bush presidencies. I do thank George Bush, Sr. for his service in 
World War II. 
25 California Association of Scholars, “A Crisis of Competence: 
The Corrupting Effect of Political Activism in the University of 
California,” April 2012 [a report prepared for the Regents of the 
University of California]: http://www.nas.org/images/documents/ 
a_crisis_of_competence.pdf. 
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the taxpayer still foots a good part of the bill, if said think 
tank is a tax-exempt non-profit. “Reports” that link the 
decline of civilization to the political thoughtfulness of 
faculty and students are demagogic attempts to blame 
“decline” on the very people whose raison d’être is to up-
hold standards of argumentation and evidence. The prob-
lem with educators, from the standpoint of the dema-
gogues, is that our business is the creation of new 
knowledge and ways of thinking by means of debate, in-
spiration, scholarship, statistics, mathematics, sound ex-
perimental protocols, telescopes, colliders, and so forth. 
As fond as we may be of certain traditions of learning and 
not others—a fondness that can certainly fall to the level 
of prejudice—ultimately our allegiance is neither to con-
ventional nor convenient wisdom. This is why our history 
has always been one of controversy as well as collusion. 
We are accused of heresy; people burn our books; dicta-
tors send us to the mines, or Siberia, to be re-educated. 
The Pythagoreans were thrown out of Croton. Socrates 
had to drink the hemlock. Twenty of Thomas Aquinas’s 
propositions were condemned. The Wycliffites of four-
teenth-century England were cultured at Oxford and later 
burned to death. The Brothers Grimm were thrown out 
of the University of Gottingen by the Duke of Hanover. 
Martin Luther King, Jr., PhD in Theology (Boston Uni-
versity) and author of several important books, including 
I Have a Dream, was jailed and also assassinated. And the 
“September Six” were not only excommunicated by the 
Mormon Church for studying its history, social policy, 
and sexually abusive treatment of women and children, 
they were also fired by Brigham Young University.26 
                                                                            
26 Knowledge is carefully guarded by the Mormons, according to 
the former Mormons who spoke to me about this matter. For 
example, because Mormon men know the secret names of their 
wives, they can call for them after death to join them in heaven. 
Mormon women have no comparable power/knowledge. Mor-
mons believe that “the glory of God is intelligence,” but this also 
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 As noted, the truth is far more mixed than this de-
scription of academic martyrdom would suggest. All in-
stitutions are susceptible to the conservatism of social 
learning; as Michel de Certeau puts it, “each ‘discipline’ 
maintains its ambivalence of being at once the law of a 
group and the law of a field of scientific research” (de 
Certeau 1988, 61). Academics are now, and always have 
been, in the grip of the group; and sometimes the re-
search that least interests us concerns ourselves, and how 
we might better act on behalf of our communities while 
maintaining our allegiance to “pure” knowledge. It is, 
therefore, particularly vital at this time in history that we 
further the self-reflection we so generously propose to 
others—through, for example, the kinds of teaching and 
research ongoing at UC-Santa Barbara and many other 
universities on the public humanities. My colleague Alan 
Liu has for years devoted himself to finding new ways to 
be humanist, digitally and otherwise; my colleague Chris-
topher Newfield, author of Unmaking the Public Universi-
ty (2011), runs a widely-respected weblog (with Michael 
Meranze from UCLA) on academic topics, Remaking the 
University; and my colleague Robert Samuels, author of 
Why Higher Education Should Be Free (2013), also main-
tains a similar weblog, Changing Universities.27  I have 
taught a number of courses on the public humanities, as 
Newfield is now doing in the field of critical university 
studies. All of us have learned from a long line of prede-
cessors (for example, Readings 1997, Engell 1999) and the 
continuing inspiration of figures like Stanton Glantz 
                                                                            
means, “don’t delve into the mysteries; the mysteries will take 
care of themselves.” 
27 For more about one of Alan Liu’s recent initiatives (with 
Geoffrey Rockwell and Melissa Terras), see “4 Humanities—
Advocating for the Humanities,” http://liu.english.ucsb.edu/ 
category/new-media-projects/. See, also, Newfield’s and Meran-
ze’s weblog, Remaking the University, http://utotherescue.blog 
spot.com/, and Samuels’s weblog, Changing Universities, http:// 
changinguniversities.blogspot.com/. 
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(UC-San Francisco, School of Medicine), an important 
advocate for the effects of secondhand smoke and for to-
bacco control, and Robert Meister (UC-Santa Cruz), who 
now advocates an academic activism that responds to the 
“financialization” of capital with financialized resistance 
(Meister 2013). No academic today, in whatever field, can 
afford to be ignorant of the historical, economic and po-
litical circumstances of his or her work, and every de-
partment and program should offer courses on these sub-
jects so that our students are also appropriately informed.   
Para-academic reflection, research, and activism—and 
I am arguing for enhancing their interconnections—
include creativity, as even a cursory glance at the BABEL 
Working Group’s website will demonstrate.28 Many new 
means of getting academic are now appearing, provoking 
fresh wonder (in me, at least) at the resourcefulness of the 
truth drive and the minds/brains that further it.29 I chose 
to publish Staying Alive with punctum books because 
open-access publishing is a brilliant way around the fail-
ure of academic and trade publishers to fend off corpo-
ratization and the consequent loss of quality (such as the 
ever-intensifying limits on page-length and reference ap-
paratus) and even corruption (see Fan 2012). Open-access 
publishing also helps us to resist growing administrative 
and corporate attempts to interfere with academic intel-
lectual property rights (as Meister puts it, academics, un-
like journalists, do not “work for hire,” and therefore le-
gally retain the right to publish their own material as they 
choose)—unless, as so many scientists have done, we sign 
away said rights on behalf of the corporations funding 
                                                                            
28 See BABEL Working Group, http://www.babelworkinggroup. 
org. 
29 See Joy and Neufeld (2007). Also see De Paulo et al. (2003) on 
the sufferings of liars, who “tell less compelling tales” than 
truth-tellers, and “make a more negative impression and are 
more tense” (74); and Grotstein (2004) on “The Implications of 
a Truth-Drive in Bion’s Theory of ‘O’.” 
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our research.30 When taxpayer money is also used in such 
projects, the “public” university becomes yet another cov-
ert means of transferring wealth from taxpayers to private 
corporations.  
Openness cannot guarantee fairness (only because 
nothing can), but in these days of plummeting transpar-
ency, it seems both strategic and joyous to embrace it. 
Share what you know. When you go to a committee meet-
ing and hear something interesting, tell someone else. 
The confidentiality requirements with respect to universi-
ty business, including and especially the unspoken, habit-
ual requirements, are absurd. The vast majority of univer-
sity “secrets” have nothing to do with national security or 
protecting the privacy of particular persons. Don’t keep 
secrets when there’s no good reason to do so. The pleas-
ure of being in the know, of being thought a good citizen, 
is an indulgence we can no longer afford. I once asked the 
Chair of UC-Santa Barbara’s Academic Senate Commit-
tee on finance and budget for some information and was 
told it was confidential, on no basis whatsoever; I had to 
get the Senate President to tell her she had no business 
keeping Senate business from a member of the Senate. 
Everyone has hundreds of stories like this. None of us can 
afford to be like that committee chair.  Unless something 
is stamped “confidential” and there are FBI agents hover-
ing in the hallways, we must always tell what we know. 
 I opened Staying Alive to companion essays by earli-
er-career colleagues partly because rank and status barri-
ers interfere too much with the connectivity academic 
communities need to build new strengths and new ways 
of living and knowledge-making in our benighted times. 
We inspire one another across boundaries of age and 
privilege, and now we can publish in ways consistent with 
the principles and communitarian pleasures of our re-
search. The memes and models in my own work grow 
                                                                            
30 The Public Library of Science (PLoS) is a welcome develop-
ment in this regard (http://www.plos.org/). 
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and change in the hands, minds, and brains of those who 
are remaking the discipline(s). The hybridity of Staying 
Alive (part monograph, part anthology) is meant to give 
form, in Suzanne Langer’s sense (1977), to the undead 
dynamism that John Milton ascribed to books, ideas and 
writers in Areopagitica (1644): “For Books are not abso-
lutely dead things, but doe contain a potencie of life in 
them, to be as active as that soule whose progeny they 
are.” Staying Alive means to further as well as give form 
to intertextual relationality and friendship. And many 
new academic forms far more innovative than this are 
appearing every day, as happened in the 1970s with Der-
rida’s Glas (1990). 
Both creative and critical thinking must begin at 
home. Academics are prone to self-righteousness—a van-
ity we share with the religious right—and if we do not 
keep ourselves honest, no one will. God is not on the side 
of locationalism (specific brain functions are located in 
specific areas of the brain), nor does Satan sponsor work 
on neuroplasticity (wherein different areas of the brain 
can be recruited to perform new functions). At least, 
there is no evidence for supernatural intervention on the-
se scores. Academic truths require evidence, logic, dissent 
and the forging of new working hypotheses. Faith is 
something else: it means the willingness to believe in the 
unseen and unverifiable, in what we cannot directly know. 
The Academy is not cultic, even if plenty of us are reli-
gious. But we are always tempted to mistake the know-
ledge we make for the last word on, say, cognition, or the 
laws of physics, and then along comes a Heisenberg, or an 
Antonio Damasio.  
We are as unconscious as any body or any thing of the 
forces that have formed us, of the lives of our own cells, of 
ancient, embodied memories and the transpersonal trans-
missions of our neighbors. But we should at least be 
aware that we do not know ourselves fully, and I say this 
not to lay claim to the privilege of enlightenment, but ra-
ther to gesture to the responsibility we have to keep our 
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knowledge disciplines open and unsettled. As Geoffrey 
Bennington has written about Derrida’s “university with-
out condition,” 
 
The University (and, more especially . . . the ‘Hu-
manities’) have a responsibility to foster events of 
thought that cannot fail to unsettle the University 
in its Idea of itself. For this to happen, the special 
institution that the University is must open itself 
up to the possibility of unpredictable events . . . in 
a way that always might seem to threaten the very 
institution that it is. On this account, the Universi-
ty is in principle the institution that ‘lives’ the pre-
carious chance and ruin of the institution as its 
very institutionality. (Bennington 2010, 28) 
 
Our awareness of the limits of our awareness guides our 
research, at least when we are at our best. We know that 
ongoing analyses of our reasons for asking the questions 
we ask and answering as we do helps us learn more about 
the research topics we pursue. But this does not make us 
popular, even amongst ourselves. We require critical thinking 
because we assert that, as mortal creatures, we have our lim-
its—we can’t remake the world according to our wishes, 
though we can certainly change some of its courses. We 
intervene in Reality in significant ways, but it always ex-
ceeds our ability to grasp and manage it, and we can only 
flout its obduracies up to a point. This is one reason why, 
at least from Pythagoras onward, knowledge-comm-
unities have so often had an ascetic, a “disciplinary” as-
pect—one that we tend, unfortunately, to idealize. We 
need endlessly to undo this idealization, which is one rea-
son for my own concern with discipline as a mode of en-
joyment, and my sympathy with current attempts to em-
phasize the ludic, experimental, experiential aspects of 
study. I hope we can further our understanding of critical 
thinking as a form of play, and vice-versa; our lives are the 
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richer when perceiving, thinking and feeling, along with 
stillness, playing and working, are fully interconnected. 
 Our habitual skepticism, however, coupled with the 
narrowness of our training, has a down side: exacerbation 
of the feeling of not-mattering that seems now to afflict 
creaturely subjectivity all over the world. All life matters, 
because of its rarity, variety, and uniqueness; I share the 
materials, experiential and otherwise, that make me what 
I am with a multitude of things and creatures, but “I” am 
an unrepeatable combination thereof; “I” am something 
that will never come again, at least in this universe. I love 
the idea that I am made and remade by astonishing flur-
ries of cooperative multicellular activity. I would not 
trade my brilliantly complex, loyal and hardworking im-
mune system for surgical knowledge (if I had to, which 
thankfully I don’t), nor my amazing brain, which I love 
just because it is a brain, and because I am so lucky to 
have one, for a computer, nor my nervous system, not 
even the soles of my feet, nor my pheromonal receptivity, 
for anything at all; prosthetics are brilliant achievements, 
but we should not allow their value to eclipse the really 
quite unbelievable achievement that is the human brain/ 
mind/body. Take the measure of, take pleasure and pride 
in, what an astonishing being you are. However much ed-
ucation or money you do or don’t have, however well or 
badly treated, you are a finely-wrought, irreplaceable, brilliant 
achievement of eons and eons of transformations in “vi-
brant matter”—Jane Bennett’s felicitous phrase (2010). 
 The recognition that we do not know ourselves fully is 
not incompatible with an appreciation of our brilliant 
complexity. Rather, the two go together: both are ac-
knowledgments of the Real, of that which exceeds signifi-
cation. In my view, the Real trenches on complexity, inso-
far as the latter designates a truly unmanageable, non-
totalizable potential for change.31 Complexity is a concept 
                                                                            
31 Complexity theory developed out of chaos theory; it models 
the dynamism of complex or “open” systems, wherein new de-
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whose social implications technocracy can only try to 
manage; and it is the complexity of knowledge-pro-
duction, and of the universities that shelter it, that will 
always exceed whatever the technocrats have planned for 
us. (Take over our universities? If it comes to that, we will 
start—and accredit—our own schools; indeed this process 
has already begun.32) While there are always “top-down” 
directives at work in complexity, they are also always buf-
feted and constrained by contingencies, copying “errors,” 
and strange attractors at a distance. Impulses to manage 
and quantify this effervescence are doomed to failure, 
though capable of doing very costly damage along the 
way. What makes non-denominational universities so 
important—and some denominational ones too—is the 
diversity and complexity of their values, goals, and exper-
tise. (The Right complains that we don’t teach creation-
ism or intelligent design; but that is because the scientific 
evidence does not point in that direction. Religious faith 
does. And anyway, for their part, right wing “Christian” 
schools don’t teach much evolutionary theory either. “Fair and 
balanced” always means that it’s the other people who 
should be fair and balanced.) Universities bring together 
hundreds of very different, sophisticated, ever-evolving 
methodologies, working environments, and research top-
ics, in the hope that interdisciplinary relations will (as 
studies of creativity suggest they will) spark previously 
unimaginable insights. Real knowledge is “emergent,” be-
cause, as noted, it is artifactual; it is made by living crea-
tures working together and against one another—playing, 
exploring and critiquing each other’s work across as well 
as within disciplines. Academic (inter)disciplines produce 
new understandings in the way all open (self-evolving) 
                                                                            
velopments “emerge” from interactions across and between 
networks of forces and events. See Waldrop 1992, 17. 
32 See, for example, The Brooklyn Institute of Social Research 
(http://thebrooklyninstitute.com/), The Saxifrage School (http:// 
saxifrageschool.org/), and the Urmadic University (http://www. 
theodessey.org/). 
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systems do, as evidenced by current rapproche-ments be-
tween the sciences and the humanities. However en-
trenched we are in our ways of doing things, we cross-
inspire each other, sometimes when we least expect it. 
Without the arts and humanities, our potential for scien-
tific and technological invention will be significantly com-
promised (and vice-versa); what must be evaluated is not 
simply what happens in one discipline or “division,” but 
what all disciplines accomplish together and against each 
other. 
 That complexity, of course, links us in a thousand 
million ways to our environs, and vice versa. Given what 
we know now about the biology of communication and 
social connection, about the simultaneity of propriocep-
tion and inter/exterioception,33 we should, more than ev-
er, understand that everything becomes part of our work, 
one way or another, and therefore it must always be a de-
liberate part of our work not simply to think critically 
about the workings of our own (embodied) minds, but also 
to reflect upon, and engage, our connectedness to wider 
communities, because they are always in our work. Politi-
cal and ethical engagements do not divert us from our 
work, as the right wing “reports” we have been consider-
ing would like us to believe. They are an inevitable and 
necessary part of it. And here lies more of the self-defeating 
(self-)destructivity, the death drive, that impels contempo-
rary “management” of universities and the interests those 
managers serve. It is a fact, not a piety, that exclusivity 
profits no one, not even those who most enjoy it. So the 
Academy needs to educate, not just the “public,” but the 
powerful, much more directly. It is essential that we com-
bat the policies that keep faculty away from trustees, re-
gents, donors, and alumni, as if we were bearers of infec-
tion. After all, we were once their professors. Western po-
                                                                            
33 “Proprioception” refers to our ability to perceive the moving 
parts of bodies, especially our own, as unified and purposive. 
Interoception and exteroception refer to perceptions of interior 
events and of the outside world, respectively. 
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litical writing has long made efforts to remind the wealthy 
and powerful (or those who would become so at any cost) 
of the laws of change and death—the very topic of Hans 
Holbein’s well-known anamorphic painting The Ambas-
sadors (1533). These reminders of the Real remain the 
responsibility (one of them, anyway) of any thinking per-
son. 
 The fact is that the wealthy are mad as hatters, just 
like the rest of us, and we are almost as out of touch with 
what goes on in their heads (and their shadow govern-
ments, foundations, and banks) as the people who love 
being screwed by them.34 What they have most in com-
mon, or hope they do, is the immunity that Esposito points out 
is the obverse of “community.” When Karen Rothmeyer, 
then of the Wall Street Journal, asked Richard Scaife why 
he gave so much money to the religious right, his re-
sponse was “you fucking Communist cunt, get out of here”—
they were outdoors at the time (Rothmeyer 1982; see also 
Rothmeyer 1998). For “The Family,” Hitler, Lenin and 
Jesus are all illustrious examples of the kind of power it 
wants for itself—“the power of a small core of people” 
(Sharlett 2008, 3). Sharlett reminds us, however, that de-
spite the Family’s “theological oddities”—“its concentric 
rings of secrecy, its fascination with megalomaniacs from 
Mao to Hitler, its conviction that being one of God’s cho-
sen provides diplomatic immunity”—the Family “is any-
thing but separate from the world” (Sharlett 2008, 57). 
Never mind the strange bedfellows problem; political or 
religious differences can always be overcome by reserving 
anew, by further esotericizing, core bonds, resources, and 
convictions, in the name of advancing, with other groups, 
ideas about “control” and how to maintain it. (There may 
be limits, however, after all: Mormons are forbidden to 
become Masons, lest, according to my native informants, 
                                                                            
34 On corporations and psychopathy, see Babiak and Hare 
(2007, 94–97); for a nuanced discussion of leadership and men-
tal illness, see Ghaemi (2011). 
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they discover the non-revelatory origins of so many of 
their practices, like the symbols on their underwear.) 
 The weird commonalities thus produced are a special-
ty of the Heritage Foundation. Even before Cribb, Cheney 
and their ilk began the “counter-offensive” against “col-
lege” in the 1980s, there were some strange days indeed. 
In the mid-1970s, Scaife’s choice for head of the Heritage 
Foundation, Edwin Feulner, imported Stuart Butler, a 
member of the British Fabian Society, and a number of 
other like-minded subjects of the Queen. In its early days, 
the Fabian Society, enchanted by the enlightenment and 
enterprise of Renaissance England (Henry VIII was quite 
the union-buster), advocated a “gradualist” socialism (i.e. 
social “reconstruction,” not revolution). Its Australian chapter 
was behind the “Half-Caste Act” that “saved” a generation 
of aboriginal children by taking them away from their 
parents (Robertson 2008).35 The Fabians advocated slum 
clearances, eugenics (sterilization of the weak), and health 
services that would assist in the formation of an “Imperial 
race,” one that would be more productive, disciplined and 
militant than the “stunted, anemic, demoralised denizens 
. . . of our great cities” (Semmel 1968, 85–90). Of course, 
they also wanted a national education system to help cul-
tivate this new race, because “it is in the classrooms . . . 
that the future battles of the Empire for commercial pros-
perity are already being lost” (Semmel 1968, 63; my em-
phasis). The British Labour Party was founded by the Fa-
bians to serve as its executive arm, so to speak. Ba’athism 
was its offshoot in the Middle East. It’s a funny old world. 
 Edward Spannaus, a longtime Scaife antagonist, thinks the 
Heritage Foundation’s socialist-conservative connection 
was based on a mutual “hatred of industrial capitalism” 
and its resistance to the charms of international financial 
and social engineering schemes. The subjection of indus-
try to said schemes does seem to have been a feature of 
                                                                            
35 See also Robertson 2006, 36, for discussion of Australia’s em-
phasis on “assimilation.” 
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life in the U.S. at least since the mid-1970s, but the con-
nection goes back to the 1930s, when Friedrich von Hay-
ek moved his “feudal, aristocratic,” monetarist “Austrian 
School” to the London School of Economics. Subsequent-
ly, von Hayek founded and headed the neo-liberal Mont 
Pelerin Society, of which Milton Friedman is a member. 
Scaife has also been funding Mont Pelerin’s spinoff think 
tanks in the U.S. (see Spannaus 1997). Seen from this per-
spective, there’s nothing particularly surprising about the 
religious Right’s embrace of Mitt Romney in the last pres-
idential election, as he is a prominent member of yet an-
other secretive power-net-work devoted to the “building-
up of Zion” (and Zion’s architectural correlate, the Tab-
ernacle), led by a President who receives the “continuing 
revelation” of Jesus Christ.  
 Not too long ago, Newsweek likened the Church of 
Latter Day Saints to “a sanctified multinational corpora-
tion—the General Electric of American religion, with 
global ambitions and an estimated net worth of $30 bil-
lion” (Kirn 2011). The net worth has to be “estimated” 
because the Church has not released a full financial state-
ment since 1959. Romney’s refusal, during his 2012 pres-
idential bid, to release in full his own financial statements 
and tax returns is, like Scaife’s entitled enjoyment of ob-
scenity and lamentable lack of chivalry, a claim to im-
munity that mimes the practices of his cult. This is sover-
eignty in the mode of what Bataille calls heterogeneity—
power’s pursuit of jouissance and the fascinating effects 
thereof on all us neighbors (see Fradenburg 2002, 84, 
270n9; Bersani 2008). Likewise, the core of Dick Cheney’s 
appeal has always been his refusal of accountability, not 
his respectability. Think of his remarkable contention 
that the Vice-President is not part of the executive branch 
of the U.S. government, and therefore is not bound by the 
same orders governing the release of classified infor-
mation as the White House (Rood 2007). Or his cool ex-
planation for why he didn’t serve in the armed forces dur-
ing the Vietnam War: “I had other priorities.” Or the way 
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he was protected by his Texas friends from any legal con-
sequences that might have flowed from unaccountably 
unloading his shotgun into a fellow quail hunter’s face. 
No lame excuses like Bill Clinton’s “I didn’t inhale” for 
Cheney; he knows how to recover from embarrassment: 
never abandon the image of arbitrary and unstoppable 
power. It isn’t true that the cover-up is always worse than 
the crime; sometimes the cover-up is the very thing that 
the most disenfranchised most admire. As Lynyrd Sky-
nyrd famously and confusedly put it in their song “Sweet 
Home Alabama”: “Watergate does not bother me; does 
your conscience bother you?” 
 I once met (in 1996) a Dartmouth alum, an arbitra-
geur who was also a Catharist. He showed me his very 
thick Cathar bible, but would not allow me to look in it, 
despite my credentials as a medievalist who had at one 
time studied the Albigensian Crusade. He explained that 
he had been drawn to Catharism partly because, to its 
way of thinking, it didn’t matter what you did on earth; 
earth is just the realm of matter and evil, and no one is 
responsible in it or to it. Again we find the same love of 
secrecy and immunity—the same claims to exceptional-
ism and esotericism. And the same distaste for transpar-
ency, connectivity, exoteric knowledge, and community. 
The Mormon Church has a ritual in which its members 
must agree to be disemboweled if they reveal their secret 
names to the wrong people. It is a death cult, which wor-
ships a certain style of power: the power to hold in re-
serve, to deprive, keep secret, and control, rather than de-
velop some healthy respect for the Real. We are indeed 
speaking of fantasies of omnipotence, which always fail to 
appreciate the force of the Øther (of the non-totalizable 
symbolic order); of megalomania, whose ambitions, as 
Freud noted, become vast in proportion to traumatic nar-
cissistic injury (Freud 1958). How can we help to depro-
gram the rich? Withdraw taxpayer assistance from all col-
leges and universities that continue to permit fraternities, 
sororities, dining clubs and secret societies to flourish on 
STAYING ALIVE      41 
 
their campuses. Exclusionary societies on college and uni-
versity campuses culture the think tanks and CEOs of the 
future. They are in no way entitled to associate them-
selves with those colleges and universities, and no public 
monies should be devoted to their well-being, directly or 
indirectly. Never mind substance abuse or rape; boards of 
trustees protect the student right to party because exclu-
sionary societies are the petri dishes of occult political 
and economic power. Let’s party in the open instead. 
 Insofar as we para-academics are committed to the 
production of knowledge and to the impossibility of fin-
alizing it, our moment demands that we “learn to think 
the present, the now that we inhabit . . . as irreducibly 
not-one” (Chakrabarty 2000, 249).36 This call is urgent 
because our moment is characterized by a simultaneous 
overvaluation of modernity in the form of technology’s 
promise of immunity, and hatred of modernity’s demo-
cratizing and demystifying tendencies (which hatred we 
are then asked to project onto Islam). Medievalists are all 
too familiar with these melancholic cults and cultivations 
of power: Scaife’s pride in being able to trace his family 
back to medieval England (so could most of the Brewsters 
of the world, with DNA testing); Catharism for capita-
lists; the eponymous “Fabian the Delayer”; Freemason-
ry’s preoccupation with Solomon’s Temple, Jerusalem, 
the Crusades and the Templars; nearly everybody’s des-
cent from one of the Twelve Tribes of Israel. It’s all back 
to the future. Is it a symptom of this melancholic am-
bivalence that contemporary threats to academic free-
dom are spearheaded by Israeli antagonism toward Mid-
dle Eastern scholars and open campus discussions of the 
Palestinian “question”? (see Kurwa 2012).  
 This intense libidinal cathexis of the Old Testament 
by Christian sectarians, audible everywhere on talk radio 
                                                                            
36Postcolonial theory and Medieval Studies have been engaged 
for a while now in a rich dialogue about “modernity”; see, for 
example, Cohen (2000, 2008), Davis (2008), and Davis and Alt-
schul (2009).  
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and in the Holy Land itself, is familiar to medievalists for 
having accompanied nearly every militant, persecuting 
turn of events in the European Middle Ages. The Family’s 
seminars on “Biblical Capitalism” are another example; 
so is John Brown, of Dallas, Texas, who founded Zion Oil 
because he was persuaded by God, by certain verses in 
Genesis and Deuteronomy, and by the evangelist Jim 
Spillman’s “treasure map” of the Jews’ ancient tribal terri-
tories, to begin drilling on Maanit, an inland plain north-
east of Tel Aviv. His geologist, Stephen Pierce, also a 
born-again Christian, said “there is science to support 
their faith in this project”; according to USA Today, an 
article of his in the “leading industry publication Oil and 
Gas Journal” notes Maanit’s three geological reefs, for-
mations “whose cavities and pockets can be [sic] full of 
oil” (Krauss 2005). At about the same time that Brown 
gained notoriety, thousands of evangelical Christians 
marched on the West Bank in celebration of Israel’s cap-
ture of east Jerusalem in the 1967 war; they were de-
scribed by the Seattle Post-Intelligencer as “fervent Zion-
ists who believe [that the] return [of the Jews] to the bib-
lical land of Israel will speed the Second Coming of 
Christ” (Copans 2005). This notion of the conversion of 
the Jews as necessary if not sufficient to the Apocalypse is 
an Augustinian position (as is the doctrine of “correc-
tion” as a form of love), and it is also a Mormon position: 
now, in the “last moment of the world,” comes the 
prophesied one (Mitt Romney), who, had he won the 
election, might have redeemed America (for Mormons, of 
course). It was hoped that Romney’s fulfillment of messi-
anic prophecy would start off the final millennium, dur-
ing which the Jews would finally bow down to Jesus and 
confess their errors. This is why Romney wants Jerusalem 
to be the capital of Israel; Israel has to be supported in 
every way, no matter what it does (immunity again), be-
cause the Jews are also the Mormons’ ancestors, the first 
chosen people (it’s a Twelve Tribes thing); the Jews are 
just currently mistaken chosen people, who will be given 
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the opportunity to bow the knee, and confess their errors. 
For some reason (see below), Israel thinks it wise policy 
to ally with such people; if they knew anything about me-
dieval history, they might more wisely hesitate to do so. 
 A reasonable humility might suggest the dangers of 
trying to speed up God’s providence—certainly Fabian 
the Delayer might not have approved. But never mind; 
militant theology has for centuries told us otherwise. The 
past is revivified to force God’s hand in the name of a fu-
ture that will really propel the “purified remnant” to-
wards the New Jerusalem (Weber 1999, 52–53, 77). Being 
one of the elect means having immunity. These days the 
elect are so impatient that they can hardly wait to bypass 
death; they want to get it over with, they want the “living 
beyond” death that delivers the biggest all-time rush of 
aliveness (see Rickels 1991, 73). They’re dying to frack the 
planet in order to fuel the future. Their solution to the 
energy crisis? Keep drilling, because what is buried in the 
earth is sublime; it is ready to be alive again, to be fire, 
after matter is destroyed. Again, the death cult: this is one 
reason why so much Mormon ritual involves tracing ge-
nealogies and baptizing the dead; both Hitler and Musso-
lini have, by such means, been invited to Mormon heaven 
(which is the only heaven). There are even proxy wedding 
ceremonies for the newly baptized dead; maybe Eva 
Braun and Hitler are finally living in undead wedded 
bliss. We are speaking both of forwardness and of con-
trolling reserves, of propulsion and security technology; 
for capital today, these are the most significant defenses 
against vulnerability and the uncertainty that lies ahead. 
The exceptionalism and esotericism associated with the 
premodern past by our own day’s death-cults of power—
the dark side, you could say, of contemporary medieval-
ism—is being acted out, rather than analyzed, everywhere 
we look. 
 We have to put a stop to megalomaniacal capitalism, 
by funding projects that enhance the present experience of 
living in preference (if we are forced to choose) to those 
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meant to prepare invulnerable (immune) bodies for the 
day when the sun goes nova. To do this, academics have to 
dig, not for oil and gas, but for the crazies who are plan-
ning liftoff in the shadows. We need scholarly hacking. 
Again, I am not arguing conspiracy, but the reverse. 
While alliances are constantly being forged among the 
death cults of contemporary capitalism—as noted, said 
cults share a certain understanding of control and exclu-
sivity—none of them really thinks the adherents to any 
cult other than their own have the slightest chance of 
gaining control of the world or getting into heaven. This 
is a major weakness. However much any one cult may 
think it can control the world, none knows that it is in a 
world whose realities—including rival cults—far outstrip 
it. Transparency is not a political solution in and of itself, 
and we must remember that shadows nurture beautiful 
dreams as well as nightmares; but in the early 21st century, 
it is necessary thereto. Transparency is one of the most im-
portant effects of the truth-drive, and should therefore be 
fought for and practiced by every scholar, scientist, thinker, 





Adams, J. (1850-1856). “Letter to John Jebb, London, 10 Sep-
tember 1785.” In The Works of John Adams, Second Presi-
dent of the United States. 10 vols., 9:538–543. Boston: Little, 
Brown. 
Agamben, G. (2005). The State of Exception, trans. Kevin Attell. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ames, M. (2011). “How UC Davis Chancellor Linda Katehi 
Brought Oppression Back to Greece’s Universities.” naked 




Babiak, P. and R. Hare (2007). Snakes in Suits: When Psycho-
paths Go to Work. New York: Harper. 
STAYING ALIVE      45 
 
Bennett, J. (2010). Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
Bennington, G. (2010). “Foundations.” In Not Half No End: Mil-
itantly Melancholic Essays in Honor of Jacques Derrida, 19–
34. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Bersani, L. (2008). “The Power of Evil and the Power of Love.” 
In L. Bersani and A. Phillips, Intimacies, 57–88. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Butler, J. (2004). Precarious Life: The Powers of Mourning and 
Violence. London: Verso. 
Califano, J.A., Jr. (1970). The Student Revolution: A Global Con-
frontation. New York: W. W. Norton. 
Carrel, P. (2010). The Handbook of Risk Management: Imple-
menting a Post-Crisis Corporate Culture. Chichester: John 
Wiley & Sons. 
Chakrabarty, D. (2000). Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial 
Thought and Historical Difference. Princeton University 
Press. 
Cheney, L. (1992). Telling the Truth. Washington, DC: National 
Endowment for the Humanities. 
Cohen, J.J., ed. (2000). The Postcolonial Middle Ages. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Cohen, J.J., ed. (2008). Cultural Diversity in the British Middle 
Ages: Archipelago, Island, England. New York: Palgrave Macmil-
lan. 
Coley, R. and D. Lockwood (2012). Cloud Time: The Inception 
of the Future. Winchester, UK: Zero Books. 
Copans, L. (2005). “Evangelicals, Jews Are Kindred Spirits.” As-
sociated Press News Archive, 24 October; http://www.ap 
newsarchive.com/2005/Evangelicals-Jews-Are-Kindred- 
Spirits/id-72402c2a0269dc23c92d7b0f1a56c23b. 
Copulus, M.R. (1984). “The LaRouche Network.” The Heritage 
Foundation, July 19: http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/ 
1984/07/the-larouche-network.  
de Certeau, M. (1988). The Writing of History, trans. Tom Con-
ley. New York: Columbia University Press. 
Davis, K. (2008). Periodization and Sovereignty: How Ideas of 
Feudalism and Secularization Govern the Politics of Time. 
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.  
Davis, K. and N. Altschul, eds. (2009). Medievalisms in the Post-
colonial World: The Idea of the “Middle Ages” Outside Eu-
rope. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
46 DRIVING EDUCATION 
 
De Paulo, B., et al. (2003). “Cues to Deception.” Psychological 
Bulletin 129: 74–118. 
Derrida, J. (1990). Glas, trans. J.P. Leavey and R. Rand. Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press. 
Engell, J. and A. Dangerfield (1998). “The Market-Model Uni-
versity: Humanities in the Age of Money.” Harvard Maga-
zine (May-June): 48–55, 111. 
Engell, J. (1999). The Committed Word: Literature and Public 
Values. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 
Engell, J. and A. Dangerfield (2005). Saving Higher Education in 
the Age of Money. Charlottesville: University of Virginia 
Press. 
Esposito, R. (2011). Immunitas, trans. Zakiya Hanafi. Cam-
bridge, UK: Polity. 
European Ministers of Education (1999). “The Bologna Declara-
tion of 19 June 1999,” http://www.bologna-berlin2003.de/ 
pdf/bologna_declaration.pdf.  
Fan, X (2012). “University Publishers Fined Over Bribery Scan-
dal.” Cherwell, July 8: http://www.cherwell.org/news/top 
stories/2012/07/08/university-publishers-fined-over-bribery 
-scandal. 
Fradenburg, L.O. (1991). City, Marriage, Tournament: Arts of 
Rule in Late Medieval Scotland. Madison: University of Wis-
consin Press. 
Fradenburg, L.O.A. (2002). Sacrifice Your Love: Psychoanalysis, 
Historicism, Chaucer. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
Freud, S. (1958). “Psychoanalytic Notes on an Autobiographical 
Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides).” In 
The Standard Edition of the Psychological Works of Sigmund 
Freud, ed. James Strachey, Vol. 12, 33–82. London: Hogarth 
Press. 
Galloway, A. (2006). Protocol: How Control Exists After Decen-
tralization. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Galloway, A. and E. Thacker (2007). The Exploit: A Theory of 
Networks. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ghaemi, N. (2011). A First-Rate Madness: Uncovering the Links 
Between Leadership and Mental Illness. New York: Penguin. 
Grotstein, J. (2004). “The Seventh Servant: The Implications of a 
Truth Drive in Bion’s Theory of ‘O’.” International Journal 
of Psychoanalysis 85: 1081–1101. 
STAYING ALIVE      47 
 
Hedges, C. (2012). “Criminalizing Dissent.” truthdig: drilling 
beneath the headlines, August 13: http://www.truthdig.com/ 
report/item/criminalizing_dissent_20120813/. 
Hoffmeyer, J. (2008). Biosemiotics: An Examination into the 
Signs of Life and the Life of Signs. Scranton: University of 
Scranton Press. 
Howard-Jones, P. (2010). Introducing Neuroeducational Re-
search: Neuroscience, Education and the Brain from Contexts 
to Practice. New York: Routledge. 
Hundley, K. (2011). “Billionaire’s Role in Hiring Decisions at 
Florida State University Raises Questions.” Tampa Bay 
Times, May 10: http://www.tampabay.com/news/business/ 
billionaires-role-in-hiring-decisions-at-florida-state-university-
raises/1168680. 
International Commission on Higher Education in Greece 
(2011). “Report of the International Commission on Higher 
Education in Greece,” February; available at: Not the Major-
ity Opinion [weblog of J. Panaretos]: http://notthemajority 
opinion.blogspot.com/2011/04/report-of-international-
advisory.html. 
Jacobs, J. (1985). Cities and the Wealth of Nations. New York: 
Vintage. 
Johnson, D. (2003). “Who’s Behind the Attack on Liberal Pro-
fessors?” History News Network, February 10; http://hnn.us/ 
articles/1244.html. 
Joy, E.A. and C.M. Neufeld (2007). “A Confession of Faith: 
Notes Toward a New Humanism.” Journal of Narrative 
Theory 37: 161–190. 
Kirn, W. (2011). “Mormons Rock!” Newsweek, June 5: http:// 
www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2011/06/05/mormons
-rock.print.html.  
Kozlowski, K. and M. Hicks (2012). “Wayne State’s Tenure 
Proposal Stirs Controversy.” The Detroit News, July 23: 
http://www.detroitnews.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20 
1207230100/METRO/207230390. 
Krauss, L. (2005). “His Mission: Seek and Ye Shall Find Oil.” 
USA Today, May 18: http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/ 
world/2005-05-18-israel-oil_x.htm. 
Kurwa, R. (2012). “How the UC Administration Censors 
Students and Faculty Who Stand Up for Student Rights.” 
Mondoweiss: The War of Ideas in the Middle East, August 
23: http://mondoweiss.net/2012/08/timeline-how-the-uc-ad 




Larouche, L. and D. Goldman (1980). The Ugly Truth About 
Milton Friedman. New York: New Benjamin Franklin 
House.  
Langer, S. (1977). Feeling and Form. New York: Longman. 
Lee, H.K. and K. Fagan (2012). “Pepper-sprayed UC Davis 
Protesters Won’t Be Charged.” San Francisco Chronicle, 
January 23: http://www.sfgate.com/default/article/Pepper-
sprayed-UC-Davis-activists-won-t-be-charged-2664257.php. 
Lipton, S. (1999). Images of Intolerance: The Representation of 
Jews and Judaism in the Bible Moralisée. Berkeley: Universi-
ty of California Press. 
Margulis, L. (1998). Symbiotic Planet: A New Look at Evolution. 
New York: Basic Books. 
Meister, R. (2013). “Liquidity.” Unpublished paper, presented at 
the “Futures of Finance” Summer Institute, June 11, New 
York City, New York, and at the “Cultures of Finance” Con-
ference, August 15, Stockholm, Sweden. 
Mesiter, R. (2012). “Brown and Yudof Bail on the Master Plan.” 
Keep California’s Promise, July 1: http://keepcalifornias 
promise.org/2628/brown-and-yudof-bail-on-the-master-plan. 
Messer-Davidow, E. (1993). “Manufacturing the Attack on Lib-
eralized Higher Education.” Social Text 36: 40–80. 
Milton, J. (1644). Areopagitica. Project Gutenberg: http://www. 
gutenberg.org/files/608/608-h/608-h.htm. 
Nash, G.B., C. Crabtree, and R.E. Dunn (2000). History on Trial: 
Culture Wars and the Teaching of the Past. New York: Vin-
tage. 
Newfield, C. (2011). Unmaking the Public University: The Forty-
Year Assault on the Middle Class. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Nussbaum, M. (2010). Not for Profit: Why Democracy Needs the 
Humanities. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Pape, R. (2005) Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Ter-
rorism. New York: Random House. 
Pritscher, C.F. (2010). Einstein and Zen: Learning to Learn 
(Counterpoints: Studies in the Postmodern Theory of Educa-
tion). New York: Peter Lang. 
PRWEB (2011). “Kroll Announces Top Ten Cyber Security 
Trends for 2012.” PRWeb.com, December 14: http:// www. 
com/releases/TopCyberSecurityTrends/2012/prweb90395 
07.htm. 
STAYING ALIVE      49 
 
Readings, B. (1997). The University in Ruins. Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press. 
Reuter, C. (2004). My Life is a Weapon: A Modern History of 
Suicide Bombing, trans. Helena Ragg-Kirby. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press. 
Rickels, L. (1991). The Case of California. Baltimore: Johns Hop-
kins University Press. 
Robertson, G. (2008). “We should say sorry, too.” The Guardi-
an, February 13: http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/ 
feb/14/australia. 
Rood, J. (2007). “Cheney Power Grab: Says White House Rules 
Don’t Apply to Him,” ABC News Blogs, June 21: http://abc 
news.go.com/blogs/headlines/2007/06/cheney -power-gr/. 
Rothmeyer, K. (1982). “Citizen Scaife.” Harvard Square Library: 
http://www.harvardsquarelibrary.org/speakout/scaife.html. 
Abridged from H.F. Vetter, Speak Out Against the New 
Right (Boston: Beacon Press). 
Rothmeyer, K. (1998). “The Man Behind the Mask.” Salon, 
April 7: http://www.salon.com/news/1998/04/07news.html. 
Samuels, R. (2013). Why Public Higher Education Should Be 
Free: How To Decrease Cost and Increase Quality at Ameri-
can Universities. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press. 
Savage, J.E. (n.d.). “The Role of Tenure in Higher Education.” 
Brown University, Computer Science Dept.: http://cs. 
brown.edu/~jes/papers/tenure.html. 
Schwartz, Amy E. (1992). “Some Politics at the NEH.” The 
Washington Post, September 8, A 21. 
Scott, D.L. (2012). “How the American University Was Killed, 
In Five Easy Steps.” The Homeless Adjunct [weblog] August 
12: http://junctrebellion.wordpress.com/2012/08/12/how-
the-american-university-was-killed-in-five-easy-steps/. 
Semmel, B. (1968). Imperialism and Social Reform: English So-
cial-Imperial Thought 1895-1914. New York: Anchor. 
Sharlett, J. (2008). The Family: The Secret Fundamentalism at 
the Heart of American Power. New York: Harper-Collins. 
Sizemore, B. (2012). “Ex-Blackwater Faces Lawsuit Over New 
Name, Academi.” The Virginian Pilot, July 7; http://hampton 
roads.com/2012/07/exblackwater-faces-lawsuit-over-new 
-name-academi. 
Spannaus, E. (1997). “Richard Mellon Scaife: Who Is He Real-
ly?” The Executive Intelligence Review, March 21: http://american 
_almanac.tripod.com/scaife.htm. 
50 DRIVING EDUCATION 
 
Strauss, V. (2011). “Did FSU Let Billionaire Buy Professor-
ships?” The Washington Post, May 16; http://www. 
washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/post/did-fsu-
let-billionaire-buy-professorships/2011/05/15/AFwzdR4G_blog.html. 
Thacker, E. (2004). Biomedia. Minneapolis: University of Min-
nesota Press. 
Virilio, P. (2006). The Information Bomb. London: Verso. 
Waldrop, M.M. (1992). Complexity: The Emerging Science at the 
Edge of Order and Chaos. New York: Simon and Schuster. 
Weber, E. (1999). Apocalypses: Prophecies, Cults, and Millennial 
Beliefs Through the Ages. Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-
sity Press. 
Xu, D. and S. Jaggers (2013a). “Adaptability to Online Learning: 
Differences Across Types of Students and Academic Subject 
Areas” [CCRC Working Paper], Columbia University: Aca-
demic Commons: http://academiccommons.columbia.edu/ 
item/ac:157286. 
Xu, D. and S. Jaggers (2013b). “The Impact of Online Learning 
on Students’ Course Outcomes: Evidence from a Large 
Community and Technical College System.” Economics of 














AN ARMY OF LOVERS CAN BE BEATEN. These things 
appear on the walls of the Red district in the 
course of the night. Nobody can track down the 
author or painter for any of them, leading you to 
suspect they’re one and the same. Enough to make 
you believe in a folk consciousness. They are not 
slogans so much as texts, revealed in order to be 
thought about, expanded on, translated into action 
by the people . . . . 
Thomas Pynchon, Gravity’s Rainbow 
 
 
Late in the first part of Thomas Pynchon’s Gravity’s 
Rainbow, Leni Pökler stands at the window in the damp 
Berlin night. She’s left her husband and is on the run with 
her daughter, who sleeps in a corner of the safe-house on 
a heap of old communist magazines. The city’s stale, fun-
gal vitality seeps into the room, across its stained walls, 
into the clammy chunk of bread passed from hand to 
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hand. It seems simultaneously to smother any revolu-
tionary spark in the Red district and to enfold its 
potential, to nestle and shelter it. The ambivalence of the 
mood—suspended between the futility and the tender 
possibility of revolutionary resistance—vibrates in the 
single snatch of graffiti glimpsed on the walls: AN ARMY 
OF LOVERS CAN BE BEATEN. 
 I was reminded of this passage, and of Pynchon’s 1973 
novel more generally, in reading Aranye Fradenburg’s 
urgent, thoughtful essay “Driving Education.” 1973 was 
the year, incidentally, as Fradenburg reminds us, when 
the tanks rolled in to Athens Polytechnic, suppressing 
campus protests against the Greek military junta. The 
biography of Linda Katehi, the Greek-American chan-
cellor of the University of California, Davis since 2009, 
links one violent suppression to another: namely, the 
Greek tanks Katehi witnessed, but did not oppose, in 
1973 and the point-blank pepper-spraying of UC-Davis 
student activists in 2011, under Katehi’s leadership. Fra-
denburg describes how the chancellor’s career links 
“securitization” and neoliberal educational reforms in 
Greece and California, forty years ago and today. The task 
of picturing such connections—networks of share-holder 
profits, of “risk” and “risk management,” paranoia, emer-
gency, fascism, violence, and precarity—is assumed both 
by Pynchon’s novel and Fradenburg’s essay. “I am not 
speaking of conspiracy; I am speaking of an ‘emergent’ 
phenomenon,” Fradenburg writes. The “emergent” situ-
ation “certainly has concentrations of forces, but no single 
center point from which domination radiates.” Likewise, 
Pynchon’s novel inscribes paranoia but withholds the 
singular conspiracy that would justify it: “But I tell you 
there is no such message, no such home” (Pynchon 1973, 
148–149).  
 Pynchon’s novel remains one of the great documents 
for imagining the capitalism we continue to inhabit: the 
decentralized omnipresence of corporations, the “creative 
destruction” by which this infrastructure extends itself, 
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and the aping of the web of globalized connections in (as 
Fradenburg writes) the “exceptionalism and esotericism 
associated with the premodern past by our own day’s 
death-cults of power—the dark side, you could say, of 
contemporary medievalism—[that] is being acted out, 
rather than analyzed, everywhere we look.” But Gravity’s 
Rainbow also resonates with Fradenburg’s larger corpus 
insofar as it is a vast anatomy of play, and the play of 
desire, within frameworks of coercion. In Pynchon’s 
novel, playfulness is a catalyst for narrative action as well 
as the electric charge in the text’s aesthetic plasma. 
Fradenburg’s brilliant accounts of medieval literature and 
courtly culture have been exemplary in their ability to 
think eros within the matrices of constraint—and to 
explore how “restraint, sacrifice, duty, ‘containment,’ are 
forms taken by desire” (Fradenburg 2002, 7). Play is 
increasingly central to Fradenburg’s conceptions of 
cultural and scholarly practice. “I hope we can further 
understand critical thinking as a form of play, and vice 
versa,” Fradenburg writes. “Innovation always takes the 
form of manifest enjoyment of the signifier’s powers” 
(Fradenburg 2009, 93). In joining systemicity to play and 
imperative to pleasure, Pynchon’s novel and Fraden-
burg’s scholarly corpus converge. 
 The epigraph on the first page of Gravity’s Rainbow 
comes from the Nazi-turned-NASA-scientist Wernher 
von Braun, shortly before the 1969 Apollo moon launch: 
“Nature does not know extinction; all it knows is 
transformation. Everything science has taught me, and 
continues to teach me, strengthens my belief in the 
continuity of our spiritual existence after death.” Attach-
ed to von Braun’s name, the novel’s inaugural words (its 
epigraph) stage the queasy homologies of natural trans-
formation, mystical consolation, and the technocratic “flex-
ibility” that repurposes a Nazi weapons expert to put a man 
on the moon. How might we insist on the distinction 
between late-captialist flexibility and the potentially liberatory 
capacities for transformation? This is among the ques-
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tions that the essays in Staying Alive implicitly pose as 
they explore the ability to change that Fradenburg else-
where calls “plasticity” and “resilience” (Fradenburg 2011b).  
 While much of Fradenburg’s recent work has focused 
on the adaptations that art and play foster, “Driving Edu-
cation” performs what may be a necessary accompan-
iment to aesthetic imagination: a critical investigation of 
the social world that makes those practices possible or 
impossible, allows them to thrive or renders them pre-
carious. Aside from carrying out such a critical investi-
gation, “Driving Education” presents the claim that such 
self-awareness is integral to scholarly research. The 
irreducible and finally inexhaustible complexity out of 
which our knowledge emerges should appear as a dimen-
sion of that knowledge: 
 
everything becomes part of our work, one way or 
another, and therefore it must always be a delib-
erate part of our work not simply to think crit-
ically about the workings of our own (embodied) 
minds, but also to reflect on, and engage, our con-
nectedness to wider communities, because they are 
in our work.  
 
Since we can never get to the bottom of the “the forces 
that have formed us,” as Fradenburg writes, we have a 
“responsibility . . . to keep our knowledge disciplines 
opened and unsettled.” In “Driving Education,” this res-
ponsibility entails mapping and describing that “edge of a 
knife” on which the future of the humanities teeters. The 
endeavor continues, after a fashion, the psychoanalytic 
project Fradenburg carried out so well in Sacrifice Your 
Love: Psychoanalysis, Historicism, Chaucer, insofar as it 
follows the premise that “the un/conscious desire of the 
observer changes the object of observation, and analysis 
of this desire can produce knowledge about the object” 
(Fradenburg 2002, 47). Such epistemic inextricability of 
subject and object resonates with Stefan Collini’s recent 
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account of knowledge in the humanities: “no starting-
point is beyond reconsideration, because no assumptions 
(about how societies change or how people act or how 
meanings mean) are beyond challenge, because no 
vocabulary has an exclusive monopoly” (Collini 2012, 
66). Insofar as our knowledge-production is intricated 
with malleable identities, communities, and historical 
understandings, its premises remain radically open to re-
making. 
 Viewed from another perspective, a book like Staying 
Alive could appear to be extra- or meta-disciplinary, stan-
ding over and apart from the standard production of aca-
demic knowledge. For instance, Stanley Fish argues that 
disciplinary self-understanding is necessarily extrinsic to 
scholarship: 
 
[C]an you simultaneously operate within a 
practice and be self-consciously in touch with the 
conditions that enable it? The answer could be yes 
only if you could achieve a reflective distance from 
those conditions while still engaging in the prac-
tice; but once the conditions enabling a practice 
become the object of analytic attention . . . , you 
are engaging in another practice (the practice of 
reflecting on the conditions of a practice you are 
not now practicing) . . . . Once you turn, for exam-
ple, from actually performing literary criticism to 
examining the ‘network of forces and factors’ that 
underlie the performance, literary criticism is no 
longer what you are performing. (Fish 1994, 240)  
 
What Fish does not allow for is that a scholarly text, or a 
body of writings, may encode a process for incorporating 
“practice” and “reflection.” It is not the work of a mo-
ment, a flash of comprehending both oneself and one’s 
object. Instead, as Fradenburg avers, such a process is 
“about signifiying and thereby about becoming. It isn’t so 
much about finishing.” The movements of this know-
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ledge-production are “counter-traumatic,” insofar as they 
“permit change, tolerate the frustrations of process, and 
therefore address anxiety” (Fradenburg 2011a, 57). Fra-
denburg’s whole body of work, and Staying Alive in 
particular, provide a practical rejoinder to Fish’s claim 
that only an abrupt coincidence of scholarly practice and 
self-reflection will do. Issues that may well seem outside 
of disciplinary inquiry turn out to be right at the heart of 
academic knowledge, “in our work.”  
 The present essay responds to Fradenburg’s “Driving 
Education”—tracing an echo, identifying a genre, and 
giving a report. The echo is the one shared with Pyn-
chon’s “army of lovers,” a phrase that vibrates with the 
same chords of resistance, vulnerability, playfulness, and 
eros as do the pages of Staying Alive. An “army of lovers,” 
after all, is one way (a sentimental, but perhaps ener-
gizing, way) of naming those who would defend and 
support the humanities and fine arts, or fight for spec-
ulative thought and the study of the past. The genre in 
which I locate “Driving Education” is what I am going to 
call “academic-activist reflexivity.” Finally, I offer a report 
on three of the “publics” addressed, and in part con-
structed, by academic-activist writings: those of citizens, 
of workers, and of amateurs. 
 “Academic-activist reflexivity” is admittedly a clunky 
name, and I would welcome other terms to categorize the 
critical accounts of higher education currently being arti-
culated in blogs, books, articles, tweets, talks, and other 
formats, including direct action. While there have always 
been “activist” texts concerning the state of higher edu-
cation, the ascendance of digital media has transformed 
the scale and scope of the conversation. A broader range 
of those involved in post-secondary education can par-
ticipate in the discussion and publish—make public—
their perspectives and analyses. While “genre” may be too 
narrow and delimited a category for what I’m describing, 
and “discourse” too broad, the important point is that a 
set of commonalities are shared across the texts of “aca-
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demic-activist reflexivity.” I’ll draw attention to a few. 
First, while these numerous accounts of higher edu-
cation differ widely, they tend to express dissatisfaction 
with neoliberal changes to academic life—that is, with the 
ways in which higher education has been rendered in-
creasingly amenable to (if not indistinguishable from) 
commercial and financial markets. Second, academic-
activist writings produce dialogic coherence by cross-linking, 
or (to use a more medieval term) compiling, sources: by 
retweeting, collating links in a blog, and selecting and 
organizing points of knowledge from the frenetic infor-
mation landscape. These practices give rise to the sense of 
a shared project. Fradenburg’s “Driving Education” is an 
example of this compilatory generosity; it draws on an 
especially broad selection of sources—journalistic, scholarly, 
theoretical, documentary, electronic, print, traditionally author-
itative, seemingly ephemeral . . . . 
 Third, these writings are activist insofar as they seek, 
explicitly or implicitly, to mobilize collective change in 
higher education. They pursue this end largely through 
critique: by giving an account of the kind of thing that 
higher education is right now—what configurations of 
persons, practices, moneys, attitudes, affects, and tech-
nologies it mobilizes—and identifying the consequences 
and the meanings of these situations. I would suggest that 
activist-academic writings offer counter-evidence to the 
rebuke of scholarly critique recently made by, among 
others, Bruno Latour1 and Sharon Marcus and Stephen 
Best.2 Such anti-critical polemics tend to discount the 
                                                                            
1 For instance: “what performs a critique cannot also compose. It 
is really a mundane question of having the right tools for the 
right job. With a hammer (or a sledgehammer) in hand you can 
do a lot of things: break down walls, destroy idols, ridicule 
prejudices, but you cannot repair, take care, assemble, reassem-
ble, stitch together. It is no more possible to compose with the 
paraphernalia of critique than it is to cook with a seesaw” 
(Latour 2010). See also Latour 2004.  
2 Best and Marcus offer tendentious caricatures of critique’s 
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political efficacy of knowledge about knowledge claims. 
However, this dismissal tends to pay attention only to the 
informational content of academic-activist writings, not 
to their rhetorical dimensions. They also communicate to 
someone. They rely on their ability to call upon and affect 
an audience—a potentially politicized collective. The wide 
range of formats, vocabularies, and modes of address 
characteristic of academic-activist reflexivity suggest that 
the effect of the genre is to pluralize and expand who we 
talk to when we talk about higher ed. In other words, 
these writings help construct new, and collective, subjects 
of address. The rhetorical work of “constructing publics” 
provides one means of answering Eve Kosofsky Sedg-
wick’s call for the tactical analysis of critique, of whether 
it empowers or merely diverts us: “What does knowledge 
do—the pursuit of it, the having and exposing of it, the 
receiving again of knowledge one already knows? How, in 
short, is knowledge performative, and how best does one 
move among its causes and effects?” (Sedgwick 2002, 
124). The value of academic-activist writings depends up-
on their performative force. Who do they mobilize, to do 
what? Thus, below I consider some of the audiences 
convoked by the blogs, essays, journalism, and social media of 
academic activism. Compiling a few of the powerful voices and 
ideas that I’ve come across in my own reading is one of the 
essay’s aims; another is to take preliminary steps toward 
tactical evaluation.  
 Like Pynchon’s Red district graffiti, the commun-
                                                                            
delusions of grandeur; for instance, “Where it had become 
common for literary scholars to equate their work with political 
activism, the disasters and triumphs of the last decade have 
shown that literary criticism alone is not sufficient to effect 
change” (Best and Marcus 2009, 2). They attribute to these 
“suspicious” readers “the untenable claim that we are always 
more free than those who produce the texts we study and that 
our insights and methods therefore have the power to confer 
freedom” (2009, 18).  
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ications of activist-academic reflexivity constitute an ar-
chive that is both monumental and ephemeral, that feels 
alternately neighborly and anonymous. They help form 
the malleable architecture of our intellectual and pro-
fessional habitus. These texts link together collectives that 
may be irreducibly vulnerable because their unity derives 
not from military discipline, not from pursuit of “profit” 
or “security,” but from something closer to caritas and 
eros. “AN ARMY OF LOVERS CAN BE BEATEN”—but will it 
be? If defeat is possible—or is likely, or snapping at our 
heels—then we have a responsibility to evaluate how best 
to help stave it off, cheat death, shift the tactics, transform 
the terrain. “Driving Education” is concerned to assemble 
some of the crucial facts about precisely how the liberal 
arts and the resources of the past are being valued and 
devalued, funded and defunded, desired and manipulated 
in the present. I offer below a partial account of the 
audiences to which academic-activist writings address 
themselves beyond any narrow definition of the univer-
sity. My comments might be thought of as a gloss on the 
graffiti that appears on the decaying walls of Pynchon’s 
Berlin—“not slogans so much as texts, revealed in order 
to be thought about, expanded on, translated into action 
by the people . . . .” 
 
*  *  * 
 
In his important essay “History as a Challenge to the Idea 
of the University,” Jeffrey J. Williams points out many of 
the blind spots characteristic of laments over the fate of 
U.S. universities. One is the failure to imagine alternative 
futures. “We resort to nostalgia […] rather than imagine 
new possibilities,” Williams writes (Williams 2005, 69). 
Such a “politics of nostalgia” tends to idealize the uni-
versity lost as a “refugium or humanistic enclave,” which, 
Williams argues, does not accurately describe past insti-
tutions nor present us with a more democratic future 
(Williams 2005, 59). Similarly Aaron Bady notes how our 
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envisioning of the future tends to rely on memories of the 
past, especially when imagining the fate of public uni-
versities: 
  
. . . in practice, the “other world” we work for tends to 
look a lot like the world we know was possible—and can 
show by pointing to the past—because we can 
recall it through glowing accounts of the postwar 
boom, and because in an age of austerity, it seems 
more possible, more practical to recover what we 
used to have than to try to create something new.   
. . . In defending ourselves from the worsening 
future, we can gloss over the flaws of the past. 
(Bady 2013) 
 
Williams and Bady encourage us to think carefully about 
the resources we have for orienting academic-activist wri-
tings toward the future. Since more than idealizations of 
the past are needed, mobilizing new “publics” to imagine 
alternatives and help construct them is essential. In call-
ing on new collectivities to lay claim to higher education, 
the voices of activist-academic reflexivity are seeding fut-
ures that depart from the neoliberal horizons of austerity 
and crisis. 
 The first subject of address that I’ll discuss here is the 
citizenry, or the “public” of public education. A web of 
political and civic ties connects people to particular schools and 
the broader system of higher ed. Taxes, state budgets, 
sports fandom, alumni networks, shared history, and 
civic pride already consitute a web of connections that 
give tensility and social reality to this group. The Uni-
versity of California system perhaps best exemplifies the 
strengths and the vulnerabilities of the attempt to mobi-
lize the citizenry on behalf of higher education. In “Driv-
ing Education,” Fradenburg, a professor at UC-Santa 
Barbara, discusses Governor Jerry Brown’s disregard for 
the state’s groundbreaking “Master Plan for Higher 
Education,” as the 1960 Donahue Act is widely known. 
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The Master Plan was “a blanket commitment from the 
state to educate all the California students who wanted an 
education and, in doing so, to facilitate the kind of class 
mobility that has placed public education at the center of 
American civic life” (Bady and Konczal 2012). Governor 
Brown’s contempt for the Master Plan, writes Fraden-
burg, effects an “autocratic end-run around the legisla-
ture, the thousands of Californians who have petitioned 
to preserve the Master Plan,” and the UC faculty who 
ensured their institutions’ compliance with the Plan. The 
perception of Brown’s presumptiveness also indicates the 
grounds for resistance to it: communities of political, 
civic, and institutional actors are already mobilized on 
behalf of public higher education. 
 Gina Patnaik’s online essay, “Breaking Trust: The Past 
and Future of the University of California,” describes the 
legal history of the concept of “public trust,” the phrase 
that defined California’s protection of its universities in 
the state’s 1879 constitution. The concept of public trust, 
Patnaik documents, is not reducible to a claim on land or 
property. In the context of legal history, “public trust” 
rather “reconfigures the terms of university space […] as 
the area necessary for undertaking the enterprises of 
public education.” Patnaik explicitly casts the history she 
tells in terms of the alternative futures it might give rise 
to. Faced with “the vanishing sense of public accoun-
tability for higher education,” she argues, “public trust 
doctrine in California provides an alternate history: what 
might have shaped the terms of public education in our 
present moment?” If the University of California “had 
remained a site of embattled interests and active public 
dissent, would we have acquired new language to discuss 
the state’s responsibility to protect public education? Can 
we imagine our way to such claims today?” Patnaik’s 
essay is an example of critical, activist historiography, one 
that offers the legal concept of “public trust” as a tactical 
and imaginative tool for laying claim to the university 
system. It reveals the basis for Californians’ claim on the 
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state universities as a public good. 
 From the perspective of tactical analysis, how effect-
tive have academic-activist appeals to the citizenry been? 
Despite the democratic breadth and historical depth of 
appeals to California residents, the UC system remains 
under attack. State-specific obstacles are part of the pro-
blem—for instance, the political immunity of the UC 
Board of Regents. More broadly, however, U.S. politics is 
so saturated with the neoliberal vocabulary of austerity, 
and so beholden to the corporate power brokers who 
deliver it, that it turns out to be almost Sisyphian to ad-
vance legislation that expands state spending on edu-
cation. The “public” character of higher education is 
being eroded nationally, as out-of-state tuition and cor-
porate partnerships make up more and more of state-
school budgets. It remains unclear what a mobilized 
citizenry can effectively do against today’s ironclad tru-
ism that public welfare is best served by bolstering private 
profit-making enterprises. In many cases, for-profit com-
panies devour whatever public funds there are. For-profit 
schools, for instance, while only educating about ten 
percent of post-secondary students, “receive around a 
quarter of the Pell Grants and student loans. A recent 
Senate study found that ‘the 15 publicly traded for-profit 
education companies received 86 percent of revenues 
from taxpayers’” (Bady and Konczal 2012). Given the 
current system of political priorities and influence, legis-
lators appear unlikely to recommit to massive funding for 
higher education. Academic-activism needs to look for 
effective points of leverage. 
 One group that does have a stronger claim to power in 
higher education is “laborers at the point of produc-
tion”—that is, instructors, both tenure-stream and ad-
junct or temporary. These are the second subject of 
address for academic-activist writing that I will discuss. 
Without instructors’ labor, the daily business of higher 
education would grind to a halt. Right now it would seem 
that the crucial problem facing academic-labor organ-
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izing is how to build solidarity across the hierarchies of 
the profession. How do shared—but not equally shared—
conditions of precarity provide the grounds for organ-
izing and for coordinated action? 
 Thus far, the advantages of concerted action have 
been almost entirely on the side of financial markets and 
their administrative yes-men. When Moody’s Investors 
Service downgraded its financial outlook for colleges and 
universities as a whole in January 2013, the bond-credit-
rating company advised “bolder actions by university 
leaders to reduce costs and increase operational effici-
ency,” especially through “strong governance and man-
agement leadership” (Martin 2013). It is hard to miss the 
uniformity with such investor demands have been imple-
mented. The “bolder” administrative measures have been 
concerned to reduce instructors’ labor power—i.e., to 
decrease the value of instructors’ work and thereby the 
leverage they have in controlling their labor. Examples of 
this devaluing of academic labor include investment in 
automatized software to grade student writing (Markoff 
2013), Harvard’s recruitment of alumni to act as unpaid 
teaching staff for online courses (Pérez-Peña 2013), the 
enthusiasm for massive open online courses (or MOOCs), and 
the current all-time high in the proportion of university 
faculty who are adjuncts (76 percent) (Lewin 2013). Paul 
Boshears notes the extreme devaluation actually realized 
by MOOCs: “today, the value of some of the most gifted 
lecturers has approached zero. Their talent at comm-
unicating their knowledge is given away for free” (Bo-
shears 2012; also see Rees 2013).  
 The vulnerability of adjuncts has long been noted and 
lamented, but whatever good intentions tenure-stream 
faculty have had regarding this issue, their sentiments 
have been inadequate to stem the “adjunctification” of 
higher education. Nor have good intentions done much 
to change adjuncts’ working conditions, including low 
pay, temporary contracts, lack of health insurance, and 
exclusion from institutional resources. The unfortunate 
64 ORLEMANSKI: AN ARMY OF LOVERS 
 
fact is that precarity is currently being universalized in 
academic labor. A recent dispute at Wayne State well 
illustrates the point. In July of 2012, the Wayne State 
administration proposed measures to eliminate tenure 
protections, enabling dismissal of tenured faculty on 
account of a “financially based reduction in [work] force” 
or actions construed as disruptive to the functioning of 
the university (presumably including political and labor 
protests) (Jaschik 2012). In other words, tenure would be 
no defense against austerity or administrative oversight. 
While the faculty union eventually reached an agreement 
that preserved tenure protections, the case offers a 
pointed lesson. If each member of our profession atom-
istically pursues the goal of tenure, the few who achieve it 
may find it utterly transformed. Though perhaps still 
officially on the books (as it was slated to be at Wayne 
State), “tenure” may not offer job security or protection 
for unpopular opinions and actions. 
 Sarah Kendzior, now a journalist but formerly an 
academic job seeker, recently chastised tenure-stream 
faculty for luxuriating in their exceptionality: “Success is 
meaningless when the system that sustained it—the high-
er education system—is no longer sustainable. When it 
falls, everyone falls” (Kendzior 2013). While I agree with 
Kendzior’s point, the urgent task would seem to be 
figuring out how to build labor solidarity when so many 
factors conspire against it, such as adjuncts’ often man-
dated absence from institutional decision-making, their 
de facto exclusion from spaces of academic collegiality, 
“two-tiered unionism,” and the professional demands 
that keep almost all faculty very, very busy. To make the 
collective clout of instructors a reality, academic-activist 
reflexivity needs both to address inequalities within aca-
demic labor and to search out the ways in which neo-
liberal institutions are vulnerable to labor organizing. 
Mutual aid provides the only solid foundation for such 
organizing: it is clear that only together can tenure-
stream faculty and adjuncts insist upon the real value of 
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academic labor. The current system relies on each group 
undermining the claims of the other as precarity spreads. 
The ethos of mutual aid is well articulated by the 
indigenous activist Lilla Watson: “If you have come to 
help me, you are wasting your time; but if you are here 
because your liberation is bound up with mine, then let us 
work together.” “Success is not a pathway out of social 
responsibility,” Kendzior writes of the academic job 
market (Kendzior 2013). This is not only because escap-
ing collective responsibility is immoral; it is also poor 
strategy, leading to a situation in which “academic free-
dom” comes to mean very little. 
 The third of the three possibilities for rhetorical 
address that I’d like to outline here is that to amateurs, or 
“academics” considered not so much as institutional 
actors but as lovers of learning. While such a constituency 
may sound ideal rather than real, the experiments in 
teaching and publication currently being conducted un-
der the rubric of “para-academia” provide one arena for 
observing such amateurism in action. Para-academia de-
notes a collection of grassroots, not-for-profit alternatives 
to accredited and accrediting institutions of higher edu-
cation and “continuing” education. These alternatives stand in a 
contiguous, contingent relation to academia’s institutional 
forms. The relation is, on the one hand, “parasitic,” inso-
far as para-academia takes advantage of both “surpluses 
and insufficiencies” of formal institutions (Allen et al. 
2012, 145). On the other hand, para-academia is “comple-
mentary or supplementary, drawing on the other mean-
ing of ‘para-,’ which suggests being alongside” (Boshears 
2012). Many of these para-academic knowledge pro-
ducers (such as the editors of continent. and Speculations 
journals, which include Jamie Allen, Paul Boshears, Paul 
Ennis, and Robert Jackson, all cited here in this essay3) 
                                                                            
3 See continent. journal: http://www.continentcontinent.com/ 
index.php/continent, and Speculations journal: http://www. 
speculations-journal.org/ 
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are students in PhD programs and also graduates of those 
programs who have been unable to secure regular tenure-
stream appointments. In this sense, “amateur” does not 
necessarily mean lacking in professional training, but it 
does denote some sort of intellectual existence outside of 
the University proper. 
 The groups and programs that could be called para-
academic are numerous. A few recent examples include 
The Public School New York (TPSNY), The Art School in 
the Art School, The Brooklyn Institute for Social Research, 
Mozilla Open Badges, the BABEL Working Group, a 
Freeskool, and the pedagogical initiatives asso-ciated with 
the Occupy movement, like the Free School University 
and the Howard Zinn Memorial Lecture Series at Occupy 
Boston.4 The website of a Freeskool, based in Victoria, 
British Columbia, describes it as 
 
a space to (un)learn, rewind, share skills, dream up 
the sort of community we want to live in and make 
it a reality through our practice. A Freeskool is 
YOU. You are the facilitator, you are the parti-
cipant, you are our community.5  
 
The Public School New York defines itself as “a frame-
work that supports autodidactic activities.”6 Open Badges 
is a non-proprietary system for recognizing learning that 
takes place outside of traditional avenues of accreditation. 
The Brooklyn Institute was founded by post-grads in New 
                                                                            
4 See The Public School New York (http://thepublicschool.org/ 
nyc), The Art School in the Art School (http://theasintheas. 
org/), The Brooklyn Institute for Social Research (http://the 
brooklyninstitute.com/), Mozilla’s Open Badges program (http:// 
openbadges.org/), BABEL Working Group (http://www.babel 
workinggroup.org), a freeskool [weblog] (http://afreeskool.word 
press.com/), and Occupy Boston (http://www.occupy boston.org/). 
5 See a freeskool [weblog]: http://afreeskool.wordpress.com/.  
6 See The Public School New York: http://thepublicschool.org/ 
nyc.  
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York City without university teaching appointments in 
order to provide “material and intellectual support and 
space for young scholars to teach, write, research, publish 
and, put simply, work.”7 As such examples suggest, para-
academic organizations tend to challenge pedagogical 
hierarchies, to advocate a DIY ethos, to reject norms of 
accreditation, and to emphasize the creative labor of 
building knowledge communities. 
 Perhaps the most important effect of para-academia is 
to cast critical light on contemporary higher education, in 
order to corrode the stability of its forms and the assump-
tions they rest on. “Essentially the para-academic has a 
chance to reveal that which the academic ‘proper’ has 
given up, and what the price of academic ‘freedom’ really 
is,” Paul Ennis remarks (Allen et al. 2012, 146). Para-
academia can exert a transformative “pressure” on tradi-
tional academia, claims Jamie Allen, with the “progres-
sive potential to evolve the ways that knowledge is 
accessed and thought about at pedagogic, societal and 
political scales,” and this “pressure” encourages “contin-
uously rethinking the nature of scholarship and teaching” 
(Allen et al. 2012, 140, 144). The interminable task of 
reconsidering what scholarship is returns us to Fraden-
burg’s call “to keep our knowledge disciplines opened and 
unsettled.” In some sense, para-academia accomplishes 
more directly what I have claimed is achieved by the rhe-
torical addresses of all academic-activist writing: it calls 
upon new collectivities of knowledge and thereby helps to 
foster alternative futures. 
 One way to gain purchase on the “outstitutional” 
models that para-academia offers is to analytically sepa-
rate the “university” from “academia.” “I take academia 
to be the culture of knowledge-communication, while the 
university happens to be the most notable site of such 
                                                                            
7 “About,” The Brooklyn Institute for Social Research, http://the 
brooklyninstitute.com/the-institute/about-2/. See also Andrew 
Marantz, “Night School,” The New Yorker, August 6, 2012, 23. 
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communication at present,” remarks Michael Austin 
(Allen et al. 2012, 137). Boshears articulates the distinc-
tion at greater length:  
 
Both Academia and the University are imagined 
communities, to borrow Benedict Anderson’s phrase. 
However, the University is an institution that ac-
credits, controls, and stamps the passports of those 
that would enter its territory. It is a striated space 
as opposed to Academia’s fluid space. I would suggest 
that an academic is someone that can identify on 
two levels: first, with those slighted and pressured 
in the [university’s] above cited political and eco-
nomic circumstances; second, they enjoy reading/ 
writing footnotes/end-notes/marginalia/figures/tables, 
etc. (Allen et al. 2012, 139) 
 
Boshears’s account gives two criteria for the “academic,” 
one negative and one positive: the true academic is nece-
ssarily discomfited by the current marketization of uni-
versities, and, secondly, she takes pleasure in the forms 
and labors of knowledge-production. Boshears describes, 
then, what I would call an insurgent amateurism, which 
has both constructive and critical aspects. Insurgent ama-
teurism creates and relishes knowledge, it dissents from 
“the University,” and (bringing the constructive and 
critical aspects together) it builds alternative pedagogical 
communities and organizations. 
 The prospects for para-academia are not, of course, all 
sweetness and light. It is important to juxtapose the 
growth in non-accrediting “amateur” institutions with 
the much more statistically significant explosion in en-
rollment in for-profit schools, which grew by 235 percent 
between 2000 and 2010. From 2005 to 2010, over 75 
percent of newly accredited colleges and universities were 
for-profit (Bady and Korczal 2012). Given that many who 
enroll in the University of Phoenix and the like want to 
improve their options for employment (however inade-
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quately for-profit schools deliver this), hard questions 
persist about how to unite the para-academic resources 
for playing and inventing with techniques of economic 
survival and the pursuit of upward mobility. 
 Moreover, as I mentioned above, massive open online 
courses (MOOC’s) have in most cases dovetailed smooth-
ly with universities’ wishes to reduce costs and control 
educators’ intellectual property. Indeed, MOOC’s, along 
with their older cousin the “TED talk,” might be thought 
of as the neoliberal vector of para-academia, beaming out, 
as it were, from Silicon Valley. The more than one thou-
sand TED talks, distributed online by the private non-
profit Sapling Foundation under a Creative Commons 
license, have been watched more than a billion times. 
TED’s prevalence—and the corresponding influence of its 
“techno-humanitarian mentality,” which re-casts essen-
tially political conflicts as “problems of inadequate 
connectivity or an insufficiency of gadgets”—suggest the 
drawbacks of a globally networked and distributed 
academia (Morozov 2012). A few select distribution plat-
forms will tend to increase access but homogenize 
content in such a way that they always (surprise!) pro-
mote the economies of scale that make their own 
operation possible. In the future, Robert Jackson predicts, 
“Everyone can produce for the collective, but only a few 
select collectives will organise decentralised academic 
practice into a manageable service, often pushing journals 
and authors they see ‘fit’ for mass appeal and attention” 
(Allen et al. 2012, 145).  
 Even in light of these developments, it is essential to 
find hope in the broadly shared desire for post-secondary 
education. People’s evident hunger to learn should be a 
spur to our collective imagination and to our active care 
in shaping the futures of colleges and universities. Aaron 
Bady, one of the most articulate and outspoken critics of 
MOOC’s, nonetheless draws attention to the utopian 
dimension that attends even the most flawed and cynical 
of free-education initiatives: 
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If the MOOC-ification of higher ed is likely to be a 
dead-end, . . . MOOC’s do enable us to ask a ques-
tion that we’ve been too defensively crouched to 
think about: what should or could “higher edu-
cation” look like, if it were stripped of its creden-
tializing and profit-making functions? If it were 
free, and if it wasn’t about determining who gets 
jobs and who doesn’t, what would it look like? 
(Bady 2013) 
 
Para-academia, it seems to me, is a series of practical 
investigations of just this question. Para-academia and 
“insurgent amateurism” appear to convert into a prin-
ciple of action Fradenburg’s acute formulation of scholar-
ship’s social immanence: “Group desire makes what we 
call knowledge. There is no other kind of knowledge than 
this; this is what knowledge is, and we make it.” “Group 
desire” and “our connectedness to wider communities” 
open the rhetorical dimension of critique. Academic-acti-
vist writings not only deliver dispatches from the num-
erous battlegrounds of higher education. They also call 
upon those who care to read them—those who might 
defend the institutional homes of speculation, imagi-
nation, and historical understanding. These writings are 
the communiqués that circulate within the “army of 
lovers” and also pass beyond them, to unpresupposed 
outposts and new readers. Staying Alive is a profound, 
long-meditated, and unique contribution to this circu-
lation of mobilizing reflections about learning in the 
present. Taking a stand in our vulnerability, in our desire, 
does not mean the battle is lost. An army of lovers can be 
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Individual (co)adaptability is not only of the greatest 
significance as a factor of evolution . . . but is itself per-
haps the chief object of selection. 
Sewall Wright, “Evolution in Mendelian Populations” 
 
 
The ability of individual organisms to respond creatively 
to the creative forces in their environments is one of the 
chief engines of evolutionary process (Calvin 1996). Post-
genome biology has put genetic determinism all in doubt. 
Increasingly, for evolutionary theorists, the history of 
living matter now derives from complex interactions be-
tween genotype, phenotype, and environmental afford-
ances (Gibson 1977; Hoffmeyer 2008, 72–75). As a conse-
quence of Lynn Margulis’s work on the evolutionary sig-
nificance of symbiosis, many different kinds of conjunctions—
not just internal experimentation and natural selection—
76 LIVING THE LIBERAL ARTS 
 
now appear to have forceful effects on the histories of 
living tissue (Margulis 1998). Genetic inheritance is no 
longer imagined as a digital “program” for the unfolding 
of a life without significant variation. Instead, we now 
think of the vicissitudes of genetic expression—whether, 
how, and under what conditions a gene will be activated 
or “expressed”—as the result of interactions with envi-
ronmental influences. Neuronal connectivity is both “ex-
perience-dependent” and capable, over time, of altering 
the functional architecture of the brain (Singer 2008, 102 
–105, 108). In fact, by contrast with the atomism of so 
much 20th-century science, holistic approaches have 
made us aware of the transformative power of all kinds of 
connectivity—neuronal, psychoendo-crinological, anthropher-
omonal, bacteriological—and the term “ecology” now ap-
plies widely to all open-ended assemblages of living systems and 
territories, in which environmental factors help to write the 
histories of specific organisms, and vice-versa. The cau-
sality involved is that of complexity, of self-organized 
systems and epigenesis, not the causality of scripts that 
determine all performances thereof. The organism is, 
simply put, no longer a “dead end” (Hoffmeyer 2008, 72). 
It constantly co-processes its boundaries in tandem with 
all the life-forms and forces to which it is connected, from 
which the biological meaningfulness of its life- and self-
experience emerges, in a new key. 
 We are in the midst of a paradigm-shift whose conse-
quences for our understanding and appreciation of the 
arts and humanities are profound. The latest research in 
contemporary study of the mind does not support the 
employment-oriented policies and dismissal of the arts 
and humanities articulated in the Bologna Process docu-
ments and their ilk.1 Instead it asserts in powerful old and 
new ways the life-saving and life-enhancing opportunities 
afforded by liberal arts education. True, this knowledge is 
                                                                            
1 On the Bologna Process, discussed in Chapter 1 of this book, 
see Labi (2009). 
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still quite unthinkable in those cultural concentrations that still 
hold to scientistic or providential models of living process, 
and is only intermittently thinkable for the rest of us.2 
When it does capture mainstream attention, it appears in 
relatively neutralized forms, like studies of innovation. 
Venture capitalists almost by definition respect the diffi-
culty of prediction and the productivity of broadcast in-
vestment; there is a reason why they have been so im-
portant to the knowledge industries specifically. But they 
also seem to misunderstand completely how minds work, 
if their current fixation on online education is any indica-
tion (see Bady 2013; Heller 2013), and they appear to be 
ignorant of the highly uneven history of scientific discov-
ery (see Serres 1995, 2). The new paradigm keeps very un-
easy company with intelligent design, top-down manage-
ment, and the apocalyptic fantasy of (the O/other’s) ac-
countability—for example, the rage to quantify educa-
tional outcomes. Instead, it affirms the creativity inherent 
in matter, for which chaos, drift, causal parity and con-
tingency are just as significant as codes, templates, and 
five-year plans. It affirms the existence of realities that far 
exceed us; but at the same time it acknowledges that our 
knowledge of those realities is artifactual—something we 
make together, and no less powerful for that. It encour-
ages (the study of) real-time process, experimentation, 
and “becoming,” and recognizes the role of the observer 
to be an integral (neither intrusive nor obstructive) part 
of discovery. In short, scientism is in flight (see Gallagher 
and Zahavi 2008, 29, 40–41), and plasticity and complexi-
ty may well be the biggest challenge fundamentalisms of 
all kinds—including invariant code worship—have ever 
faced.3 
                                                                            
2 “Automatisms of attitude have a durability, a slow temporality, 
which does not match the sometimes rapid change of conceptu-
al mutation”: Davidson 1987, 276. 
3 A caveat is in order here: progressive thinkers have also war-
ned us many times against the overvaluation of flexibility and 
spontaneity (Malabou 2008). I deeply appreciate Malabou’s 
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 The un-thinking that always accompanies paradigm 
shift breaks down reason even in the academy, which 
organizationally has barely begun remaking itself in ac-
cordance with its own new wisdoms.4 The effects of social 
learning are almost as conservative in the academy as they 
are elsewhere; as noted in Chapter 1, all disciplines, in-
cluding the humanities, follow the “law of the group” as 
well as the “law of the science” (cf. de Certeau 1988, 61). 
Unsurprisingly, the institutional implementation of in-
terdisciplinarity lags far behind the praise bestowed upon 
such by university administrators. In the humanities, the 
conservatism of funding institutions, calcified accounting 
methods, and increasingly top-heavy administrative structures 
make collaborative teaching and research projects exceed-
ingly difficult to arrange, and the very narrow specializa-
tion characteristic of American science yields much the 
same result, despite its more collaborative working styles. 
It remains the case that interdisciplinarity usually de-
pends on faculty willing to take on extra workload with 
little apparent support or reward in sight. (Please, col-
leagues: let us not, like the schmoos of L’il Abner, jump at 
every opportunity to suffer a thousand cuts for the sake of 
the new normal. This behavior is not sustainable.)5 
                                                                            
attempt to distinguish plasticity from the neo-liberal discourse 
of flexibility, because so many critiques of neo-liberal discourse 
do not underscore the extent to which it is an appropriation of 
poststructuralist thought. Just because “flexibility” and “diversi-
ty” have become standard management-speak, does not mean 
that these terms have been forever detached from semantic 
neighbors like “social justice” and “freedom.” Words are in no 
one’s possession, even if some arrangements of them are under 
copyright or trademarked (see also p. 122, in this chapter). 
4 The term “unthinking” derives from the title of Christopher 
Bollas’s book The Shadow of the Object: Psychoanalysis of the 
Unthought Known (1987).  
5 Studies conducted during the 1970s and 1980s showed that 
faculty across disciplines worked over 60 hours per week; all 
indications are that our workload has increased considerably 
since then, and the University of California is now hoping for 
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  Disciplines are modes of enjoyment that unquestion-
ably overlap, but they are also “turf”—psychical realities, 
so to speak—and their practitioners are increasingly en-
couraged by administrators to compete for, rather than 
share (and thus maximize), the much-diminished re-
sources now available to faculty. Even humanists appeal 
at times to an antique social-Darwinist hyper-valorizing 
of competition as a means of securing “excellence” (i.e., as 
much funding for their own particular pursuits as possi-
ble).6 Despite humanist identifications with their oppres-
sors, however—or perhaps because of them—splitting 
between the humanities and the sciences rages on in many quar-
ters and guises. Post-romantic humanists can still be antag-
onistic to “Western” science and “left-brain thinking,” 
while idealizing imaginative activity and affective experi-
ence. In the sciences it is still too easy to bump up against 
post-Enlightenment idealization of logical positivism, and 
contempt for “fuzzy thinking.”7  
 Disciplines are easily caught up in the imaginary reg-
ister.8 They generate all sorts of invidious mirrorings, 
misrecognitions, and misattributions. When post-struct-
uralist theory argued for the plasticities of self, subjectivi-
ty, and meaning, they upset a lot of scientists; but biolo-
gists also argue that semiosis and self/non-self represen-
tation (e.g., the Major Histocompatibility Complex, or 
MHC9) are fundamental to living process. Too many his-
                                                                            
more (see UCOP 2013). 
6 There is a vast literature on the importance of cooperation 
amongst the great apes. For a primer, see Dugatkin (1997). 
7 The psychologist Stanton Peele responded to a call by Ellen 
Langer for psychologists to “open their minds to possibility” by 
“urging psychologists to protect their discipline as ‘a beacon for 
a commitment to empiricism and reasoning’” (Ruark 2010).  
8 Lacan 2002, 75–81. Lacan’s conception of the imaginary regis-
ter of subjective experience contrasts fascination with the image 
of the Other with awareness of the open systematicity (multi-
plicities, arbitrariness) of social signification. 
9 For non-specialists, a helpful introduction to the MHC is 
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torians (and historicists) are still naïve empiricists who 
look down on “soft” cultural analysis, hoping that statis-
tics and devotion to the archives will give their work the 
élan of science. The same misguided hope fuels the gadg-
et-loving proponents of digital humanism who argue that 
the humanities can only be saved by jettisoning critical 
readings and embracing in their stead the computation of 
style and the steady production of databases.10 Yet now, 
in the early 21st century, neuroscientists like Edelman are 
trying to restore value to (the study of) qualia, the felt 
quality of experience—the deep green of a New England 
summer, the wideness of the sky (Edelman 2004); compu-
tational models of mind have largely given way to com-
plex neuroplastic ones; and phenomenology is once again 
giving analytical philosophy a run for its money. 
 It remains as noted some years ago by Engell and 
Dangerfield: in the age of money, things that cost a lot of 
money—like new technology—get much more respect 
and support than the new ideas that lead to their creation 
(Engell and Dangerfield 1998, 52). Arts departments in-
vest heavily in alliances in the sciences and engineering, 
but reap little effective support therefrom for K-12 arts 
education—despite, in the case of music, for example, its 
possible contributions to the development of reading skills and 
                                                                            
Phelps (2002). 
10 This characterization does not represent all who work in the 
Digital Humanities, of course, many of whom do not seek to 
eschew critical reading for data gathering, but rather, embrace 
both. But there are also digital humanists who do perversely 
insist that the primary way forward for the humanities is mainly 
through computing; for an overview of the debates, see Gold 
(2012). On gadget-love, see Rickels (1995): “Evolution provided 
the context for imagining that thought can or must go on with-
out the body and that means beyond the repro-bonds between 
the sexes. What thus moves away from interpersonal relations 
of sex difference comes at us, growing stronger, as fetishism, a 
gadget-love that’s all about getting into machines while . . . ful-
filling . . . our commitment to reproduction as still the only way 
to keep the species and the technology going.” 
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spatial and mathematical ability.11 Like music depart-
ments, classics departments are regularly shut down despite the 
fact that a background in classics is one of the most reliable 
predictors of success in law school (Engell and Danger-
field 1998, 50). In American psychoanalytic education, 
the prestige of the medical model remains strong; in 
many states licensing for “lay” analysts is not available 
despite their importance to the history of psychoanalysis 
(think, for example, of Klein, Erikson, and Kristeva). But 
while psychoanalysis grows, in some ways, more scientific 
(through, for example, the contributions of developmen-
tal psychology and neuropsychoanalysis), it also grows 
more and more relational, more and more aware of the 
unpredictability and artfulness of psychoanalytic process.  
 Because of our failure to recognize that scientific 
method and humanist styles of interpretation and research en-
hance one another (in practical as well as theoretical ways), 
our ships pass in the night, bearing fantastic images of the 
O/other disciplines—oblivious to the fact that the impro-
visational, artful nature of real-time knowing is not a 
failed attempt at empiricism, but rather adaptation (and 
creativity) in action. The humanities specialize in training 
students in the arts of managing the uncertainties of ex-
perience—learning to see and hear better, to read quickly 
but with care, to write and speak persuasively. Studies 
indicate that as quickly as two hours after a learning ex-
perience, there are changes in the fibrous white matter of 
the brain, the part of the brain largely responsible for 
connectivity (Blumenfeld-Katzir et al. 2011).12 If—and 
                                                                            
11 See Doidge 2007, 289, for a clear, accessible description of 
what music can do for your brain. See also Frances Rauscher 
(2008) for a summary of recent research on music education 
and its influence on a variety of cognitive abilities, including 
mathematics and spatial intelligence, and Anvari (2002) on 
relationships between music, phoneme discrimination and 
reading. 
12 See Tokuhama-Espinosa (2011) on the “human survival and 
life skills” basic to learning and social situations (143). 
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only if—accompanied by regular practice, these gains can 
be real and lasting. (If I make my students read four pages 
of Lacan fourteen times so they can have the experience 
of something obscure becoming clearer, they will be 
much more capable of following The New York Times. 
Education enables simple pleasures and quotidian achievements 
as well as extraordinary ones.) Our knowledge of neuroplas-
ticity has helped us to appreciate anew not only the im-
portance of real-time exercise of performative and inter-
pretive skills but also the breadth, depth, and sociality 
offered by immersive on-site liberal arts education. How 
better—where better—to acquire, maintain and develop a 
wide variety of cognitive and affective skills, from math-
ematics to music, to curating and computer engineering, 
to trust and teamwork, than in an environment designed 
to support and challenge the learning mind? Where else 
will students find the friends and lovers who want to meet 
at the library to study, work together in the lab until mid-
night, ease the anxieties of student life by going for pizza 
and gossip? Their fellow chemistry majors and violinists 
and future industry contacts, or (with respect) the family 
dog? 
 What most distinguishes the intelligence of humans 
from that of other great apes is social cognition (Herr-
mann et al. 2007). The cultivation of such in real-time 
contexts is an indispensable support to the exercise of 
other kinds of intelligence. Capitalist-technocratic inter-
ests want to persuade us otherwise; replacing face-to-face, 
embodied learning environments with online education 
isn’t a problem because the real-time interactivity of so-
cial life has, in their view, no significance for learning or 
innovation. Yet so much depends—but so much has al-
ways depended—on developing a ready, responsive, re-
sponsible, creative and worldly brain: catholic in its pur-
suits but capable of focus, fascination and wonder, of en-
joying the challenge of difference rather than running 
away in fear, of getting help rather than fighting or flying, 
of appreciating the brilliance of mathematical, Miltonic 
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and Derridean signifiers (after which, reading legal briefs 
will feel like a walk in the park); capable of spatial think-
ing, of sensitivity to group psychology and the impor-
tance of ambience; and achieving all of this with the real-
time, all-the-time support of other students, teaching 
assistants, lab assistants, librarians, professors, artists-in-
residence, and visiting lecturers in an ecology and dwell-
ing-place (the university) that mixes together all kinds of 
learning and states of mind, including the kind of 
(shared) downtime necessary for creativity. Biola Univer-
sity knows very well the importance of face-to-face com-
munities, despite its online offerings, just as Dartmouth 
College, which grooms so many future captains of indus-
try, still (for now) sponsors the arts and humanities edu-
cation increasingly out of reach to less advantaged 
students.  
 The hard truth is that it is very far from being a good 
idea to subordinate one’s education to one’s “life,” as so 
much online university advertising encourages us to do, 
unless (for psychological, familial or economic reasons), 
there really is no other way. Young, single high-school 
graduates are not being dashing individualists when they 
opt for online higher education; they have plenty of com-
pany both past and present. Diploma mills, correspond-
ence courses, and night and extension programs have 
been around for a long time—they just relied on other 
technologies (books, snail mail, television and radio pro-
gramming, etc.) to provide the same services. The cap-
tains of the online education industry—including some of 
the Regents of the University of California—don’t want to 
improve the delivery of traditional or alternative educa-
tional opportunities; they want to replace face-to-face, 
bricks-and-mortar education outright, luring students 
and educational institutions with the promise of easy sav-
ings while watching their gold pile up in the sub-dun-
geon. But online education is in fact expensive, for indi-
viduals as well as institutions (Newfield 2013a, 2013b), 
and the only reason it is ever competitive with public uni-
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versity tuition costs is because the same investors have 
lobbied so successfully to raise the latter. In his May 2011 
summary of the University of California Faculty Senate’s 
report on Mark Yudof’s “Online Education Project Plan,” 
Daniel Simmons noted that “several divisions and com-
mittees pointed to research on the high rates of non-
completion of online courses. . . . The literature also 
demonstrates that less well-prepared students will require 
significant additional resources for support services” (Simmons 
2011, 4). There is no good evidence to support the claim that 
online education does a better job overall than face-to-
face education. Studies indicate that online resources can 
be very effective in the context of embodied, face-to-face 
education, less so on their own; the latest, best, most in-
dependent research also indicates that male students of all 
kinds, and the economically disadvantaged, are least like-
ly to benefit from online education.13 (Of course it mat-
                                                                            
13 See the U.S. Department of Education’s 2010 “Review of 
Online Learning Studies”: “When used by itself, online learning 
appears to be as effective as conventional classroom instruction, 
but not more so . . . . Despite what appears to be strong support 
for blended applications [mixtures of online and face-to-face 
learning], the studies . . . do not demonstrate that online learning 
is superior as a medium. . . . the online and classroom conditions 
differed in terms of time spent, curriculum and pedagogy,” and 
“the combination of elements in the treatment conditions . . . 
produced the observed learning advantages” (xviii). Further, the 
same DOE report found that “many of the studies suffered from 
weaknesses such as small sample sizes; failure to report reten-
tion rates for students in the conditions being contrasted; and, 
in many cases, potential bias stemming from the authors’ dual 
roles as experimenters and instructors.” A new study of 500,000 
online courses in the state of Washington found that, “[o]verall, 
the online format had a significantly negative relationship with 
both course persistence and course grade, indicating that the 
typical student had difficulty adapting to online courses. [More-
over,] males, Black students, and students with lower levels of 
academic preparation experienced significantly stronger nega-
tive coefficients for online learning compared with their coun-
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ters a great deal how we understand the “job” education is 
supposed to do. Not simply the retention of “informa-
tion,” but the encouragement and development of think-
ing about information, is crucial; so is finishing one’s 
coursework.) My point is not that rugged individuals, or 
even just earnest individuals, or even entire communities, 
can’t benefit from such offerings; many do, and go far. 
There is no question that alternative educational oppor-
tunities have been a crucial means for women, minorities, 
and the economically disadvantaged to embark on careers 
and enterprises of all kinds. But there is also no question 
that learning benefits enormously from full and flexible 
relationality, chance encounters and spontaneity—getting 
coffee after class, sitting down on a bench to chat with 
your TA, running into your professors in the bookstore, 
experimenting with new subjects and methods in an im-
mersive environment that appreciates wonder and pro-
vides a little time for rumination. The relational context 
is, after all, how we first learned everything—in moments 
of “proto-conversation” with our caregivers, through the 
development of joint attention and the sustained negotia-
tions of rapprochement (Tomasello 1995; Mahler 1972). 
Living well depends on good education (the more embod-
ied and interactive, the better), and good education should be 
available to everyone.  
 Academic psychology has unfortunately provided an 
assist to the technocratic narrowing of cultural experience 
by trophying the limitations of the human brain rather 
than its uniquely marvelous abilities. I am, of course, in 
favor of anything that helps us think better, but I am not 
in favor of the condescending rhetoric (e.g., “folk psy-
chology”) adopted by many scientists and philosophers 
                                                                            
terparts, in terms of both course persistence and course grade.    
. . . These patterns also suggest that performance gaps between 
key demographic groups already observed in face-to-face class-
rooms . . . are exacerbated in online courses. This is troubling 
from an equity perspective” (Xu and Jaggers 2013a, 23; see also 
Xu and Jaggers 2013b). 
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when discussing evolution’s most astonishing achieve-
ments. In his review of Damasio’s Descartes’ Error, Daniel 
Dennett writes: 
 
The legacy of René Descartes’ notorious dualism 
of mind and body extends far beyond academia      
. . . . Even among those of us who have battled 
Descartes’ vision, there has been a powerful ten-
dency to treat the mind (that is to say, the brain) 
as the body’s boss, the pilot of the ship. Falling in 
with this standard way of thinking, we ignore an 
important alternative: viewing the brain (and hence 
the mind) as one organ among many, a relatively re-
cent usurper of control, whose functions cannot 
properly be understood until we see it not as the 
boss, but as just one more somewhat fractious ser-
vant, working to further the interests of the body 
that shelters and fuels it, and gives its activities 
meaning. (Dennett 1995, 3) 
 
I know of no well-respected scholars in the humanities or 
social sciences who, in 1995, thought of the mind or brain 
as the “boss” of anybody.   
Note that Dennett’s rhetoric mixed old and new 
workplace terms—and hierarchical ones at that (“serv-
ant,” “boss”)—with the language of political subordina-
tion and domination (“usurper of control”). Dennett’s 
rhetoric was, arguably, democratizing to an extent; but 
why did someone still have to be the boss and someone 
else the servant? Why couldn’t the brain just be an im-
portant part of the open systematicity of the body? Or 
part of a cooperative community? Would we have lost 
anything by conceptualizing it in this way? And whose 
folly, whose fantasy of control, did he mean to unmask?14  
                                                                            
14  The pleasure of unmasking folly was, of course, a big part of 
the affective fuel of (Enlightenment) empiricism and its scientis-
tic heirs and commentators (Zilsel 2000). But it has a long histo-
ry in iconoclastic thought, and I acknowledge its role in this 
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All crypto-Cartesians? Presumably, at the time of writing, 
Dennett was unaware of the ongoing humanist critique of 
the mind’s independence from and superiority to the 
body. But Lakoff and Johnson’s Metaphors We Live By, an 
extraordinarily influential argument for the grounding of 
figuration in bodily experience, had been published fif-
teen years previously (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980).   
 Also writing at the time when academic humanists 
and social scientists were busily deconstructing “common 
sense” as an ideological formation, Patricia Churchland 
offered her own critique, arguing that the “tools” of com-
mon sense were not “up to the task” of building an ade-
quate theory of “the cognitive dynamics of intelligent 
beings” (Churchland 1980, 153).15 The mind, that is to 
say, is largely incapable of understanding itself, unless it is 
a very special mind that has very special training in study-
ing itself as an object of scientific interest.  Dennett’s dis-
tinction between first- and third-person knowledge makes a 
similar point, though it confers some value on subjective 
experience as a way of knowing; but the critique of com-
mon sense in the context of arguments for special mental 
training in fact goes back to Descartes (1996, e.g., 22, 59). 
It is therefore a bit surprising to learn that so many post-
Enlightenment scientists thought “common sense” up to the 
task of theorizing cognitive dynamics, though no doubt 
Churchland is correct in claiming that some psycholo-
gists have mistaken its nature and purposes. Early in the 
history of the term “common sense,” and for some centu-
ries thereafter, it designated the mind’s ability to combine 
many different kinds of sensory perception into intelligi-
ble assemblages—and thus, I might add, to construct in-
terpretations vital to survival. Scientific circles no longer 
                                                                            
book. I favor the unmasking of folly; but with Erasmus, I also 
praise it.   
15  For an example of recent social science critiques of “common 
sense,” see Darder and Torres 1999, 174 ff. Gramsci analyzed 
“common sense” as an aspect of ideology in The Prison Note-
books (2003, 22, 58).  
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locate common sense in the pineal gland, nor do they use 
the term “common sense” to refer to mind/brain connec-
tivity, but the science of neuroplasticity has affirmed the 
importance of “cross-modal” perception to the project of 
thinking about anything at all. The evident pleasure Church-
land’s rhetoric, like Dennett’s, takes in the unmasking of 
folly is, I propose, a symptom of the melancholia that 
undergirds scientistic fantasies of omnipotence.16 
Mental training is a concern for the humanities as well 
as the sciences.  But scientific methods and humanist arts 
of interpretation, while drawing on each other in many 
important ways, do not on the whole mean to accomplish 
the same things. Humanists are interested in training the 
everyday functions of the brain, functions that respond to 
real-time, ever-changing conditions. Despite advances in 
algorithmic complexity and ecologically-sensitive concep-
tualizations of phenomena, scientists still rely largely on 
specially-constructed laboratory conditions and equip-
ment, as well as manipulations of data, that screen out the 
higgledy-piggledy circumstances in which we normally 
think. Statistical analysis reduces phenomena to counta-
ble units analyzed retroactively and only then projected 
into the future. It deserves our interest because it is in-
deed capable of revealing uncanny truths about group 
behaviors we rarely experience consciously. But even 
though we can carry statistical knowledge around in our 
heads, we do not conduct statistical analyses in those 
heads while crossing the street, when we are trying to 
calculate our chances of survival. Nor can we, at that 
moment, set up a laboratory simulation of the circum-
stances in real time. Despite the appreciation of real-time 
decision-making, and even “guessing,” in studies of the 
evolution and neurobiology of intelligence (Calvin 2001), 
                                                                            
16 I discuss this melancholic formation further below.  I do not, 
by the way, intend these remarks as a critique of expertise, but 
we should remember that it is fallible, and reflect on the regular-
ity with which scientific method fails to give the basic brain 
functions on which it depends their due.   
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many 20th-century scientists and analytical philosophers 
regard these activities not as “best practices” in the do-
main of surviving and thriving, but as woefully imprecise 
by comparison with knowledge generated by means of 
traditional scientific methods. 
 Consider the following email exchange between two 
professors living in faculty housing in Santa Barbara:  
 
Professor 1: I’m worried that if the county fixes 
those little roads, people will drive faster on them. 
The potholes are kind of like natural speed-bumps. 
Maybe we should keep them. 
 
Professor 2: It seems to me that if we want to know 
whether and when people’s speed slows down or 
picks up, we would have to collect data on that af-
ter the roads are paved. Let’s not speculate wildly. 
 
We might well wonder why we would wait till after the 
roads are re-paved; why not begin data-collection before, 
to enable comparison? But that is a minor concern for the 
purposes of the present argument. Not only is data analy-
sis invariably retrospective, it rarely decides for us. It 
can’t settle questions like, “is it worth our while to wait 
until the county agrees to pave the roads and then install 
the roadside detectors needed to record traffic speed on a 
little out-of-the-way dead-end road?” And we would still 
have to find a solution to competing interests: some driv-
ers will be concerned, above all else, about their wheel 
alignment and suspension, or disappearing into sinkholes, and 
others will be concerned, above all else, with the safety of 
children, pets, and meadow creatures, and/or maintain-
ing a serene atmosphere in our seaside locus amoenus. 
Data cannot deliberate for us; it can only help. And 
“speculation” is not the only alternative to measurement. 
There’s also making the best possible decision you can. 
Respect your first impulses (the non-conscious mind is 
trying to tell you something); but inform yourself, and 
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consult with others before you decide on a point of view, 
and do this within a reasonable time-frame, or your pa-
ralysis will make the decision for you (as it did in the 
above case; but note that indecision is occasionally the 
best prelude to good policy). When, at the age of six, I was 
looking into the eyes of my little classmate Toril Johnson, 
who was trying to convince me to push the fire-alarm 
button, I could not call a time-out to measure her levels of 
arousal, or observe her in the wild sufficiently to acquire 
reliable knowledge about her capacity for and styles of 
deception. Again, we forget to praise our everyday know-
ledge of how to do things, how to evaluate what stands 
before us in real time and relatively uncontrolled condi-
tions. Of course we do a lot of things badly, but we do 
many things very well indeed—and measurement is also 
perfectly capable of contributing to bungling and even 
disastrous outcomes.  
  Scientific method is one of many ways of organizing 
intelligence, all of which are important to the study and 
practice of living process. I am not a Luddite, and I am 
well aware that the day is coming when our brains will be 
equipped with computers that can escort us across the 
street the way Boy Scouts used to do, just as smart cars 
now wake us up when we’re getting sleepy, and calibrate 
the distance between my fender and that of the car in 
front of me. Computers are already an important part of 
our experience of embodiment. Nor am I arguing against 
the creation of special liminal circumstances to shelter 
experimentation; play is exactly that, and we need to rec-
ognize (without conflating) the affinities between labora-
tory experimentation and the ludic practices of the arts 
and humanities. My point is rather that life comes at us 
fast, and the plasticity needed to respond (with curiosity 
and/or suspicion, generosity and/or rejection, action and/ 
or deliberation, etc.) to that rush of information and ex-
perience is lost when we insist that our brains confine 
themselves to a few highly specific context-dependent 
standards of accuracy. Furthermore, if the historians of 
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our own time are to be believed, life now comes at us even 
more quickly than it did before (“it is as if the desire for 
personal speed, granted as the gift of a prosthetic tech-
nology, is so intense that we are content to ruin our plan-
et to experience it”: Duffy 2009, 264). If this is true, we are 
even more vulnerable to trauma (toxins, climate change, 
superbugs, and all their psychical equivalents) than we 
used to be, and we need, all the more, brains that can re-
spond to the unexpected. But we need not rely altogether 
on this argument. Contemporary life has no monopoly 
on trauma, even though its stylizations of such are dis-
tinctive enough to warrant close scrutiny. The brain’s 
resilience and capacity for approximation are among its 
most outstanding achievements, and this fact itself testi-
fies to our species’ longstanding need to respond to 
changing circumstances and uncertain outcomes.  
There is no fixed difference between ordinary and ex-
traordinary thinking, of course. Knowledge of dark mat-
ter or Pythagorean politics does and will contribute to 
everyday thinking, and the pursuits of higher math and 
human-computer interactions will refine the way our 
brains work over time. Everyday thinking is also an essen-
tial part of extraordinary thinking—even philosophers 
who scorn language, like the aforementioned (and, in 
fact, very chatty) Patricia Churchland, use it constantly 
(Churchland 1980, 164). Everyday thinking includes most 
non-conscious and conscious mental activity, and the 
inextricably intertwined activities of the body, including 
imagination, memory, executive functions, perception, 
sensation, proprioception, kinesis, and affect. In Charles 
Peirce’s terms, everyday thinking requires facility in the 
interpretation of iconic and indexical signs, not just sym-
bols; in fact it is the product of the interdependent work-
ings of all three (Hoffmeyer 2008, 284–290).  
The importance of culture to evolution is now widely 
accepted (Doidge 2007, 287–312), and culture depends to 
a large extent on language. Paraverbal and verbal lan-
guage do not always get the respect they should in Anglo-
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American philosophical circles; but there is nothing ordi-
nary about them. For one thing, verbal language has digi-
tal as well as analog aspects (Hoffmeyer 2008, 78–80), 
insofar as it consists of interconnected and systematic 
assemblages of discrete, abstract elements that are swit-
ched on and off (vocal cord vibration, yes or no; stoppage 
of airflow, yes or no). Most importantly, ordinary lan-
guage is an open, complex, combinatorial system, and 
therein lies, not a lamentable slipperiness, but a creative 
resource capable of responding improvisationally to un-
foreseen developments, and of communicating to others 
affects and sensations that would otherwise be limited to 
non-linguistic coding and replication. The arts of living 
are necessarily open to experience; they must cope with, 
and ideally make creative use of, both constant change 
and causal parity (overdetermination). 
 The humanities are important not only for the content 
that they convey but even more so for the techniques of 
living—the “life-skills”—they teach. There are no good know-
ledge-based reasons to abandon the cultivation of everyday 
thinking, and very good reasons to continue teaching 
students how to use language fluently and persuasively, 
how to perceive the world as richly and informatively as 
possible, and how to extend memory to pasts that have 
largely disappeared. The most important purpose of the 
humanities and fine arts is to refine the brain’s ability to 
do innumerable real-time things necessary for surviving 
and thriving: to perceive color keenly; hypothesize about 
the intentions and direction of moving shapes; listen with 
sharp ears for changes in tone, or the slightest rustle in 
the bushes; read faces and para-language; model fictions 
and possible futures; and understand, in however limited 
a fashion (the miracle is that we can do it at all), the wish-
es and intentions of other beings (see Gallese 2007). The-
se are priceless abilities, and we need to refine them (now 
more than ever—but when have we not?), owing to the 
vulnerability of the lives of mortal creatures—a vulnera-
bility that is the special target of the contemporary globe-
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trotting Ubermensch’s attempts at immunity (on immun-
ity, see Esposito 2011, and Chapter 1 in this volume).  
 Neuroscience is now establishing, however (at times) 
unintentionally, the importance of artistic and humanist 
training to mental functioning. But, as noted, these dis-
coveries have sadly done little to protect the academic 
disciplines of the arts and humanities from budget cuts 
and closings. If contemporary boosters of employment-
related technical and scientific education have any inter-
est in the new knowledge of the brain that scientists are 
actually producing, they’re keeping it close. We need to 
reverse this unthinking, to speak for the lifesaving powers 
of the liberal arts, and for the inextricability of thriving 
and surviving. Surely the brain (such an astonishing crea-
tion, the product of millions of years of internal experi-
mentation, capable of infinite jest and most excellent 
fancy) deserves more respect, especially from the people 
whose work has done so much to establish its wondrous 
qualities—its neurochemical resilience, its perceptual 
outreach, the lavish redundancies, multiple pathways and 
“degeneracies” that enable its creative connectivity (Edel-
man 2004, 154). 
 The academy participates all too often in the unthink-
ing of the import and potential of the humanities, and if 
we are to change the course of our current off-world 
death-drive, we need to be very well acquainted with the 
forces that feed our own creaturely melancholy and crises 
of enjoyment. As noted, disciplinary tensions are easily 
assimilated to the rivalrous, zero-sum phantasies of the imagi-
nary register; the positivist-empiricist automaton and the 
radical relativist snob function as imaginary figures de-
signed to reduce a much more complicated picture to 
fighting form. Splitting of this sort does not, however, 
function simply to divide the sciences from the humani-
ties (and thus conquer both—in the case of the sciences, 
by subordinating them altogether to the research agendas 
of capitalism: Press and Washburn 2000). Splitting is re-
peated inside nearly every contemporary academic disci-
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pline. Turf wars break out between humanist sociologists 
and their statistically-minded colleagues. Experimental physicists 
think theoretical physicists look down on them. Neither 
linguists nor those who profess “communication” are to 
be found in language departments; analytic philosophers 
warn their graduate students away from Nietzsche (and 
other philosophers foolish enough to traffic in “big ide-
as”) with all the fervor of the pastors of the Church of the 
Militant Lamb. The near-ubiquity of this kind of splitting 
of potential disciplinary affinities demands that we con-
sider its psychological and social meanings. Something is 
at stake here that is as yet poorly understood; and perhaps 
that something is what Timothy Gilmore has called “bio-
phobia” (Gilmore n.d., 11). Contemporary de-valuation of the 
mind’s ability to size up new situations, and its corollary 
idealization of technological prosthesis, is a melancholic 
denial of creaturely inventiveness and precariousness. 
  In the disciplinary imaginary of contemporary dis-
course on the academy, the sciences are self-evidently 
utilitarian, and the humanities somehow lofty and lovely 
and loveable, but useless and impossible to evaluate. Stan-
ley Fish, in a thought-piece published in The New York 
Times, asserts that the humanities don’t pay for them-
selves: “indeed, if your criteria are productivity, efficiency 
and consumer satisfaction, it makes perfect sense to 
withdraw funds and material support from the humani-
ties—which do not earn their keep” (Fish 2010). But if 
“consumer satisfaction” means anything like “student 
interest,” the humanities are in reasonably good form, 
despite the drops in enrollment that typically accompany 
hard times. Cuts to the humanities are not inspired by 
that kind of market force. Enrollment in language courses 
has even been climbing, at some universities at least, 
while language departments are being closed down or 
“consolidated”; sometimes faculty are whittled away on 
the grounds of small numbers of language majors, with-
out consideration of overall enrollment numbers. The 
(now former) President of the University of California, 
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Mark Yudof, remarked in 2009 that “[w]e roughly have a 
$20-billion budget; $3 billion comes from the state. That’s 
the English department, the Spanish department, eco-
nomics—that have difficulty generating the big outside 
grants. I love the humanities . . . . But the engineering 
colleges are going to bring in more external research sup-
port, and that money’s crucial” (Morrison 2011). This is a 
disingenuous and misleading statement. Engineering 
colleges are expensive; the humanities, not so much. Yu-
dof knows perfectly well that the tuition dollar brought in 
by popular undergraduate majors in the humanities and 
social sciences is essential to the financial solvency of the 
UC system; humanities professors typically teach twice as 
many classes a year as do scientists, make smaller salaries, 
and publish just as much research, if not more. So: what 
desires are served by “love” for the lovely humanities? 
What kind of “love” is it that can so easily be brushed 
aside (as Yudof does in his statement)? 
 “The big outside grants” to which Yudof refers—from 
NIH, NSF, and so on—only contribute a portion of the 
costs of research. Certain percentages of extramural 
grants are appropriated by host institutions to support 
the indirect costs of managing and housing such research—
construction, dismantling of disused labs and equipment, 
custodial upkeep, waste disposal, administrative services 
(payroll, human resources, accounting, student and facul-
ty housing, student services, library collections, and much 
much more.) As a consequence, scientists have come to 
believe—it is like an article of faith—that their grants help 
to support the rest of the university. But there is no evi-
dence for that conviction; there isn’t even any evidence 
that research in the sciences and engineering is self-
sustaining. An American Association of Universities 
(AAU) report on “Facilities and Administrative Cost Re-
imbursement” found that “universities contribute more 
than $8 billion of their own funds each year to support 
their R&D activities, or nearly 20 percent of their total 
research and development expenditures” (AAU 2007). A 
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more recent AAU report on “Regulatory and Financial 
Reform of Federal Research Policy” concludes that the 
pressure on universities to share the costs of funding ex-
ternal grants has worsened considerably since 2007:  
 
[T]he current regulatory climate has become dys-
functional—regulations do not align closely with 
true risk, and new regulatory mandates are unfun-
ded due to the 26-percent cap on reimbursement 
of administrative costs. It is a growing fiscal chal-
lenge for universities to manage unfunded man-
dates as institutional budgets are being reduced, 
administrative cost reimbursements are being sup-
pressed, and cost-sharing requirements are in-
creasing. (AAU 2011) 
 
Under the pressure of recent budget cuts, universities are 
working more closely with major granting institutions on 
the problem of indirect costs, and taking more from ex-
tramural grants to cover the losses they think are engen-
dered thereby. One result of this belated prudence is 
likely to be even more pressure on scientists to spend 
their time writing grants instead of doing science and 
teaching students, thus driving them ever more into the 
arms of the defense, security and pharmaceutical indus-
tries. The evaluation of indirect costs is an area of aca-
demic finance that requires considerably more transpar-
ency than is characteristic of current practice. But the best 
available estimates do not point in the direction of the 
profitability of scientific and technological research to the 
universities that support it.  
 So why do these facts have so little purchase on the 
self-proclaimed pragmatists amongst us? Questions about 
“indirect costs” are not new; they have been raised for 
decades. Most reasonable scientists will readily ack-
nowledge (to colleagues and friends, if not to funding 
agencies) the enormous role played by “luck” and “acci-
dent” in scientific discovery, as well as the near-certainty 
STAYING ALIVE  97 
 
that current means of modeling reality will be superseded 
by new ones. It is, furthermore, still the case that many 
scientific patents do not create wealth or portend social 
“impact.” They are far from useless—often they are small 
parts of larger efforts that, in time, may well lead in excit-
ing and even monetizable directions. The connection 
between scientific research and utility is notoriously indi-
rect and unpredictable, but many studies have shown that 
there are real payoffs in supporting research regardless of 
the difficulty of predicting outcomes.  
Current funding conditions favor scientific work that 
can, one way or another, be commodified, but the “ac-
countability” drive ironically costs a great deal (one of the 
reasons administrative costs have burgeoned) and ap-
pears to do a poorer job in the long run of producing im-
portant innovations. “Pure” science is arguably more 
likely to generate transformative knowledge and technol-
ogy than is research directed at specific interventions and 
applications guided by commercial or political interests.17 
Investment in knowledge, of whatever sort, requires a 
spirit of adventure—because, no matter how mathemati-
cal we are being, we cannot say with absolute certainty 
where we will end up, or even to what we will have con-
tributed, when it is all over, which it never is. Obfuscation 
of the risks and costliness of scientific research is an ideo-
logical symptom, fueled more by ambition and fear of 
dispossession than by reason and data.   
Both the UK and Canada have mandated that aca-
demic research should be funded only if it has “impact” 
on business or social goods like health and welfare. In 
those countries, “impact” is the favored alibi for the de-
                                                                            
17 See Greenberg [1967] 1999, passim, but especially 29 and 290–
291 as a starting point. Greenberg is friendlier to the value of 
policy involvement than I am, but his book is an invaluable 
introduction to this complex issue, especially with respect to the 
theoretical and historical difficulties of maintaining a hard-and-
fast distinction between pure and applied science. See Lövbrand 
(2006) for a case study that queries the distinction. 
98 LIVING THE LIBERAL ARTS 
 
funding not only of the humanities, but also of scientific 
and economic studies that do not further the agendas of 
global capital. “Scientific discovery is not valuable unless 
it has commercial value,” according to John Macdougal, 
President of the National Research Council of Canada 
(cited by Tobis 2013). For Macdougal, science has no 
more inherent value than do the humanities. The criteri-
on that trumps all evaluations of all knowledge disci-
plines, humanist or scientific, is commercial value. The 
effect of “imaginary” differences between the sciences and 
the humanities is legible here: the obscuring of our com-
mon vulnerability to capital. A 1997 survey of 2,167 uni-
versity scientists showed that nearly one in five had 
delayed publication of corporate-funded research results 
for more than six months “to protect proprietary infor-
mation—and this was the number that admitted to de-
lay”; a few years later, the Journal of the American Med-
ical Association published an analysis showing that non-
profit studies of cancer drugs were eight times as likely to 
reach unfavorable conclusions as those funded by phar-
maceutical companies (Press and Washburn 2000; see 
also Washburn 2011). The culture of secrecy that per-
vades the “academic-industrial complex” not only de-
stroys academic freedom—which includes the right to 
share one’s research results with other investigators and 
the public—but also undermines the spirit of community 
that has done so much to advance knowledge in the age of 
liberal arts education.18  
  The accountability drive scorns pleasure, passion, lei-
sure, and luxury (except for the wealthy) in order to con-
vince us that none of these things have anything to do 
with “necessity,” usefulness or practicality. (Never mind 
that the mind and body both really need downtime in 
order to work well.) One of the problems with this view-
                                                                            
18 See also Washburn 2005, 85 ff., on the impact of this culture 
of secrecy on graduate student work. Her book is a must-read 
for anyone seeking to understand the corporatization of con-
temporary science. 
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point is that the terms “necessity” and “luxury” do not 
designate stable essences, but highly variable and relative 
qualities. One is thirsty, but what, and in what circum-
stances, does one drink? As Bataille puts it, “there is noth-
ing that permits us to define what is useful to man” (Bataille 
1985, 166)—as the futility of Christianity’s longstanding 
attempts to define what is needful to man might have 
suggested to us long before now. Utility depends on con-
text. It is a function of the organism’s (co)-adaptation 
with its environment; one creature’s utility is another’s 
impossible luxury, and the dividing lines between them 
have been drawn variously at different times in different 
cultures (see Fradenburg 1999; Fradenburg 2002, 68, 
68n59, 297n3; Sternberg 1997). The fact that the notion of 
the “useful” has so often been used to attack imaginative 
work (and pure science) does not mean that it should not 
be reclaimed, and I believe it should be reclaimed now.19  
The Oxford English Dictionary (OED) defines “utility” 
as “fitness for some desirable purpose or valuable end” 
(s.v. “utility”); but desirable in what way, and for whom? 
Arguably, some of the most useful items around would 
include condoms, energy drinks and smartphones, but no 
politician is promising to make these things universally 
available, and all have ties to important forms of enjoy-
ment. Philosophical utilitarianism concerns “the ability, 
capacity, or power of a person, action or thing to satisfy 
the needs or gratify the desires of the majority, or of the 
human race as a whole” (OED). But in our own day, this 
definition sounds more like communism than a funding 
rationale, and it would almost certainly rule out ascrip-
tions of utility to gated communities. In short, which ma-
jority? It is, moreover, impossible to divorce the satis-
faction of a need from the enjoyment attendant on that 
satisfaction. It is always some kind of joy to satisfy needs, 
                                                                            
19 See Barbara Johnson’s Persons and Things for a brilliant and 
highly influential discussion of the ethics of “use” (2008, 63, 97); 
Gibson’s concept of “affordances” is also relevant (1977). 
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even if the process of satisfying them is neverending. It 
can even be a joy to feel need; as noted, failure to thrive in 
infants can be caused by hyper-attention to their needs, 
not just by neglect thereof. A lot of U.S. social and eco-
nomic policy depends on the belief that we can and 
should distinguish states of need from other states like 
withdrawal, obsession, compulsiveness, and urgency, but 
this is no easy matter; we can read neurochemical mark-
ers, so to speak, but even if there were no significant over-
lap between these states of feeling, how would we 
estimate the significance of such differences?  
Desire trumps “need” all the time. History is rife with 
examples of those who choose passion over survival: re-
vengers, berserkers, Young Werthers, militia members, 
suicide bombers, freedom fighters, addicts, self-immo-
lators, revolutionaries, hunger-strikers, lovers—the list 
goes on. This is by no means confined either to humans 
or to violent enactments; recall the well-known study that 
showed that little monkeys preferred clutching fuzzy 
blankets to eating from mechanical food dispensers even 
if they were starving. The political and economic implica-
tions of the relationship between need and desire are as 
wide-ranging now as they were in the days when medieval 
Christendom was fighting over the meaning of poverty, 
property, and charity. U.S. welfare policy rests on the 
assumption that we can easily differentiate the basic needs of 
others (which we will perhaps agree to pay for) from car-
ing for states of mind (which we really don’t like to pay 
for). Welfare policy similarly assumes that we have more 
right to interfere in the lives of those who are “needy” 
than we do in the lives of the powerful, despite the fact 
that the children of the wealthy notoriously show just as 
many signs of emotional deprivation as the children of 
the poor.  
But psychological pain is often far more difficult to re-
solve and forget than physical pain, and in any case it is 
now settled knowledge that the feedback loop between 
psyche and soma is both intense and ongoing. Insofar as 
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the distinction between need and desire rests on the belief 
that the former is somehow a somatic condition and the 
latter a psychical one, it cannot hold. We can spend an 
entire life dying psychically, or fending off that death, or 
becoming ill, feeling tortured or killing ourselves, because 
of psychical pain (see Freud 1900, 613). Both physical and 
psychological pain threaten our survival and self-exten-
sion. Pain makes us want to curl up, sleep, die; but ex-
pressing pain, and feeling that our pain is understood, at 
least begins to undo pain’s terrible work of isolation 
(Scarry 1985, 4). For both kinds of pain, we need tech-
niques of living that extend us into the world—or help us 
act creatively along with it—and that also help us to forge 
links with other minds by means of receptivity and ex-
pressivity. This is one of the many reasons why online 
education should be a helpful supplement to face-to-face 
education, not a replacement for it. The opportunity af-
forded by the live and lively classroom to inspire and in-
tegrate affect, sensation and thought, is priceless and 
contributes to the richness of life. 	  
  Accountability rests on the phantasy of the “thief of 
enjoyment”: “I am not happy—though I would never 
mention this to anyone, I find that my money can’t buy 
everything, and I never feel as though I have enough, and 
I have to keep finding more, and more, and more, in or-
der to feel like a ‘winner,’ blah blah blah—and the reason 
is that someone has stolen it from me, by being lazy, or 
overly rational and well-informed. It’s not because perfect 
enjoyment is simply impossible for all mortal creatures, 
regardless of their circumstances.”20 However, it is be-
cause perfect enjoyment is impossible for mortal crea-
tures, however elect and immune some imagine them-
selves to be. So the sciences are not suffering because hu-
                                                                            
20 See Žižek 1990, especially 55n7, on the fantasy of the “theft of 
enjoyment,” a kind of splitting that attributes to the Other be-
havior that “steals” enjoyment from “my” group—for example, 
by not working hard enough, or working too much, or expect-
ing pensions as compensation for low public-service salaries. 
102 LIVING THE LIBERAL ARTS 
 
manists are teaching too many small classes (we are not); 
neither are humanists suffering because extramural fund-
ing agencies give more money to the sciences than they 
do to the humanities. Humanists are not, on the whole, 
more lovable than scientists, nor do they need more love, 
though they might have an easier time acknowledging 
love’s crucial role in evolution. I personally think rotifers 
are as beautiful as an illuminated capital. Well, almost as 
beautiful. So, again, let us avoid polarization; all disci-
plines are currently suffering more from recent trends 
and hype trails in management theory than they are from 
the other disciplines’ imagined luxuries.   
The real question is whether or not humanists can or 
should justify their work on the grounds that they (and 
their texts, images, music) provide moral, spiritual or 
psychological uplift. These justifications, however, were 
abandoned by most humanists long ago. We have been 
criticizing our claims to moral and aesthetic authority at 
least since World War II suggested that lovers of opera 
and Germanic folklore are not invariably good people. In 
fact, critiques of humanist idealizations of the greatness, 
profundity, and coherence of the self and its (self)-
knowledge appear in Montaigne’s Essais, and continue in 
contemporary writing on post-humanism (Derrida 2008, 
Hayles 2008, Wolfe 2010), as well as in affect theory (Te-
rada 2003). We have perhaps been too hard on ourselves; 
the “ethical turn” in theory has produced wonderful, in-
spiring work (Davis and Womack 2001), and Raymond 
Mar’s research (2008) shows that reading fiction may en-
hance our capacities for empathy, mentalization, and social 
intelligence. The activations involved in the experience of 
aesthetic enjoyment are also central to many other im-
portant brain functions (cf. Zeki 2008, 2009). We can’t 
draw compelling conclusions from these findings, but 
neuroplastic connectivity does invite us to re-evaluate all 
activities of the brain from the standpoint of complexity. 
Still, for the most part, post-WWII humanist literary 
study has focused on renewing the study and practice of 
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rhetoric, including critique of the ways rhetoric some-
times likes to masquerade as unassailable truth or “gut 
feelings.” 
 However—there are many twists and turns in this 
history—where humanists might once have been consid-
ered arrogant for presuming to pronounce on the cultural 
and moral value of all human productions, they are now 
considered godless hedonists for disposing of their own 
pretensions. Those who think the arts are worthwhile 
only if they imply loyalty to the values of the Confederacy 
have been upset by humanist questioning of cultural au-
thority and discourses of power, and for decades have 
been calling for the defunding of the National Endow-
ment for the Humanities, partly on the grounds that its 
pitifully tiny budget is a threat to the national fisc. For 
somewhat different reasons, many scientists have also 
been offended by humanist critiques of objective stand-
ards of value; the term “radical relativist” is a slur with 
more than one derivation. It does no justice to the hu-
manities’ passionate interest in the validity of interpreta-
tion—in why three people can hear or read the same 
words and interpret them differently, and what this plas-
ticity is for, evolutionarily speaking or otherwise. Human-
ists do also know, with Jacques Derrida (1973, 134), that 
none of us speaks or interprets without appealing in some 
way to truth, however contextualized and contingent that 
truth (and truth-telling process) may appear, or be. But 
truth is no less truthful because it is context-dependent 
(see Latour 1999). Mathematics remains as elegant as ever, but 
consider how much, and how, mathematics changed in the 
course of the development of systems theory. From the 
standpoint of complexity, truth has new modalities, al-
most new flavors. All shifts in thought bring curses as 
well as blessings; systems theory is not a gift from the 
angels. Centers of power, wealth and influence have good 
reasons to herald any and all concepts that promise to 
diffuse responsibility. But complexity also promises an 
emancipatory shift. We may no longer have to devalue 
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the world, or ourselves, as rife with error, delusion, and 
fancy; instead, we can live in a world of artfulness, possi-
bility, and plenty.  
In rethinking what’s left of the Enlightenment opposi-
tion between Truth and Fancy, we should also remember 
that the humanities learned to be wary of absolute cer-
tainty partly from post-Newtonian scientific critiques of 
certainty. Humanities disciplines have also, throughout 
their history, welcomed insights from philosophy, philol-
ogy, linguistics, statistics, anthropology, sociology, psy-
chology, cognitive science, and evolutionary biology. Many 
humanists respect the sciences and like thinking with them, 
and vice-versa; hence the new fields of quantitative liter-
ary studies, neurohumanism, cognitive religious studies, 
neuropsychoanalysis, neuroaesthetics, and affect theory. 
Scientists, in turn, are increasingly interested in holistic 
and ecological analyses of mentation; cognitive psycholo-
gists leaven their reliance on flashcards with study of real-
time reading process, and environmental theory investi-
gates the interdependence of perception of inner and out-
er worlds (an oversimplistic description of Gibson 1997). 
Complexity theory’s claim that novelty “emerges” out of 
the play of open systems undoes the antinomy between 
variation and repeatability on which so many past dis-
tinctions between the sciences and the humanities have 
depended.  
One of the central claims of this book is that poststruc-
turalist science embraces many values and insights more 
usually attributed to (post)humanism. Today’s scientists 
came of age in the days when Michel Foucault and Joan 
Kelly were dismantling les grands récits narratifs of Euro-
pean history, and Derrida was unfolding the philosophi-
cal implications of the linguistic sign. For scientists now, 
“it’s all about plasticity,” as a biologist colleague of mine 
said to me not long ago. Even the multiculturalism once 
criticized by scientists because of its apparent disrespect 
for universals has become a highly beneficial part of ex-
perimental method. Indeed, the charges have been re-
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versed; when the subjects of our psychological obser-
vation are diverse in age, ethnicity, gender, and so forth, 
we are less likely to claim universality for findings that are 
true only for certain (sub)cultures, and more likely to 
map the influence of experience on relatively stable fea-
tures of the mind/brain. Comparative research is as likely 
to clarify the latter as it is the former (see, for example, 
Lee Sui Wan’s [2000] nuanced thesis on the “possibly 
universal aspects of ‘motherese’”). We have also learned 
that cognition is not “opposed” to affect; affect, rather, 
helps us think, by encouraging us to pay attention, try out 
new things, and form memories.  
The interdisciplinarity of liberal arts education works 
in many different ways on many different levels, only one 
of which is professional collaboration in academic re-
search projects. Thankfully, for the time being, at least, 
the liberal arts are still alive in K-12 education, even 
though so many language and arts programs have been 
foolishly cut. I was a member of my high school Science 
Club; in eighth grade, I elected to join a group of students 
who went spelunking with one of our teachers. We all 
know that affect is very powerful in determining the im-
portance we give to different subjects. Many of today’s 
scientists also studied arts and humanities in high school 
and college, even if they didn’t major in them. Long be-
fore the specialization that takes place in the course of 
higher education, interdisciplinary awareness prepares 
the ground for the new hybridities and collaborations of 
the future. And, as noted, embodied communities pro-
vide the best possible support for this cross-disciplinary 
creativity. It’s under these circumstances that we’re most 
likely to attend lectures in other departments and talk 
about them afterwards with colleagues, perhaps bringing 
with us a copy of Michel Serres’ Biogeia, or stopping by—
even if one is a humanist—to ‘ooh’ and ‘ah’ over interest-
ing new developments in somebody’s slime mold. Research 
thrives when researchers live and work together. It also thrives 
when we can work with far-away colleagues; virtual reality 
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is not deprived of reality, but it is also only one version 
thereof. We need not scorn the simulacrum for its lack of 
vitality and veracity; we can still respect the signifier’s 
powers of transmission and social linkage without deny-
ing the virtues of living presence. We are beings with a 
long history of exploring the power of prosthesis; lan-
guage itself is a distance medium. But we invest as heavily 
in prosthetics as we do to a significant degree because of 
our anxieties about the fragility of our enjoyment, bodies, 
lives, and loves. 
 The knowledge and technology we make is a conse-
quence of the kind of creature we are (and vice-versa)—
vulnerable, curious, affect-laden. We fall for the melan-
cholic lures of prosthesis and genetic engineering—the 
promise of a better, cleaner, invulnerable, endlessly grati-
fied body—while the “creature” is in fact a more and 
more endangered species. In the academy, the newest 
biophobic symptom is the devaluation of “life” as a tiny 
dead-end anomaly in a brutal universe that is indifferent 
to us. Why not rather celebrate its rarity? Why not rather 
appreciate the astonishing phenomena that emerge from 
possibility? While admiring the superintelligent cyborgs 
we already expect to become, we forget how amazing our 
brains and bodies already are, and how many remarkable 
things they allow us to do. We can support and extend 
sentience without pretending to ourselves that we have escaped 
from a world of change. The biggest problem our world 
faces today is not humanist overvaluation of subjectivity 
or scientific empiricism; it is melancholic scorn for the 
everyday lives of mortal creatures, and the wanton dis-
carding of lives that goes on daily (see, for example, Bau-
man 2003). Neither gadget-love nor rhinocerous horn 
will eliminate the vicissitudes of our enjoyment.21 
                                                                            
21 I caution my colleagues to consider what the devaluing of self 
and subjectivity might mean in a time of drone warfare, techno-
cratic biophobia, and human trafficking (see Butler 2004; Cha-
kravorty and Neti 2009; Waldby 2004). For work on reconfigur-
ing the ethics and discourses of biopolitics in light of posthu-
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In the sciences, self, culture, even the life experiences 
of creatures still hover somewhere “over” the real action, 
apparently towards the top of the disciplinary heap but in 
fact epiphenomenal. Despite Dennett’s elegant, nuanced 
critique of his own influential distinction between “sub-
jective” or “first-person” knowing and objective or “third-
person” knowing (Dennett 2007, 252), the distinction still 
makes a difference, and the privilege goes to third-person 
knowledge. Edward Wilson’s (1999) call for “consilience” 
between the humanities and the sciences has not gotten 
us much further, because the former are subsumed into a 
larger explanatory framework, leaving behind all of their 
messy and valuable complexity. Ted Slingerland’s arbore-
al schema posits scientific “ground” for the treehouses of 
culture, thus bearing an uncanny and no doubt unintend-
ed resemblance to Marx’s much-criticized distinction 
between economic structure and cultural superstructure 
(2009).22 But encoding and decoding, pattern-recognition 
and construction, are fundamental to living process, sen-
tient or otherwise. Sentience itself is highly varied, con-
sisting of very “early” functions and forms working cheek 
by jowl with “later” ones. If, as Barbieri (2009) contends, 
symbolic semiosis emerges from the code semiotics of 
early organic life, ideas like consilience relegate semiosis 
to much too narrow a band of material activity. Similarly, 
the privileging of third- over first-person knowledge 
downplays both the extent of their interdependence and 
the enormous pragmatic value of the latter.  
But self has also been acquiring new significance all 
across the sciences and philosophy. Biologists speak of 
recognition of “self/non-self” as basic to the workings of 
                                                                            
man developments and philosophies, see Zylinska (2009), Mac-
Cormack (2012), and Chen (2012). 
22 Slingerland (2008) seems determined to make the humanities 
responsible for, instead of critical of, “mind-body dualism”—
but despite its unwarranted polarizations, his book is a challeng-
ing discussion of current claims that the sciences can help the 
humanities “progress.” 
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immune systems (the Major Histocompatibility Complex, 
again). Does this install a primitive binary at the heart of 
organismic experience? Perhaps. But what if that binary 
were an element in an open network of signifying chains 
constructed out of familiarity and unfamiliarity? Could 
the digital be partly responsible for the multicellular pro-
pensities of living matter? Can self be thus distinguished 
from its idealist forebear, the “soul”? Self-experience is a 
neural phenomenon, embodied and always-unfolding (Ledoux 
2010). Self is not the ultimate arbiter of reality, even of its 
own psychical reality. Arguably, however, neither is it 
merely a befuddled, delusional witness nor an aggressive 
display of false coherence. Hood (2012) argues that self is 
an unfolding narrative; it is, so to speak, what episodic 
memory is for. Self is critic and storyteller, inventor and 
historian (Boyd 2009). Many contemporary psychoana-
lysts understand self to mean a succession of self-states 
often unaware of their discontinuity (see Lachmann and 
Beebe 1997). Above all, self-process is generated by neu-
ronal and neurochemical activity in the service of organ-
ismic attempts to shape and evaluate lived experience. 
Thus the self can also be imagined as a moving point in 
an open, self-organized, living system (see Bersani and 
Dutoit 2008, Bersani 2010); if not globally coherent and 
stable, that is to say, it most certainly has elements there-
of.23 We do not need to jettison subjectivity and self-
process; instead we need to redescribe them, so as to in-
clude the self-constitutive activity of the semi-permeable 
sac whose formation arises from non-sentient activity, 
but is at the same time necessary to life. 
 Didier Anzieu’s “skin-ego” (1989, 1993) and Hoff-
meyer’s notion of skin as self (2008, 25–36) both illustrate 
the conceptual relocation of self to the activity of the 
membrane. Damasio argues for a “proto-self” that doesn’t 
simply await neo-cortical developments but rather sha-
23 As Doidge (2007) points out, plasticity and entrenchment are 
two sides of the same coin. 
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pes, and is shaped by, very ancient brain-stem functions 
(Damasio 2010, 31–62). This is a neural platform whose 
plasticity eventuates in the complexity and historicity of 
“personal” selfhood. Self-process plays a crucial role in 
directing attention and concern, thereby shaping the 
brain and its ability to (co)adapt to inner and outer envi-
ronmental change. It is one of the chief shapers of the 
“appetitive motivational system” Panksepp calls SEEK-
ING (Panksepp 1998, 24–27, 51). Organisms, it seems, 
always seek enrichment, not just “bare life”; as J.Z. Young 
puts it in The Study of Man, art is biologically significant 
because it insists “that life be worthwhile, which, after all, 
is the final guarantee of its continuance” (Young 1971, 
360). However fallible, the sophistication of sentience is 
an aspect of, and enables, living process. 
 Dissanayake’s suggestion that “making special” is one 
of the core functions of art helps to explain why we have 
such difficulty appreciating the artistry of everyday life 
(Dissanayake 1988, 74–106). Art does in fact capture at-
tention by, say, making us see or feel the creamy or 
gleaming character of rock rather than its overfamiliar 
immobile lumpiness. What is of importance in this pro-
cess is not simply the separation of self from non-self, but 
the work done on the boundary between the two, where 
we can make the familiar unfamiliar just as readily as the 
other way round. (Indeed it is embellishment, not neces-
sity, that is the mother of invention.) Jane Jacobs notes 
that the ludic and ornamental applications of our most 
important technologies (such as ceramics, metallurgy, plastics) 
preceded their practical applications; our oldest known ex-
amples of wheels are from toy wagons (Jacobs 1988, 221). 
The placard, the territorial marker, the beautiful or for-
bidding entryway, are all forms of display, and hence in-
struments of living process. Avian and simian perfor-
mance displays (e.g., in courting) must vary from “tradi-
tion” if they are going to attract attention to this specially 
plumageous or architecturally creative bird, or that small 
but exceptionally boisterous and noisy chimpanzee. The 
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crafting of insult and satire marks emergence or expul-
sion from the crowd, as in the scene of Homeric single 
combat, or the horripilation and posturing of little pussy-
cats intent on territorial defense or combat (see Fraden-
burg 1991). These are stylizations of the gaze—the being 
looked at—fundamental to the co-constructions of crea-
tures and territories (Lacan 1998, 75; Caillois 2003, 89–
106). My point is not to reduce the arts to “survival” prac-
tices, but rather to expand our understanding of survival 
practices themselves as including and being included by 
the arts of thriving and enjoyment.  
 Because female sexual choice is practiced by a wide 
variety of species, including primates, many evolutionary 
theorists have considered the possibility that female “taste” or 
aesthetic judgment may be the most important factor in 
evolutionary change (for discussion see Rothenberg 2005, 
34–39). Hoffmeyer’s critique of Dawkins suggests that 
aesthetic judgment does not simply serve the “selfish 
gene” but rather points to the agency of phenotypal expe-
rience in general (Hoffmeyer 2008, 75–78, 96–98). Arts of 
any kind depend and elaborate on signaling and its inter-
pretation; all benefit from play, practice and sophistica-
tion; all depend on the construction and deconstruction 
of meaningful patterns, among which are the “vitality 
affects” Daniel Stern (2010) writes about: intensity, still-
ness, exaggeration, subtlety. The arts foreground expres-
sion and interpretation—they heighten sentient exper-
ience, and in this way sustain the attention that can lead 
to neuroplastic change (Mahoney 1991, 69ff, 95–100). Art 
is what a behavioral ethologist would call a “costly,” but 
therefore noticeable, signal (Reader 2003, 5.). Animals 
“exaggerate” signals because exaggeration is part of living 
process: little siamangs and chimpanzees try regularly to 
avoid the responsibilities of adult life by means of exag-
gerated distress calls and temper tantrums; when ready to 
mate, female chimps will moan theatrically to attract the 
attention of the males that interest them; we all perfume 
the air when we want love, or give each other the evil eye, 
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often in order to avoid injury—war by other means, i.e. 
politics (Byrne 2003). These are the masks of love and 
war—when I unfurl my best feathers, or costume my des-
trier to enhance the appearance of my monstrous, chival-
ric oneness with him.  
 Classical and medieval animal lore is full of examples 
of beasts’ love of the arts. John of Trevisa writes that ox-
herders know to “please their oxen with whistling and 
song to make them bear the yoke better”; “deer love mel-
ody by kynde, as Avicenna says”; they marvel at “the 
noise of pipes,” and enjoy “accord of melody” (Seymour 
[1975] 1988, XVIII.xv, XVIII.xxx).24 Horses are “glad of 
the noise of symphony,” and are “comforted with the 
noise of a trumpet to battle and to fighting” (XVIII. 
xxxix). In distinguishing between beasts that have voices 
and those that do not, John of Trevisa notes that the for-
mer “make tunes and melody . . . namely in time of en-
gendering,” when they “pray for love.” Darwin, in effect, 
agrees: “[T]he power of intercommunication between 
members of the same community—and . . . between members 
of the opposite sexes . . . is of the highest importance to [so-
cial animals]” (Darwin 1872, 60). Antonio Damasio’s 
work on emotions recalls Darwin’s by defining emotions 
as expressive and embodied social activity (Damasio 
2003, 46). The grimace does not simply “represent” pain, 
fear or anger; like tears, it relieves pain by means of pro-
jection, ex-pression in both senses of the term. Emotions 
are extimate, part of the inherent expressivity of affective 
process. The mask hides the face and its emotional dis-
plays, but also calls attention to the presence of disguise. 
Hiding and making appearances—camouflage and dis-
play—are functions crucial to life, and both are ways of 
shaping sentient awareness. 
24 All citations to Trevisa are taken from Seymour’s edition 
([1975] 1988), cited by book and section number. On John of 
Trevisa and his “auctour” Bartholomaeus Anglicus, see Keen 
(2007) and Fowler (1995). My remarks on Trevisa draw on 
Fradenburg (2012). 
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 Steen (2009) argues that consciousness is for the pur-
pose of responsiveness to novelty, in the same way that 
the plasticity of memory does not simply lead to “distor-
tions,” but creates new narratives and understandings of 
our lives in accordance with changing realities.  The kind 
of representational accuracy admired by empiricists, that 
is to say, may not be as high a priority for episodic mem-
ory as the social and psychological renegotiability of life-
stories.25 We need to model reality in malleable fashion if 
we are to live and learn; even the evidence of our senses is 
based on interpretation (what you might call the outreach 
capacities of the optic nerve: Mahoney 1991, 106–108). 
Relationality, intellectual stimulation, and the arts are not 
fripperies, but activities for life. What is “mentalization” 
if not awareness, via signification, of the sentience of oth-
ers—of minds “like our own” (or not) (see Fonagy 1998)? 
We know that our lab rat brothers and sisters will run 
mazes out of curiosity, sans reward; fish will swim mazes 
for the same reason, because they enjoy SEEKING (Pans-
kepp 1998, 24–27). So, at the Santa Barbara Zoo, the 
zookeepers dig and reshape the soil in the meerkat habitat 
so that the meerkats will follow them around and then dig 
and reshape it all over again. Thriving and surviving are 
fully intricated with each other; cultural activity is neither 
epiphenomenal, nor dispensable, but essential to our 
ways of living.  
Culture is what Elaine Scarry, in her unsurpassable 
book on The Body in Pain, calls “self-extension” (Scarry 
1985, 33). We might call it the caring side of prosthesis, 
because it tends to the body’s vulnerabilities, rather than 
denying that they exist. By comparison with the humble 
proximity of lightbulb to eye, or bed to aching legs, she 
writes, 
elaborate forms of self-extension occur at a . . . dis-
25 Schacter 1996, 98–133, discusses the “troubling” plasticity of 
memory. 
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tance from the body; the telephone or the airplane 
is a more emphatic instance of overcoming the 
limitation of the human body than is the cart. Yet 
even as here when most exhilaratingly defiant of 
the body, civilization always has embedded within 
it a profound allegiance to the body. (Scarry 1985, 
57)  
The sciences study patterns in matter and physical forces 
(among other things); the humanities teach human or-
ganisms how best to move, and keep on moving, with 
maximum power and grace.  If the humanities are “fuzzy” 
and their processes and outcomes difficult to quantify, 
that is because living is “fuzzy.” It demands artfulness, 
experimentation, and hypothesis. 
 Athletes and musical prodigies benefit from training, 
mental as well as physical; to suggest that training in rhe-
torical, critical, and scholarly abilities accomplishes noth-
ing is as foolish as suggesting that actors and dancers 
should be exclusively self-taught. It only makes sense that 
we would train ourselves and our young how best to in-
terpret and address the world, as sentient entities living in 
complex ecologies. The idea that life is artful and requires 
creativity, technique, and practice, is of course an ancient 
one; indeed there is no culture, no group, without stylized 
and distinctive arts of living. In Volume 3 of The History 
of Sexuality, Foucault studies the classical regimens that 
taught the arts of living to Western antiquity (one of his 
chapters is on Artemidorus’s Oneirocriticon, the treatise 
on the interpretation of dreams discussed by Freud at the 
beginning of his own tome by that name) (see Foucault 
1988; Fradenburg 2009). Within and beyond the regi-
mens of antiquity, formalized arts of living included 
“consolations” and “inspirations” (for example, how to 
endure awaiting execution in a Roman prison, with both 
sons already dead).26 We cannot jettison the arts and hu-
26 The most famous example of the consolation is De Consola-
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manities without also jettisoning counsel and healing. (This 
argument will not, of course, sway anybody who wants to 
jettison teaching, healing, and helping, despite the fact 
that all lives demonstrably depend on such arts.) Freud 
wrote, in Civilization and Its Discontents, that life was too 
hard for us. But we had, he thought, developed “tech-
niques of living” to help us manage—such as remaking 
the world according to our wishes (courageous, but prob-
ably futile), and love (most likely to succeed) (Freud 
1961b, 62ff.). Jung formulated the ideal outcome of psy-
choanalysis as “creative living”: “as a living phenome-
non,” he wrote, “[the psychological fact] is always 
indissolubly bound up with the continuity of the vital 
process, so that it is not only something evolved but also 
continually evolving and creative” (Jung 1953, par. 717). 
 Jazz, writes Steven Knoblauch, is “a model for impro-
vising within and flowing with the rhythms of life, for 
inhabiting experience in its fullness . . . and for sustaining 
and surviving . . . treatment relationships” (Knoblauch 
1996, 324). Philip Ringstrom’s discussions of improvisa-
tion see psychoanalytic technique in much the same way 
(Ringstrom 2001, 731). Biological processes are also im-
provisational, at least in the sense that no moment, no 
challenge to life, is ever exactly the same as another. Whe-
ther we argue, with the evolutionary psychologists, for an 
“improvisational intelligence” produced by selection, or 
with the anthropologists for the dependence of ecological 
(co)adaption on social learning, the (living) processes in-
volved have much in common: pattern-recognition and 
interpretation, copying of motifs and errors therein, pat-
tern change, environmental complexity, and temporality 
in the form of generational (and phenotypal) innovation 
and its miscalculations (Calvin 1996; Boyd, Richerson 
and Henrich 2011). The humanities are interpretive arts, 
whatever else they may be; they teach necessarily impro-
visational, real-time, and unpredictable practice, because 
                                                                            
tione Philosophiae, by Boethius (ed. Moreschini 2000). 
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that is the lion’s share of living (Aron 2006, 355). Ring-
strom contends that there is no technique for improvisa-
tion; but in fact we do teach improvisation as technique, 
in manners as well as in theatre—as we do in the humani-
ties, at least in classes small enough to engage in discus-
sion, when we are thinking on our feet, pulling words out 
of nowhere, expressing new ideas and linking them to 
familiar ones. Creativity means pattern-definition and 
change.27 
 The vitality affects—loudness, intensity, speed of 
movement, and so forth—and the “forms of vitality” that 
transmit them, are crucial to the semiosis of living pro-
cess, as well as to the arts (Stern 2010). We can see re-
shapings of these forms in the styles of signification that 
followed the plagues of 14th-century Europe.28 According 
to the literary historian Siegfried Wenzel, the arts of 14th-
century England made scant mention of the plague, by 
comparison with, for example, the ubiquity of the danse 
macabre on the continent; English medical writing on the 
plague was derived from a narrow range of authorities, 
primarily Guy de Chauliac (Wenzel 1982, 150). Can we, 
as Wenzel did—and rather too many medievalists after 
him—conclude from this and similar evidence that the 
English were less traumatized by the plague than the 
French and the Italians (see, for example, Lewis 2003, 
148)? I think not. For one thing, post-traumatic disorders 
express themselves in many different ways (phobic and 
counterphobic, melancholic and maniacal), including sil-
ence. We still know very little about how and why these 
                                                                            
27 T. Paul Cox’s essay “The Slopes of Davos” is critical of the 
idea that improvisation might be “a way of life” (Cox 2013, 8). 
But I do believe it is the nature of all living process. The fact that 
improvisation has been captured on occasion by neo-liberal 
discourse, or at least by the entertainments neo-liberalism puts 
on “outside . . . the secure perimeter” (my emphasis) that shel-
ters the big capitalist powers from lesser ones at Davos, does not 
mean we can’t reclaim it for another kind of thought.  
28 On cultural epidemiology, see Trostle and Sommerfeld (1996).  
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different pathways are taken, by any particular person, in 
any historical situation. But I suggest there is plenty of 
evidence of trauma in the writing of the period. One of 
late medieval England’s foremost (post)traumatic symp-
toms is the acceleration and expansion of preparedness: 
newly Englished almanacs and divination guides, astro-
logical and medical treatises, and herbals, herbals, herb-
als. We see English prose, which in this period is in-
creasingly associated with the dissemination of plain 
truths legible to ordinary minds, rather than with the 
especially difficult challenge to memory it had been in 
earlier periods. We see attempts to manage anxiety by 
means of improved foresight, and to take talismanic ac-
tion against abandonment: read it yourself, do it yourself, 
because cura,  ‘care,’ has fled the land. Cura shrinks to the 
precincts of St. Paul’s; the surviving doctors and priests 
are all running away from the villages and towns. Have an 
herbal and an almanac on hand, maybe a treatise on as-
trology, because you are on your own. After the plague, 
catastrophic loss of Heimlich (‘homely’) space leads to the 
re-territorializing of the human mind as Heimlich. How 
can we feel companionated by other minds under these 
circumstances? And if we can’t, what happens to the 
common weal? If no one cares for the commons, the 
commons must care for itself. The survivors make the 
world “home” again—they re-environ—by learning about 
it and the minds in which they keep it. This is familiar to 
us from our own time; from the 1970s onward, when 
Great Society initiatives were blamed by right wing op-
portunists for the economic crash brought on by the 
OPEC oil crisis of 1974, and U.S. leadership offered little 
or nothing in the way of intelligent and forward-looking 
responses, our non-fiction bestseller list has been cram-
med with “self-help” books. 
 In the 14th century, translation into the vernacular 
became lifesaving, restorative activity, in a way that medi-
cal humanists would understand well, to say nothing of 
the Franciscans (St. Francis is credited with having writ-
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ten some of the earliest poems in Italian). The aforemen-
tioned John Trevisa was probably the most ambitious and 
prolific of the new translators in plaguey England. His 
Properties of Things, a translation of Bartholomaeus An-
glicus’ De proprietatibus rerum, contains knowledge of 
plants and many other “things” of medicinal value. The 
Sixth Book treats of sleep, dreams, and exercise, like an 
old regimen (or, to use Foucault’s term, “care of self” 
treatise). The Properties discuss vertigo, spasms, the “things 
that befall man against kynde,” but also those things of the 
earth that “are made to relieve . . . many kinds of infirmi-
ties” of “mannes kynde,” to “comfort, help, and succour, 
and keep and save [us]” (VII.i). It’s not all bad out there; 
lunatics can be healed by the long teeth of wolves (XVIII.i). And 
why not? If, while in the middle of a psychotic break, 
someone handed me a lupine incisor to bind to my cheek, 
I might well feel a new spring in my step. I have a talisman. 
Someone—me?—has replied to my howls. Post-trauma, popu-
lar knowledge about care upholds relationality, however 
tenuously. 
 It is hard to ignore the affection, registered in the (pa-
ra)language of Trevisa’s translation (as in Bartholomae-
us’s balanced, rhythmic Latin), for the beasts that move 
upon the earth: sadness over the ignoble deaths of faithful 
old dogs; wonder at the intelligence of spiders, evident in 
their works but unknowable to us, a kind of secret, un-
translatable mental life. The expressive power of Trevisa’s 
translation—its transmission of affects, like curiosity and 
sympathy—is at least as significant as its content, in a 
plague-decimated land with no reason to celebrate the 
gifts of nature. As noted above, a new vernacular audi-
ence could read or hear this science—this “natural histo-
ry”—and bind its wounds accordingly. And they could 
hear the “things” of nature (and beyond) described in 
poetical English prose, in the “mother tongue,” which has 
its own healing powers, like music; it evokes attachment, 
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re-environs us in chora.29 The earth is not simply a purga-
tory readying us for heavenly places; it is a home for all 
living creatures. 
 Trevisa transvalues earth and heaven by turning the 
latter into the chora of the earth. Heaven, though above 
earth (in all senses), is in a position to “influence” it fully, 
and thus quicken it: “[A]lthough the earth is lowest in 
comparison to the body of heaven, nonetheless it receives 
the most influence of the light of heaven and is therefore 
most plenteous as the mother of all, and brings forth 
many diverse and most contrary kinds” (XIV.ii). A heim-
lich place indeed. The text continues: “[W]hat seems lack-
ing [in the earth] of nobleness of substance is recovered 
in effect and virtue, for . . . it brings forth some more no-
ble [kyndes] than heaven does. . . . [It] brings forth crea-
tures with life, feeling and reason” (XIV.ii). Trevisa de-
scribes all sentient life, not just reason, as “noble.” Influ-
ence is glad to touch the earth, to make it heavenly, to 
link different entities and territories. Trevisa’s prose make 
us feel the earth’s specialness: Book XVII treats of “the 
fairness of the earth, touching virtues and properties of 
ore and of metal and stones and things that grow under 
the ground, and of trees, herbs, grass and weeds that grow 
and spring from the earth” (my emphasis). This is amplifi-
catio, enumeratio (amplification, enumeration)—an em-
paradising, as Milton might have put it, of the lively 
mind. The rhythm first tumbles along with energy and 
then, paralleling two doublets, begins to enchant us. Book 
VIII will clarify that human beings are beasts too; Trevisa 
writes about “the virtues and properties of things that 
have life and feeling; and all that is comprehended of flesh 
and of spirit of life and so of body and soul is called ani-
mal ‘a beast,’ whether it be airy as fowl, or watery as fish 
that swim, or earthy as beasts that go on the ground and 
                                                                            
29 On the “semiotic chora”—the primordial “receptacle” whose 
rhythms precede but always undergird language and our per-
ceptions of space—see Kristeva 1984, 25–30, and Kristeva 1980, 
6–7. 
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in fields, as men and beasts wild and tame.” This is 
anaphora, pleonasm, a reveling in the multitudinousness 
and variousness of beasts, all brought together by rhythm 
(“men and beasts wild and tame”).  
In today’s world, Trevisa would have had a lot of 
trouble finding funding for such a project. What could 
England hope to gain from a translation of a 200-year-old 
enormous Latin tome? Territory is bound up with affect: 
we mark it with our memories, and vice versa, and this 
expressivity helps us process the vicissitudes of territory 
(and of the territory of the O/other—territory is always 
extimate), as I argue happened in 14th-century England. 
(It is also happening today, visible, as noted, in the deadly 
fantasy of immunity, but also audible in the material of 
those of my patients whose fears are embedded in identi-
fications with endangered species.) Denmark’s loss of Schles-
wig-Holstein to the Austro-Prussian army in 1864 also 
meant the loss of most of Denmark’s non-Danish-speaking 
population; the monarchy “turned its eyes inward under 
the rationale that ‘outward losses must be made up by 
inward gains’” (Blau and Christensen 2002). The “work-
ing through” that might otherwise have been enabled was 
compromised by the imperative to “make it up”; the re-
sult was the interior colonization of Jutland and the em-
ergence of a “common Danish culture,” best exemplified 
by the religious poet and national icon N.F.S. Gruntvig, a 
great promoter of the purity of the Danish language, and 
an anti-Semite (see Blau and Christensen 2002). Den-
mark’s loss of its non-Danish-speaking population is re-
dressed with one of the most venerable maneuvers of 
magical thinking: we didn’t want them anyway. This is only one 
aspect of Denmark’s cultural renascence; but it is a sobering 
one to say the least, since we all know how that sort of 
thing turned out in the end for the chosen people. The 
arts exaggerate, foreground, make spectacular, and there-
by help us attend to and learn better the formal features 
of the more quotidian arts of living; but the rigid and ri-
gidifying forms of stereotype and propaganda can narrow 
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our vision down almost to nothing. The arts are at work 
in human predation and defense and also in the ineradi-
cable cultural dimension of epidemic.  
 Interpretation and relationality depend on one anoth-
er; all relationships are unending processes of interpreta-
tion and expression, listening and signifying. In turn, sen-
tience assists relationality: we can neither thrive nor sur-
vive without minds alert to possibility. Psychoanalytic 
attention to somatic and paraverbal communication and 
to “primary” and “secondary” process (such as multiple-
code theory: see Bucci 1997) attests to the many different 
(but interlocking) modes of sentience that constitute liv-
ing process and our awareness and experience thereof. 
Psychoanalysis is also an art that cultivates sentience; the 
ear of the analyst—of the analysand too—is a highly sen-
sitive instrument. Analysts try to listen to all the ways 
people signify, all at once. We try to reach all different 
parts of the (embodied and motoric) mind, all different 
modes of (un-)consciousness, all the different intensities 
and gradations of human sentience, all at once (cf. Kohut 
[1953] on empathy as a mode of knowing). And though 
psychoanalysis is particularly focused on real-time inter-
subjective engagement, so are many other efforts to teach, 
heal, help and befriend, like the medical humanities 
(Charon 2006).  
 No organism lasts for long if it can’t interpret signals 
well, or signal what it needs to communicate. Both the 
fine arts and the arts of living exercise therapeutic powers 
of expression and interpretation. Psychoanalysis is still 
the Talking Cure. But it is also the Listening Cure, the 
Seeing and Being Seen Cure, the Screaming Cure, and the 
Cure by means of Metaphor, Quietness, Silence, and Hos-
pitality. The enhancement of sentience in the service of 
relationality is its aim, as is true also of the arts and hu-
manities. “[H]umans are interpretations of their worlds; 
we are embodied tacit theories” (Mahoney, 88). Infantile 
fantasies are hypotheses about self and other that are test-
ed, refined and transformed in the course of develop-
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ment. Our interpretations of relational experiences, and 
the resulting expectations about how such experiences 
will and should be negotiated, are stored as “procedural 
memories”—memories we keep, non-consciously, of tech-
niques of living, and how to use them (Herbert 2006, 43; cf. 
also Brickman 2008). The quiet non-consciousness of 
procedural memory is one of the most important reasons 
why the complexity and artistry of living process is so 
easy for us to forget. We like to take our templates and 
skills for granted as much as possible. We become neur-
ally entrenched. Once we have learned them, we never 
have to ponder the rules governing utterances in English, 
or bicycle-pedaling, until something goes wrong, and we 
often resent the labor it takes to give such basic assump-
tions fresh attention; the act of making-conscious almost 
always meets resistance, because it takes energy. Affect 
plays its role here, by attaching us to (relational) expecta-
tions we hope will always be met, and making it hard for 
us to (co)adapt to, and create, new circumstances. Be-
cause it is non-conscious, because we take for granted the 
knowledge of practice encoded by procedural memory, 
we do not think of it enough when we consider the work 
of self-transformation (see, for example, Modell 2003, 42–
47). But making-conscious is another way to foster men-
tal plasticity (resilience); it is not simply a matter of shin-
ing a light, but rather of the spreading neuroplastic change set 
off thereby. The complexities of living process require 
enormous finesse to negotiate, and it is part of the work 
both of psychoanalysis and the liberal arts in general to 
focus attention on the activities of procedural patterns, so 
naturalized, so in the background, so difficult to describe 
and explain.  
 Living process depends on preservation as well as in-
novation. The relational arts teach us how better to pro-
tect the bonds that help us thrive, while also allowing 
them to change and grow, and even make way for new 
ones. But, as Malabou notes, thriving is not a matter of 
infinite “flexibility,” but rather of plasticity (Malabou 
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2008, 47). Forces do not shape us willy-nilly, which is a 
good thing, because plasticity means we can be profound-
ly influenced over time. Some “innovations,” after all, are 
to be avoided, like most online universities, or the latest 
thing in mortgage-backed securities. As noted, these days 
we have to wrap our minds more and more around the 
idea that the living can be replaced, not just on the as-
sembly-line, but in the classroom and the hospital. This 
accelerating devaluation of life serves domination, the 
antidote to which is to know that we are all mortal crea-
tures—immunity remains impossible. It is only with the 
“sole support” of this knowledge that “we can attempt to 
live with others” (Kristeva 1992, 170). There are many 
different kinds of intelligence, and there will always be a 
few writers who don’t need to read Shakespeare in col-
lege, or game designers who don’t need economics cours-
es to get rich. But a terrible narrowing of the mind and of 
mental experience is ongoing in our country, sometimes 
waved on by the very scientists who ought most of all to 
respect the mind’s powers. As the philosopher Guillaume 
LeBlanc has argued throughout his oeuvre, philosophy is 
work performed in and on behalf of particular cultures 
and ecologies. This requires a new ethos of the philoso-
pher, for whom the question of belonging to an ordinary 
world has become, not something to bracket or trans-
cend, but vital. Understanding how ordinariness is pro-
duced, and critiquing self-evidence, remain crucial activ-
ities of cultural analysis.  But we are also bound to deci-
phering the relationship of our work to the arts of thriv-
ing and surviving, and it is time to fight not just for this 
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Let us tie the strings on this bit of reality 
  Jack Spicer 
 
 
I would like to begin with a short poem by Jack Spicer: 1 
 
                                                                                                            
1 Spicer was an important contributor, along with Robin Blaser 
and Robert Duncan, to the “Berkeley Renaissance” in the late 
1940s and early 1950s (later folded into the San Francisco Re-
naissance and the “New American Poetry”). Spicer only pub-
lished, as a matter of policy, with very small, local, presses; and, 
since private and public readings constituted a major scene of 
the circulation of his poetry within various coteries, a number of 
interesting poems exist only in manuscript. Spicer died in 1965 
at the age of forty from alcoholism-related complications, and is 
buried anonymously in San Francisco. This poem, as yet un-
published, is held among the Jack Spicer Papers, BANC MSS 
2004/209, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berke-
ley. See Box 6, folder 30.  
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Poetry is action like a bird 
Flying around a room. 
Birds usually fly 
From window to window 
Or, on stormy nights of bad luck, 
In the door and out the other door so fast 
No one knows they are flying. 
 
Partaking of the discourses of both lyric poetry and poet-
ics (as a discursive-performative theorization of poesis), 
Spicer’s little poem refuses to adopt either a defensive 
posture or a transparent explanatory discourse. The poem 
consists of only two sentences that narrow in scope as the 
poem progresses; the first sentence begins with a meta-
phor and ends with a simile modifying the second noun-
phrase of that metaphor, and the second sentence is an 
amplification of the simile in the first sentence. The rela-
tively colloquial diction (including the use of “fast” as an 
adverb instead of “quickly”) and the syntax seem simple 
enough at first glance, and the association of (especially 
lyric) poetry and birds is conventional enough in English 
verse.  
 Yet the poem arrives at the conventional association 
of poetry and birds through an unlikely route, enunciat-
ing the association, not in terms of a similarity of poetry 
to a bird’s song, but a similarity of the action which con-
stitutes poetry to a particular ornithological behavior: “a 
bird / flying around the room.” A bird flying around the 
room may be flying “window to window”—presumably 
stuck in a house and trying to break free to the outdoors. 
But, this flight path might also mark an attempt to get in 
and stay in the human shelter, ending in an all-too-brief 
bivouac owing to the bird’s “bad luck.”  Both possibilities 
underscore the nature of the action in question as the 
survival behavior of an organism—flouting convention 
and focusing on a creaturely, rather than a symbolic, bird 
of poesy. The first line break of the poem reinforces this 
sense, suggesting that one first read “poetry is action like 
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a bird” as a sentence unto itself, ahead of its participation 
in the syntax of the second line. In this most basic tool of 
de-subordinating standard syntax (the line break), the 
poem insinuates that the simplest kinetics involved in the 
survival of mortal creaturely life make for a sufficient 
comparison to the action of poetry: poetry is action like 
the organism of a bird is action—poetry is action like the 
existence/survival of a bird in any given moment is action. 
 The description of a bird flying all-too-briefly through 
a human shelter in the last three lines further associates 
the action that is poesy with the survival of life that is 
precariously mortal, yet paradoxically, requires more than 
the conditions of bare survival in order to survive. Draw-
ing on his graduate study of Old English literature with 
philologist Arthur G. Brodeur, Spicer here introduces an 
allusion that most of his avant-gardist colleagues might 
have missed—gesturing to the account of the conversion 
of Northumbrian King Edwin in Bede’s Ecclesiastical His-
tory of the English People.  In a very famous passage, after 
Edwin has been advised by Coifi, the “chief priest,” to 
accept the faith preached by the missionary Paulinus, one 
of Edwin’s advisors reasons that Christianity might offer 
insight into human life beyond mortality: 
 
when we compare the present life of man on earth 
with that time of which we have no knowledge, it 
seems to me like the swift flight of a single sparrow 
through the banqueting-hall where you are sitting 
at dinner on a winter’s day with your thegns and 
counselors. In the midst there is a comforting fire 
to warm the hall; outside, the storms of winter rain 
or snow are raging. The sparrow flies swiftly through 
one door of the hall, and out the other. While he is inside, 
he is safe from the winter storms; but after a few 
moments of comfort, he vanishes from sight into 
the wintry world from which he came. Even so, 
man appears on earth for a little while, but of what 
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went before this life or of what follows, we know 
nothing . . . . (Bede 1990, 129–130) 
 
Spicer, however, implicitly demonstrates how the exam-
ple of the sparrow-flight—here deployed as a demonstra-
tion of how Christianity claims to offer more information 
than paganism about the fate of the soul—might just as 
easily return one’s focus to creaturely life, insofar as Spic-
er’s poem affirms the sparrow’s attempt to thrive—
however briefly—in a cozy shelter, by comparing such 
creaturely behavior to the action of poetry. In the process, 
the poem intertwines life-processes and the desire to not 
only survive, but to thrive (enjoying the love of move-
ment, either sheltered beside a warm fire, or freed from 
the confines of the windows), with the action of the poem 
itself. Although the poem is grammatically “about” the 
“subject” of poetry, it advances a certain experiential 
claim about poetry without definitively representing po-
etry per se. The brevity of the poem, combined with the 
opacity of the action with which it equates poetry and 
then modifies it with a single subsequent sentence in rela-
tively colloquial diction (i.e., “bad luck,” “so fast”), does 
not represent posited kinetics of poesy as much as it per-
forms them. In its performance of these poetics, the poem 
advances a claim on their necessity for mortal creatures 
like Bede’s sparrow. The poem has the capacity to leave a 
reader or hearer with less a clear sense of what poetry or 
this poem’s “object of representation” is, than with a clear 
experience of what poesy does—though it goes by so fast 
as to feel like a phenomenological blur. The very brevity 
of the poem is bound up with the experience of this læne 
lif (brief, fleeting life, lit. “loaned life”)—with the mortali-
ty of a human reader. But the poem is not an appeal to a 
binary of experience versus cognition, nor a populist dis-
avowal of serious thought or exacting description—in fact, it 
shows off its learnedness with a relatively obscure and compli-
cated allusion, even as a very tiny poem. 
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 This blurry sense of a bird-action passing through/ 
by/past one’s consciousness as part of cognizing and stri-
ving after a desire, or need, for not only shelter, but also 
for a warm fire in order to survive, makes no excuses for 
its “fuzziness.” In fact, the semantic and performative 
intertwining of organismic and poetic kinetics and mor-
tality here enshrines something like what Maurice Mer-
leau-Ponty would call the whole “phenomenal field” as 
necessary for life.2 Such fleeting and fuzzy moments do 
not fail to admit a real world to thought, but neither do 
they fail to engage the richly rewarding problem of how 
consciousness and the actual intertwine. That poesis itself, 
as the experience of the actual, may pass so fleetingly and 
unquantifiably, is not something for which Spicer’s poem 
seems interested in apologizing.  
 Too often, however, defenses of the humanities, and 
specifically works of poetics, are just that: defenses, apol-
2 Merleau-Ponty writes: “We shall no longer hold that percep-
tion is incipient science, but conversely that classical science is a 
form of perception which loses sight of its origins and believes 
itself complete. The first philosophical act would appear to be to 
return to the world of actual experience which is prior to the 
objective world, since it is in it that we shall be able to grasp the 
theoretical basis no less than the limits of that objective world, 
restore to things their concrete physiognomy, to organisms their 
individual ways of dealing with the world, and to subjectivity its 
inherence in history . . . . This phenomenal field is not an ‘inner 
world,’ the ‘phenomenon’ is not a ‘state of consciousness,’ or a 
‘mental fact,’ and the experience of phenomena is not an act of 
introspection or an intuition in Bergson’s sense . . . . Thus what 
we discover by going beyond the prejudice of the objective 
world is not an occult inner world. Nor is this world of living 
experience complete closed to naïve consciousness, as is Berg-
son’s inferiority” (Merleau-Ponty 2002, 66–67). Even more 
starkly, Merleau-Ponty famously explains that, “a philosophy 
becomes transcendental, or radical, not by taking its place in 
absolute consciousness without mentioning the ways by which 
this is reached, but by considering itself as a problem” (2002, 
73). 
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ogetics.3 This may result from the famous poieiaphobic 
offensive in the Fifth Book of Plato’s Republic, a much 
earlier suspicion of the illimitable iterative capacity of 
context, utterance, and inscriptions, or a later develop-
ment of what Fradenburg calls (borrowing from Christo-
pher Bollas) unthinking. Too often, a colleague has said to 
me something to the effect of, “oh, I have no idea how to 
read poetry, I work on prose.” Certainly, in Modern Eng-
lish writing, ever since Sidney’s Defense of Poesy, main-
streams of work in poetics and the humanities too often 
position themselves on the defensive, framing the moral-
izing side-effects of poesy as excuses for its apparent an-
cillary relation to the sort of knowledge production that 
can be easily valued on scales of the state, war, and value 
itself. I invoke the term poetics insofar as it concerns the 
artifacts made by humans and other provisional life-
processes and the interpretations, critiques, readings, com-
mentaries, editions, exhibitions, et alia, that the humanities 
make of and with such artifacts. But, as Fradenburg’s 
work suggests, the news is out: Poetics is on the offensive, 
and “the organism” constitutes a viable critical term. In 
responding to Fradenburg’s repositioning of thriving as a 
necessary condition of life, I want to suggest some alter-
3 Poetics itself is admittedly a weird genre—perhaps more accu-
rately a style or rhetorical force—that constantly demonstrates 
theory as praxis in discussing the ontology, conditions of, and 
limits of making, while also on occasion attempting to direct it, 
produce norms, or even catalyze new makings. The wide and 
widely divergent use of the term “poetics” as a contemporary 
disciplinary designation in the North American academy can be 
used to refer to works as divergent as Charles Bernstein’s A 
Poetics (1992), Lyn Hejinian’s The Language of Inquiry (2000), 
and a series of what for the most part amounts to innovative 
works of literary criticism published in the “Modern and Con-
temporary Poetics” series of Alabama University Press, includ-
ing Miriam Nichols’ Radical Affections (2010), Juliana Spahr’s 
Everybody’s Autonomy (2001), Peter Middleton’s Distant Read-
ing (2005), Jerome McGann’s The Point is to Change It (2007), 
and Steve McCaffery’s The Darkness of the Present (2012). 
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natives to a language of representation not adequate to 
the complexity of the poetics of the thriving organism. 
For Fradenburg, making and the critical study of such 
making actually constitute a basic function of organis-
mic life that “constantly co-processes its boundaries in 
tandem with all the life-forms and forces to which it is 
connected.”  
 This argument stands refreshingly far out from the 
kinds of answers instructors often give to undergraduate 
non-humanities majors enrolled in compulsory humani-
ties core courses. I consistently hear two responses to the 
question “why should I have to take this class?” from the 
mouths of colleagues (for whom I generally have the ut-
most respect), both of which put the humanities hopeless-
ly on the defensive: that, 1) reading Homer, Virgil, Shake-
speare (unsurprisingly, such courses perennially skip over 
the Middle Ages), even Melville, will make one a more 
interesting and well-rounded person (and indeed, as Fra-
denburg herself points out, well-cultured Wagner fans in 
the Nazi party likely felt that they led very interesting 
lives), and that, 2) practicing creative thinking and critical 
reading/writing will equip one to engage in creative prob-
lem solving and to be innovative in one’s professional 
field. Reading “great books” will make business and fi-
nance majors, for example, into more inventive capital-
ists. Not only is this second argument party to the same 
logic that would reduce English departments to centers 
for technical writing or a kind of innovation workshop 
for corporate America, but given the disastrous effects of 
the sub-prime mortgage crises, the idiocy of “innova-
tions” in hedge-fund trading and similar financial instru-
ments—not to mention the bulge of wealth-disparity to 
which these have indelibly contributed—innovation and 
creative problem solving would appear as the very last 
tools with which to further equip Capital and its future 
technocrats now. The impoverishment of both of these 
arguments, aside from their complicity in capitalism and 
state power, emanates from taking an initially defensive 
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combative position. Again, such a position leads, like the 
argument consolidated by Sidney’s Defense of Poesy, to 
making excuses for poesy by pointing to its moralizing 
side effects. In doing so, the defense of poesy reduces the 
possible radicalism of the “delight” component of “to 
teach and delight” to a normalizing and hopelessly mi-
metic discourse.  
 Fradenburg, however, implies (and here I borrow a 
phrase coined by Liza Blake) the offense of poetry by posi-
tively differentiating and entangling the humanities with 
mathematical, experimental, statistical, and observational 
sciences, without ever demanding that the humanities attempt 
to behave like the “sciences” in order to “survive.” Fradenburg 
puts it this way: 
The sciences study patterns in matter and physical 
forces (among other things); the humanities teach 
human organisms how best to move and keep moving, 
with maximum power and grace. If the humanities 
are “fuzzy” and their processes and outcomes dif-
ficult to quantify, that is because living is “fuzzy.”  
At no point, therefore, in a humanistic gesture, can a 
chunk of scientistic data stand as self-evidentiary, for “da-
ta cannot deliberate for us, it can only help.” The humani-
ties fundamentally concern making. This means that 
while the tasks of the humanities can include knowledge-
production (through various processes of making, which 
are themselves forms of knowledge), the humanities are 
concerned first with simply paying attention to and caring 
for making/poesy in “real” time. 
 Thriving, it turns out, is a prerequisite for the survival 
of most kinds of life processes—not the “reward” for the 
few who can pull themselves up by their bootstraps: “Liv-
ing well depends on good education, and it should be 
available to everyone.” Believing that “the biggest prob-
lem our world faces today is not humanist over-valua-
tion of creaturely invention and experience, but melan-
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cholic scorn for the everyday lives of mortal creatures,” 
Fradenburg asserts that “thriving and surviving are fully 
intricated with each other; cultural activity is neither epi-
phenomenal, nor dispensable, but essential to our way of 
living.” The basic political implications of this fact alone 
could be catalogued at some length in an invective against 
material conditions and attendant attitudes (both global 
and local) which continue to determine the dismantling 
of any whiff of (sensible, much less revolutionary) wealth 
re-distribution amidst the current global obsession with 
“austerity.” Take, for example, one New York National 
Public Radio listener’s complaint that persons receiving 
assistance from the Supplementary Nutrition Assistance 
Program (formerly Food Stamps) may use taxpayer mon-
ey to purchase lobster or other “luxury” foods not strictly 
necessary for nutrition and “survival.”4 But the entangle-
ment of poetics with the life-processes of organisms is 
what undergirds these flashpoints in current politics of 
thriving. If the organism, as Fradenburg avers, “constant-
ly co-processes its boundaries in tandem with all the life-
forms and forces to which it is connected, from which the 
biological meaningfulness of its life- and self-experience 
emerges, in a new key,” then, as understood through the 
disciplines cited by Fradenburg (including contemporary 
psychology, neuroscience, immunology, cell-biology), the 
organism depends on poetics—the capacity to make its 
relations to, and co-make its relations with, its environ-
ment in a manner that results in varying, adaptable, and 
aesthetically interesting entanglements and negotiations 
of everything from transport to attraction, digestion, space, use, 
acquiescence, sexualities, temporalities, organisms, ideas, 
concepts, and codes.  
4 The October 12, 2010 episode of the Brian Lehrer show on 
New York NPR station WNYC included a segment that ad-
dressed an attempt to ban the use of SNAP funds to purchase 
soda. See, in the online discussion board for that episode, the 
comments of “Steve from Queens” on lobster: http://www. 
wnyc.org/shows/bl/2010/oct/12/food-stamp-approval/. 
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 What sort of lexicon can more closely describe the 
texture of a poesy necessary for living without compro-
mising its necessary fuzziness? William Carlos Williams’ 
Spring and All similarly re-situates poetry, and its prime 
mover (Williams’ complicated concept of the “imagina-
tion”), outside of moralizing apologia:  
The inevitable flux of the seeing eye toward meas-
uring itself by the world it inhabits can only result 
in himself crushing humiliation unless the indi-
vidual raise to some approximate co-extension with the 
universe. This is possible by aid of the imagination. 
Only through the agency of this force can a man 
[sic] feel himself moved largely with sympathetic 
pulses at work. (Williams 2011, 26–27) 
The urgency here is unmistakable. The organism must 
make an interface, a co-extension, with the very physics of 
the Universe. Without an act of the imagination the or-
ganism will fail, shaken to pieces. As Robin Blaser puts it 
(expanding Williams’ visual register into the auditory, 
tactile, and proprioceptive), “the body hears the world, 
and the power of the earth over the body, the city over the 
body, is in terms of rhythms, meters, phrasing, picked 
up—the body’s own rhythms compose those or it would 
shake to pieces—The music of the spheres is quite real, 
but the sounds of the earth must meet it” (Blaser 2006, 4). 
With poesy as the necessary construction of these by-
ways, these ports and pores of a phenomenological archi-
tecture, the organism can simultaneously differentiate 
and entangle itself with various registers, even to the 
point of displacing Structure, however locally. Such sim-
ultaneous differentiation and entanglement recalls the 
manner in which, as contemporary poet Lisa Robertson 
writes, German Romantic architect and art historian Gottfried 
Semper “proposed a four-part unsubordinated architec-
tural topology, where surface was in non-hierarchical 
relationship with molded plasticity,” and in which “the 
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transience and non-essential [and, I would add, provi-
sional or mortal] quality of the surface did not lessen its 
topological value” (Robertson 2003, 129). 
 If all of this is indeed the case, then as humanists we 
need to radically ramp up our practical and strategically 
biologizing investigations into mechanisms of entangle-
ment, and also into intensifications of co-extensiveness. 
We need to better understand how entanglement and co-
extensiveness are co-produced from the side of the hu-
manities—to develop a sort of “rhyming dictionary” for 
certain aspects of life-processes and the forces of the 
physical cosmos. Take, for example, mid-twentieth-cen-
tury psychologist Silvan Tomkins’ theorization of the role 
that interest plays in the affect-system of an organism: 
 
We are arguing that this affect [interest] supports 
both what is necessary for life and what is possible, 
by virtue of linkages to sub-systems, which them-
selves range from concerns with the transport of 
energy in and out of the body, to concerns about 
the characteristics of formal systems such as logic 
and mathematics. The human being cares about 
many things and he does so because the general af-
fect of interest is structurally linked to a variety of 
other apparatuses which activate this affect in 
ways which are appropriate to the specific needs of 
each sub-system. While excitement is sufficiently 
massive a motive to amplify and make a difference 
to such an already intense stimulation as accom-
panies sexual intercourse, it is nonetheless capable 
of sufficiently graded, flexible innervation and 
combination to provide a motive matched to the 
most subtle cognitive capacities. (Tomkins 1962, 
345)  
 
The upshot of such a system, in which interest, a most 
basic sort of motivation, plays such a plastic role—often 
feeding back to the extent that interest itself can become 
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interesting—is a banal but too-often forgotten element of 
a capacious poetics of the organism: that we need to find 
or make interesting things, or to make things interesting, 
in order to survive. This is why it is not merely a trend of 
the neo-baroque, or a hipster-poet caginess, when Lisa 
Robertson writes, “ornament is the decoration of mortali-
ty,” or insists that to ask “what shall our new ornaments 
be?” amounts to “a serious political question” (Robertson 
2003, 67). Making, and its more seemingly “frivolous” 
possibilities, or poetics, are a biological necessity, and as 
such, one the humanities can think with the sciences if we 
first positively think the humanities as something differ-
ent.  
 These statements of Robertson’s might alert us as well 
to the ethical function of taking a stand for the viability of 
words like “organism,” “living,” “life,” etc., as critical terms. The 
most orthodox practitioners of genealogical readings or of 
negative dialectics might scoff at such potentially “biolo-
gizing” accounts of living and its affects. Many a near-
sighted reading of certain sections of Deleuze and Guat-
tari’s One Thousand Plateaus would bewail the admin-
istrative tyranny of the organism as arboreal organization 
of a Body. Object-oriented philosophers like Graham 
Harman vigorously renounce any concern for ethics or 
politics,5 and the most interesting and productive lines of 
new materialist or speculative realist thought tend to 
ground ethics in a discourse of a monist cosmos, dispens-
ing with the question of accessing alterity as a ruse of “co-
relationism,” rank anthropocentricism, or a violent liber-
al humanism (e.g., Bennett 2009, 122). Yet, while a less 
ego-maniacal vision of the cosmos might lead us to say, 
                                                                                                            
5 Harman often addresses his sense that his politics do not per-
tain to his philosophy, and vice-versa, in his many public speak-
ing appearances. However, a literary critic might be more likely 
to encounter this attitude in Harman’s (2012) “reluctant” ad-
dress to literary-critical interest in his work in his essay “The 
Well Wrought Broken Hammer: Object Oriented Literary Criti-
cism.” 
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with Whitman, that “to die is different than any one sup-
posed,” the thriving organism (the consciousness that, 
however provisional, feels the intractable reality of onto-
logical difference when faced with a feeling, a plant, a 
wind, gravity, a lover, a cat, the mortality of a lover, or—
not to be too Heideggerian—its own mortality) may yet 
have difficulty adding with Whitman, “and luckier” 
(Whitman 1959, 30).  For, following Fradenburg, “Self is 
not the ultimate arbiter of reality, even of its own psychi-
cal reality; but neither is it merely a befuddled, delusional 
witness or an aggressive display of false coherence.”   
 As Fradenburg further notes, “recognition of self/ 
non-self” is “basic to the workings of immune systems.” 
However, Fradenburg suggests, not at all does this pro-
cess of self/non-self recognition slip into a paranoia that 
would limit the role of surrounding entities in an organ-
ism’s co-production to that of “hostile pathogen.” Rather, 
concepts of emergence cannot be severed from questions 
of differentiation, and perhaps more importantly, from 
mortality. The organism may only provisionally act on 
behalf of its communities of cells, but its provisionality 
does not render it less important. As Fradenburg writes, 
 
. . . these days we have to wrap our minds more 
and more around the idea that the living can be 
replaced, not just on the assembly-line, but in the 
classroom and the hospital. This accelerating de-
valuation is a threat in service of domination, the 
antidote to which is to know that we are all mortal 
creatures—immunity remains impossible. It is only 
with the “sole support” of this knowledge that “we 
can attempt to live with others.” 
 
Allowing critical thought to emanate from a position of 
our own creaturely finitude thus assumes a place of the 
highest importance. This may sound like I am advocating 
in favor of continuing to pursue what object-oriented 
philosophers and new materialists disparage as “the ques-
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tion of access” (meaning: philosophy and thinking as 
conditioned by the supposed primacy of human-centered 
access to knowledge and being-in-the-world). But this is 
because the logical gymnastics required to evade the lim-
its of the human organism in a lexicon of critical thought 
too easily flip into a fantasy of tyrannical, infinitely-
extendable human perception and knowledge in an at-
tempt to instrumentalize everything (and isn’t that Capi-
talism, after all?). Pretending that we might ever entirely 
dispense with the complications of perception (without 
which life would probably not be) can only result in a 
gnostic and thus anti-human fantasy of the redemptive 
quality of knowledge as acquired through an infinite and 
homogenous extensibility of intellect—a sublimated de-
sire for deliverance from mortal worldliness. Critic Paul 
A. Bové, in his book Poetry Against Torture, differentiates 
these tendencies in contrasting the projects of Bacon (and 
Descartes) with Italian critic Giambattista Vico: 
 
Bacon and Vico share the classical and liberal ideal 
of perfectibility, but Bacon dreams of achieving 
this by expanding the domain of knowledge, in-
deed, by producing knowledge as a necessary and 
sufficient domain for human aspiration and activi-
ty: “so that human wisdom may be brought to 
complete perfection.” Vico does not share Bacon’s 
vision of the modern for two reasons. First, its to-
talizing ambition is reductive in a way that leaves 
behind all that tradition and older forms of life 
might offer to imagine and fulfill the aspiration to 
and practices of human wisdom. Second, it is not 
only willfully amnesiac but also violently arrogant 
and uncomfortably close in kind and ambition to 
then new forms of imperial and authoritarian po-
litical ambition. Vico’s language, always precise, 
rewards the sort of attention that literary readers 
properly learn from the study of poems . . . . (Bové 
2008, 7) 
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To promote thriving in the face of the total domination of 
global Capital and the accelerating ecological cataclysm, it 
will be necessary to recognize a panoply of differences in 
something other than a purely abstracted infinite Other. 
To discuss the “organism” posits neither the structure of 
the monad as subject of consciousness (but without nec-
essarily dispensing with everything phenomenology con-
tinues to teach) to which all else is equally Other and only 
ever an Object of representation, nor a model in which 
the experience of consciousness is no longer of any con-
cern.6 As Fradenburg writes, 
 
encoding and decoding, pattern-recognition and 
construction, are fundamental to living process, 
sentient or otherwise. Sentience itself is highly var-
ied, consisting of very “early” functions and forms 
working cheek by jowl with “later ones.” If, as 
Barbieri contends, symbolic semiosis emerges from 
the code semiotics of early organic life, ideas like 
consilience relegate semiosis to much too narrow a 
band of material activity.  
 . . . We do not need to jettison subjectivity and 
self-process; instead we need to redescribe them, 
so as to include the self-constitutive activity of the 
semi-permeable sac whose formation arises from 
non-sentient activity, but is at the same time nec-
essary to life. 
 
Eve Sedgwick and Adam Frank point to the role of com-
plexity in Tomkins’ attempts to think the organism as a 
system of incompletely overlapping and partially redun-
dant feedback systems. If the details of Tomkins’ some-
                                                                                                            
6 Derrida is not wrong to write that “tout autre est tout autre” 
(e.g., Derrida 1995, 82). We readers just tend to do the wrong 
sort of algebra with this equation so that its results suggest a 
homogenous “Other,” when the whole point is that the Oth-
er/Outside is already included as a structuring principle of the 
supposed “One.”  
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times laughably obsolete biological model no longer hold 
(due to its dependence on a hazy concept of “density of 
neural firing”), the flexibility of his conceptual framework 
remains useful. As Sedgwick and Frank write, “We dis-
cuss this pattern in the framework of Tomkins’ habit of 
layering digital (on/off) with analog (graduated and/or 
multiply differentiated) representational models, and we 
argue for the great conceptual value of this habit” (Sedg-
wick and Frank 2003, 101).7 The principle of incompletely 
layering digital and analog systems in complexity offers a 
way to conceptualize learning, change, and movement, 
while such finitely differentiated systems also allow for 
selective interface of the organism-system with its envi-
ronment at certain points, but not in infinite contiguity.  
 Pointing out the usefulness of Tomkinsian thought 
for conceptualizing values or qualities that function or 
operate in terms more than two but less than infinity, 
Sedgwick and Frank argue that “the hygiene of current 
antiessentialism seemingly depends on rigorous adher-
ence to the (erroneously machine-identified) model of 
digital, on/off representation: insofar as they are ‘theo-
rized,’ affects must turn into ‘Affect’” (Sedgwick and 
Frank 2003, 108, 111).8 The work of the humanities, iron-
ically, in its most psychologizing moments, must resist 
the urge to commit a certain kind of abstraction and train 
                                                                                                            
7 As Fradenburg points out, the biosemioticians make this same 
point.  
8 Sedgwick and Frank further explain: “any definitional invoca-
tion of analogically conceived, qualitative differences, in the 
form of finitely many (n>2) values, does indeed run the risk of 
reproducing a biologizing essentialism . . . [but] that risk is far 
from being obviated by even the most scrupulous practice of 
digitalization.” Further, “[t]he essentialism that adheres to digi-
tal models is structured differently from the essentialism of the 
analog. . . . To see the latter [digital] as a less ‘essentialist’ meta-
phorics than the former reflects, we argue, only the habitual 
privileging of digital models wrongly equated with the machines 
over analog models wrongly equated with the biological” (Sedg-
wick and Frank 2003, 111). 
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itself not necessarily on this or that particular account of 
“materiality,” so much as upon the precarious particular 
situated within the physics of the cosmos. Sedgwick and 
Frank argue, “there is no reason to believe that the neces-
sarily analog models of the color wheel, or say, the peri-
odic table of the elements constrain an understanding of 
difference, contingency, performative force, or the possi-
bility of change” (2003, 114). To produce critical thought 
that does justice to sentience and the various kinds of 
texts and plastic artifacts that sentience (of many kinds) 
can produce, we will need fuzzy, and sometimes necessari-
ly questionable models. 
 To support Fradenburg’s theorization of the humani-
ties as a necessary aid to thriving, I think we will further 
need to employ a more capacious lexicon of poetics—
specifically, flexible alternatives to vocabularies oriented 
around poetics determined most saliently as representa-
tion, mimesis, expression, and semiosis. Such a lexicon, 
however, would not exclude Fradenburg’s assertions that 
“no organism lasts for long if it can’t interpret signals well, 
or signal what it needs to communicate,” and that, “both 
the fine arts and the arts of living further exercise thera-
peutic powers of expression and interpretation.” To in-
voke the complexity of the organism in a discussion of 
systems of signal-making and signal-interpretation is to 
imply a truly complex concept of signaling whose per-
formative forces still include those before, after, or to the 
side of signaling. In order to follow Fradenburg’s argu-
ment and to do justice to the complexity of the signal-
interpretation necessary for the survival of an organism, 
the humanities also need a more interesting vocabulary 
for the para-signaling capacities of organisms and arti-
facts. A building may “signify” a whole set of forces and 
depend on a set of codes to inform its inhabitants how to 
move through it, and a poem may “mean” something, but 
a building can also shelter or hold, and a poem can also 
make one feel things quite apart from what and how it 
signifies. That the “arts of living” and their luxurious 
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functions are for Fradenburg so intertwined with the 
therapeutic powers of expression serves to suggest that 
these possible “extra-semiotic” functions inhere in even 
the most coded of displays. 
 Regardless of any individual critic’s good or bad rea-
sons for disliking the writings of Martin Heidegger (I 
assume most of us will have some of one or the other), 
most humanists still fail to grasp the possibility in shed-
ding the correspondence theory of truth in language and 
trying to grasp the responsibility of realizing, as Hedi-
egger did, that 
 
language is not only and not primarily an audible 
and written expression of what is to be communi-
cated. It not only puts forth in words and state-
ments what is overtly or covertly intended to be 
communicated; language alone brings what is, as 
something that is, into the Open for the first time. 
(Heidegger 1971a, 71) 
 
Objections to this statement easily arise: the exclusivity 
with which Heidegger offers hermeneutics as the alterna-
tive to the representational and expressive force of lan-
guage, the patent anthropocentrism of this remark (sure, 
it is arrogant and violent to think that the nominating 
power of language speaking the human allows things to 
so shine for the first time). But such objections can be 
provisionally set aside much more easily than is conven-
tionally thought if one would listen here for the force of 
what is by no means a “difficult” observation:9 that lan-
                                                                                                            
9 In fact, speaking anecdotally of many conversations at academ-
ic conferences, it is by raising objections to Heidegger’s anthro-
pocentricism and related reprehensible politics that critics per-
ennially, and lamentably, divert conversation away from the 
challenge of alternatives to representation contained within 
Heidegger’s work. I have no desire to deny the risk of engaging 
with writing that was deeply entangled with the Nazi death ma-
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guage does things other than signaling, that the particular 
rhetorical and paraverbal forces of language (or, more 
capaciously, any force of relational intimacy) are not sec-
ondary to language’s semiotic function or construction.10  
 Thinking about poetics in terms of “poems” (what I 
still, perhaps rather conservatively, believe to be a privi-
leged space in which to think about making), twentieth-
century poet Charles Olson suggests in his notes that, 
“the poem’s job is to be able to attend, and get attention 
to, the variety of order in creation” (Olson 2010, 15). 
Such a “variety of order” (to be found either in the crea-
tion of the world, the world as an auto-, but also multi-
poetic creation, or the creation of the more conventional-
ly conceived poem) would require a more variegated and 
differentiated lexicon (not necessarily a more precise lexi-
con, as we are humanists, after all—amateurs, not tech-
nocrats). Such a poem would accede to the status of a 
physical organism. Alluding to Alfred North Whitehead, 
Olson writes that “a strain is characterized by close asso-
ciational qualities and definite geometric relations, and a 
growth of ordered physical complexity (which ought to 
be the poem) is dependent on the growth of ordered rela-
tionships among strains” (Olson 2010, 28).  
 Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht’s efforts, in his Powers of 
Philology: Dynamics of Textual Scholarship (2003) and 
                                                                                                            
chine, but the risk of not paying attention to what it may have 
discovered is also not one I am willing to take.  
10 Such a gravitational intimacy is exactly what Heidegger’s con-
cept of language might suggest, denuded of its anthropocentric 
relation to “History.” If we assume, with Heidegger, that it is 
language and not the human who speaks, then what “language” 
names is less a purely semiotic system than a way to talk about 
intimacy and relationality itself. Heidegger writes in his essay 
“The Nature of Language”: “Language, Saying of the world’s 
fourfold, is no longer only such that we speaking human beings 
are related to it in the sense of a nexus existing between man 
and language. Language is, as world-moving Saying, the relation 
of all relations” (Heidegger 1971b, 107). 
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The Production of Presence: What Meaning Cannot Con-
vey (2004), make significant strides in contributing to 
such a vocabulary, provisionally distinguishing between a 
“presence culture” and the overwhelming push of a con-
temporary “meaning culture” that dominates by interpre-
tation and is heedless of a concept of power thought in 
terms of “the potential of occupying or blocking spaces 
with bodies” (something that Occupy-movement general 
assemblies world-wide understood very well in 2011) 
(Gumbrecht 2004, 83–84). Gumbrecht beseeches fellow 
critics to “try to pause for a moment before we begin to 
make sense . . . then let ourselves be caught by an oscilla-
tion where presence effects permeate the meaning effects 
[of an artifact]” (2004, 126). What I want to take from 
Gumbrecht here is not, however, a ban on “making 
sense” so much as an effort to give a little more time or 
ontological weight to understanding rhetorical force apart from 
its subordination to systems of  “meaning.” Fradenburg’s 
work seems to suggest a certain push past Gumbrecht’s 
sense of an “oscillation” between presence and meaning 
effects. And Gumbrecht implies that “presence” and 
“meaning” cannot be thought at the same time (much like 
the position and momentum of electrons in the Heisen-
berg uncertainty principle). Instead, Fradenburg posits 
that, even in the most over-coded moments of linguistic 
systems, language harbors a capacity to to carry simulta-
neously within itself the sort of paraverbal effects that I 
am discussing. If I suggest a kind of divagation from 
Fradenburg’s commitment to thinking the symbolic and 
the parasymbolic at the same time, it is as a corrective to a 
humanities still obsessed with a paranoid critique of the 
logic of representation—a desire to give some equal time 
to the implications of insights like those of Olson and 
Heidegger mentioned above. 
 Medievalist Mary Carruthers attempts to correct an 
over-theologization of the medieval arts by exploring how 
these medieval arts conceived of “‘making sense’ of physi-
cal sensations derived from human encounters with their 
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own crafted artifacts,” arguing that “medieval art is not 
only explained by considerations of semiology, represen-
tation, mimesis—though these are of course important—
but also by persuasion” (Carruthers 2013, 13, 14)—which 
is to say, rhetorical force (on a non-representational and 
a-semiotic level of affective and sensory aesthetic percep-
tion). Similarly, as I think the psychoanalytic spirit of 
“Living the Liberal Arts” would suggest, even in the most 
therapeutic of situations, there are makings which do not 
consist of an organism “expressing” in a purely emetic-
coding model, but in fact need to be understood literally 
as the production of certain kinds of provisional shelters 
for contact with the world, of literal forces that repel or 
attract, that hook into the affects and senses of other be-
ings, sentient and non-sentient. The inner-outer inter-
twining of an organism and its “Outside” suggests a mod-
el of making very different from “expression” determined 
as the communication of an “inside” state to an Outside. 
In the discourses of ethology cited by Fradenburg (for 
both human and non-human creatures), the concept of 
“expressivity” is related to “display,” as performativity and per-
suasion.11 In Elizabeth Grosz’s Deleuzian reading of the 
                                                                                                            
11 For example, Fradenburg writes, “Art does in fact capture 
attention by, say, making us see or feel the creamy or gleaming 
character of rock rather than its overfamiliar immobile lumpi-
ness. What is of importance in this process is not simply the 
separation of self from not-self, but the work done on the 
boundary between the two, where we can make the familiar 
unfamiliar just as readily as the other way around. (In fact em-
bellishment, not necessity, is the mother of invention.) Jane 
Jacobs notes that the ludic and ornamental applications of our 
most important technologies (such as ceramics, metallurgy, 
plastics) preceded their practical applications; our oldest known 
examples of wheels are from toy wagons (Jacobs 1988, 221). 
Further, the placard, the territorial marker, the beautiful or 
forbidding entryway, are all forms of display, and hence instru-
ments of living process.  Avian and simian performance displays 
(e.g., in courting) must vary from ‘tradition’ if they are going to 
attract attention to this specially plumageous or architecturally 
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ethology of birdsong, display functions to render a “terri-
tory” provisionally perceptible: “the space in which sensa-
tions may emerge, from which a rhythm, a tone, a color-
ing, weight, texture may be extracted and moved else-
where” (Grosz 2008, 12; cf. Grosz, 2008, 48–49, 68–69). 
The ontology of such poesis is not exhausted as expression 
of an “inside” (although signals are certainly involved), 
but operates as “an arena of enchantment, a mise-en- 
scène for seduction that brings together heterogeneous 
and otherwise unrelated elements: melody and rhythms, a 
series of gestures, bows, dips, a tree or a perch, a nest, a 
clearing, an audience of rivals, an audience of desired 
ones” (Grosz 2008, 28). For Grosz, following Deleuze, the 
“first artist” is not the maker of symbols, but “the archi-
tect” (2008, 48). And indeed, an organism must also make 
forces, skins, envelopes, sounds, textures, loves, and more, 
in order to survive. 
 If we can talk about even the most seemingly theolog-
ically charged medieval literature as having non-repre-
sentational and non-expressive functions (even if that 
literature also inevitably succumbs to certain semiotic 
and representational logics), then certainly, we can and 
indeed need to think about a poetics of thriving in more 
adventurous and less abstracting terms. This is to say, too, 
that Fradenburg’s commitment to thriving also convinces 
me of the potential perniciousness of a “taste” (on the 
part of certain schools of criticism) for evaporating pleasur-
able or even relaxed affects or sensations from the poetics of 
poems or art-objects of any kind—or from critical read-
ings and critical theorizing. Such devotedly paranoid an-
alysis, wholly abstracted from any concrete therapeutic 
function, is gnostic in its aims and can only read poesy as 
purely a symptom of the Death Drive or of Capital. In 
either case, one does disservice to actual therapeutic prac-
tices (and analysts and patients), to an artifact’s texture, 
                                                                                                            
creative bird, or that small but exceptionally boisterous and 
noisy chimpanzee.” 
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or to actual material labor struggles (including most es-
pecially those of adjunct and other precarious academic 
labor), by abstracting from the particular forces and feel-
ings of the co-makings in question.  
 In a letter from Jack Spicer to his friend Robin Blaser, 
Spicer risks a more than sufficiently wild vocabulary in 
offering Blaser advice on how to proceed with the compo-
sition of an especially appealing poem. Spicer writes:  
 
I know you. You will have suspicions of it (CLEV-
ER READER) and you will accuse it of lies which 
are only (would be only) lies because the other po-
ems do not exist that you would refuse to write. 
Thus Ginsberg and Wieners pop like firecrackers 
while a great poet (Blake, Rimbaud, Yeats) why his 
whole life of writing is one immense soundless ex-
plosion.  
 I exhort you—accept it (UNCHANGED) and 
hatch it as an eagle would basilisk’s egg. Do not 
change, shift, cross out sections but let them change, 
shift, cross out themselves as you raise (the egg rais-
es) a whole family of human-tongued basilisks. 
The court of the gods lies in the poem properly ex-
tended into poetry.12 
 
Unfortunately, advice of such vitality, weirdness, or fuzz-
iness, is rarely offered as instruction to either producers 
or critical readers of poetry in contemporary North Am-
erican academic settings.13 Spicer’s exhortation proposes, 
however tongue-in-cheek, or self-consciously performa-
tive (in the vein of an overblown lexicon of “magic” and 
                                                                                                            
12 The letter is held in the Jack Spicer Papers, BANC MSS 
2004/209, The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berke-
ley. 
13 This is especially true in the American poetry workshop sys-
tem, which illegibly prizes a normalizing “craft”—determined 
by a pseudo-transparent language of mechanics—while also dis-
avowing formal “Theory.” 
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divinity), a model which demands attention to the co-
production of poems with organic and inorganic forces 
that are nothing like a fantasy of transcendence of world-
liness. He offers the poem as an emblem of a very medie-
val desire for a mixture of styles in a set of hybrid organ-
isms. The poet as an eagle mothering mythical beasts 
offers an antidote to the “cleverness” (in the American 
English pejorative sense of the term) of the reader that 
would turn the possibility for radically amplifying life 
into a calculated joke instead of the organic thinking—
nay, co-thinking—of on-the-spot decisions in a larger 
cosmos. The dance between the advice to raise the hy-
brid-beast snake-poems and to let the “egg” itself raise 
them not only suggests an organismic co-production of 
boundaries, but also a process that must be rigorously 
theorized and cannot be represented in/as quantity, tested 
in a controlled experiment, nor reduced to reproducible 
procedure: it is only had in living with the poems as a way 
of living. Moreover—the multiplication and transfor-
mation of poems into mythical deadly snakes (right out of 
a medieval bestiary) which perform human speech, sug-
gests again a kind of poem whose functions, though fuzzy, 
are certainly potentially vital, or at least dangerously in-
teresting, relative to one’s own mortal living. Aside from 
their emblematic nature, or potential symbolism (and 
surely the tone of this passage suggests that the beasts op-
erate as organisms and forces more so than as mere alle-
gory), these poems bite, soothe, sing, and perhaps, even 
heal the clever reader too paralyzed to write more poems, 
or even get up in the morning. 
 Spicer’s bird-nest of singing snakes, finally, suggests 
that the relation of poetics and life might be sought in 
what I would consider a very medieval understanding of 
these hybrid creatures: as wonders, marvels. These hu-
man-tongued basilisks are wondrous in their excess of 
conventional epistemological categories, yes, but also in 
their capacity (thanks to their varied and enigmatic ap-
pearance in language) to make us cognize the feelings of 
STAYING ALIVE 159 
living first as feelings and not as signification. They offer 
to human organisms an attention to the forces of a real 
cosmos traversing our living, forces that can stream and 
snake sneakily around the abyssal logics of representa-
tion. Such poems, like living, require a kind of reading 
with one’s own wits—often slowly and recursively. This is 
a reading whose value lies in the particularities of its ex-
perience, which cannot be replicated by data, and which 
cannot be reduced to decoding. For the humanities to 
thrive, we need to use a more variegated vocabulary for 
the poetics of the organism, a lexicon that is flexible and 
alternative to that of representational poetics, yet not am-
nesiac of history. Many artifacts indeed do represent, 
mimic, or encode—but some ornaments just decorate, an 
appointment for which they are no less needful in the 
physical wonder of sentience.14 
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3: Breathing with  
Lacan’s Seminar X 
 





[An] intimate relation . . . exists between the move-
ments of expression and those of respiration. 
Charles Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man 
and Animals 
 
The greatest significance is ascribed to oxygen in the 
pleasure-unpleasure workings of the psyche. 
Sandor Ferenczi  
 
 
Is a panic attack “a phenomenon of a psychological” na-
ture? Or of a “neurobiological (or even neurochemical) 
nature” (Masi 2004, 311)?  Arguably, the question is not 
well-formed; panic—a critical somatic as well as psychical 
experience—defies rather than invites categorization. Many 
practitioners have regarded the plasticity of the nonethe-
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less vital and “involuntary” process of respiration to be 
particularly persuasive evidence for psychosomatic con-
nectivity: if the organism can make even breathing serve 
its ends, the links between soma and psyche must be 
powerful indeed. Breathing troubles the boundary be-
tween the voluntary and the involuntary; it is visceral, but 
available to (un)conscious manipulation. Respiration is 
meaning-making, as “the first postnatal communication 
that we establish with our environment”; nonetheless it is 
“rhythmically verified under the command of an urgent 
need” (Wyss 1947; Chiozza 1998, 32). Breathing tells us 
that we are and are not captains of our fate. 
 Nowadays, from neuroscience to affect theory to psy-
choendocrinology, the “embodied” character of psycho-
logical process is nearly axiomatic, despite the continuing 
obscurity of “mind/brain” connectivity (cf. Fonagy and 
Target 2007, passim). But interest in embodiment has a 
long history, notably (for my present purposes) in psy-
choanalytic writing on disorders like neurasthenia and 
hysteria. Lacanian psychoanalysis—generally understood 
to be more disembodying than not—may prima facie 
seem more of a diversion than a contribution to the psy-
choanalytic thinking of embodiment. This chapter argues, 
however, that the Lacanian objet a is a striking conceptu-
alization of the embodied mind’s experience of change.  
Further, it is a conceptualization that trenches on the psy-
chosomatic nature of rhetorical activity. 
  In the rhetoric of respiration, paramount tropes are 
activity and passivity, self and other, consciousness and 
unconsciousness. Respiration links the history of what 
and how the body takes in, and why, to narrative struc-
ture, comical or tragical (that is to say, man’s fate). Eisler 
notes “profound connections” between respiration and 
consciousness; e.g., “inhibition in breathing is the domi-
nating symptom that distinguishes [disturbances of con-
sciousness, i.e. “fits,”] . . . from sleep” (Eisler 1922, 41).1 
                                                                            
1 If, as Francis Steen argues (in forthcoming work), conscious-
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 Even vital organs respond “dispositionally” to regres-
sion, i.e., to the organism’s activation of its oldest modes 
of functioning, like those that create distinctions between 
me and not me (Eisler 1922, 41). We cannot choose to 
stop breathing, but we can stylize the rhythms of our “ex-
change of gases,” as instance and anticipation of the roles 
played by intake and expulsion in the construction of the 
self (Weiszaecker 1950b; Chiozza 1998, 32). In object re-
lations, the “‘first phantasies’”—infantile “theories” that 
try to explain and map sensations and perceptions—are 
“‘bound up with sensations’ resulting from stimuli expe-
rienced at birth, [of intake and expulsion,] during respira-
tion, feeding and elimination” (Mitrani 1993, 322–323; 
citing Isaacs 1952, 910). Breathing is the first taking in, 
but also invasion by, something other—something that is 
not exactly chosen.   
 Discrimination of “self” from “not-self” is a vital func-
tion at the biomolecular level. It eliminates pathogens, 
and, less helpfully, “rejects” transplants (Mahoney 1991, 
226). The proteins at work in self-/non-self recognition 
(the Major Histocompatibility Complex [MHC]) seem 
also to be involved in judgments about relationships—of 
kinship, group, species, territory.2 Display behavior marks dis-
tinctions between self/non-self, my group/yours. “Core 
variability” in display behavior promotes the recognition 
of individuals and “may be the origin of new unique dis-
play patterns for newly evolving sibling species” (Jenssen 
1977, 210).3 Modifying basic display patterns enables the 
                                                                            
ness arises the better to process novelty, it could readily enlist 
anxiety and its respiratory features to calm or to screen (hide, 
but also project) trauma—trauma being, by definition, a break-
ing-through of boundaries, a wound, and therefore the action of 
a force that is not adequately anticipated. 
2 A lot of data indicates that “we use these to judge relatedness,” 
on which cooperative behavior depends:  Dr. Antony de To-
maso (Life Sciences, UC-Santa Barbara), personal communica-
tion. See also Havlicek and Roberts (2009). 
3 A humanist might think of “core variability” as “variations on 
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evaluation of different intra- and interspecific perfor-
mances (“I like his mating dance the best”; “how do I best 
get this crow to understand I want him out of here, with-
out getting hurt”). Considering the claim made by Lakoff 
and Johnson (1980), and centuries of rhetoricians before 
them, that metaphors signify the mind’s embodiment, we 
should recall Freud’s notion of the “bodily ego” and its 
introjections and projections, which, he believed, found 
their prototypes in exhalation and inhalation. Sighing and 
yawning directly stimulate the respiratory zone: “there is 
an hedonic element in breathing,” in feeling the ebb and 
flow of not-self into self (Forsyth 1921, 125).   
 The work of self-other distinction-making always leaves a 
lot of things out. The creation of the objet a, the remainder, 
is also the creation of “me.”  Subsequently, the a jogs my 
memory as that part of “me” that I experience as lost (or 
would like to believe I’ve gotten rid of), such that, if I 
could only recover it (or completely rid myself of it), I 
would be complete (not haunted). Its various avatars are 
therefore notoriously hard to pin down. The voice and 
the gaze can come at me from all sides, and of course I 
can’t be sure they’re human. Is the sound of the shofar 
human, or not, let alone a sound “I” make? Who or what 
is it that assembles me, calls me together, alarms or or-
ganizes me, when “I” am emerging, or fading out?4 What 
gives “me” life/death? Art foregrounds this (d)estrange-
ment; since “I” am not all there when I am changing, 
adapting, mutating, something must speak for me.  The 
(re)formations of the objet a mark the course of the or-
ganism’s vital experimentations, meaning also each eclipse of 
self-feeling entailed in such transformations. 
 Living is constrained not just by factors like gravity 
                                                                            
a theme.” 
4 Lacan discusses the shofar in Seminar X: Anxiety (1962/63, 
XIX.171–179). All citations of Lacan’s Seminar X are from Cor-
mac Gallagher’s unauthorized translations (rev. Mary Cherou-
Lagreze) of unedited French transcripts, by section and page 
number. 
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and food supply, but also by the social forms that derive 
from and embed these supposedly extra-social factors—
for example, the expectations my parents have of me 
(“angel,” “baby,” “daughter”), expectations that impress 
themselves on me (the agalma of Lacan’s Seminar X: Anx-
iety [1962/63, XIV.124]).  What happens, then, to the rest 
of me? I can’t say, though I know it used to be here, and 
probably went somewhere. But wherever the rest of “me” 
has gone, “I” exist as a signifier in the discourse of the 
Other (“baby,” “daughter”). I already have a very strong 
sense of this when, upon being born, the importance of 
interpreting (and being interpreted) skyrockets. To breathe 
(and to sob, scream, shriek) is to be on display. “[T]he expira-
tion in sighing (in Spanish desahogo, . . . de-choking) is a 
recovery from . . . discouragement,” says Chiozza (1988, 
31). Infants play with respiration, “breathing quickly then 
slowly, shallowly then deeply—their attention obviously 
concentrated on the game” (Forsyth 1921, 124). 
 In 1893 Freud and Breuer laid out a still-powerful 
rationale for thinking psychosomatically:   
 
The fading of a memory or of its affect depends . . . 
on whether an energetic reaction . . . supervened    
. . . . By reaction we here mean the whole range of 
voluntary and involuntary reflexes by which . . . 
the affects are habitually worked off—from weep-
ing up to an actual act of revenge. (Breuer and 
Freud [1893] 1955, 7) 
 
Abreactions like sighing, crying and shouting occur fre-
quently in analysis, and are often transformative.  Abre-
action is expressive activity, in both senses:  it pushes out 
bad affects, and displays them. I “spit it out,” “cry my 
head off,” “get it off my chest.”  (In English, the word 
“express” means both “to express,” “to press out [an es-
sence],” and also “to signify”).  The expression and “regu-
lation” of affect is directly linked to physiological changes 
in the body (respiration, heart rate, blood pressure), changes 
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which in turn give rise to signals that are fed back into the 
brain and influence ongoing processing (Ledoux 2002, 
288). The brainstem mechanisms that mediate “suffoca-
tion alarm,” and are activated during panic, are very an-
cient (Panksepp 2005, 147). The amygdala has “output 
connections” to the brain systems that initiate defensive 
responses (like “freezing”). A network of processes that 
links ancient brainstem to limbic to cortical activity has 
taken a long time to evolve.5 While, phenomenologically, 
the affect of anxiety seems to us both unmistakeable and 
unvaried, it is really much more of an assemblage and 
much more of an achievement, so to speak, than is gener-
ally recognized. Because it “requires, at a minimum, net-
works involved in arousal (monoamine systems), emo-
tional (amygdale . . . extended amygdale), and cognitive 
(prefrontal cortex, hippocampus) functions,” according 
to Ledoux, it “is best thought of as a property of the over-
all circuitry rather than of specific brain regions”—i.e., it 
is best thought of holistically (Ledoux 2002, 290).   
   “Holistic” means (in this context) generated by a com-
plex system.  If “neurons that fire together, wire together” 
(Hebb’s Law), what is decisive in affect-formation and 
expression is the factor of time. Bodily registration of af-
fective experience is neither “deeper” nor “truer” than its 
registration in the order of the signifier. Affects arise as a 
consequence of connections between conscious and un-
conscious (or “implicit”) processing, connections that take 
shape, in the forms of linguistic registration, facial display, 
vocal patterns (including contour, pitch and volume), gestural 
language (slumping vs. pacing), and levels and kinds of 
arousal, defined by Beebe and Lachmann as “pattern[s] of 
physiological indices such as EEG, heart rate, and respira-
tion” (Beebe and Lachmann 1994, 129). For Freud, affects 
are psychosomatic phenomena, not disembodied emo-
tions: combinations “of certain feelings in the pleasure-
                                                                            
5 See Ledoux on the connectivity between the brain’s cortical, 
motivational, and emotional systems (2002, 323). 
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unpleasure series with the corresponding innervations of 
discharge and a perception of them, but probably also the 
precipitate of a particular important event,” namely 
birth—“at the time of which [we felt] the effects upon the 
heart’s action and upon respiration characteristic of anxi-
ety” (Freud [1933] 1961, 80; my emphasis).  
 Affects are expressive.6 Expression is action that shapes, and 
is shaped by, states of arousal: “[A] particular facial or vo-
cal pattern is always associated with a particular arousal 
state” (Beebe and Lachmann 1994, 129)—for example, the 
“increased sensory attention and motor tension” charac-
teristic of “preparedness” (Freud [1933] 1961, 80–81). 
Infants listen, and scan faces, to identify/affect parents’ 
states of arousal. In turn, “[h]eightened affect” “lead[s] to 
the formation of representations” (Beebe & Lachmann 1994, 
129; cf. also Anzieu 1979, 75). The mediation of “somato-
psychic experiences” of trauma (for example, the com-
promise of the noradrenergic system, which regulates 
respiration) is accomplished in part through the “reintro-
duction of ideational representation” (Marans 1996, 536–
537). Respiration both is, and precipitates, expressive and 
interpretive activity, nonverbal as well as verbal. 
 Living is artful. J. Z. Young points out that art “has the 
most central of biological functions, ‘of insisting that life 
be worthwhile, which, after all, is the final guarantee of its 
continuance” (Young 1971/74, 360; see also Dissanayake 
[1998] 2002, 70). And there are few species for which 
“worthwhile” has no social dimension whatsoever. For us, 
sociality is paramount. Expression acknowledges the “re-
lational field” of “the Øther”—Lacan calls it a “ceding” (of 
imaginary sovereignty). “I am always a cedable object, . . . 
an object of exchange” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.232). Ced-
ing is adaptation: I am aware of the world around (and 
in) me, and if I want to live (well), I must realize that my 
                                                                            
6 Damasio’s understanding of the emotions as incompletely 
voluntary but profoundly socially expressive is relevant here 
(2003, 29 ff.).   
170 BREATHING WITH SEMINAR X 
 
power over my environment has its limits.  “If I want to 
live” is the key:  I cede because I want to make a deal; I 
need something I don’t have, someone else has got it, I 
need to get it out of them. Again, expression acknowledg-
es the “relational field” of “the Øther”: when I act out, I 
act out. I open, unfurl my best feathers, because I want 
you to notice me. This is the import of Foghorn Leghorn: 
“For—I say, fortunately, I always carry a spare set of 
feathers.” 
 Respiration marks our constitutive permeability, our 
embeddedness in the Øther. So changes in respiration 
mark our attempts to struggle against, or settle into, that 
permeability. Respiratory disturbances express changes in 
the rhythms of analysis (Guignard 1995, 1083). One of 
my own analysands arrives in a state of agitation, choking 
and/or hyperventilating, broadcasting speechlessness and 
helplessness. Sighs follow her expressions of pain, as if the 
reward for verbal effort were deep breathing. The pleas-
ure is partly that of letting oneself be changed; in analysis, 
the sigh is an act of ceding, which is also a bid for life—
ceding not to the analyst, but to the Øther. 
 Respiration marks and is an experience of intersubjec-
tivity. One of Gardner’s analysands made efforts at “dy-
adic respiratory union” that were “like a dream,” as they 
displayed the analyst’s own, at that time, unknown “pul-
monary disorder” (Gardner 1994, 930, 933). Anthi ex-
plains the blocked respiration of one of his patients as a 
suppression of the urge to scream and cry (Anthi 1995, 
36–37). As with all symptoms, styles of breathing can 
express many different affective experiences; they are 
created by (our) history.  Inhibition (or hiding) can serve 
the refusal to cede, just as exhibition (or showing) can 
serve to distract attention from the hidden treasure the 
subject dreams of keeping forever. An analysand of Mi-
trani’s experienced exhalation as “losing herself” “to a 
gaseous state of invisibility”; “broncho-constriction” was 
an “effort aimed at holding a self, equated with life’s 
breath, safely inside her lungs” (Mitrani 1993, 331). Note 
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that display and reserve are repeat performances, not just 
repeated experience. They announce, to the O/Øther, aliveness, 
through the cry for attention, the cry for help, which must 
also at times be smothered in the mode of camouflage.7 
 The cessation of screaming and crying is the corner-
stone of our sentimental educations. My parents may not 
like it when I scream and cry; maybe if I choke back “un-
bearable psychic pain, sorrow and anger,” I’m more likely 
to be comforted, not less. Or, I might “hold my breath” in 
anticipation of the return of the abandoning object. There 
are strong clinical connections between unconscious 
breath-holding and “obstinacy”—i.e., the refusal to cede 
one’s position, to leave behind any “remainder”: “when 
annoyed, infants will obstinately hold their breath, even 
to the point of becoming convulsed and comatose” (For-
syth 1921, 124). Withholding is always withholding from 
the Other. The best revenge may be a dish served cold, 
but it is never eaten alone:   
 
An insult which is returned, if only in words, is 
remembered differently from one endured in si-
lence. Common speech also recognizes this differ-
ence in the psychical and bodily consequences, and . . . 
designates silently endured suffering as a . . . wound, 
injury, mortification. (Freud [1893] 1962, 36) 
 
 Classical and medieval traditions of poetic complaint 
do not allow the spurned to suffer in silence for very long.   
At the same time, complaint is always haunted by its pu-
tative excessiveness and futility, and thus by the unbeara-
bility of listening to it. Dido, the queen who refused to 
lose, knows her “compleyninge”  letter—her last words to 
Aeneas, in Chaucer’s Legend of Good Women—will not 
change the will of the gods. But that does not stop her. 
                                                                            
7 See Szpilman (1945/2000, 103–104); the anecdote, about a 
mother forced to smother her crying baby while hiding from the 
police, is related in Roman Polanski’s film The Pianist. 
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Since she also has nothing left to lose, she is free to “lose a 
word on” Aeneas, whose inconsistency renders him less 
than the smoke that will shortly bear her remains into the 
atmosphere:  
  
“But sin my name is lost through yow,” quod she, 
“I may wel lese a word on yow, or letter, 
Al-be-it that I shal be never the better; 
For thilke wind that blew your ship a-wey, 
The same wind hath blowe your fey a-wey.”  
(ll. 438–442) 
 
[“But since my name is lost through you,” said she,  
“I may [as] well lose a word on you, or letter, 
Although for that I shall be never the better, 
For that wind that blew your ship away, 
That same wind has blown your faith away.”]8   
  
The wind can blow us anywhere:  on our imperialist way, 
into the annals of shame, to the far corners of the world, 
home.  
 Air has an “a” quality; it is full of our leavings (carbon 
dioxide); full of our transmissions (pheromones); full of 
organisms seeking to breach our defenses. Since we all 
breathe the same air, it (materially) has, and expresses, 
social significance. Respiration stocks the “olfactory un-
conscious” and transmits hormones and pheromones as 
well as pathogens (see Brennan 2004). Because intangible 
and protean, air’s power of alteration is immense. For 
Aristotle it is the epitome of unseen force; in Chaucer’s 
House of Fame it is the medium of the Øther, the “barred” 
symbolic order—of scandal, rumor, notoriety, (un)deser-
ved reputation, the phantasms that haunt Anzieu’s “sound-
image of the self” (Anzieu 1979, 26).  
 In Lacan’s meditation on the shofar, the voice be-
                                                                            
8 All citations of Chaucer’s poetry are from Benson’s (1987) 
edition; all translations are mine. 
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comes a when air is concentrated (cf. the sail), and its 
propulsion rhythmically timed. The stylization and mag-
nification of sound creates the a as Echo, what is rejected 
but can’t be effaced (as in Dido’s complaint), and contin-
ues to seek some way of announcing, “here I am, look at 
me, pay attention to me,” the mode of address of so many 
medieval lyrics:  “have reuthe on me, ful of murnyng.”9 
 
Der Schrei, dendas kind bei der Geburt ausstößt, 
ist das Signal seines Eintritts in die Welt der Spra-
che, ich würde sogar sagen, es ist ein Eintritt im 
Atemstillstand.  
 
[The scream that the child utters at birth is the 
signal of his entry into the world of language. It is 
an entry into respiratory arrest.] (Samson 2012, 
30; my translation) 
 
Respiratory action is a bridge between affect and lan-
guage.  Schreber writes that he is “forced to emit bellow-
ing noises” when the “muscles serving the process of 
respiration are set in motion by the lower God” (noted by 
Ferenczi 1910, 225n10).  Bellowing (Lat. follis, ‘bellows’) 
and horn-blowing both need air. During phonation, sen-
sitivity to carbon dioxide decreases notably, so inter-
twined are respiration, outcry and language. Chiozza 
suggests that “through audible language we attempt to re-
establish the original union that was lost” (Chiozza 1998, 
32n5, referencing Murray 1983). Since there is no original 
union to lose, let’s say instead it is the way we display our-
selves and participate in the field of the Other. 
 The intersubjectivity of breathing is foregrounded in 
emergency work, when the paramedic “breathes for” the 
distressed, a merging of functions inbetween life and death, for 
                                                                            
9 “Have pity on me, full of mourning”; from “Mary at the Foot 
of the Cross,” ed. Karen Saupe, TEAMS Middle English Texts 
Series, gen. ed. Russell Peck, http://www.lib.rochester.edu/cam 
elot/teams/mary.htm. 
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which we are to be grateful: the gift of life/death (resuscita-
tion so often brings back to life an organism it also ages). 
Since air is always exchanged, so it can be a gift: infants 
“conceive of breath, the stimulus object, as a concrete 
thing, and this well into childhood, as shown by a boy of 
six who offered a handful of breath to another child pant-
ing after a race” (Forsyth 1921, 124). Respiration is bound 
to oral experience, and begins to help with excretion in 
later infancy. Forsyth suggests that the respiratory zone 
(which . . . plays an excretory as well as a nutritive role) 
may influence character-formation in a way comparable 
to that of the anal zone” (Forsyth 1921, 126). Again, air 
has intersubjective significance; Forsyth identifies breath 
as one of “the original objects . . . of an infant’s love,” one 
of the mother’s “outstanding rivals” (Forsyth 1921, 134). 
 Obstfeld contends that the pulmonary function im-
plies “sharing something in common,” and “is connected 
to the capacity for empathy and the desire for deep un-
derstanding” (referenced by Chiozza 1998, 32–33). But 
respiratory experience will inevitably entail aggression as 
well as love. The air may be pure, but one does not for all 
that breathe so easily in Fiesole, when down below people 
are dying in the plague-ridden atmosphere of Firenze.10 
Our folklore tells us breathing has to be “started” by the 
Other: the gift of life/death. So we also recognize the di-
mension of horror here. It’s the Other who gives me oxy-
gen, or makes me struggle for it, the father as much as the 
mother. The father of one of my patients “sucked up all 
the oxygen in the house”; the children all kept their 
mouths open and were shamed for it (she is bulimic). Just 
so Sylvia Plath barely dared to breathe or ‘achoo’ when 
she was living like a poor white foot in Daddy’s shoe.11  
Infants readily re-experience the dying that is also the 
experience of birth, via suffocating experiences in early 
                                                                            
10 The reference is to Boccaccio’s Decameron. 
11 Sylvia Plath, “Daddy,” in Ariel: The Restored Edition (New 
York: HarperCollins, 2004), 74–76. 
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childhood (attacks by smothering breasts, bedding and 
bath-water, and respiratory infections). 
 Contending against Fenichel’s sourcing of asthma in 
“a sexualization of respiration owing to a regression of 
Oedipal drives,” Adroer suggests that “asthma depends 
on fixations at the level of the breast,” the aim of which is 
to avoid collapse of self (Adroer 1996, 787; citing Fenichel 
1931). Fears of “suffocating containment” are expressed 
by the body via oscillations between contact and with-
drawal (Cooper 2004, 158, 162). Containment can protect 
the subject from the suffocating effects of others’ “de-
mands, deficiencies, or deadness” (Cooper 2004, 162), but 
can also be suffocating in its own right. The ambiguities 
of containment appear in the transference and counter-
transference: Ogden reports an analysis in which “feelings 
of being foreclosed from all that is human [were] experi-
enced in the form of images and sensations of suffoca-
tion”; at the same time, to inhale what was formerly 
feared was also suffocating (Ogden 2004, 180). Wolson 
suggests that, “[w]hen the infant merges with the primary 
maternal object, the fear of psychic death is experienced 
as the fear of entrapment, suffocation and ego dissolu-
tion” (Wolson 2005, 684). 
 What enables communication also enables vulnerabil-
ity to haunting and possession. A medium is a medium—
the Other is always at the other end. The point is not to 
demystify exchange—we are very familiar with its iro-
nies—but rather to underscore sufficiently that exchange 
is the sine qua non of living (and its vicissitudes). Not 
simply the formation of a sac, but also osmosis, “ecosys-
temic connection,” the permeability of that sac (as is rep-
licated over and over in the structure of the lung), is 
essential to vitality (Chiozza 1998, 34). 
 Birth is often understood to entail a traumatic loss of 
union with the uterine environment.  But if the “core” self 
begins to develop in the womb, and maintains its coher-
ence during the birth process, perhaps, as Mancia sug-
gests, it’s not so bad as all that:  “since even the most 
176 BREATHING WITH SEMINAR X 
 
primitive form of memory can be retained after birth 
thanks to its affective component,” “we are justified in 
thinking that the processes which organize this function 
before birth . . . lend a sense of continuity to the affective 
nucleus of the [postnatal] self”—this despite the “undeni-
ably traumatic” aspects of birth, such as “the move from 
the watery environment of the womb to the ‘dry land’ of 
the outside world, from one type of respiration to anoth-
er” (Mancia 1989, 1065). Despite all this, “birth does not 
interrupt the continuum of mental development”; it is “a 
process of continuous transformation.” But should we 
not also note that an experience of rupture depends on a 
prior experience of linking, if not continuity? 
 Borning is aporetic, a certain epitome of the experi-
ence of coming-into-being without knowing what or 
where we are or were.  The subsistence of an affective 
nucleus throughout the birth process accords with ultra-
sound studies of prenatal behavior; but this affective nu-
cleus can undergo fragmentation and reconstitution nonetheless. 
Either way, when an affective nucleus finds herself subject 
to gravity and sick with too much carbon dioxide, she has 
to start living in an environment capable of overwhelm-
ing and traumatizing her. She has to cede, attend, link 
herself to, that environment. Birth remains a stunning 
emergence/y. At minimum, the demand on the infant’s 
intellect is massive; to start breathing is to start interpret-
ing, for life, and for the O/Øther. “In the few minutes 
required by the placenta to separate from the uterus, the 
newborn must activate the central and autonomic nerv-
ous systems, replace the liquid filling the lungs with air, 
and establish and reorganize the direction of the blood 
flow through the heart and main blood vessels”; this is 
indeed a rapid series of “adaptations” (Chiozza 1998, 29–
30).  It is exactly the series to which Freud refers when he 
defines the “state of anxiety” as a reprise of “the combina-
tion of unpleasurable feelings, impulses of discharge and 
bodily sensations” experienced by the borning infant and 
caused by “the interruption of the renovation of the blood 
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(internal respiration)” (Freud 1917, 395). Angst, angusti-
ae, enge:  restriction, narrowness, narrow straits. 
 When placental circulation is interrupted, “a condi-
tion of partial suffocation is produced, and this increases 
in intensity until the child draws its first breath, often not 
for several minutes” (Forsyth 1921, 124). Anxiety attacks, 
Freud notes, are interpreted in accordance with ideas 
“nearest to hand,” such as the “extinction of life” or a dis-
turbance of bodily functions “such as respiration” (Freud 
[1895] 1962, 92–93). Panic attack mimes the dying, the 
succumbing to catastrophe, that the subject believes is 
already happening to her. Panicked bodies performatively 
and perhaps apotropaically “act out” annihilation; they 
“believe that what they fear . . . is already taking place” 
(Masi 2004, 311, 313). Oscillations between intimacy and 
separation are “existentially motivated,” writes Wolson 
(2005, 684). The (affective traces of the) birth process 
force upon us adaptations—cedings—that resemble life’s 
evolutionary transition from one means of oxygenation 
to another, and anticipate the organism’s acquisition and 
loss of autonomy in the field of the Øther. Not self-
continuity, but rather the giving up of one way of life for 
another, is the import of birth for Lacan (1962/63, XXV, 
passim).   
 Freud tells us that anxiety is a signal of danger—the 
danger, in Lacanian terms, that enforces the “ceding” of 
the a, that of the suspension of the “renewal of blood,” 
namely, ceasing to be as one was (Freud, [1933] 1961, 84). 
The a can be thought of as the remainder of the process 
of striving for life. Affective display accompanies these 
changes, and is always showy compared to that little thing 
(the afterbirth, the legendary “meconium”) we leave be-
hind. We never really forget it; nor does it ever seem to 
forgive us.  So, at the moment of “my” origin, I become a 
signifier in the symbolic order, and something aban-
doned and unmentionable—something with gills, Thing-
y, an extinct mode of viability, but re-membered by my 
body, non-conscious. 
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 The Øther, says Lacan, is always there in its “full reali-
ty,” whether we are conscious of this or not.  When the 
Øther’s reality acquires subjective presence, it makes itself 
felt, as insistent but immense and obscure patterning. 
Nonetheless, at least we have something to talk to, even if 
its replies, like those of any oracle, are highly ambiguous. 
The payoff for being impressed is the ability to express, 
and hence to impress others. I find myself in a very dif-
ferent world, needing new kinds of support, from entities 
I am ready to know but am not sure how to approach. But 
I have new, enhanced ways of “expressing” my emotions, 
of abreacting. Laughter takes me a while to learn, I have 
to do a lot of smiling first. Comedy is linked to ceding, as 
Ernst Kris points out: the face contorted by the grin 
and/or by laughter is just one step away from the “gri-
mace” (Kris 1940, 323). I might snarl, but if I “recognize” 
you, I might start smiling instead. If I recognize you, I 
might even enjoy you, perhaps laugh at your jokes. I ac-
quire a sense of humor. I yield to having (“lost”) some 
part of myself at sea, or in the primeval swamp, or in a 
Devonian pool (Fortey 1998, 137–166). Then, the “I” 
knows it is where “it” once was: not immortal, omnipo-
tent, or eternal, except for, possibly, the effects of its sig-
nifiers on the Ø. If the “I” cedes, however, “I” can desublimate 
being and instead become, before, during and after my 
whole life long. Of course we don’t “know” what’s back there. 
So what? How should that limit constrain us? 
 The value of what I give up can’t be determined exact-
ly, except for the fact that, whatever it is, I decide it isn’t 
worth (social) annihilation. And there’s always something 
new to adapt to. Anxiety signals these advents of the “I,” 
signals every re/constitution of the “subject,” every adap-
tation to (new) life. We become breathless with anticipa-
tion as well as dread. We inflate and deflate ourselves when we 
reach extremes of feeling—we horripilate, or make our-
selves small. So when we change, we change our breath-
ing, and change we must. Anxiety can readily kick off this 
appeal: “I’ll do anything to make myself recognizeable to 
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you. But what do you want to see in me?” I abandon (part 
of) my being so that I can be loveable to the people I de-
pend on. If I want to survive as a subject, an “I,” I have to 
make myself loveable in the eyes of my caregivers; I can’t 
simply eat them. I have a lot of incentive to put energy 
into my aestheticization; only if I’m sufficiently entertain-
ing (and/or terrifying) will my needs be addressed. There-
fore, “I” take shape according to my self-states’ various 
interpretations of the desire of the Øther.  Unfortunately, 
my self-states do not and never will know for certain what 
“I” am (or a is) before the desire of the Øther (it doesn’t 
know either, because it isn’t really an entity, whether we 
know it or not). Anxiety marks the moment when the 
Øther’s desire for us seems to fail. So “I” experiment 
some more. It appears that “my” desire can’t be satisfied 
because I can’t afford to stop enchanting my nurses. At 
the same time, I know the nurses don’t know everything. 
They can’t see the future either. So there’s always a chance 
I can get into the game. 
 How the subject accesses the reality of the Øther is 
subject to change. Lacan imagines these anxiety-inducing 
processes as a series of stages, where each stage leaves 
something ineffaceable behind—ineffaceable, because it 
has changed (things) forever. At the first stage, says La-
can, the reality of the Other is “presentified” through 
need (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.229). Need makes us aware 
that we are not self-contained; the feeling of need is an 
intrusion of lack (cf. Chiozza 1998, 32). But there’s more 
to come. At the “second level” (the anal), something de-
taches itself from “my” being, in order to answer the Oth-
er’s demand that we release our feces when It wants us 
to—a demand made in and by language, “which [we] hear 
from the Other” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.229). Signifiers 
have power over our bodies; that’s how they turn us into 
splendid wholes and murky, rhizomatic embarrassments. 
But we can recover somewhat from mortifications (if not 
from vulnerability thereto), by “talking back,” being a 
“smartass.” (The simultaneous registration of vulnerabil-
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ity to mortification and the power of backtalk is the im-
port of the jester.) Psychobiological history is one of con-
stantly trying to find new ways to live, in response to new 
seductions or irritations. It’s the story of the creature’s 
entry into the field of the Øther:  of an “original anxiety” 
traumatically related to “the emergence of the organism . . 
. into a certain world where it is going to live” (Lacan 
1962/63, XXV.229). You could say that the environment 
is the first remainder. That’s how we treat it, anyway. 
 It is “something unbelievable,” it’s really amazing, 
how this works, Lacan feels (1962/63, XXV.229). Don’t 
take it for granted. Some might compare fetal suspension 
in amniotic fluid to the situation of the brachiopod, en-
sconced in and caressed by plankton-bearing ocean-water 
(Lacan 1962/63, XXV.229). But there’s a difference: bra-
chiopoda are osmotic—directly hooked-up to sea-water. 
They get food and oxygen directly from the water sur-
rounding and flowing into them. Lacan, however, thinks 
the human fetus does not exchange anything with the 
fluid surrounding it. It gets everything it needs from the 
placenta through the umbilical cord. The fetus is self-
contained with respect to its surround. Lacan emphasizes 
this formulation because it dramatizes an extra strange-
ness for the human being—namely, that it must “take in” 
something as foreign as air. The “birth trauma” (“there is 
no other one”) means that an other element intrudes, pre-
ceded by a “stifling” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.230). 
 The organism with, on its borders, “a certain number 
of chosen points of exchange,” is not like the fetus. “The 
most basic schema of vital exchange is . . . created by the 
function of this wall, of this border, of this osmosis be-
tween an outside milieu and an inside milieu, between 
which there can be a common factor” (Lacan 1962/62, 
XXV.229). By contrast the fetus is cradled in, but separate 
from, its “outside” milieu. It is a question of a style of 
intake, whereby the human fetus is perhaps more sur-
prised by birth, by the difference between itself and its 
environment, than brachiopoda. We are to wonder at the 
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“strangeness” of “our” long-ago passage “into the air,” 
and its corollary, the “radical intrusion [at birth] of some-
thing so other to the [fetal] human being” as air, where 
suddenly we are starved for something, but we do not 
know what. This experience of need is thus doubly inva-
sive:  the irruption of the feeling of need, and the intake 
of—the satisfaction of the need by—something alien to 
me. Breathing out is similarly involuntary but manipula-
ble; we can take in plenty of oxygen, but if we can’t expel  
carbon dioxide, we die just as surely. Breathing is an ex-
perience of (embodied) extimacy: the “me”-ness of a strange 
element, the strangeness of what is in me. 
 Lacan stresses that the fetal pulmonary system’s abil-
ity to process air is irrelevant to the fetus’s survival. What 
need accounts for the emergence of the lung? What pre-
pares us for the “strangeness of the leap by which living 
beings have emerged from their primitive milieu, have 
passed into the air” with the help of an organ of “arbitrary 
character” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.229)? Life begins (again) 
by differentiating itself from its surroundings, a process 
that paradoxically enables exchange with those surround-
ings. Living is in fact an unending process of differentia-
tion. The transition from water to land recapitulates this 
phenomenology. Life grows on the edges, in the pools 
nesting along the fault lines of the Devonian Period. It 
depends on the passage of flows between water, earth, air 
and fire. 
 But to what end? Lacan insists on the arbitrary char-
acter of evolution, as he does on the ex nihilo of verbal 
language. While playing at the edges of pooling streams, 
couldn’t our marine ancestors just as easily have experi-
mented with flatness, or eyes on stalks, or snorkels? The 
intrusion within the organism of the respiratory neo-for-
mation of lungs is just as strange as its later technological 
avatars: the iron lung, or the spacesuit, also a “reserve of 
air” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.229). Anxiety signals the hu-
man being’s emergence from what thereafter is (re)con-
stituted as a remainder. But this emergence depends also 
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on “the aspiration into oneself” of a “different milieu.” “I” 
cannot emerge, come out, without taking in. So, in the 
world she must enter, the “little neo-natal subject” is  
 
what [s]he has first of all to give; and it is to this 
object that there is appended, as to a causal object, 
what is going to identify [her] primordially to the 
desire to retain. The first developmental form of 
desire is thus and as such akin to the order of in-
hibition. (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.230) 
 
What is sacrificed turns into the “cause” of my desire, 
which unleashes chains of substitutions and signifiers by 
means of which I (re)discover the a in my surroundings. 
Cordelia, however, won’t heave her heart into her mouth, 
or give in to anything that isn’t a square deal—and we 
know how many of those there are around.12 We also 
know Hamlet can’t do or say anything except folly, at 
least until the jester’s skull shows up as remainder and 
reminder of the vanity of human wishes (Hamlet V.i; the 
follis is a purse, a bag, an inflated ball, “windball,” but also 
a small coin; on the theme of vanity, see Lacan 1962/63, 
XXV.232). We learn at the same time that the remains of 
Caesar are airborne. Sooner or later, (desire for) the a will 
“fall off” (roll off? blow away?) any stage it is foolish 
(“imprudent,” “lacking in foresight”) enough to mount 
(Lacan 1962/63, XXV.232).13 Ophelia learns this the hard 
way, according to Gertrude’s report: while not-herself, 
Ophelia plays on the edge of a stream, she’s out on a limb; 
when she falls in, her clothes lose their buoyancy and pull 
her down (Hamlet IV.vii). Again, life emerges and re-
merges at the edges of water, land, air. The subject’s con-
tinuing dependence on the sacrificed remainder is also 
unbearable for Lear, who, buffeted by the winds like any 
                                                                            
12 In William Shakespeare’s King Lear; see especially Act I, Scene 
i. 
13 See also Lacan’s discussion of the world, the stage, and Hamlet 
(1962/63, III.24–28). 
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poor houseless creature, cries to them to blow and crack 
their cheeks.   
 In Shakespeare’s Twelfth Night (III.i), Feste says he is 
Olivia’s “corrupter of words” (corrumpo, “to break to 
pieces,” hence “to bring to naught”).  Inspector Clouseau 
has no native language, he is clueless, his inflated hump 
flies the friendly skies of Paris.14 Education or exposure of 
vanity (anamorphosis) is also a tragic theme—“I eat the 
air, promise-crammed” (Hamlet III.ii). But tragedy resub-
limates by rendering desublimation horrifying, as though 
the real could be bothered with our little disappoint-
ments. Coming after Lacan’s seminar on Hamlet, Seminar 
X is in part a poetics of comedy, to which anxiety is inti-
mately related.15 The a must fall off the stage “through the 
test of what it will have left there in a relationship of trag-
edy, or more often of comedy” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV. 
232). Further, it’s not the (comic) role that counts, “but 
what remains beyond this role”—a remainder that is 
“precarious” but unavoidable for all that. The comic actor 
acts this out: the missing piece is always in another uni-
verse, outlined by the play’s designs, but unknowable to 
consciousness (“I” don’t visit behind that scene). The 
comic actor acts out the connection between this split and 
the experience of ceding to exchange, to the role of signi-
fier in the desire of the Other, to our piecemeal nature. 
The comedy itself is but the “vase” of Seminar VII, whose 
shape is designed to call our attention to the emptiness 
inside (Lacan 1992, 120). 
 Comic plots ask us to find pleasure in our often-
baroque ornamentations of the air we breathe—pleasure 
that includes some understanding of the meaning of or-
namentation. So there must be inflations—the rhetorical 
                                                                            
14 In The Pink Panther Strikes Again. 
15 Miller (1990) notes that Lacan thought comedy even more 
important than tragedy, especially with respect to analytic pro-
cess. See also Galligan’s (1984) emphasis on comedy as a tech-
nique of living. Thanks to Peter Van Summeren for drawing my 
attention to these works. 
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term is amplification—to deflate. The comic plot, the 
“rhythm” of comedy, alternately inflates and deflates. 
Boasting competitions have a similar rhythm. Satiric gen-
res—the troubadour sirventes, the Scots “flyting”—
foreground “backtalk.” The “sirventes” are so-called be-
cause the poet’s persona is a servant—and service to the 
Øther is something we all owe, for which we (foolishly) 
expect compensation. The question of class is embedded 
in subject-formation (e.g., the “family romance,” hence 
the tragedy of Oedipus [Freud, 1910]) and in comedy—
hence antique comedy’s famous “lower” characters; the 
humble origins of “Plautus” (a self-deprecating nickname) and 
Terence (a freed slave); and the querelle that blew up in 
the name of these names in Renaissance debates about 
comedy (Hardin). The buffoon is all puffed up; Ecclesias-
tes says “All is vanity”—in Hebrew, “vanity” is “ruach,” 
“which means wind, or again breath, a mist, if you wish, 
something which is effaced” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.232). 
“Imagination blows” the windbag Malvolio after he reads 
the love letter he believes to be from his employer Olivia 
(Twelfth Night II.v). Because he denies his servile status, 
he is a fool, and made a fool of; the windbag is “shot 
down,” deflated. But wordplay is also just this sort of 
nothing; hence Feste lets the signifier keep going and go-
ing, which reminds us that we all eat the air, or that noth-
ing is ever completely down-to-earth, or that even the 
clever can fly too high. 
 Hamlet’s atmosphere of rueful wisdom comes down 
to this:  the ceding, the yielding to change, the “readiness” 
(V.ii). Lacan remarks that the Hegelian fight to the death 
for pure prestige “has indeed the accent of meaning the 
fight for nothing” (Lacan 1962/63, XXV.232; my empha-
sis). Satirized in Shakespeare’s Troilus and Cressida, the 
fight over nothing is the centerpiece of Twelfth Night as it 
is that of Hamlet. Act III is consumed by Fabian and Sir 
Toby’s efforts to entertain themselves by starting a fight, a 
duel of honor, over nothing, over the a, between Viola 
and Sir Andrew the “manikin” (as Fabian calls him in 
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III.ii).  “Anxiety, at the level of castration, represents the 
Øther, since encountering a weakening of the apparatus 
gives us the object . . . in the form of a lack (carence)” (La-
can 1962/63, XXV.233). And “[w]ho is the one who gives 
us the first example of a castration, attracted, assumed, if 
not desired as such, if not Oedipus?” (Lacan 1962/63, 
XXV.233)—Oedipus the fool, like all the melancholy men 
who follow him in subliming their basic fault(s) (for ex-
ample, Duke Orsino, Hamlet). What misses or is missing 
is enlightenment: Oedipus wants to see the satisfaction of 
his desire because he wants to see what’s beyond it; his 
real desire is for knowledge, says Lacan. But Oedipus 
doesn’t know about the unconscious/Ø. 
   Evolutionary theory is full of aspirational (and pathet-
ic) narratives about radical eco-biological change; the 
development of the lung, the transition from water to 
land, is only one of them.  Another goes as follows: 
 
The leap from anaerobic (non-oxygenating) to 
aerobic metabolism . . . reflected one of those syn-
ergistic processes wherein life forms transformed 
the environment to which they were adapting.  By 
giving out oxygen as a byproduct, photosynthesis 
‘created an atmosphere which made the develop-
ment of respiration possible’. . . . Later life-forms 
realized a ‘windfall profit,’ so to speak, and devel-
oped respiration and the refined visual capacities 
we associate with anticipatory movements.  (Ma-
honey 1991, 130–131; my emphasis) 
 
Breathing, vision, foresight, synergy: it’s all there. Oedi-
pus sees his own eyes lying bleeding on the ground. But 
what does he see with? The import of this mystery is the 
impossibility of seeing ourselves as the Øther sees us, 
which includes “the way we look to us all” (Simon 1986). 
The wisdom that asks us to bear the knowledge of our 
limitations can’t help at this vanishing point, where noth-
ing and no one can see us in all our foolish guises.  But we 
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needn’t be so literal about it, says Lacan; the “bloody ritu-
al” is “not necessary—and this is why the human drama is 
not tragedy, but comedy:  [we] have eyes in order not to 
see—it is not necessary for [us] to tear them out” (Lacan 
1962/63, XXV.233). Psychoanalysis prefers me to “posit 
[my]self as a finite object to which are appended finite 
desires, which only take on the appearance of becoming 
infinite in so far as by escaping from one another . . . they 
carry the subject away further from any authentic realiza-
tion” (Lacan 1962/62, XXV.237). What do I get out of 
putting the brakes on substitution? I get an interpreta-
tion—not “a confrontation with anxiety,” but “an over-
coming of anxiety when the Øther has named [her]self” 
(Lacan 1962/63, XXV.237). If talking makes me feel bet-
ter, it is because doing so enhances my capacity for dis-
play, for expression, not simply because the Other who I 
address may be capable thereby of experiencing what I 
experience, but because the Ø/other to whom I address 
myself is situated in its own inability to avoid impression, 
change, and misprision. 
 What we find in Lacan’s Seminar, Book X: Anxiety is a 
reduction of the antinomy between Mahler’s (1974) em-
phasis on autonomy and Bowlby’s (1969) on attachment, 
where such reduction takes the form neither of “optimal 
frustration” nor a sentimentalized intersubjectivity. It is 
more a question of our mutual dependence on the ether, 
our mutual reference to an apparent invisibility—a Third, 
an Øther—that mediates our living and waves on the sig-
nifiers that will take up that task on another level of func-
tioning. 
 
* * * 
 
It seemed to me a cloud encompassed us, 
Luminous, dense, consolidate and bright 
As adamant on which the sun is striking. 
Into itself did the eternal pearl  
Receive us, even as water doth receive 
A ray of light, remaining still unbroken. (Dante, Paradiso) 
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And what is the situation of our own discourse? Are we 
witnessing in our current moment a semiotic transfor-
mation of the life sciences, or a biologizing transfor-
mation of semiotics?  The critique of “representation,” 
never more “scientific” within the disciplines of the hu-
manities, has renewed its adolescence (for example, see 
Massumi 2002, passim); but representations of relation-
ships are at the forefront of the contemporary life scienc-
es. Current ethological research presents much animal 
display as open system, not fixed repertoire; as learned 
signaling as well as inherited, innovative as well as tradi-
tional (see, for example, Boyd 2009, 159). If Lacan’s dis-
tinction between the animal and human orders seems to 
explain less and less, his respect for unpredictability and 
improvisation in symbolic process (Ø) is nonetheless a 
point at which exchange between his work and the new 





Adroer, S. (1996). “Fixation of Asthma and Sexual Impotence at 
Different Pregenital Stages.” International Journal of Psy-
choanalysis 77: 787–802. 
Anthi, P.R. (1995). “Resistance Analysis and Psychic Reality.” 
Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 50: 32–47. 
Anzieu, D. (1979). “The Sound Image of the Self.”  International 
Review of Psychoanalysis 6: 23–36. 
Beebe, B. and Lachmann, F.M. (1994). “Representation and In-
ternalization in Infancy: Three Principles of Salience.” Psy-
choanalytic Psychology 11.2: 127–165. 
Benson, L.D., gen. ed.  (2008). The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd edn.  
Boston:  Houghton-Mifflin. 
Bowlby, J. (1969). Attachment and Loss, Vol. 1: Attachment.  
New York: Basic Books. 
Boyd, B. (2009).  On the Origin of Stories:  Evolution, Cognition 
and Fiction. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
Brennan, T. (2004). The Transmission of Affect.  Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press.  
188 BREATHING WITH SEMINAR X 
 
Breuer, J. and S. Freud. ([1893] 1955). “On the Psychical Mech-
anism of Hysterical Phenomena: Preliminary Communica-
tion.” In The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 2, ed. and trans. James Stra-
chey, 1–17. London: Hogarth Press. [Hereafter referred to as 
SE = Standard Edition.] 
Chiozza, L. (1998). Hidden Affects in Somatic Disorders: Psycho-
analytic Perspectives on Asthma, Psoriasis, Diabetes, Cere-
brovascular Disease, and Other Disorders. Madison: 
Psychosocial Press. 
Cooper, P.C. (2004). “The Abyss Becoming Well:  Psychoanaly-
sis and Reversals in Perspective.” Psychoanalytic Review 
91.2: 157–177. 
Damasio, A. (2003). Looking for Spinoza: Joy, Sorrow, and the 
Feeling Brain. New York: Harcourt. 
Dissanayake, Ellen. ([1988] 2002). What Is Art For?  Seattle: 
University of Washington Press. 
Eisler, M. J.  (1922). “Pleasure in Sleep and Disturbed Capacity 
for Sleep—A Contribution to the Study of the Oral Stage of 
the Development of the Libido.” International Journal of 
Psychoanalysis 3: 30–42. 
Fenichel, O. (1931). Hysterien und Zwangsneurosen. Vienna: 
Internationaler Psychoanalytischer Verlag. 
Ferenczi, S. (1993). Letter from Sandor Ferenczi to Sigmund 
Freud, October 10, 1910. In The Correspondence of Sigmund 
Freud and Sandor Ferenczi, Vol. 1: 1908-1914, eds. E. Bra-
bant, E. Falzeder, and P. Giampieri-Deutsch, trans. Peter 
Hoffer, 224–226. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press. 
Fonagy, P. and M. Target. (2007). “The Rooting of the Mind in 
the Body: New Links Between Attachment Theory and Psy-
choanalytic Thought.” Journal of the American Psychoana-
lytic Association 55: 411–456. 
Forsyth, D. (1921). “The Rudiments of Character:  A Study of 
Infant Behavior.” Psychoanalytic Review 8: 117–143. 
Fortey, R.A. (1998). Life: A Natural History of the First Four 
Billion Years of Life on Earth. New York: Knopf. 
Freud, S. ([1893] 1962). “On the Psychical Mechanism of Hys-
terical Phenomena:  A Lecture.” SE, Vol. 3, 25–39. 
Freud, S. ([1895] 1962). “On the Grounds for Detaching a Par-
ticular Syndrome from Neurasthenia Under the Description 
‘Anxiety Neurosis.’” SE, Vol. 3, 85–115. 
STAYING ALIVE 189 
 
Freud, S. ([1910] 1958). “A Special Type of Choice of Object 
Made by Men: Contributions to the Psychology of Love I.”  
SE, Vol. 11, 163–176. 
Freud, S. ([1917] 1963). “Lecture XXV: Anxiety.”  Introductory 
Lectures on Psychoanalysis (Part III).  SE, Vol. 16, 241–463.  
Freud, S. ([1933] 1961). “Lecture XXXII: Anxiety and Instinctu-
al Life.” New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis. SE, 
Vol. 22, 1–142. 
Galligan, E.L. (1984). The Comic Vision in Literature.  Athens:  
University of Georgia Press. 
Gardner, M.R. (1994).  “Is That a Fact?  Empiricism Revisited, 
or a Psychoanalyst at Sea.” International Journal of Psycho-
analysis 75: 927–937. 
Guignard, F. (1995). “The Infantile in the Analytic Relation-
ship.” International Journal of Psychoanalysis 76: 1083–1093. 
Hardin, R.F. (2007).“Encountering Plautus in the Renaissance: 
A Humanist Debate on Comedy.”  Renaissance Quarterly 
60: 789–818. 
Havlicek, J. and S.C. Roberts. (2009). “MHC-correlated Mate 
Choice in Humans: A Review.” Psychoneuroendocrinology 
34: 497–512. 
Isaacs, S. (1952). “The Nature and Function of Phantasy.” In M. 
Klein, P. Heimann, S. Issacs, and J. Riviere, Developments in 
Psychoanalysis, 67–121. London: Hogarth Press. 
Jenssen, T.A. (1977). “The Evolution of Anoline Lizard Display 
Behavior.” American Zoologist 17: 203–215. 
Kris, E. (1940). “Laughter as an Expressive Process:  Contribu-
tions to the Psychoanalysis of Expressive Behavior.” Inter-
national Journal of Psychoanalysis 21: 314–341. 
Lacan, J. (1962/63). The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X: Anx-
iety, trans. C. Gallagher, rev. M. Cherou-Lagreze, http:// 
www.lacaninireland.com/web/?page_id=123. 
Lacan, J.  (1992).  The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII: The 
Ethics of Psychoanalysis (1959-60), trans. Dennis Porter. 
New York: W.W. Norton. 
Lacan, J., J.-A. Miller, and J. Hulbert. (1977).  “Desire and the 
Interpretation of Desire in Hamlet.” Yale French Studies 
55.6: 11–52. 
Lakoff, G. and M. Johnson. (1980). Metaphors We Live By.  Chi-
cago: University of Chicago Press. 
Ledoux, J. (2002). Synaptic Self:  How Our Brains Become Who 
We Are.  New York: Penguin. 
190 BREATHING WITH SEMINAR X 
 
Mahler, M.S. (1974).  “Symbiosis and Individuation:  The Psy-
chological Birth of the Human Infant.” Psychoanalytic Study 
of the Child 29: 89–106. 
Mahoney, M.J. (1991). Human Change Processes:  The Scientific 
Foundations of Psychotherapy. New York: Basic Books. 
Mancia, M. (1989). “On the Birth of the Self.” Rivista Psico-
analytica 35: 1052–72. 
Marans, S. (1996). “Psychoanalysis on the Beat:  Children, Po-
lice and Urban Trauma.” Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 
51: 522–541. 
Masi, F.D. (2004). “The Psychodynamic of Panic Attacks: A 
Useful Integration of Psychoanalysis and Neuroscience.” Journal 
of the International Psychoanalytic Association 85: 311–336. 
Massumi, B. (2002). Parables of the Virtual: Movement, Affect, 
Sensation. Durham: Duke University Press. 
Miller, J.-A. (1990). “L’ecole et son psychanalyste,”  “Dispositif 
du Passe,” and “Du tragique a la comedie,” École de la Cause 
freudienne, http://www.causefreudienne.net/index.php/ecole/ 
textes-fondateurs/l-ecole-et-son-psychanalyste. 
Mitrani, J.L. (1993). “‘Unmentalized’ Experience in the Etiology 
and Treatment of Psychosomatic Asthma.” Contemporary 
Psychoanalysis 29: 314–342. 
Murray, J.F. (1985).  “Crecimiento y desarrollo del aparato res-
piratorio.”  In L.H. Smith and S.O. Tier, eds, Pathophysiolo-
gy: The Biological Principles of Disease. 2nd edn. Inter-
national Textbook of Medicine, Vol. 1. Philadelphia: W.B. 
Saunders. 
Obstfeld, E. (1975). “Psicoanalisis del trastorno diabetico.”  Eidon 5: 33–
59. 
Ogden, T.H. (2004). “The Analytic Third:  Implications for Psy-
choanalytic Theory and Technique.” Psychoanalytic Quar-
terly 73: 167–195. 
Panksepp, J. (2005). “Commentary on ‘Integrating the Psycho-
analytic and Neurobiological Views of Panic Disorder’.”  
Neuropsychoanalysis 7: 145–150. 
Premack, D. (1985). “‘Gavagai!’ or the Future History of the 
Animal Language Controversy.” Cognition 19: 207–296. 
Samson, F.  (2012). “Das Objekt der Angst.”  In Angst: Lektüren 
zu Jacques Lacans Seminar X, ed. Michaela Wüensch, 13–23. 
Wien-Berlin: Verlag Turia + Kant. 
Simon, P. ([1986] 2012). “The Boy in the Bubble.” In Paul Si-
mon, Graceland (CD). Legacy Recordings.  
Steen, F.  (In Preparation).  Incorporating Consciousness. 
STAYING ALIVE 191 
 
Szpilman, W. ([1945] 2000). Death of a City; republished in 
English as The Pianist: The Extraordinary True Story of One 
Man’s Survival in Warsaw, 1939-1945, trans. A. Bell. New 
York: Picador. 
Wolson, P. (2005). “The Existential Dimension of Psychoanaly-
sis (EDP):  Psychic Survival and the Fear of Psychic Death 
(Nonbeing).”  Psychoanalytic Review 92: 675–699. 
Wyss, W. ([1947] 1974). Cuerpo y Espiritu.  Barcelona:  Manuel 
Marin. 
Young, J.Z. (1971/74). An Introduction to the Study of Man.  
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 

Fugue 3 
The Object Breath 
Ruth Evans 
w 
Breathing my mother in 
Breathing my beloved in 
Breathing 
Breathing her nicotine 
Breathing 
Breathing the fall-out in 
Out, in, out, in, out, in, out, in 
Out, in, out, in, out, in, out 
(Out, out, out, out) 
Kate Bush, “Breathing” (1980) 
BREATHING WITH “BREATHING” 
Respiration is habitual, so we do not normally notice it. 
Voice—what Steven Connor calls “shaped breath”—
claims our attention, but breathing, because it is second 
nature, slips under the radar (Connor 2008a). Breath is 
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nature to voice’s culture. Yet respiration is “meaning-
making,” as Aranye Fradenburg rightly insists in her 
marvelous, erudite essay: our first gulp of air is an invol-
untary response to a traumatic change in our environ-
ment, but that change catapults us from safety to pro-
found anxiety, provoking and developing our skills of 
interpretation and expression, as we take in that novelty 
and push it out again in our cries, our laughter, our 
words. Breathing is the making of us, just as we come to 
know and make the world through breathing. 
 I want in this essay to take up Fradenburg’s two pro-
vocative claims that “the Lacanian objet a is a striking 
conceptualization of the embodied mind’s experience of 
change” and that this conceptualization “trenches on the 
psychosomatic nature of rhetorical activity.” My purpose 
in this response is to breathe with “Breathing” by elabo-
rating on the wide-ranging implications of these claims: 
for psychoanalysis on the one hand and for reading litera-
ture and art on the other. I end by considering Fraden-
burg’s crucial question about the interrelationship of the 
life sciences, psychoanalysis, and the humanities as a 
question about the “representations of relationships,” and 
thus about the nature of creatureliness. 
 As Fradenburg reminds us, although breathing is an 
autonomous physiological process, it can also be enlisted 
by the mind, consciously or unconsciously, to serve its 
ends. I have to breathe, but breathing is also “me,” insofar 
as the objet a that constitutes “me”—driving me to act, 
organizing my desire—is shaped by the anxieties that 
attend change, of which the neonate’s encounter with the 
real of the pneuma is paradigmatic. Fradenburg’s highly 
original contribution to the neurobiological and psycho-
analytic literature on anxiety lies in her argument that the 
origins of the objet a lie as much in breathing—let’s call it 
the respiratory stage—as in the oral, anal, and genital 
developmental stages. As Fradenburg argues, “[a]nxiety 
signals the human being’s emergence from what thereaf-
ter is (re)constituted as a remainder”: the lost object. In 
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Lacanian theory the object is “both the hole and that 
which stops it up” (Adams 1996, 104)—it hollows out a 
space inside me (creating lack) and it covers it up (screen-
ing that lack). We might see the action of the lungs, push-
ing air in and out, as a dynamic version of this para-
doxical topology. Although breathing is not an object, 
clinical symptoms that involve respiratory mechanisms 
(choking, sighing, panic attacks, breath-holding) demon-
strate that breathing embodies unconscious desire, and is 
thus connected to the object. 
 Maureen McLane beautifully connects breathing and 
desire when she observes: “It’s only humans as far as we 
know who can use words to get bodies together. The word as 
the body evanesced in a breath, a breath bearing intelligi-
ble sound” (McLane 2012a, 8). Words—signifiers—liter-
ally get bodies together, via calls, emails, texts, love-letters, but 
also metaphorically, through literary forms, which people 
worlds with strangely alive, absent presences. Signifiers 
are fleeting, like breath, vanishing from one to the other 
in the signifying chain, bearing witness to the absent 
body—“intelligible sound”—but never making that body 
fully present (“the body evanesced in a breath”), just as 
desire moves ceaselessly from signifier to signifier, never 
finding its final satisfaction. McLane’s words imagine breath-
ing as both expressive of desire and as behaving like desire. 
 Now psychoanalysis associates desire with the Freudi-
an partial objects around which the drive turns. I want to 
argue that Fradenburg’s essay opens up the possibility of 
theorizing breath—as distinct from breathing—as anoth-
er partial object, as “a catalyst that sets off love” (Salecl 
and Žižek 1996, 3). Why argue this? 
 In western culture, breath has many dimensions. On 
the one hand, it is inferior to logos, insubstantial, not even 
(like voice) a vibration in the air. God made his creatures 
with his Word, but he breathed life into Adam. St Augus-
tine worries about the (lack of) substance of God’s breath: 
“But we must not think that the creatures He made by a 
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word are better than what He made by a breath, in view 
of the fact that a word is better than a breath in us” (Au-
gustine 1982, 5; my emphasis). Word—voice—trumps breath 
in the hierarchy of air-related phenomena. And yet, Augus-
tine concedes, “to produce a breath is to produce the 
soul” (1982, 5). Breath is life and death. For Søren Kier-
kegaard, breathing opens onto the dimension of possibil-
ity: to pray is to breathe, “and possibility is for the self 
what oxygen is for breathing” (1989, 33). Kierkegaard’s is 
a religious understanding of the adage attributed to Cice-
ro: Dum spiro spero [“while I breathe, I hope”]. But 
Fradenburg’s question—“What gives ‘me’ life/ death?”—
is not about breath as substance or possibility, nor is it 
really about what Connor calls “the intense work of fanta-
sy that attaches to the human breath, which is both de-
monic and divine, both flatulence and afflatus” (Connor 
2008b). Rather, it concerns breath as the Lacanian object: 
that which constitutes the self, that which is invested with 
love. 
BREATH AS OBJET A 
Is breath a love object? Sigmund Freud (1962) identified a 
number of so-called “partial objects,” elements that the 
child imagines as separate from the body: the most im-
portant of these are the breast, faeces, and phallus. To 
these Lacan (1979) added a further two: gaze and voice. 
These last two are, in Renata Salecl’s and Slavoj Žižek’s 
words, “love objects par excellence,” because they are “a 
medium, a catalyst that sets off love” (1996, 3). These par-
tial objects are “partial” not because they are part of a 
total object—the body—but because they represent only 
partially the function that produces them: the breast is a 
love object because it represents more than food. They are 
“something that is separated from [the subject], but be-
longs to him and which he needs to complete himself” 
(Lacan 1997, 195), avatars of the lost object (Lacan’s objet 
a): a hole in the symbolic, but also the cover-up of that 
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hole. The partial objects are all associated with the body’s 
erotogenicized, rim-like structures: orifices and apertures 
that act as “the source and departure of a certain drive”— 
the mouth, the anus, the umbilicus (Lacan 1997, 169, 172). The 
drive (oral, anal, scopic) emerges from a rim as it aims at 
the object of desire [Fig. 1] and then returns, but it never 
“hits” the object (a): it always circumvents it. The shape 
that the drive describes as it moves around the object—as 
the object rises “in a bump”—is “like the wooden darning 
egg in the material which, in analysis, you are darning: 
the objet a” (Lacan 1979, 257). Lacan links these rim-like 
orifices, which open and close, to the opening and closing 
gap of the unconscious (1979, 200). 
Figure 1. The partial drive and its circuit 
198 EVANS: THE OBJECT BREATH 
 But breath, unlike the other partial objects, is not 
connected with developmental tasks and breathing has 
nothing to do with the drives: it is a (semi)-autonomous 
physiological process. Breathing satisfies a need, not a 
demand. Yet, as Fradenburg amply demonstrates, breath 
represents more than our need for air. The clinical litera-
ture and cultural history suggest that breath is an object 
that can be detached from the body and invested with 
love. 
 The Greeks considered air to be the substance of the 
self. Herakleitos says that “[t]he stuff of the psyche is a 
smoke-like substance of finest particles that gives rise to 
all other things; its particles are of less mass than any oth-
er substance and it is constantly in motion” (Herakleitos 
1976, 18). As Devin Johnston notes, “For the Greeks, bod-
ily odor and breath carry the effluvia of essence, undimin-
ished while the organism lives, the sole continuity of the 
psyche when it dies” (2009, 6). After death we will go on 
as breath; while we live we are constituted by the dynamic 
of respiratory exchange: “Breathing my mother in / 
Breathing my beloved in / Out, in, out, in, out, in, out,” as 
Kate Bush has it. Contrary to Augustine’s view of breath 
as insubstantial, medieval vernacular traditions held that 
breath is composed of one of the four elements that are 
basic to all living things: earth, fire, air, and water. As The 
Early South-English Legendary (c. 1300) puts it: “Man 
hath of eorþe al is bodi: and of watere he hauez wete, / Of 
þe Eyr he hath breth and wind: of fuyr he hath hete” 
[“Man’s body is entirely of earth; he has moisture from 
water; from the air he has breath and respiration; from 
fire he has heat”] (Horstmann 1887, 318). Breath is me: it 
is elemental. A gaseous wave of bodily flotsam and jet-
sam, breath is a delirious, sometimes poisonous, mix of 
self and other, slag and allure: cigarette smoke, ketones, 
dust, microbes, pheromones, sweetness, “plumes of par-
ticulate matter” (Johnston 2009, 5). 
 In our sensual engagement with respiratory mecha-
nisms, breath is both eroticized and charged with desire. 
STAYING ALIVE 199 
We taste the other’s breath in kissing. CPR is the “kiss of 
life.” We respond with emotion when we hear the sudden 
intake of breath, the sigh, the sound of panting, heavy 
breathing, rasping breath, the death rattle, a laboring wo-
man’s butterfly breathing. We feel warm breath fluttering 
and the swoosh of snorting on our skin. We see with re-
lief the chest rising and falling, the feather held to the lips 
trembling. We smell, with disgust or delight, bad breath, 
garlic breath, sweet breath, the Cook’s breath that “ful 
soure stynketh” (Chaucer, The Manciple’s Prologue, 
IX.32).1 And what do we make of the fact that respiratory
rate is one of the vital signs of life, and yet in triage is al-
most never measured accurately (Lovett et al. 2005)? That 
we need better instruments? That we need better methods 
of auscultation and observation? Or that poor inter-ob-
server agreement argues for an element of desire in the 
interaction: a residue that distorts the measurement? As 
Fradenburg argues, air “has an ‘a’ quality”: it is like the 
remainder around which the drive moves. 
FLA(I)RING NOSTRILS 
We use two orifices to breathe—the mouth and the nose. 
But nostrils seldom enter cultural history. Maybe this is 
because we associate the nose primarily with smell and 
with disgust (snot, sniffles), or because we are obsessed 
with the oral. Or because we find the mouth infinitely 
expressive, whereas the poor nose isn’t. A nose doesn’t 
give much away (unless it has an imagined shine on it). 
“To hold one’s nose” means to block a smell, not to arrest 
breathing; “to look down the nose at someone” refers to 
an action of the eyes, not the breath. Yet the nasal cavities 
play a starring role in western culture: in Genesis 2.7 
God’s ex-spiration brings Adam to life solely through his 
1 All citations of Chaucer’s poetry are from Benson’s (1987) 
edition, The Riverside Chaucer, by fragment, book, and/or line 
numbers; all translations are mine. 
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nostrils: “And Jehovah God formed man of the dust of 
the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of 
life; and man became a living soul” (Douay-Rheims Bi-
ble). Although the mechanics of divine CPR remain somewhat 
obscure—does God breathe life into Adam through His 
nostrils or His mouth?—the human nares are privileged 
here as a dual point of entry for the pneuma. 
 In the psychoanalytic tradition, the nasal fossae are 
associated overwhelmingly with the olfactory (Sharon-
Zisser 2004). Freud famously sees “nostrils with scabs” in 
Irma’s throat, but these are reminders of his own cocaine 
use (Freud 1999, 88–90) and are unconnected to breath-
ing and its affects. I’m struck by the fact that the nostrils 
are rim-like structures, and yet Lacan does not include 
them in his list of eroticized bodily orifices that function 
as specific sources for the drive, namely, “the two rims 
concerned in the digestive tract . . . the rheumy rim of our 
eyelids, our ears, our navels” (1979, 172). But breathing is 
not associated with a drive (or is it?), and the nostrils do 
not open and close like the other orifices (or do they?), 
which, as Lacan observes, “are linked to the opening/closing of 
the gap of the unconscious” (1979, 200). 
 Why do our fantasies of breathing make so little refer-
ence to the nostrils? The nose is a complex organ that 
plays an important role in breathing. A normal adult nose 
processes on average 10,000 liters of air in 24 hours. The 
nose contains structures called turbinates that streamline 
the air that passes around them, humidifying, heat-ex-
changing, filtering, sensing, and controlling the airflow. 
The turbinates are crucial for maintaining nasal and sinus 
health and physiology (Wolf et al. 2004). They contain 
erectile tissue that swells and engorges in response to con-
gestion or as an immunological defense. Anxiety inter-
feres with nasal respiratory functions: vasomotor rhinitis 
can be caused by emotional stress. As we say, people get 
up our noses. Psychoanalysis needs to begin to theorize 
the nostrils qua air-passages, as opposed to olfactory or-




gans, or at the very least to account for why these aper-
tures are largely absent in fantasies of the psychical body. 
 Lacan’s list of the bodily orifices associated with desire 
doesn’t rule out the possibility of adding the nostrils to 
that list—as the source and departure of a certain drive— 
and of positing breath as the object of a drive. The nos-
trils are, after all, differentiated by their rim-like structure 
and they are, in relation to certain dimensions of respira-
tion, erogenous zones. Sneezing is reported as a fetish.2 
 Is the infant’s game of respiration—“breathing quick-
ly then slowly, shallowly then deeply” (Fradenburg, citing 
Forsyth)—a version of the fort-da, the game with the cot-
ton reel that Freud’s grandson invented to represent the 
appearance and disappearance of the mother? For Lacan, 
“This reel is not the mother reduced to a little ball . . . it is 
a small part of the subject that detaches itself from him 
while still remaining his. . . . [M]an thinks with his object 
. . . . To this object we will later give the name it bears in 
the Lacanian algebra—the petit a” (Lacan 1979, 62). In 
this sense, the infant plays with its breath as if it were an 
object: a part of ourselves that detaches itself from us while still 
remaining ours. “Love makes its object from what is miss-
ing in the real” (Florence 2011). David Forsyth identifies 
breath as one of “the original objects . . . of an infant’s 
love,” one of the mother’s “outstanding rivals” (Forsyth 
1921, 134, cited by Fradenburg). 
 “Nostril” is from Old English “nos-þyrel.” The ety-
mology of þyrel/thirl is “[a] hole, bore, perforation; an 
aperture” (Oxford English Dictionary). A nostril is a hole 
bored into each side of the fleshy protuberance that is the 
nose. Chaucer twice describes the grief that Queen Anel-
ida experiences when her false knight Arcite betrays her 
love as analogous to being “thirled” [“pierced”] by mem-
ory. Here’s Anelida, lamenting: “So thirleth with the poynt of 
                                                                            
2 See Sneeze Fetish Forum: http://www.sneezefetishforum.org/ 
forums/. 
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remembraunce / The sword of sorowe . . . / Myn herte” 
[“The sword of sorrow has so pierced my heart with the 
point of remembrance”] (Anelida and Arcite, 211–213). 
And here’s the narrator, in sympathy with her: “So singe I 
here . . . / Howe that Arcite Anelida so sore / Hath thirled 
with the poynt of remembraunce” [“how Arcite has pierced 
Anelida so sorely with the point of remembrance”] (Anel-
ida and Arcite, 348–350). The image of memory, the 
sword’s tip, piercing Anelida’s heart is an exquisite meta-
phor for the desire that does not—that cannot ever—
attain its object: the physical sensation of loss is felt as a 
perforation in the body’s defenses. Thirl is also thrill 
(OED). Anelida is thrilled: emotionally pierced. I imagine 
a poetics of the nostrils in which the cavities of the nose 
are also “thirled” with remembrance, pierced by desire. 
 Insofar as breath is invested with remembrance, so it 
functions as an object of desire. Breath as an object sur-
faces with peculiar force in accounts of anorexic desire. 
STARVED OF BREATH 
In his study of anxiety, On the Nightmare (1931), Ernest 
Jones notes that one of its cardinal physical symptoms is a 
“sense of oppression or weight at the chest which alarm-
ingly interferes with respiration” (Jones 1931, 12). Anxie-
ty feels like the physical torture of peine forte et dure 
(being pressed to death by having heavy stones heaped on 
one’s chest): the breath is squeezed out of the body. The 
rhetoric of suffocation is often invoked in descriptions of 
anorexia nervosa. The narrator of Marya Hornbacher’s 
Wasted: A Memoir of Anorexia and Bulimia speaks of her 
elaborate food-system—dividing food into 80-calorie 
units—as a form of respiratory stifling: “systems, like cor-
sets, keep shrinking, tightening around the body, pressing 
the breath out of you” (1998, 246). These food-systems 
provide control over chaos, but the narrator’s anxiety—
expressed in terms of a symbol of constricting, female 
clothing (but that symbol should not be read over-simply 
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in sociological terms)—shows that what’s also at stake in 
the establishment of the food-system is the loss of an ob-
ject. Containment, in corsets or diet plans, protects the 
subject from the suffocating effects of others, but is suffo-
cating in its own right (as Fradenburg notes). 
 The recovering anorexic/bulimic narrator of Janice 
Galloway’s The Trick Is to Keep Breathing declares on the 
last pages of the novel: “I’m gawky, not a natural swim-
mer. . . . I read somewhere the trick is to keep breathing, 
make out it’s not unnatural at all. They say it comes with 
practice” (Galloway 2003, 235). Unable to completely 
control her respiration, to breathe with her desire, the 
narrator feels like a fish out of water, in an alien envi-
ronment. She can’t breathe properly, and things are not 
going swimmingly. But is the alien environment the one 
she has been in or the one she is about to dive into? When 
the infant starts breathing, “[f]or the very first time, he is 
traversed by something outside of himself. . . . [and] that 
particular experience constitutes the first encounter with 
the real of the ex-uteros, the real of the pneuma” (Flor-
ence 2011). Withholding her breathing has been a strate-
gy of control, a way of refusing the real of the pneuma. It’s 
another form of ambiguous containment: not breathing 
allows the narrator to escape the real but she risks drown-
ing in the effort. 
 Crying is also a function of respiratory physiology. 
One of Hilde Bruch’s anorexic patients “determinedly 
refrained from crying for [her parents] when she awoke 
from naps in her crib” (cited in Brown 1991, 195). The 
anorectic does not want to be noticed: she does not want 
to open—as Fradenburg writes, to unfurl her best feath-
ers. She voluntarily curbs her respiratory processes, not 
because she wants to die but because she wants to play 
with the phantasy of her own death, her own disappear-
ance. This is not self-effacing; it’s an aggressive refusal to 
accede to the Other. As Lacan observes of anorexia nervo-
sa, “the phantasy of one’s death is usually manipulated by 
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the child in his love relations with his parents” (1979, 
215). As Fradenburg writes, since “[i]t’s the Other who 
gives me oxygen, or makes me struggle for it, the father as 
much as the mother,” to express myself by crying would 
be to acknowledge the relational field that I do not want 
to be caught in. Lacan’s remark that we must seek correla-
tions for the infant’s refusal of the breast, for “the first 
forms of anorexia,” at the level of the big Other (Lacan 
1962/63, 303–304) finds its echo in Galloway’s narrator’s 
references to this structuring Other: “I read somewhere . . 
. . They say . . . ” (2003, 235). Our desire to keep breath-
ing—or not to breathe—is the desire of the Other. 
 The anorectic does not eat nothing, as those medieval 
fasting saints understood only too well. Inanition can be a 
feast. Air is full of the remainders of our desire. Sylvia 
Plath’s resurgent “Lady Lazarus” triumphantly reveals her 
vengeful meal plan: “Herr God, Herr Lucifer / Beware 
Beware. / Out of the ash I rise with my red hair / And I 
eat men like air” (2005, 17). Fire consumes (h)air, leaving 
ash, but what is consumed (air) becomes in turn the ob-
ject of consumption, in a marvelously comedic reversal of 
the gendered status quo. Gods and devils are airy noth-
ings; anthropophagy is effortless. Air is the chameleon’s 
dish, “promise-crammed” (Hamlet, 3.2): the carrier of Hamlet’s 
desire to avenge his father’s death, of Lady Lazarus’s desire 
to feast on the delicious nothing of her revenge on the 
primordial forbidding father, on the nom-du-père. 
PNEUMATIC FORMS 
Respiration, Fradenburg tells us, “links the history of 
what and how the body takes in, and why, to narrative 
structure, comical or tragical.” The metaphors and locu-
tions associated with breathing point to a respiratory ba-
sis for genres: a literary psychosomatics, if you will, that 
connects the embodied mind’s experience of change to 
rhetorical forms. Samuel Beckett offers a brilliant epitome 
of this process in his 35-second play Breath: 






1. Faint light on stage littered with miscel-
laneous rubbish. Hold for about five se-
conds. 
 
2. Faint brief cry and immediately inspira-
tion and slow increase of light together 
reaching maximum together in about ten 
seconds. Silence and hold about five se-
conds. 
 
3. Expiration and slow decrease of light to-
gether reaching minimum together (light 
as in 1) in about ten seconds and imme-
diately cry as before. Silence and hold for 
about five seconds. 
 
Rubbish. No verticals, all scattered and ly-
ing. 
 
Cry. Instant of recorded vagitus [the cry 
of a newborn infant]. Important that two 
cries be identical, switching on and off 
strictly synchronized light and breath. 
 
Breath. Amplified recording. 
 
Maximum light. Not bright. If 0 = dark 
and 10 = bright, light should move from 
about 3 to 6 and back.  
(Beckett 1970?) 
 
First there is a “faint light,” amidst the trash, held (like 
the breath) for about 5 seconds, in uncertainty or perhaps 
anticipation, and then the “faint brief” cry of a newborn 
baby, followed by “inspiration” (inhaling/stimulation/di-
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vine influence/(Romantic) poetic motivation) as the light 
gets stronger (fiat lux! a comic reference to creation). The 
intake of breath and the light swell together in diapason, 
and are then both suspended (the breath holds its breath, 
the light holds its breath) before the breath is slowly ex-
pelled and the light slowly fades; the first birth-cry is re-
peated, and then there is silence, again suspended: un-
certain, nervous. There is no consolation and no tran-
scendence. 
 The first cry mimes the moment when the child takes 
its first breath, and is invaded by something alien; when 
“the foetus, upon birth, goes from one topology to anoth-
er” (Florence 2011). As Freud argues, this violent topo-
logical shift means that “the act of birth, as the indi-
vidual’s first experience of anxiety, has given the affect of 
anxiety certain characteristic forms of expression” (Freud 
1990, 12–13)—that is, respiratory expressions. In Beck-
ett’s play, birth, life, and death are condensed into a few 
brief, pulsating moments on a bleak, chaotic stage. The 
viewer does not know if the events that unfold are tragic 
or absurd, providential or doomed, does not know if she 
should celebrate the life that appears so briefly or mourn 
its swift passing. The fleeting life is heralded by a cry, but 
it fades fifteen seconds later with the same cry, as if the 
infant expires almost as soon as it has been born (trage-
dy), or as if life merely lasted for as long as it takes for one 
breath to be inhaled and exhaled (which is comic in its 
reductiveness). Expression and interpretation are pared 
down, but are nevertheless present: the degree zero of the 
recognition that “[r]espiration both is, and precipitates, 
expressive and interpretive activity, nonverbal as well as 
verbal” (Fradenburg’s words). There is chaos, somewhat 
illuminated; there is the pattern of a repeated cry. The 
second cry is the same as the first, but it does not mean 
the same because we encounter it as part of a narrative 
that unfolds in time. We register a barely perceptible but 
meaningful change between them: a slide, perhaps, from 




hope to tragedy to comedy. It never gets really dark. 
Somehow we’ll keep going. 
 The physical dynamics of breathing take many (liter-
ary) forms. Laughter, in physical terms, is repeated sharp 
breaths. It is a “dynamic response of the respiratory sys-
tem” (Filippelli  et al. 2001, 1446), shaped by the expirato-
ry muscles and the diaphragm. The myriad permutations 
of the laugh are a dazzling catalog of literary subgenres: 
the chuckle, the titter, the giggle, the chortle, the cackle, 
the belly laugh, the sputtering burst, breathless laughter, 
the snicker, the snigger, the guffaw, the snort, the hoot, 
nervous laughter, embarrassed laughter. One can roll 
with laughter, whoop with laughter, or cry with laughter. 
Chaucer’s Sir Thopas is a chortle or a knowing snigger; 
the Miller’s Tale, at the moment of Alison’s “Teehee,” is a 
joyful hoot. 
 So also the cough, which is, as Connor remarks, 
“closely twinned with and often implicated in the laugh, 
and indeed, we might say that laughter is the orchestra-
tion of the reflex action involved in the cough” (Connor 
2008a). The embodied dimension of the signifier is evi-
dent in Connor’s “crew” of “creole quasi-locutions: the lisp, the 
gasp, the sigh, the rasp, the whistle, the hiss, the brrr, the 
purr, the snore, the sniffle, the crepitus, the croak” (Con-
nor 2008a). There is also the whoop of pertussis and the 
self-conscious “ahem.” Like laughter’s array of forms, this 
tussive litany is a lexicon of literary subgenres. Other breath-
related phenomena are hiccups, yawns, sneezes, gulps, 
wheezes, puffs, and pants. The various prologues of the 
Canterbury Tales are models of some of these respiratory 
mechanisms: the Wife of Bath’s is a gloriously protracted, 
mock-apologetic throat-clearing, the Prioress’s a pious 
sniffle, the Manciple’s words to the Cook an irascible hiss. 
 The literary as a moment of evanescent breath is given 
form in Frank O’Hara’s magnificent poem “The Day Lady 
Died,” in which the poet, shocked to learn accidentally of 
Billie Holiday’s death by seeing a New York Post “with her 
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face on it,” finds himself suddenly sweating a lot and 
thinks of “leaning on the john door in the 5 SPOT / while 
she whispered a song along the keyboard / to Mal Wal-
dron and everyone and I stopped breathing” (1995, 325)—
there is no final punctuation. Like “Mal Waldron and eve-
ryone and I,” the poem stops breathing, as if the air had 
been squeezed out of it by the realization that Holiday is 
dead. This is breathing begetting tragedy. But the poem is 
also at that moment vividly, intensely alive: it is breath-
ing. This is breathing begetting comedy. 
 The syntactic ambiguity—Holiday “whispered” her 
song to “Mal Waldron and everyone” and “Mal Waldron 
and everyone and I stopped breathing”—creates a mo-
ment of après-coup that transforms the rapt listeners of 
Holiday’s song into grieving subjects, and simulates a 
double exhalation, so that Holiday’s entrancing, lyrical 
whisper, her breathing out, is then belatedly understood 
as a dying sigh. O’Hara does not make his poem a mon-
ument to Holiday (although it is this): he offers nothing 
as grand or self-aggrandizing as Shakespeare’s assertion 
to his beloved in Sonnet 18: “So long as men can breathe, 
or eyes can see, / So long lives this, and this gives life to 
thee.” O’Hara’s poem does not live in order that the dead 
live on. Instead there is a quiet exhalation and inhalation: 
the poem stops—what McLane calls “lyric arrest” (2012b, 
22)—and then starts again: a new cycle, life, art. 
 Margery Kempe’s performance of Christ’s death at 
Calvary is a startling example of one extraordinary medi-
eval woman’s ability to make breathing serve her ends. To 
understand that performance we must go back to Kem-
pe’s first-recorded traumatic episode: not her own birth 
but the events that accompany the birth of her first child. 
Believing that she might die after a difficult pregnancy 
and delivery, Kempe sends for her confessor so that she 
may express an old, unconfessed sin. But while she is re-
vealing it, her confessor cuts her off: he “gan scharply to 
vndyrnemyn hir er þan sche had fully seyd hir entent” 
[“sharply reproved her before she had fully said her mean-




ing”]3 (Meech and Allen 1940, 7). Stifled by him, she “wold 
not more seyn” [“wished to say nothing more”], and the 
sin goes unshriven. 
 The effect of this is that she “went owt of hir mende” 
[“out of her mind”] (7); for more than half a year she is 
vexed with spirits, and sees “deuelys opyn her mowthys al 
inflaumyd wyth brennyng lowys of fyr as þei schuld a 
swalwyd hyr in” [“devils opening their mouths, all in-
flamed with burning flames of fire, as if they must swal-
low her in”] (7). Her fear of being ingested by the Other is 
primarily an oral fear of being eaten alive but also a fear 
of being inhaled, a fear that is typical of ego dissolution. 
It’s what Kate Bush protects herself against when she changes 
the steady rhythms of “Out, in, out, in, out, in, out” (where 
the focus is already on the exhaling) to an anxious pant-
ing as she rids herself of the breath that is poisoning her: 
“(Out, out, out, out)” (1980). What shall we call this? Not 
abjection: ab-halation? 
 Calvary is where Kempe symbolically gives birth to 
Christ and simultaneously experiences his death, where 
she first begins her extravagant “krying & roryng” (68). 
Her bellowing needs air; it’s her attempt to reverse being 
stifled by her confessor. But this time her breathing is 
within her control; she knows, for example, that this cry-
ing irritates people: “sche wolde kepyn it in as mech as 
she myth þat þe pepyl xulde not an herd it for noyng of 
hem” [“she wished to keep it in as much as she was able 
so that the people might not hear it because it annoyed 
them]” (69). This withholding sometimes causes her to 
“wax as bloo as any leed” [“become as blue as lead”] (69), 
as if she were being suffocated: a withholding that repli-
cates the original withholding of her sin from her confes-
sor, but which, given her recognition of her fellow-Chris-
tians’ hostility to the practice, is (for her) satisfyingly ag-
                                                                            
3 All citations of The Book of Margery Kempe from Meech and 
Allen’s 1940 edition, by page number; translations are mine. 
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gressive. If she is acting out, then we can also understand 
this as a response to trauma. If “[a]nxiety marks the mo-
ment when the Other’s desire for us seems to fail,” as 
Fradenburg argues, then it is gratifying to Kempe that 
Christ can reassure her that he has not forsaken her, that 
he knows what a “she” is. Kempe’s behavior is a magnifi-
cent improvisation, a gloriously comic response to anxie-
ty, a way of turning unpleasure into pleasure, and into 
form: her Book. 
BREATHING MY BELOVED IN: SMITH/STEWART AND THE 
OBJECT BREATH 
Figure 2. Smith/Stewart, Breathing Space (1997); with 
permission from the artists. 
The link between (artistic) expression and respiration is 
strikingly dramatized in the work of the Glasgow-based 
artists Stephanie Smith and Edward Stewart. Smith/Stew-
art’s artworks are preoccupied with the struggle to breathe. 
Breathing Space (1997),4 a looped, two-channel color video 
projection installation [Fig. 2], shows Ms. Smith’s head 
and shoulders on one screen; she is lying on a red sheet 
4 Smith/Stewart, Breathing Space (1997): http://www.smithstew 
art.co.uk/selected-works/breathing-space/. 




and has a white plastic bag tightly fitted over her head. 
The other screen shows Mr. Stewart’s head and shoulders; 
he is lying on a white sheet, with a black plastic bag over 
his head. As each artist slowly inhales and exhales, the 
plastic bags are sucked in and out, sticking to their faces. 
Microphones inside the bags amplify their breathing, which 
becomes increasingly panicky. 
 The viewer is both fascinated and distressed. Are they 
breathing together or dying together? The artists are unit-
ed by their shared experience of anxiety, but kept apart 
on their separate screens. In its rigidity, repetition, and 
compulsion, its referencing of torture and masochism, the 
performance sexualizes respiration, but the viewer does 
not know if this is a game or a punishment, nor who is in 
control. The artwork is not only a trap for the gaze but 
also a trap for the breath: the artwork sucks the oxygen 
from the viewers by producing within them the anxiety 




Figure 3. Smith/Stewart, Sustain (1995); with permission 
of the artists. 
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 Sustain (1995), another two-channel color video pro-
jection installation, is concerned with the intersubjectivi-
ty of breathing and with what Fradenburg calls “the dim-
ension of horror” in our reliance on the Other to give or 
withhold our oxygen. In the lower screen Mr. Stewart, fully 
clothed, is submerged under water in a bathtub, holding 
his breath and staring up at Ms. Smith, who is leaning 
over him [Fig. 3].5 His only means of survival is Ms. 
Smith, who repeatedly bends over him to breathe into his 
mouth, resurfacing to take another breath while he re-
mains underwater. Mr. Stewart makes no attempt to get 
out of the tub. Nothing appears to compel him to stay 
there (elements of torture and coercion are absent), but 
Ms. Smith makes no attempt to pull him out. 
 This underwater mouth-to-mouth resuscitation eroti-
cizes breathing, and makes breath a love object that keeps 
the other alive. Even though Mr. Stewart displays no anx-
iety about whether she will return (she never disappears), 
it’s a matter of life and death for him that the mother give 
him the gift of breath. To stay alive through the gift of the 
other’s breath is terrifying, evoking suffocation, death, 
drowning, sex, the death drive. Breathing exists on a bor-
derline: one is always poised to be alive or dead. Exploit-
ing the medium of video, the looped tape, with its sound-
track of heavy-breathing, emphasizes that breathing goes 
on and on—in/out, in/out: it is the original binary code, 0 
+ 1, ones and zeros, off/on, but it’s binary code made dangerous 
by positing it as fragile, perilous, finite. 
 Sustain calls to mind a performance artwork by Mari-
na Abramović and Ulay, Breathing In/Breathing Out (per-
formed twice, in Belgrade in 1977, and in Amsterdam in 
1978), in which the two artists blocked their nostrils with 
cigarette filters, taped microphones to their throats, and 
pressed their mouths together [Fig. 4]. Each was able to 
inhale only the exhaled breath of the other. As carbon di-
5 Smith/Stewart, Sustain (1995), http://www.smithstewart.co.uk/ 
selected-works/sustain/. 




oxide filled their lungs, they began to sweat and be visibly 
distressed, agitating their bodies in their attempt to cope 
with their slow suffocation. Viewers were able to sense 
their agony through the projected and amplified sound of 
breathing. It took nineteen minutes in the first perfor-
mance and fifteen in the second for them to use up all the 





Figure 4. Marina Abramović and Ulay, Breathing In/ 
Breathing Out (1977-78) 
 
 Abramović and Ulay’s work uses respiration to ex-
press the heterosexual couple as a monstrous unity, and 
collaborative work as potentially deadly: a parody of mu-
tual sustenance. In Smith/Stewart’s work breathing is not 
reciprocal; one gives and the other takes. Mr. Stewart is a 
newborn, utterly dependent on Ms. Smith for sustenance. 
What if she didn’t return? The apparent generosity and 
selflessness of her action is belied by the ambiguities of 
“breathing for the other,” by the aggression as well as love 
that lurks beneath it. Your breathing calls to me, but I 
might refuse to call you back, or I might call you out. Breathing 
tests our courtesy, our hospitality (or hostipitality, as Jacques 
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Derrida would have it). I live by your breath, but equally I 
may feel—as a neonate does—invaded. And so you by 
me. Which is to say that living is anxious. 
Figure 5. Smith/Stewart, Inside Out (1997); with permis-
sion of the artists. 
In another installation, Inside Out (1997), a camera is 
placed inside a mouth so that the viewer looks out from 
within the mouth cavity [Fig. 5].6 As the mouth rhythmi-
cally opens and closes, light appears and disappears, by 
turns lighting up and plunging into darkness the cavity of 
the mouth, in a visual presentation of inhalation and ex-
halation. The teeth that open and close function like a 
camera shutter or obturator. Just as the obturator in de-
sire blocks and lets in the gaze, the voice (Lacan 1979, 
147, 159), in accordance with the pulsation of the uncon-
scious as it opens and closes, so here the teeth alternately 
block and let in the breath-as-light. Breath is here imag-
ined as object-like: both the hole, when open, and the 
bouchon, the stopper for the hole, when closed (Adams 
6 Smith/Stewart, Inside Out (1997): http://www.smithstewart. 
co.uk/selected-works/inside-out/. 




1996, 104). And isn’t it the case that in Lacan’s trajectory 
of the partial drive [Fig. 1], the path described by the drive as it 




Figure 6. Smith/Stewart, Gag (1996); with permission of 
the artists. 
 
In Gag (1996), another looped, two-channel color video 
projection installation, with amplified sound, each screen 
shows a close-up face with a piece of cloth over its mouth 
[Fig. 6].7 The fingers and tongue of each subject methodi-
cally poke and force the cloth into the other subject’s 
mouth: a slow gagging, intimate, perverse. Tongues and 
fingers lick, probe, and push; the viewer focuses on the 
mouth as a rim, and on the process of gagging the breath, 
closing the hole of desire with the cloth but also making 
the hole appear. The subject reveals and conceals herself. 
Gagging not only prevents us from breathing, but also 
stops our talking, stops us emitting signifiers, excludes us from 
the symbolic, the Other. And yet the act of poking or 
pushing the fabric down into the mouth with the tongue 
or fingers functions like the point de capiton (upholstery 
                                                                            
7 Smith/Stewart, Gag (1996): http://www.smithstewart.co.uk/ 
selected-works/gag/. 
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button; anchoring point) that nails down meaning. Each 
artist seeks to arrest the movement of signifiers/breath in 
order to create meaning, linking breathing to the signifier 
and to rhetoric. 
 Smith/Stewart’s work takes breathing out of the ha-
bitual and the biological, to the point where it becomes 
part of the drive, which, as Freud insisted, could only be 
known through its representations (Adams 1996, 124). In 
their artworks, breathing is both intimate and “foreign,” 
replicating the trauma of birth, offering in Fradenburg’s 
words, “an experience of (embodied) extimacy: the ‘me’-
ness of a strange element, the strangeness of what is in 
me.” 
BREATHING WITH IT: UNPREDICTABILITY AND IMPROVISA-
TION 
Fradenburg’s rigorous, subtle, moving work has prompt-
ed me to engage closely with the astonishing “unpredicta-
bility and improvisation in symbolic process” (Fraden-
burg’s words) of a number of writers and artists whose 
work bears witness to how we respond to the anxiety that 
attends our first experience of change. So distinctive and 
inimitable is Fradenburg’s neurobiological, clinical, and 
literary appropriation of Lacan that it’s difficult to know 
if her closing question—“Are we witnessing in our cur-
rent moment a semiotic transformation of the life scienc-
es, or a biologizing transformation of semiotics?”—refers 
to a general shift in the state of intellectual inquiry, or if 
“our current discourse,” as she terms it, recognizes her 
own unique methodology. What is clear, however, is that 
at the present time we are seeing important disciplinary 
transformations. A water-themed exhibit held from May-
August 2012 at the Eyebeam Gallery in Chelsea, New York, 
“Surface Tension: The Future of Water,”8 brought together 
8 “Summer Exhibit: Surface Tension,” Eyebeam.org: http://eye 
beam.org/events/summer-exhibit-surface-tension. 




life sciences and artists exploring the imaginative possi-
bilities of science, while also making urgent points about 
climate change and the politics of water. Eco-aware art 
has been around for a while (e.g., Andy Goldsworthy, 
Mark Dion); the difference with “Surface Tension” was in 
making the science as important as the art. But the dis-
course of “me” was completely absent from the exhibit. 
 Fradenburg’s “Breathing” argues that, more than ever, 
we need supple understandings of the emotions, and for 
this we require psychoanalysis and biology and art: it’s 
not enough to say that “[l]ove and hate, beauty and fear 
are more complex than high speed algorithms and non-
Euclidean geometry” (Leach 2013). It’s not a choice be-
tween a scientific explanation on the one hand and a se-
miotic one on the other; we need both. 
 The concept of plasticity—that the brain can create 
new neural pathways in response to experience or dam-
age—is a model of this disciplinary exchange and trans-
formation. Synaptic pruning—developing new connec-
tions and pruning away weak ones—is a neurobiological 
response to change. But that feedback loop is not just 
neuronal; it involves unconscious processes, and by at-
tending to those processes and recovering their history, I 
can better understand how I come to be “me.” 
 Fradenburg’s argument is therefore also about what it 
means to be human, about creatureliness. I want to in-
voke here my colleague Devin Johnston’s subtle apprecia-
tion of non-human animal culture: 
 
[C]ulture is not limited to humans. It might in-
clude anything learned, any information not ge-
netically transmitted. House cats instinctively 
pounce, but they only learn the art of killing from 
their mothers. This technique constitutes culture, 
though far from Arnold’s ‘sweetness and light.’ It 
must always begin with a mimicry preceding com-
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prehension; from there, a little darkness grows. 
(Johnston 2009, 25) 
To recognize that animals as well as humans have culture 
is to acknowledge our shared creatureliness. That does 
not mean that human values are the touchstone for eval-
uating non-human animal culture (riffing on Matthew 
Arnold’s refined notion of “culture” as “the study and 
pursuit of perfection”) or that we therefore “get” animals 
because they seem like us. The object is not to shine light 
into supposed darkness; rather it is to make what seems 
obvious—animals’ apparent kinship with us—murkier, 
and therefore more challenging. 
 Darkness teaches us intellectual and sympathetic hu-
mility. After all, crow song “is . . . an emotional cipher, 
never cracked by our own needs and wants” (Johnston 
2009, 25). I like the ambiguities of “cracked”: besides 
code-cracking, I hear cracked apart, broken into, broken 
down, cracked open like a nut, cracking on (moving fast), 
crazed or crazy, and even the medieval musical term for 
“sing loudly,” as in the mid-fifteenth-century Towneley 
Second Shepherds’ Play, in which the second shepherd 
marvels at the angel’s Gloria announcing Christ’s birth: 
“Say, what was his song? Hard ye not how he crakyd it? / 
Thre brefes to a long?” (Stevens and Cawley 1994, ll. 946–
947). The shepherd cannot understand what the angel is 
singing because it’s just too other, too removed from his 
experience for him to presume to understand it, but he is 
in genuine awe. That’s not an argument for not seeking 
scientific causes; it’s an argument not to impose our un-
derstanding on the other. 
CONCLUSION: “BREATHING” AS FORM 
György Lukács observes that “Form is reality in the writ-
ings of critics; it is the voice with which they address their 
questions to life” (1974, 8). Respiration is also a way of 
addressing questions to life. What then do we make of the 




form of Fradenburg’s “Breathing”? Like the rhythms of 
respiration, imperceptibly regular or perceptibly irregu-
lar, Fradenburg’s essay moves in and out; it breathes in 
molecules of science, of psychoanalysis, of clinical prac-
tice, of daily life, of literature, of experience, and all of 
these inhalations are exchanged in the mix to create a new 
form. Written in the present tense, the essay’s unique 
connections and insights unfurl like the lungs, or a skein 
of breath curling in the air. Its form is distinctly that of 
the essai: a trying out, a testing of ideas, a mode of inquiry 
in and of itself, an “event,” in Jean-François Lyotard’s 
sense (Lyotard 1994, 81). Like the future anterior, her 
essay’s full impact—what it will have meant—will arrive 
belatedly. It is concerned not with pronouncing a verdict 
but with what Lukács described as “the process of judg-
ing” (1974, 8). It brilliantly shies away from what The-
odor Adorno, writing on the essay as form, called “the 
violence of dogma” (1984, 158). “It does not begin with 
Adam and Eve but with what it wants to discuss; it says 
what is at issue and stops where it feels itself complete—
not where nothing is left to say” (Adorno 1984, 152). For 
Adorno, “[l]uck and play are essential to the essay” (1984, 
152). “Breathing,” too, is playful; above all it risks itself 
with tuché, the chance encounter. “Breathing” addresses 
its questions to life because that is both the reality of its 
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4: Life’s Reach 
 





Strength issues from the tongue, for death and life de-
pend upon the powers of the tongue, if haply it is aided 
by the . . . principles of facial expression and gesture. 
    Geoffrey de Vinsauf, Poetria Nova 
 
Sensations arising from the interior of our body are sub-
ject to the same metaphoric transformations as are sen-
sations arising from the external world. In this sense we 
can speak of a corporeal imagination.  
Arthur Modell, Imagination and the Meaningful Brain 
 
 
Consider the following real-estate advertisement: 
 
Hand craftsmanship is evident throughout this 
spacious home, from the steel and glass doors that 
frame its ocean views, to the hand hewn hardwood 
floors, custom crown mouldings and fine cabi-
netry found in almost every room. The stunning 
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library, paneled in rich walnut, has a handsome 
fireplace and built-in entertainment center. Bright 
and inviting, the gourmet kitchen opens to the 
ocean view family room with fireplace and break-
fast nook. The upstairs master suite, with its oceanside 
balcony, romantic fireplace and beautifully ap-
pointed bath, is truly a private sanctuary. Each of 
the four additional bedrooms have their own full 
baths and enjoy either ocean, mountain or garden 
views. The lovely outside entertaining areas in-
clude an extensive seaside terrace as well as more 
private and intimate patios for the enjoyment of 
family and friends. This is a unique and very spe-
cial home in the very best of locations, at the beach 
in Montecito.1  
$25,900,000.00 
This example of twenty-first century ekphrasis will, I 
hope, remind us that while ekphrasis is a means of mak-
1 From a local real-estate flyer; see also “New Montecito Sea 
Meadow Escrow: 1453 Bonnymede Drive,” Santa Barbara Beach 
Blog, March 5, 2013: http://santabarbarabeachblog.com/new-
montecito-sea-meadow-escrow-1453-bonnymede-drive/. 
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ing objects sublime, it can for that very reason, in habitats 
other than les beaux arts, sound a fondly domestic note. 
Action at/from a distance means that the territory is al-
ways open to and affected by what exceeds it, and vice-
versa. The $26 million home in Montecito—an unincor-
porated area just south of Santa Barbara—is an extraor-
dinarily luxurious nest, in a temperate and beautiful 
territory, “unique and very special in the very best of loca-
tions.” If we were to see this ad while checking out real 
estate in the Santa Barbara area, we might wish we could 
afford the place, or feel scorn for its excesses, or envy, or 
just brush past it, as not in our price range, or having an 
insufficient number of bedrooms. Probably the ad would 
not remind us of Achilles’ shield. But both the ad and the 
shield aim for the intensity of becoming produced by the 
territory’s extimacies, by movements or “lines of flight” 
between the familiar and the unfamiliar, between micro-
cosms and macrocosms.2 Both shield and advertisement 
mark and re-mark territory; their allure depends on the 
extimate plasticity of place, as exemplified by ekphrasis’s 
use of cross-modal experience to show us how we look 
from the standpoint of the Real. Art renders our ways of 
living “from the standpoint of the Thing”—that is to say, 
2 See Deleuze and Guattari (2001) on “lines of flight” and other 
remodelings of spatial and temporal difference. The secondary 
literature on ekphrasis is vast; in medieval studies, see Barbetti 
(2011), and a new collection on medieval ekphrasis that is forth-
coming from Ohio University Press, which draws on papers 
from the workshop on “Ekphrasis in the Middle Ages,” Free 
University of Berlin, Berlin, Germany, February 2010. The first 
version of “Life’s Reach” was presented on that occasion. Be-
cause this chapter explores some of the biosemiotic grounds for 
the emergence of ekphrastic art, I use the term ekphrasis to 
designate both “thought” and “unthought” rhetorics of aesthetic 
description. Some of what I have to say here is relevant also to 
the trope of enargeia. Some important books on ekphrasis in-
clude Heffernan ([1993] 2004), Krieger (1992), and Mitchell 
(1995). 
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from the standpoint of the embodied/unconscious 
mind, which must project itself into the aesthetic object 
or event so that the unthought and unknown living pro-
cess can be seen and heard.  
 Achilles’ shield, as Bachelard might have put it (1994, 
183–211), is an immensifying miniaturization of the terri-
tory left behind but valorized by the assemblage of peoples 
(Achaeans, Boeotians, Locrians, Argives, Cretans) conse-
quent on Agammemnon’s activation of the war machine. 
The shield claims Achilles for a singular world and way of 
life (agrarian, pastoral, tribal), but also indicates the living 
experience of worldness as such; the shield is beyond-
Greek, just as Achilles himself, through fame and name, is 
beyond-Achilles. The shield protects Achilles from the 
indignity of exchange by cosmographing the hills and 
fields, streams and oceans, work and play of a meaningful 
way of living. Agammenon’s statist concerns are de- and 
re-territorialized by this brandishing of the extraordinary 
power of living process and the beauty of the forms it 
generates. The real estate advertisement, similarly, is for a 
dwelling of a singular nature, and one that could be “ours,” but 
it also evokes a mode of living that escapes certain bound-
aries. It might be a signifier of and in a history of becom-
ings. If your grandparents had lived there, and lost it in a 
long-ago property bust, but you remember, as a child, 
dancing there on the terrace at night, on the edge of the 
adult world, in an inimitable frock, the ad would likely 
pluck at your heartstrings in a highly particular way. But 
even if our associations derive chiefly from books or clas-
sic films, or Lifestyles of the Rich and Famous, we can nev-
er not populate such a place in our imaginations, what-
ever the ethical import of our projective creations. Like 
the shield, the advertisement strives for the mesmerizing 
power of an ekphrastic idyll standing out from the fren-
zied buying and selling, the never-proper nature of prop-
erty, given off by the real estate section in the newspaper, 
just as Achilles’ shield stands against the calculations and 
catastrophes of reasons of state. 
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 The stately home in Montecito really is a gorgeous 
place. It is an “enriched” environment, one in which crea-
tures might well be expected to thrive. Some would say it 
bespeaks “inclusive fitness.” Most humanists would want 
to avoid sociobiological overtones and say nothing of the 
sort. But if you were studying flycatcher birds instead of 
the relationships between ekphrasis and property, it most 
likely would not enter your head to question whether a 
phoebe would prefer living the good life in Montecito to a 
hardscrabble life in Barstow. Certainly Barstow will have 
its partisans, its lovers of clear skies and open ranges and 
Vegas just down the lonesome highway—the western scrub-
jay, perhaps. And the mansion in Montecito wouldn’t in-
terest everyone. It isn’t an exemplar of innovative or pro-
vocative design; it’s a bit too Carmel. It isn’t in New York 
City. Its carbon footprint would likely be significant even 
after the green renovations so popular with rich home-
owners like George Walker Bush. 
 But the ad insists that variation—beloved by creatures 
because of its power to signal and thereby intensify affec-
tive change and hence liveliness—is all over the house on 
Bonnymede Drive: three different views, cooler and war-
mer airs, stronger and lighter breezes, wild or tame wa-
ters, particularized spaces (sanctuaries for denizens, and 
larger, more public spaces for visitors). The ad is at once a 
domographing and a cosmographing of sentience, doing 
its best to evoke the paradoxical boundlessness of privacy 
and the particularity that positions me so I can see all the 
way to the horizon at the end of the ocean. It “places” me, 
and by letting “me” drift out to sea and letting the sea 
enter me, by turning “me” into my ecology and my ecolo-
gy into me, it makes living feel like living. 
 The experience of place is always already displaced by 
expressivity—by the representations that show us where 
we might or might not live—partly because territory is an 
effect of expressivity: “[E]xpressive qualities or matters of 
expression enter shifting relations with one another that 
‘express’ the relation of the territory to the interior milieu 
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of impulses and exterior milieu of circumstances” (De-
leuze and Guattari 1982, 317). In other words, shifts in 
expressivity, such as changes in style, are markers of the 
relation of the territory both to affect, and to history. Ek-
phrasis de-territorializes; as a shift in expressivity (and 
one that announces itself as such), it pulls up, and chang-
es, stakes. Experience in and of a place, for most kinds of 
sentience, means co-constructing and participating in 
holistic ecological change, as James Gibson’s theory of 
“affordances” also suggests, wherein behaviors are tightly 
linked to perceptions of environmental affordances, per-
ceptions that create the environment as extimate. For ex-
ample, which affordances are offered by my perceptions 
of the texture of this or that particular soil? How is the 
scent of this soil “in” my brain, evoking, perhaps even by 
its absence, the red clay dirt I played in as a child? And 
how will that reminiscence affect what I do with this gar-
den? 
 Thus, the ekphrastic object is always already multiply 
transformed (into words, from the textured surface of a 
bronze tablet, where the tablet also testifies to the artful-
ness of metallurgy, the power of patronage, the “richness” 
of what lies hidden in the earth, and so on), and sentience 
is further de-territorialized by means of the enhanced 
strangeness of the ekphrastic object. What are, were, its 
affordances? It is from a lost past, or made by unknown 
arts, or cosmographs a world that looks familiar but es-
capes definition. Ekphrasis evokes “the Natal”—the home 
that is elsewhere, that must always be “found” again, as 
must the new home also be found again, and again. This is 
true even when the ekphrastic effect relies primarily on 
the time it takes to tell the (tale of the) object; the mo-
ment of the fashioning of the ekphrastic object itself is 
always over by the time we learn of it, and hence has the 
potential to invite or counter trauma. Epic’s ekphrasis 
tends to stop us in the tracks of territorial narrative, of 
migration or colonization or conquest, to remind us of 
the putative homeland—the source, the natal place that’s 
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always hard to find and/or under construction—by re-
animating the object that embodies it. Or it evokes the 
elsewhere (for Beowulf, Heroic Age northern Europe) 
where home began. The movements of peoples begin so 
many pre-modern narratives in order to affirm that 
wherever we came from, it was not where we are now; as 
creatures, we had, for better or for worse, always to 
(re)make our place and way of life. The meaning of terri-
tory is its mobility and expressivity; it is multiply deter-
mined by psychical, historical, and territorial affordances.  
 Marking and unmarking place, de- and re-terri-
torializing, are dynamically interdependent expressive actions. 
Hiding and showing, finding and being found, are the prin-
cipal reasons for “display” behavior, spectacular perfor-
mances of the behavioral phenomenon of “taking one’s 
place,” as interpreted by Roger Caillois and linked by La-
can to the mirror stage (Caillois 2003, 89–106; Lacan 
[2002] 2006, passim). We make all kinds of meanings out 
of the interconnections between subjective, social, and 
environmental ecologies: the meanings of mining and 
metallurgy, as noted; ornamentation, anthems, refrains, 
rituals, the mysteries of transpersonality. Even very sim-
ple organisms depend on the recognition and construc-
tion of patterns, hence on interpretation; and the 
boundaries between self and other are always permeable, 
as studies of immune system activity have shown. Com-
munication—if “only” in the form of “entrainment,” 
chemical or electrical—is a fundamental characteristic of 
living tissue. “Matter already has meaning; it is already 
informed, organized” (Goux 1990, 228). The open sys-
tematicity of language is a very special way of communi-
cating, but it is, first and foremost, semiotic, and is 
therefore linked to (as well as different from) other forms 
of semiosis—for example, cellular activity. Biosemioti-
cians disagree as to whether and how biological “code” 
and information-processing really share significant fea-
tures with combinatorial symbolic systems; Marcello Bar-
bieri has championed code semiotics and Thomas Sebeok 
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and Jesper Hoffmeyer a more continuist zoo-semiotics 
(Barbieri 2009, 221; Hoffmeyer 2009). There is, however, 
general agreement that, as Hoffmeyer puts it, “semiosis is 
a fundamental component of life.” “[S]igns and meaning 
exist in all living systems”; in fact, semiotic activity is the 
sign of life par excellence. The near-ubiquity of learning 
in living process—one thinks of Eric Kandel’s sea snails—
would seem to support these principles (Kandel 2006, 145 
ff.). 
 What biosemioticians most want to understand is 
how language emerges from earlier kinds of semiotic ac-
tivity. But is the question well-phrased? For example, 
does the deliberate cultivation of techniques of living emerge 
from the workings of non-conscious habitus? Or do both 
derive independently from the écriture automatique of living 
process? These questions are far from settled. But the tight 
bond between living process and the arts is, for all the 
reasons we have already explored (and many more), un-
challengeable. Lacan describes ancient cave art as “primi-
tive subsistence viewed from the perspective of the Thing,” 
shorn of goods and the Good, of rational and utilitarian 
pretensions (Lacan 1997, 140). Language is an expressive 
biocultural activity, activity that enhances living process 
by showing us how we look from the standpoint of the 
Real—by revealing to us the real circumstances of mortal 
creatures, in some kind of barely bearable form. Life as 
the Greeks once perceived it is represented on Achilles’ 
shield; representation does not obscure existence, but 
magnifies and re-stylizes it on another level. How does 
life reach so far? From apparently “functional” behaviors 
to the ornamentation of everything and the scrutiny and 
social transmission thereof, all of it diagrammed in and 
on the (face of the) earth? From existing to meaning-
making to the arts, and back again: signs of life and the 
lives of signs are overdetermined, networked phenomena. 
 As affirmed on many occasions in this book, surviving 
and thriving are much more difficult to distinguish than 
utilitarian thought suggests. Biologists know that lab rats 
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and fish negotiate mazes without need of reward; they 
enjoy SEEKING for its own sake, just as we do (Panksepp 
1998, 24–27). Another example: attachment between par-
ent and offspring is a genetically-encoded survival mech-
anism for many animals, but because it is also an affective 
and artful intersubjective experience, it can fail. It always 
takes place through lines of flight: in Plath’s “Morning 
Song,” the baby tries her “handful of notes; / The clear 
vowels rise like balloons” (Plath 2005, 5). No organism 
can survive without the ability to communicate with and 
interpret its environment, which means, at minimum, 
information-processing that is subtle enough to respond 
to constant change. Even the polishing of style and ethos 
isn’t just about polishing style and ethos; it draws on 
highly trained visual attention, enhanced connectivity, 
the capacity to listen to multiple “tracks” all at once, the 
power to bedazzle or at least persuade the reluctant. It’s 
about real-time, improvisational use of “procedural” know-
ledge, the knowledge of how to do things live. Affective 
range and intensity, relational talent and meaning-mak-
ing are crucial aspects of living process. As Ellen Dis-
sanayake puts it, “valued states of mind and body such as 
self-transcendence, intimacy with our fellows, and mak-
ing and recognizing [meaning] are needs just as much as 
more ‘vital’ needs for food, warmth and rest” (Dis-
sanayake [1988] 2002, 132). “Living,” simply, is an art. 
States of mind, in turn, are constitutive of territory, and 
vice versa. “Territoriality is not [a] property of space, but 
of the way an animal behaves with respect to space” 
(Smith 1980, 74). Further, space has its own histories of 
becoming, which intersect with those of subjectivity and 
sociality. Territoriality is praxis and part of the self-
operating systems and field of “life.” 
 Putting the unthought known into words is a line of 
flight, de- and re-territorializing the perceptions and feel-
ings of embodied minds. It enhances neuronal activity, 
and thereby sentience, by enabling reflection on, and thus 
calling attention to, the cross-modal and holistic charac-
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ter of moment-to-moment existence. The house on Bonny-
mede Drive is animated by ekphrasis. It shows itself. Its 
doors frame, its kitchen opens, its bedrooms enjoy. It is 
not just shelter, but artful and affective shelter. “Hand 
craftsmanship” evokes “tactile display”—the feeling of 
polishing, the satisfaction of fit, the intimate attentiveness 
of touch. Living people made this house, carefully; my 
hand might touch what they touch, a feeling that substan-
tiates my imaginative experience of the house, whereby 
“I” become part of its ecology, aware of fine detail. It is 
like a gift to me—there is feeling in its bones. And it is 
various as well as recursive: it can be warm (“handsome 
fireplaces”) and cool (“ocean view”). It “has” magnitude 
(“almost every room,” “extensive seaside terrace”) and 
intimacy (“nook,” “private patios”). It can provide exteri-
ority and social assemblage (“lovely outside entertain-
ment areas”), but also the interiority that protects “pri-
vate ritualizations” and “individual maintenance behav-
iors” (“beautifully appointed bath”; see Smith 1980, 72, 
97, 57; citing Huxley 1966). It shelters but also welcomes 
inside itself a way of living: denizens snuggle in the li-
brary, entertained; close friends and family come for 
house parties and patio lounging; the terrace can accom-
modate a small orchestra. The house is sociable—it’s for 
social beings, it invites assemblage, people meet there, it is 
a crossroads of energies. It is also domus, oikos, like the 
intricate cavelike nests built by male bower birds, with 
front gardens decorated in abstract patterns made of bee-
tle shells, flower petals, colored stones, and now the blue 
plastic spoons brought near their habitats by tourists. 
 Display—by definition “any behavior specially adap-
ted ‘in physical form or frequency to subserve social func-
tions’”—is always about inviting and rejecting, accepting 
and declining, showing and hiding (Moynihan 1956, 1960; 
cited by Smith 1980, 7). The values of expansiveness and 
intimacy, of deep time and the moment, are implied by 
ekphrastic form: a whole way and history of living and 
dying that is also singular. Just so are we asked to hear, 
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see, and feel Heorot, Hrothgar’s great hall in Beowulf, 
through anamorphosis, from the standpoint of the 
Thing.3 The ekphrastic object is nearly always a relic, liv-
ing on, undead; we meet it between the two deaths, like 
Grendels’s shoulder, arm and claw, which Beowulf hangs 
from the ceiling in Heorot. 
 Ekphrastic advertising is common in the legends of 
peoples; cross-modality evokes their assemblages and 
crossings, territorializations and lines of flight. Geoffrey 
of Monmouth’s divine honeybee, the goddess Diana, tells 
Brutus that “beyond the setting of the sun, past the realms 
of Gaul, there lies an island in the sea . . . and for your 
descendants it will be a second Troy” (Geoffrey of Mon-
mouth 1966, 65). According to W.J. Smith, “singing”—
meaning the full, complex song, not simpler “calls”—
occurs when a bird is at “important sites in a territory,” 
either the margins or the nest site. In fact, Smith refers to 
this as “advertising behavior,” especially evident when the 
bird seeks a “high perch” and makes himself visually as 
well as sonorously conspicuous, a “risk” he will take in 
order to be found (Smith 1980, 53). Song is a means of 
“seeking opportunities for interaction” (Smith 1980, 66–
67). 
 Vocal display is part of territorial behavior for many 
species, birds and people in particular; it tells you when 
and whether another creature wants to “go out” with you, 
to play, to see and be seen, or to see where the sun sets 
(the ocean view), or whether said creature would prefer to 
be left alone (“closed all around by the sea,” en-nooked), 
with or without you. Most calls and gestures signal uncer-
tainty, when things are “up in the air,” “in process”; they 
are questions, requests, demands, descriptions and solici-
tations of affect. We mark becomings: “I love you and 
want to be near you, but I don’t know how you feel about 
3 “I don’t believe the lines demarcating hall from hut, tribe from 
state, or nature from culture, have ever been . . . stable or . . . 
clearly defined”: Joy 2005, 11. 
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me, so I’m approaching you, but sideways, with my neck 
bent in a certain way, my gaze oblique, to give you time to 
signal me back, since I’d rather we didn’t fight.”4 (This is 
a rough paraphrase of penguin courting behavior.)  
 “Information” about states of mind and how to share 
them is conveyed when an organism “shows” itself, in 
space, to the Øther. As Damasio’s (and Darwin’s) concep-
tion of “emotion” suggests, emotion is linked to the exte-
riority of display and reception. To put it another way, 
emotion is always a function of relationality and expres-
sivity. The plasticity of skin—but also, if differently, of 
feathers, fur, scales, shells, or gelatin—is a crucial aspect 
of that expressivity. “[A]rt [does] not wait for human 
beings to begin” (Deleuze and Guattari 2001, 320). The 
membranes that process movements within and between 
the worlds of our living experience are not obviously 
primary with respect to the ornamentation or elaboration 
of those membranes, since membranes are always elabo-
rating themselves (changing color, shedding, scarring, 
thickening, grimacing, reaching, withdrawing). Expres-
sion, reception, incorporation, rejection, all make use of 
skin, vellum, paper, screen. The latter are affordances en-
abling display or camouflage, and are themselves media, 
and this is true on non-conscious as well as deliberately 
artful planes of activity. 
 Through the refrain, we “go” here and there, in and 
out, back and forth, in splendor or stealth. Two signs 
thereof are amplificatio and brevitas; when we “show 
what we are,” as the God of Love says of Alceste in Chau-
cer’s Legend of Good Women, we also come near; we 
merge with, or emerge from, our surround. Alceste be-
comes daisy, and vice-versa, through a simultaneously 
clumsy and beautifully-detailed description of her cos-
tume (see Fradenburg 2002, 195): 
4 “Indecisive and vacillating behavior” and the signaling thereof 
make up most displays (Smith 1980, 71). 
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And she was clad in real habit grene. 
A fret of gold she hadde next hir heer, 
And upon that a whyt corowne she beer 
With flourouns smale, and I shal nat lye; 
For al the world, ryght as a dayesye 
Ycorouned ys with white leves lyte 
So were the flowrouns of hire coroune whyte; 
For of o perle fyn, oriental. 
Hir whyte coroune was y-maked al; 
For which the white coroune above the grene, 
Made hir lyk a daysie for to sene, 
Considered eke hir fret of gold above.  
(214–225)5 
When we turn away, separate, watch boats sail away, lose 
the light, we close up.6 There are so many reasons to mark 
one’s position, both within and without the territory one 
is always becoming in and through, since marking also 
turns territory into organism. Self- or allo-marking—like 
rubbing one’s scent onto one’s favorite tanning rock, or 
singing one’s fate therefrom—also, paradoxically, enables 
pair bonding and “group identification” or “assembly,” or 
simply “bring[s] individuals together,” as Smith puts it 
(Smith 1980, 254). Thus is the transpersonal field consti-
tuted. 
 Honeybees mark rich foraging sites with glandular 
secretions and the odors of flowers, so effectively that the 
social function of the dance of the honeybee has been 
doubted (Smith 1980, 255). But experiments have shown 
that honeybees will only find a marked foraging site if, in 
addition to marking, the scout bees also perform the loca-
tion dance. Why then do they “need” the location dance? 
Possibly the answer is that they do not—or, again, that a 
5 All citations of Chaucer’s poetry from Benson’s (1987) edition, 
The Riverside Chaucer, by fragment, book, and/or line number. 
6 On the poetics of separation in The Legend of Good Women, 
see Fradenburg (2010). 
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more nuanced understanding of need is required to go 
further with this question. Need is always a function of 
particular ecologies and their expressivities. Smith con-
cludes that such performances “solicit” attention and as-
sembly—i.e., “following behavior” (Smith 1980, 125). 
Like Diana’s evocative description of Britain, or the 
amazing chrono- and cosmographia that leads us to vir-
tual fellowship and pilgrimage in the “General Prologue” 
to Chaucer’s Canterbury Tales, and the similarly de-terri-
torializing line of flight at the beginning of the Parson’s 
“Prologue,”7 the scout bee mobilizes not simply a finding 
of resources, but a gathering of forces, perhaps even a 
becoming-swarm. The direction and angle of a honey-
bee’s “waggle runs” indicates how its next flight will be 
oriented with respect to the sun. “Musical” and physio-
logical factors in the honeybee’s dance indicate how diffi-
cult it will be to reach the new site, and how rich its 
affordances. These are mobile solicitations of great preci-
sion and grace. Just so, the Parson’s “murie tale” will, he 
hopes, be the one to lead us to our true (new) source, the 
heavens; and the Miller brings up the rear, with his bag-
pipes. Singing and dancing, vocalization and gesture, are 
shifters that mark (be)comings and goings, changes of 
direction, the work and play of living process. 
 Art works to “make special,” by calling (to) all of us—
our bodily, affective, cognitive, developmental, intersub-
jective, transpersonal processes.8 It does so in order to call 
7 “By that the Maunciple hadde his tale al ended, / The sonne fro 
the south lyne was descended/Degreës nyne and twenty as in 
highte. . . / Therwith the moones exaltacioun— / I meene Li-
bra—alwey gan ascende / As we were entrying at a thropes ende; 
/ For which oure Hoost, / as he was wont to gye, / As in this 
caas, oure joly compaignye, / Seyde in this wise:  ‘Lordynges 
everichoon, / Now lakketh us no tales mo than oon” (IX.1–16). 
8 “We might . . . start to think of literature in particular, and art 
in general, as functionally related to human personality devel-
opment. Might we perhaps take this functionality as a clue to 
the longevity and persistence of art across millennia of human 
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our attention to the extraordinariness of everyday living 
praxis, to the vital importance of forms of living we might 
otherwise mistake for unchallengeable routine, or leave 
unthought altogether. Making special also always recur-
sively calls attention to its own role in living praxis. Per-
forming, getting attention, being recognized, are ways of 
staying alive, psychically as well as otherwise. Chimpan-
zees “perform displays incorporating bowing, bobbing, 
crouching, kissing, and hand-offering gestures when so-
liciting reassurance” that they will not anger their signifi-
cant others if they come close (Smith 1980, 71). Elabo-
ration draws attention to our affect-states and our loca-
tion, in hopes of shared (or spared) experience to come. 
“Behavior selection” messages (what a creature will do 
and how) “move the communicator through space (lo-
comotion), remove it from danger (escape), or keep it 
near another individual (association)”; supplemental messages 
say “how likely the selection is to be performed,” and how 
(“partially or fully, weakly or vigorously, and in what di-
rection”) (Smith 1980, 71). Creatures want to know what 
an approach means and how their approaches will be 
received by others. They want information about affect. 
So, location, location, location: affect relocates us in space, in-
vites us to draw near, draws us further away.9 “Critical dis-
tance is not a meter, it is a rhythm”—a rhythm “caught 
up in a becoming that sweeps up the distances between 
characters,” relationality expressed through expansions 
and contractions, oscillations and impasses: between two 
animals “an oscillational constant is established . . . . Or 
else the animal opens its territory a crack for a partner of 
the opposite sex; a complex rhythmic character forms through 
duets, antiphonal or alternating singing, as in the case of 
African shrikes” (Deleuze and Guattari 2001, 320). Every-
thing in life depends on our understanding of how to manage 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
civilization?” (Mar 2009, 127). 
9 See Panksepp 1998, 18, on the “distinct subcortical emotional 
entities” of “approach and avoidance.” 
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distance: its proper calibration; our reasons for crossing it 
(impulse, affect, wish, desire); the question of what lies in 
the way. The figures of boundary and territory underlie 
all of these. My concern here is above all for the produc-
tive force of these figures. 
 Embodied creatures always seek the feeling of where 
they are in relation to where everything else of signifi-
cance is—the field of others and of the Other.10 To this 
end, we are born with proprioceptive capacities, meaning 
that our neural circuitry is always already complex en-
ough to perceive a body in motion rather than unrelated 
fragments (arm, eye, knee) randomly arranged. I can, 
from my earliest moments, organize movements and ob-
jects into shapes—faces, bodies, things that come toward 
me or speed away. A moving body is already an organiza-
tion of fragments of sensory information about velocity, 
density, intensity.  Art is the way we draw attention to the 
unthought process of creating patterns out of the over-
whelming amounts of information we receive from, and 
generate, within and without ourselves. 
 The plasticity of the boundary between self and non-
self is crucial to our ability to situate ourselves. Life forms 
cannot form in the absence of the power to discriminate 
between self and non-self, which means also the power to 
renegotiate such discriminations on the spur of the mo-
ment.11 Life begins with the membrane, with the doubled 
surface of a “sac” capable both of both insulations and 
diffusions; self/non-self discrimination makes cellular life 
possible, but the “walls” around and within cells must be 
capable of mediation—of osmosis, chemiosmosis, endos-
10 See Lacan [2002] 2006, 77 on “the question of the signification 
of space for living organisms.” 
11 I agree with Félix Guattari that subjectivity remains an im-
portant concept, and can be distinguished from the concept of 
“the individual.” “Singularity” refers to the particularity and 
unrepeatability of each “terminal” (e.g., an organism) through 
which forces flow (and are processed and transformed); see, for 
example, Guattari 2000, 34–35. 
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mosis and exosmosis. The principle of plasticity extends 
from the immune system to the organism’s awareness of 
“self”; it is why we can take in everything from trans-
planted organs to (information about) the doings of other 
creatures. According to Stern (1985, 100–123), Damasio 
(2010, 22–26), and Panksepp (1998), we are born with a 
“core-,” “proto-,” or “primal” self which allows us to en-
gage in interactions with what we know to be others, from 
a much earlier time (evolutionary as well as developmen-
tal) than we had hitherto suspected.12 Proprioception al-
lows us to “sense” how we might put this and that 
together in spatial, sonorous, and tactile registers simul-
taneously. It is a powerful interpreter and processor of 
stimuli, and without it we can’t imagine a body, let alone 
what a body might do, and so it is also critical to the ex-
timacy of display. We display in accordance with our un-
derstandings, thought or unthought, about the meanings 
of variations in the displays of other creatures—the con-
stancy or inconstancy of an approach, the softness or 
harshness of a touch—because display is performativity, 
in real time, whose purpose is to present a particular an-
imal (or plant) as exceptional—both hetero- and homog-
enous with respect to its kind. The techniques involved in 
constructing display are thus also the means for the crea-
tion of intersubjective experience, what Weisel-Barth calls 
“contingent responsiveness” and “rhythmic correspond-
ences” (2006, 373). Kernberg puts it succinctly: “[G]rad-
ually evolving definitions of self and others [and the sur-
rounding world]. . . . start out from the perception of 
bodily functions, [and] the position of the self in space 
and time” (2006, 973). I am, in part, where I am—at a 
certain angle to the sun, nearer to you than the sea. 
The construction of models of self and world depends 
12 See Panksepp 1998, 20, on the idea that an “extended neural 
entity” he calls the “primal SELF anchors organisms as coher-
ent, feeling creatures with a basic form of self-identity.” See also 
Ledoux 2002, 12. 
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on our capacity for cross-modal transfer of sensorial ex-
perience (Kernberg 2006, 974). Proprioception and cross-
modal transfer are mutually supportive; both refer to au-
tomatic, unthought interpretations of sensory and affec-
tive information. We are able, from our earliest days, to 
interpret and associate one sensory modality with anoth-
er. Babies know that loud sounds go with large gestures; if 
the sound is low, threat is suggested; if high, maybe there 
will be celebration. Organic experience is holistic; every-
thing happens at once, given a nanosecond or two. Driv-
ing wedges between, for example, visuality and sound, or 
between material patternings of sensory experience and 
verbal language, has only limited heuristic value. True, 
discrimination of this kind enables style and medium to 
emphasize the tension of organic experience, or to make 
special a particular sensory experience. But style is the 
result of interactions and connections between affects and 
sensory modes; tension and assemblage go hand-in-hand. 
If, as does contemporary neuroscience, we conceive of the 
brain’s various interpretative and expressive capacities as 
highly, if not always evenly, networked, we can more 
readily think relationality between vision and language, 
language and affect, affect and sound. 
 Visuality’s priority over language in infant develop-
ment is often adduced as the reason for the affective pow-
er of the image. Even Kristeva—whose work on “the 
semiotic” and “the chora” remains, in my view, our single 
best account of proto-verbal experience—uses this priori-
ty to plead against the greedy consumption of images in 
contemporary society (Kristeva 1997, 3–26).13 But this 
developmental supposition requires considerable nuance. 
Fetuses can taste and smell, and they can also hear; hear-
ing is our first way of “directly” experiencing distant phe-
nomena, hence of “sounding out” space, calibrating posi-
tion, being somewhere. We are always in language, even 
13 On the register of the “semiotic,” see Kristeva 1984, 25–30, 
and Kristeva 1980, 271 ff. 
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before we are born, where “in” refers to the spatiality cre-
ated by sound prior to image;14 this is one way of under-
standing the effectivity of the refrain. Newborns show 
distinct preferences for their mother’s voice and for the 
music and stories they have listened to in utero, especially 
their mother’s voice; as Stern points out, this “requires 
some level of awareness and representation of vitality 
forms while still in the womb” (Stern 1985, 104).15 Babies 
can identify phonemes and syllables and, long before they 
can talk, whole words; they read lips, facial expressions, 
and the “intonational contours” of clauses and sentences; 
they understand the emotional meaning of concordances 
and discordances between verbal and paraverbal expres-
sion. “By cross-modal perception the infant has, simulta-
neously, the sound of the syllables of the word and the 
emotional impact of the intonation, and the visual impact 
from the emotional facial expression”; the affective mem-
ory structures that result constitute the basis of the “pri-
mary motivational system” (Kernberg 2006, 973). Our 
inter- and trans-subjectivity emerges from the exercise of 
cross-modal capacities in early “proto-conversational” ex-
change. 
 Ekphrasis is a “spectacular” version of cross-modal 
sensory and affective patterning. It finds words for the 
smell, texture, color, pattern, surround, and temporality 
of an object. It is a “made-special” version of cross-modal 
experience, and is therefore a very special bid for (joint) 
attention, absorption, and contact with other minds: “Lis-
ten to me looking at this object”—often an object that 
itself represents a history of inter- and trans-subjective 
life, calling attention to the artistry of display. Ekphrasis 
is watching when the song of the territory is sung, the 
song of living creatures, their rhythms and intensities, 
comings, goings, and becomings. Song happens when the 
14 Mehler and Dupoux’s What Infants Know (1994) argues that 
infants are born into “a world of language.” 
15 On vitality forms, see Stern 2010, 3 ff. 
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organism tries to feel (by expressing to the Øther) the 
un/thought environmental and psychical forces that flow 
and change through its singularity; song foregrounds ex-
timacy, whenever location, nearness and distance, hence in-
ter/trans-subjectivity, are exigent.16 Further, neoteny, the 
very long period of human infantile dependency on oth-
ers for physical and psychical survival, astronomically 
raises the stakes of intersubjective experience for our spe-
cies.17 This is where Lacan situates the transformation of 
need into demand: in our early years, vital needs can only 
be met by making and meeting (the) demands of others 
and the Øther, such that relationality trumps and be-
comes the matrix for all aspects of our experience. As 
noted, display is the means by which we conduct rela-
tionality; display exerts force on the openness of living 
process to transformation, and makes that forcefulness 
sublime. Certainly, in ekphrasis, plot is suspended and 
time gives itself over to a certain contemplation of sen-
tient experience. Art is a means of demanding intense 
focus, but the effects of such intense attention are trans-
formative; when one sees from the standpoint of the Real, 
one sees that what and how one sees is contingent, transi-
ent, and all the more remarkable for that. We cannot feel 
directly or consciously the ongoing creativity of visual (or 
any other kind of) perception; artfulness de-territorializes 
those embodied, unthought activities. Cross-modal expe-
rience “fits” us for attending to the display and interpre-
tation of sensory assemblages, and therefore complex be-
haviors and interactions, long before either locomotion 
or autonomous self-provisioning are possible. 
Mental life is co-created in small packets of interac-
16 For example, when “intersubjective disorientation” and anxie-
ty threaten; when spontaneous, rapid, and flexible group func-
tioning is needed; when self-identity is threatened by trauma 
(Stern 1985, 110–111). 
17 I am not arguing that this temporality constitutes us as cate-
gorically different from other life forms, but it is without doubt 
a notable characteristic. 
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tion with other minds; people mind-read, engage in cross-
modal matching, and move in temporal coordination as 
they participate in each other’s experience. These intricate 
sensory and affective assemblages involve many different 
kinds of processing. We find de-territorializing figures like 
ekphrasis enchanting because these packets create our 
minds in the first place. As to the question of why we 
might, at times, prefer the delights of verbal description 
of an object to gazing upon or touching the object itself, 
we could say that intensifying the transformative experi-
ence of cross-modality, rather than the experience of an 
object infra se, is the goal (or at least effect) of “making-
special,” and is the means by which our creatureliness is 
given to us as thinkable. This is, for example, how we 
form affect-laden memories (like images of the mother 
that sustain us through the crises of her absences), and 
theory of mind: knowledge that others have minds like 
our own, but yet are not our own. The quality of assem-
blage is crucial to these inventions, and hence to consid-
eration of how and why a striking verbal presentation of a 
striking object might make a difference, and to what. 
 In the late 1990s, Wilma Bucci multiplied Freud’s 
“dual code” theory of psychic process18 by arguing for the 
existence of “unicodes,” fragments, lowest-common-de-
nominator units of encoded somato-affective-sensory 
experience (Bucci 1997, 156). Unicodes are assembled 
into concrete images. These images have coherence and 
unity, but—like dream-images or memory-images—pos-
sess no capacity for abstraction or self-organization infra 
se. The third mode of processing is that of language, 
which works both unicodes and images into narratives, 
associational sequences, and metaphors (for example, one 
unicode or image can “stand in for” another) that in turn 
18 Freud’s theory of the complementarity of unconscious (“pri-
mary”) and (pre)conscious (“secondary”) signifying process is 
most fully outlined in The Interpretation of Dreams  (1900), e.g., 
587 ff. 
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lead all the way from somatic experience to abstract con-
ceptualization and back again. The open systematicity of 
language permits highly creative constructions of mean-
ingfulness, such as pronominal systems that position us 
with respect to one another in very abstract and flexible 
ways. (Note that “point-of-view” has considerable biolog-
ical value.) 
 Language is not an obstacle to paraverbal experience. 
On the contrary, it is one of our most powerful means of 
accessing that experience, because language is not lan-
guage without prosody and the vital experience encoded 
therein. It is an open system that can multiply and rework 
categories and associations just as easily as it can use 
them to reduce arousal. It is a temporal art that requires 
rhythm and intensity to achieve its aims. And it permits 
action at a distance. The stylization of vitality works top-
down as well as bottom-up; cortical systems reach out to 
brainstem functions and vice-versa. The biological values 
of neural processing are maximal integration and resili-
ence. It is always a mistake to de-emphasize the im-
portance of integrating language and affect, or cortical 
and non-cortical functions; the coordination of right- and 
left-brain activity, for example, is crucial to language, 
because left-brain activity, on its own, cannot construe 
the social meanings or larger verbal contexts of utteranc-
es. “Talk therapy,” for example, permits us to assign ver-
bal tags to traumatic experiences, and by doing so (through 
enhanced hippocampal processing), resituate a hyper-real 
terrifying impression as a bad memory, but still, as a 
memory—as “past,” as over. 
 As noted above, ekphrasis addresses the temporality 
of our experience in part by calling attention to the affec-
tive value of constructed or “found objects,” as well as to 
the details of their construction. A certain vision once 
meant enough to someone, some community, somewhere, that 
care, expense, and attention were lavished in the process of 
re-presenting it, calling attention to it, “showing” how 
special it is. The image cannot substitute for the vitality of 
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presence; but when nothing else is left to us, it is precious 
indeed.19 When the time-consuming activity of making-
special is itself made special by re-registration in another 
mode, we know that transformation, de-territorialization, 
has taken place. A certain history of reception is in the 
making. We also know, because of the detail and labor 
involved, that the vision or activity in question was and is 
affectively meaningful, twice, now three times, over. Thus 
ekphrasis multiplies and extends the fascination of joint 
attention—of reading other minds, sharing their visions 
and the meanings thereof. It makes spectacular the trans-
formative power of transduction and translation. Psycho-
analysts might think here of Bion’s argument that when 
mother and infant process “beta” elements (compare with 
Bucci’s “unicodes”) into “alpha” elements (usable, con-
textualized bits of information about somato-affective 
states and events), they are “recasting . . . inter- and intra-
psychic elements conjoined.”20 Intersubjectivity is ipso fac-
to a meaning-making process. 
 Western culture has typically been of two minds 
about the transformative power of communion and com-
munication: it means we are vulnerable and makes us 
anxious; it means we can share experience and change 
minds. The context of attachment is crucial here: “active 
quiet,” the periods during which infant and mother com-
mune and communicate, is how we learn that we love and 
are loved in turn. There cannot be a more momentous or 
vitalizing development. Between mother and baby, facial 
mirroring and mutual gaze attunement lead to shared 
states of arousal that are transformed into experiential 
states of euphoria. Our fascination with reading and “see-
ing into” other minds is why ekphrastic temporality lends 
                                                                                                                                                                                                        
19 The (neuronal) experience of creating and giving meaning to 
such images is just as important to this kind of healing or inte-
gration as are the images themselves.  
20 On the transformation of beta into alpha elements, see Bion 
1962, 4–5. 
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itself to attunement, rhythmic exchange, and a focus on 
meaning to and for the other. We love the feeling of trust 
that the meanings of our displays will be understood and 
received well, and returned with interest. 
 Again, this is a certain history of art appreciation. 
Awareness of the temporality of attunement is likewise 
crucial to ekphrasis. Can we attune our powers of recep-
tion to the meaning-making of a long-ago and far-away 
carver of lapis lazuli? Jahan Ramazani cites Freud on the 
rarefying, and hence extra-special-making, power of time: 
“Limitation in the possibility of an enjoyment raises the 
value of the enjoyment. . . . A flower that blossoms only 
for a single night does not seem to us on that account less 
lovely” (Ramazani 1991, 305–306.) Transience is of course not 
usually a positive value in medieval culture, and yet its con-
nection to beauty is equally if differently evident in con-
temptus mundi, ars moriendi, poems about the ruins of 
the work of giants, retractions of light songs that pass 
“sone as floures fayre” (Chaucer, Troilus and Criseyde, 
V.841).   
  In arguing for the aesthetic power of transience, Freud 
remarks that, “all [the] beauty and perfection [we create] 
is determined only by its significance for our own emo-
tional lives[;] it has no need to survive us and is therefore 
independent of absolute duration” (Freud 1916, 306). 
Still, we readily turn our love of mind-reading to the 
reading of past and future minds. Art helps us along by 
maximizing our experience of affective meaning and con-
sequently enriching our memories. “Making special” gen-
erates novel patterns, and therefore intensity, and there-
fore memorability—the same way affective attunement to 
display elaborates the infant’s experience of the senses, 
affects, and cognition. Most creatures love variation just 
as much as they love recognition (we oscillate between 
neophilia and neophobia). SEEKING is just as powerful a 
drive as conservation, and the power of change to fasci-
nate us is enhanced by our long training in cross-modal 
intersubjectivity. Spectacular figuration assists both seek-
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ing and the processing of trauma through the generation 
of novel idioms; describing is renovating, even renovatio. 
As Geoffrey de Vinsauf puts it, metaphor delights because 
it “fluctuates . . . now here and now there, now near and 
now far; there is a difference and yet there is a similarity”; 
metaphor comes “disguised, as if there were no compari-
son there, but rather some new transformation were be-
ing marvelously ingrafted” (de Vinsauf [1967] 2007, 34–
36). 
 The Poetria Nova’s advice is simple: “be various and 
yet the same.” How do we accomplish this work that 
sounds so simple? Geoffrey de Vinsauf proposes cross-
modal artistry. The rhetorician must “see [to it] that a 
voice managed discreetly may enter the ears of the hearer 
and feed his hearing, being seasoned with matched spices 
of facial expression and gesture” (de Vinsauf [1967] 2007, 
36). The ancient arts of rhetoric knew all about integra-
tion, force, intensity, rhythm. How do we make some-
thing memorable? How do we ensure that our thoughts 
will stay long enough in the minds of our auditors and 
readers to influence them? “[A] statement merely hops 
through the ears if the expression of it be abrupt. . . . re-
tard your tempo, so giving increase of words” (de Vinsauf 
[1967] 2007, 24). In other words, a question of intersub-
jectivity: how does one “bind” the mind of another? 
“More sophisticated than natural order is artistic order, 
and far preferable, however much permuted the ar-
rangement be,” says de Vinsauf; art “transposes,” making 
quick things slow (or, sometimes, slow things quick), in 
order to make special, to get attention, and thereby to 
secure enduring intersubjective bonds ([1967] 2007, 19). 
This assurance of receptivity and influence is clearly de 
Vinsauf’s goal: “commit not the management of either 
pen or tongue to the hands of chance, but let prudent 
thought . . . discuss long with itself about the theme.” 
That is to say, “retard your tempo” ([1967] 2007, 24): do 
the same thing with your mind that you hope your audi-
tor will do with your words. Display is expression de-
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signed to make things happen; it sees us through un-
certainty, especially the uncertainties of reading other 
minds. We exaggerate in order to get our experience 
across to others. 
 As is well known, other times and places are the 
means whereby Chaucer’s narrators typically situate them-
selves in his dream-worlds. Two of Chaucer’s dream visions 
use ekphrasis to start off their respective journeys, as if to 
say that narrative always resituates us, however temporar-
ily, to uncanny effect; questions of time and place must 
arise. Both descriptions are imitations of Virgil’s ekphras-
tic treatment of the return of what might rather be forgot-
ten, when Aeneas encounters, in the Aeneid, just before 
he resettles in Carthage, visual representations of Troy’s 
fall and its aftermath. It’s hard to imagine a more ek-
phrastic ekphrasis, at least in this sense: is there a more 
powerful story about the dying of minds one might like to 
have known, even or especially of minds that were, fatally, 
disregarded (Cassandra, Andromache), than the story of 
Troy’s fall? Then it is rendered even more painful by its 
re-presentation in Carthaginian pictures, because re-
presentation reminds Aeneas that he has not yet lost 
enough—now he must face (again) shame as well as grief 
and defeat (and finally, in Chaucer’s renderings of the 
story, ill fame). Chaucer’s Trojan ekphrases are several 
times removed, in an era, as Sylvia Federico (2003) has 
shown, much preoccupied with the idea of Troy’s “new” 
position—London, Troy Novant—and with the power of 
media to generate change. So we should not be too sur-
prised that what will follow Chaucer’s reprise of Virgilian 
ekphrasis will most likely be an effort to know other 
minds, or to revive them, or try to make them speak, as in 
the almost comically grotesque inhabiting of Ceys’s 
corpse at the beginning of The Book of the Duchess. The 
re-territorialization of Troy’s story involves a realignment 
of forces at the natal “center,” where “everything is decid-
ed,” and hence where we find a realignment of psychical, 
STAYING ALIVE 249 
  
historical, and territorial affordances (Deleuze and Guat-
tari 2001, 319). 
 The Virgilian ekphrasis in The Book of the Duchess 
moves quickly, by comparison with the infinite detail of 
the Man in Black’s description of Blanche: “For hoolly al 
the storie of Troye / Was in the glasyng y-wrought thus, / 
Of Ector and of King Priamus, / . . . / Of Paris, Eleyne, 
and Lavyne” (326–331). This is brevitas; though ekphrasis 
more typically makes use of amplification, here it has a 
simplifying and concentrating effect, as if so many long 
years of siege and battle could be grasped all “wholly” by 
one mind or work. Concentration and dispatch work to-
gether here also in the addition of “Lavyne,” a highly eco-
nomical way to include the Aeneid: it’s as though the 
narrator were ready to get out of this installation as 
quickly as possible. Focus serves the purpose of taking in 
as quickly as one can, but so as to move on. In the de- and 
re-territorializing poetics of The Book of the Duchess, 
moving on (from death to life and life to death, from cen-
ter to elsewhere and back again) is a vital, if not obvious, 
choice. And to what do we move on? To the representa-
tion of an encounter between two minds. This is where 
we encounter the lavish display characteristic of ekphras-
tic positioning, instead of in the description of the visual 
images of Troy’s legend. There has been a shift, from the 
story of Troy, to the sublime object of courtly love, at a 
time (the later fourteenth century) when the fragility of 
the elite was manifest. And another shift, to the plane of 
elegy, and then to the de-territorialized space of the fu-
ture. 
 Lavishing—that is to say, display—will not in the end 
stop time; the power to manifest and mesmerize depends 
on the temporality and spectacularity of emergence. Brev-
itas then must (and does) return, when the Man in Black 
exclaims, “She ys ded!” The writing is starting to show up 
on the wall; everything will shift, to unknown ends. The 
Book of the Duchess uses vitality forms (sudden move-
ment, loud noise, exclamation, animation, conversation) 
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to re/create the experience of transformation and emer-
gence. What the narrator has or has not understood about the 
Man in Black’s display remains inexpressible, and yet the 
encounter is transformative nonetheless, not because, or 
not simply because, of the Man in Black’s sunkenness in 
memories, but because he tries to share and thus “relive” 
them. 
 Virgilian ekphrasis in The House of Fame is similarly 
funny and sobering. The narrator says that, 
. . . as I romed up and doun,  
I fond that on a wal ther was  
Thus written, on a table of bras:  
‘I wol now singe, if that I can, 
The armes, and al-so the man,  
That first cam, through his destine, 
Fugitif of Troye contree, 
In Itaile, with ful moche pyne, 
Unto the strondes of Lavyne.’  
(141–148)  
This is an odd kind of ekphrasis: a verbal composition is 
given visual and tactile power by means of its re-inscrip-
tion on a brass tablet. It is a refrain (“[t]he armes, and al-
so the man”) that sings of, and enacts, destruction, sur-
vival, rising from ashes, the mobility of territory. Refrain 
accompanies and is movement, incorporation of new 
rhythmic elements, lines of fight and flight; translatio is 
rhythmic change, new (verse) forms, forms of vitality and 
enervation: “and al-so,” “if that I can.” The figure travels 
by means of recursion, reversal, multimodality: the text is 
itself but also the brass work of art being advertised. Yet 
the power of display is of and in the moment, and (in a 
sense) self-consuming—a vulnerability (that of life itself) 
to expenditure. The song of the territory is set in brass 
and still never stays the same. 
 Through the “medievalization” of Dido’s story we see 
Ricardian fantasies of imperial dominion from the stand-
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point of the Real. The pietas of remembering powerful 
minds and stories is evident, but so are all the pitfalls to 
which theory of mind is prey. Seductive display can influ-
ence the mind as powerfully as supernatural potions and 
aromas; receptive ears, despite or because of their concen-
tration, can fail completely to hear what most needs to be 
heard, or what shouldn’t be heard, and to see what most 
needs to be seen. This is the burden of Chaucer’s com-
ment on Dido’s situation: “by Crist, lo! Thus hit fareth: / 
‘Hit is not al gold, that glareth’” (House of Fame, 271–
272). Brevitas again: move on; let’s waste no more vital 
energy on fixation. This is another citation, now of a pro-
verb—a circulating message (which is to say, a message), 
like the epic itself, but a change from epic’s rhythms, de-
sublimating beyond the desublimations common to epic, 
which focus on its accounting methods—necessary costs, 
the sacrifice of attachments, none of which mean any-
thing to Dido. The circulation of rumor has already de-
territorialized her, put her between the two deaths. 
 Advertising, broadcasting, seeking, de- and re-terri-
torializing: in the “Legend of Dido,” in Chaucer’s Legend 
of Good Women, there is an ekphrastic description of 
Virgil’s ekphrasis of the paintings in the “maister temple 
of the toun” of Carthage, “how Troye and al the lond de-
stroyed was” (1026). This is a description of what Aeneas 
sees—again, a multi-modality, history decanted into per-
cept—and it prompts another complaint about broadcast-
ing: “Throughout the world our shame is kid so wyde, / 
Now it is peynted upon every side” (1028–1029). At the 
swirling center of the forces, everything will be decided 
not (exclusively) by war on and over the earth, but by the 
de- and re-territorializing force of splendid display and 
rhetorical craft. The visual poverty of the ekphrasis itself, 
however, deserves comment. In Chaucer’s Virgilian ek-
phrases, the narrative pressure of separation, abandon-
ment and falling devours so much time that there is little 
left for captation and reverie. The attention ekphrasis 
usually commands is rushed along. Arguably, the brevitas 
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of these ekphrases results from Chaucer’s focus on broad-
casting, on the transmission of messages, the means by 
which what is fixed in place can travel, enabled either by 
the speed of verbal communication or the overwhelm of 
an installation (“upon every side”). Perhaps more care 
should be taken when we retell old stories, but perhaps we 
can also understand why sometimes we don’t want the 
stories of other people to dwell in our minds: they can be 
so painful, and pain plays, ultimately, an unmanageable 
role in the call to assemblage. Misattunement, rather than 
attunement, displacement rather than homecoming, guides 
Chaucer’s Virgilian ekphrases. 
 The concern for media and reputation runs through 
the Aeneid and its sequelae; it is among the memes associ-
ated with semiotic bridging (translation, display, ekphras-
tic description; membrane, skin, communication “between,” 
and constitutive of, inside and outside, affect and expressiv-
ity). The tight bond between skin and language has been 
argued by Robin Dunbar (1993) in his account of the de-
velopment of theory of mind. Language, he proposes, is 
an extension of grooming behavior. It allows us to offer 
soothing intimacies to more than one individual at a 
time, or while we are doing other things, like walking or 
foraging; and it informs us of things happening in our 
absence, which means that we can “track” our lineages, 
and acquire “a better knowledge database on a larger so-
cial network than any nonhuman primate”—that is to 
say, larger mental maps of possible alliances and trouble-
spots (Dunbar 1993, 174, 176; see also Slingerland 2009). 
Whether or not one accepts Dunbar’s causal explana-
tions, clearly grooming and gossiping are both effective 
means of fostering relationality. In fact, the two are 
“complementary,” which should caution us, should we 
still need reminders, against overemphasizing the differ-
ences between language and other forms of embodied 
communication. Dido’s vulnerability to the influence of 
Cupid’s fire and, ultimately, to rumor and storytelling, is 
mediated by her embrace of Ascanius/Cupid, her “gree-
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dy” consumption of his beautifully-described beauty, their 
proximity, their inter-breathing, the delivery of tender loving 
bodily care (to both Ascanius and Ascanius/Cupid), the 
erotic intimacy screened by the god’s use of the person of 
the child, and, set suggestively within this intersubjective 
context, Aeneas’s own story-telling, his retelling of a story 
the queen already knows. It’s all about “tidings,” as Chau-
cer also knew. 
 In evolutionary as well as personal history, we acquire 
a vocal tract capable of producing speech at roughly the 
same time we acquire the neo-cortical capacity for theory 
of mind. As noted, infant research on cross- or multi-
modal expressivity demonstrates the complementarity of 
touch and sound, gesture and symbol: we come into the 
world ready to correlate sounds, images, and textures. The 
many arguments about whether language has its origins in 
gesture, or facial expression, or vocal cries, are all too 
atomistic. Not only is the language of homo sapiens “not 
modality specific,” but “primate communication [in gen-
eral] is inherently multimodal, at both a behavioral and 
neuronal level” (Slocombe 2011, 5.) Several brain regions 
are devoted to the integration of visual and auditory sig-
nals (e.g., the auditory cortex and the superior temporal 
sulcus). The brain also constantly integrates right- and 
left-hemisphere language functions—respectively, inter-
pretation of the social and emotional contexts of utter-
ances, and “plain sense,” grammar and logic. “Para-
language”—meaningful shifts in intonation, rhythm, bod-
ily expressivity, and the like—is part of primate multimo-
dality; “[r]ather than representing emotional vestiges that 
need to be stripped from language in order to expose the 
fundamental cognitive components, these nonverbal sig-
nals are part of an important composite message” (Slo-
combe 2011, 923). When we add to this already rich 
picture the ongoing olfactory, chemical and tactile trans-
missions of affect and meaning that accompany so much 
primate exchange, the power of grooming and gossip to 
integrate neuronal functions appears all the more impres-
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sive (Brennan 2004, 49, 52). Slocombe concludes “that 
communicating simultaneously through a range of mo-
dalities is the skill that truly occupies the functional niche 
of primate grooming, and not the cognitive aspect alone” 
(2011, 923). Language is coeval with the robustness of 
human intersubjectivity, and can thus be understood as 
an emergence from care practices in more ways than one; 
that is, at least in our scientific models, ontogeny recapit-
ulates phylogeny once again. The significance of that re-
capitulation in this instance is that nature always exceeds 
itself in its expressivity—in its territorializations, as De-
leuze and Guattari would have it; and thus is dispelled 
our fantasy of being able to strip care down to the level of 
bare life. 
 Dunbar’s linking of grooming, gossip, and the origins 
of language and theory of mind is consistent with modes 
of language acquisition in the human infant. Both groom-
ing and idle talk—“phatic communion,” chit-chat—are 
simultaneously pursued by infants and caregivers during 
the course of language acquisition and the signification 
and hence passion of the body.21 Michael Corballis com-
plains that, “one is hard pressed to find any structural 
principles common to grooming and human language” 
(Corballis 1993; cited in Dunbar 1993, 697). But, as not-
ed, in infancy, vocal sounds, facial expressions, and touch 
are all integrated, particularly in those moments of active 
quiet or proto-conversation, when infant and caregiver 
exchange gazes, make faces and coo at each other, talk 
(on the caregiver’s side), babble syllabically (on the baby’s 
side), play peek-a-boo games, and so on. Again, language 
acquisition is inherently intersubjective, as noted in 1963 
by Werner and Kaplan, who proposed that infants were 
motivated to learn language and representation for social 
reasons, and that cognitive capacity develops only within 
the context of social bonds. Call sounds or “grunts” more 
recently have been seen as “a primary prelinguistic vehi-
21 On the phatic function of language see Jakobson 1998, 15, 36. 
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cle promoting the onset of language” (McCune 1993; cit-
ed in Dunbar 1993, 716). There is significant evidence of 
grunt intelligibility among primates (e.g., vervet mon-
keys), and of the coordination of grunting with tongue 
and lip movements of grooming; McCune notes that, 
“[i]n adult human conversation gruntlike vocalizations 
persist and are among the forms that indicate continued 
attention to the speaker on the part of the listener,” thus 
serving “a ‘cohesive’ function” (McCune 1993; cited in 
Dunbar 1993, 716–717). 
 Dean questions whether gossip could possibly be the 
“adaptation on which society rests,” since “much of the 
time [social information] “is wrong, sometimes inten-
tionally, possibly leading to violent misunderstanding” 
(Dean 1993; cited in Dunbar 1993, 700). Dugatkin and 
Wilson similarly associate gossip with the “confusion” 
and “anarchy caused by cheaters’ use of language” (Du-
gatkin 1993; cited in Dunbar 1993, 701). Rumor admit-
tedly is short on references and research protocols, but 
social and affective bonding is probably its most im-
portant overall function, not the communication of in-
formation per se. Proverbs, like “where there’s smoke, 
there’s bound to be fire,” would seem to promote the sus-
picion Dean fears: “[a]s has been illustrated in every man-
ifestation of the police state,” he continues, “vocal contact 
can devolve to pure suspicion. Foucault’s discussion . . . . 
[of the] Panopticon . . . is relevant here”; “[i]n situations 
of decreasing job security we have reason to be suspicious 
of the large numbers of people with whom we interact 
daily. . . . In situations where we need to talk yet say noth-
ing, perhaps most of what Dunbar would classify as 
stress-releasing endearment is simply white noise” (Dean 
1993; cited in Dunbar 1993, 700). 
 But white noise is stress-releasing for many people. 
More importantly, the adage “where there’s smoke, 
there’s fire” acknowledges that there is always already a 
question about the validity of gossip. Like Dido, we are 
well aware of the unreliability of the content of “social 
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information” and also of its destructive power. We have 
infinite cautionary tales about the bad things that happen 
to us when we take gossip too seriously, or overindulge in 
its guilty pleasures, and the Aeneid is one of them. But 
gossip creates as well as severs social bonds, regardless of 
the accuracy of the information conveyed thereby. It is by 
no means clear that contemporary surveillance tech-
niques alone occupy the functional niche of primate 
grooming and gossip. Only if we idealize “society” as nec-
essarily and exclusively dependent on accurate social in-
formation can we dethrone gossip as the “adaptation on 
which society rests.” 
 Since Dunbar’s 1993 report, there has been extensive 
research on grooming and its ubiquity among animal 
species. There are tropical undersea spas territorialized by 
small fish called cleaner wrasses, who eat parasites and 
scar tissue off other fish, including large predators who 
under different circumstances would be eating the wras-
ses. “[I]n the calming atmosphere of the cleaning station, 
the wrasses approach the bigger fish without fear, darting 
around their teeth and even into their gills”—so much so 
that fish start settling down as soon as they start waiting 
their turn to be groomed, just as I do when I walk into my 
hair salon (a well-known site of gossip, idle talk, and 
grooming, extending from forms of swaddling to scalp 
massage) (Natterson-Horowitz 2012, 165). “Grooming 
alters the neurochemistry of our brains. It releases opiates 
into our bloodstreams. It decreases our blood pressure. It 
slows our breathing,” regardless of whether we are grooming or 
being groomed (Natterson-Horowitz 2012, 166). Despite 
the ways in which grooming and gossiping can go 
wrong—for example, by threatening exclusion and defa-
mation—it is also a powerful antidote to the three most 
common factors contributing to self-injury: stress, isola-
tion and boredom. When we “reach out and touch some-
one,” we draw on the multimodal capacity that allows us 
to link touch to voice and communication. This is thriv-
ing, and it is part of living process. As the Darwinist Al-
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fred Russel Wallace contended, “the popular idea” of the 
“struggle for existence” as “entailing misery and pain on 
the animal world is the very reverse of the truth. What it 
really brings about, is the maximum of life and the en-
joyment of life” (Wallace 1891, 40; cited by Dugatkin, 
1997, 7). Creatures do not live bare lives, if they can pos-
sibly help it. The concept “bare life” is, as Agamben ar-
gues (1995), a political fantasy, related to the figure of 
“the least body of the condemned man” (Foucault [1977] 
1995, 29). It is a means of discipline, and ought to clarify 
for us the profound deprivation and constraint that puta-
tively laissez-faire capitalism of the twenty-first century 
sort has in mind for us and our fellow creatures. We must 
continue to prize the freedom to make meaning and 
beauty, to show ourselves and thereby announce, herald, 
and insist upon the indisputable fact of our common 
aliveness. 
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As Aranye Fradenburg’s chapter “Life’s Reach” explains, 
a real-estate advertisement for a luxury oceanside proper-
ty in Montecito, California and Achilles’ shield are both 
art objects that reflect in microcosm the whole of an eco-
system’s thematic expanse: 
. . . both the ad and the shield aim for the intensity 
of becoming produced by the territory’s extima-
cies, by movements or “lines of flight” between the 
familiar and the unfamiliar, between microcosms 
and macrocosms. Both shield and advertisement 
mark and re-mark territory; their allure depends 
on the extimate plasticity of place, as exemplified 
by ekphrasis’s use of cross-modal experience to 
show us how we look from the standpoint of the 
Real. 
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The shield and advertisement’s ekphrastic descriptions evoke the 
inaccessible Natal—as Fradenburg writes, “the home that is 
elsewhere, that must always be ‘found’ again”—whether that be 
Greece’s pre-Homeric past or Montecito’s unaffordable 
luxury. What maintains the art object’s restive presence 
in these human domains is not its organic surfaces or 
tactile accessibility, but rather its depth of involvement in 
our lives. Indeed, Achilles’s shield is the most ornamented piece 
of a new set of armor that has been crafted for him by 
Hephaestus, blacksmith to the gods. It could not have 
been forged at a more opportune time. As Patroclus, his 
dearest companion, lies dead on the Trojan battlefield in 
Achilles’s own armor, Achilles seethes with rage and is 
ready to return to the fight. However, as we gaze upon the 
shield as it is crafted at Hephaestus’s forge, its beauty 
gives us pause, and the Iliad interrupts blood-soaked and 
battle-grim episodes with an ekphrastic description of its 
finely-hammered surfaces. The shield depicts an else-
where home: an agrarian world of cattle and sheep, of 
ploughing and reaping, that surrounds a City at War and 
a City at Peace; and at the center of (but also encircling) 
these pastoral and urban places are images of the earth, 
sea, sun, moon, and stars. As a vision of the Natal, Achil-
les’s shield cosmographs the open territory of the Iliad 
upon the armor of its heroes. Its displays of Grecian self 
and world are no mere filigree, but art shaped according 
to the everyday practices of human living and an object 
that shapes human living into extraordinary practices. Conse-
quently, the shield’s ekphrastic displays are inseparable from 
its protective function in the ensuing, bloody battle, 
pointing towards its central role in the messy and uncer-
tain business of the Trojan War. Achilles’s shield ack-
nowledges that the circuitry between ornament and 
weapon—art and object—is no mere feedback loop but a 
transpersonal field and ever-expanding network of de- 
and re-territorialization.  
 Achilles’s shield is critical to environments subse-
quent to the Iliad because its ekphrasis, as Fradenburg ex-
STAYING ALIVE 265 
plains, outlines the potential of all crafted things—espec-
ially those that have become relics—to function as inter-
subjective messengers across time and space.1 The sounds, tex-
tures, and graphics of art objects are cross-modal gestures 
that ricochet back to us our own display behaviors, our 
own territorializing moves, our own invitations to or war-
nings against another’s approach. These gestures are communi-
cative. They invite us to engage with one another by engag-
ing with them. Achilles’s shield therefore articulates con-
nections between Olympian gods, Greek heroes, and 
Trojan enemies. Yet the shield continues to function in 
post-Hellenic environs because, as Fradenburg writes, 
“the ekphrastic object is nearly always a relic, living on, 
undead.” Its arts, shaped in a time that is already over, 
point out “a whole way and history of living and dying 
that is also singular.” Though past, the shield reaches out 
in iron-forged rhetoric towards the future. It occupies an 
expressive “spaciousness” and an enduring “nowness” 
that exceed the borders of the Iliad’s narrative frame 
(Morton 2012, 222). As a description that, Fradenburg 
writes, “mak[es] quick things slow . . . in order to make 
special,” it articulates a lentissimo that “get[s] attention” 
and “thereby secure[s] enduring intersubjective bonds” 
across other times and places. Achilles’s shield bridges the 
distance travelled from the classical past to the post-
human present, as Fradenburg continues, in “an effort to 
know other minds, or to revive them, or to try to make 
them speak.” In the aftermath of Troy, it reminds us of 
the home that we have lost and to which we will never 
return. But it also brings to mind “the new home [that 
must] also be found again, and again.” For this reason, the 
shield’s singularity invites replication: poets and transla-
tors from Virgil to Auden have riffed off its description,2 
1 On the function of literature as “quasi-object” and its relation-
ship to intersubjectivity, see Joy 2012, 162–166. 
2 See The Aeneid, Book XIII, ll. 608–728 (Virgil 1990), and “The 
Shield of Achilles” (Auden 1991, 596–597). 
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and artists John Flaxman, Cy Twombly, and a host of 
engravers have transformed its visual texture into fine 
art.3 The ekphrasis of Achilles’s shield extends the limits 
of life’s reach. Its form enacts, like language, in Fraden-
burg’s words, an “extension of grooming behavior” that 
“allows us to offer soothing intimacies” to each other, and 
it is for this reason that the shield helps to support human 
practices of living. It measures our ability to thrive and 
survive in association with our art objects. The shield 
continuously re- and de-territorializes social networks 
across past, present, and future in relation to art’s ex-
panding frame. 
 Like Achilles’s shield, Beowulf’s sword hilt, found by 
Beowulf in Grendel’s mother’s cave (its blade having been 
melted by the “hot” blood of the Grendelkin, after Beo-
wulf has slain them) is a piece of war gear and an ek-
phrastic art object that traces the complex circuitry be-
tween thriving and surviving, then and now. And yet, 
while both shield and hilt are described according to the 
rhetorical poeisis of ekphrasis, each has a very different 
production history: the former belongs to epic heroes, the 
latter to epic monsters. Achilles’s shield undergoes pro-
tracted, unwavering depiction as Hephaestus sets to work 
at his forge. We gaze upon it while it is crafted into shape 
by the Iliad’s Homeric voice and the Greeks’ Olympian 
blacksmith. These mutual processes fashion the shield 
into an object that encodes affective networks of display 
behavior in excess of its military use. Consequently, the 
shield functions as a relic that lives on long after the death 
of Achilles and the fall of Troy. In Beowulf, we are pre-
sented only with the remainder of a sword, an antique 
work that circulated previously among giants and has 
been ‘unforged’ after battle with Grendel’s mother. The 
3 See John Flaxman, “The Shield of Achilles” (1821), The Royal 
Collection; Cy Twombly, “Fifty Days at Iliam: Shield of Achil-
les” (1978), Philadelphia Museum of Art; engravings in transla-
tions by John Ogilby (1660) and Alexander Pope (1715-20). 
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hilt, too, is a relic. But it is a relic in ruins. It registers a 
lost past that promises no hope for survival.  
 As a ruin, the hilt re-frames the living practices im-
pressed upon Achilles’s shield as survivor strategies: hos-
tile tactics for navigating the aftermath of battle. In Heo-
rot, as the hilt’s surface flashes glimpses of this inaccessi-
inaccessible, monstrous past, these glimpses set in motion 
refrains that urge non-communication and anti-
sociability. As Hrothgar looks upon the hilt after Beowulf 
returns from the bloody mere, and attempts to offer lov-
ing counsel to Beowulf, he imagines, instead, the hero’s 
body as a lifeless form which bears the marks of the po-
em’s vicissitudes of collapse, decay, and loss. In ekphrasis, 
Beowulf the warr-ior and Beowulf the poem function col-
laboratively as human object and poetic artwork that ex-
tend together the hilt’s territory of ruin across the outer 
reaches of Heorot and the many halls in which its story is 
sung. As relics of a lost past, Beowulf | Beowulf recall the 
Natal, a home in ruins to which Anglo-Saxons turn and 
Anglo-Saxonists return.  
  “Life’s Reach” is an essay about home, or rather, it is 
about the affective strategies by which we search, find, but 
never arrive, at one. Its arguments begin at the front steps 
of Bonnymede Drive, a property that (I think I can say 
with some certainty) none of us will ever be able to afford. 
By starting here, with a home that is undeniably material 
but forever inaccessible, Fradenburg asks us to think 
about other less locatable nesting sites. These are domains 
of feeling, sites of intensities—places that, despite their 
immateriality, “carry the earth with it” and therefore ex-
ert an undeniable gravitational pull (Deleuze and Guat-
tari 2001, 312). The elsewhere of home leads us (as it does 
Fradenburg) towards the unending process of making a 
place for ourselves that is here, now, in the company of 
others. These activities are not exclusively domestic. To 
the extent that “Life’s Reach” is about living, it is also about living 
in the University, a home that can feel as inaccessible as a 
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luxury estate in Montecito.4 “Life’s Reach” offers theory 
and praxis for staying alive, personally and professionally, 
by encouraging living practices that double as reading 
practices. 
 My response to Fradenburg is therefore a case study 
in searching out and finding home in proximity to the 
arguments of “Life’s Reach.” It begins with a close reading 
of the sword hilt Beowulf brings to Heorot from the 
Grendelkin’s mere, the runic refrains of which prohibit 
intersubjectivity within and without the poem. The hilt 
forecloses Hrothgar’s attempts at intimacies with Beo-
wulf, and it spurs a critical bibliography rife with scholar-
ly disagreement. Yet by way of these communicative pro-
hibitions, the hilt draws its audiences together all the 
more tightly. Its refrains transform Beowulf the warrior 
into an ekphrastic object, a ruin upon which the poem’s 
entire thematic territory is cross-modally displayed. I 
want to consider what it means to make a home in Beo-
wulf’s ruins, literary forms that can seem to gesture, in the 
future-facing department of English Studies, in the direc-
tion of lifelessness for those who cannot read them. I 
want to argue that these are risks only if we do not 
acknowledge Beowulf’s ekphrasis, an embodied form that 
exceeds the outlines of Old English poetry. 
*  *  * 
When Beowulf presents Hrothgar the sword hilt that he 
has brought up from the murky darkness of Grendel’s 
mother’s mere, it is described as a diluvian artifact:  
4 Bill Readings’ 1996 monograph, The University in Ruins, and 
the BABEL Working Group’s 2012 conference program, “cruis-
ing in the ruins: the question of disciplinarity in the post/medieval uni-
versity” (http://punctumbooks.com/titles/cruising-in-the-ruins) both 
serve as an oblique call and response to Fradenburg’s chapter. 
And both also reconsider how we dwell in proximity to univer-
sity systems that provide increasingly less shelter to their deni-
zens. 
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 Hroðgar maðelode,       hylt sceawode, 
ealde lafe.       On ðæm wæs or writen 
fyrngewinnes:       syðþan flod ofsloh, 
gifen geotende       giganta cyn, 
frecne geferdon;       Þæt wæs fremde þeod 
ecean dryhtne;       him þæs endelean 
þurh wæteres wylm       waldend sealde. 
Swa wæs on ðæm scennum       sciran goldes 
þurh runstafas       rihte gemearcod, 
geseted ond gesæd,       hwam þæt sweord geworht, 
irena cyst       ærest wære, 
wreoþenhilt ond wyrmfah. 
(1687–1698b) 
 
Hrothgar spoke, he looked at the hilt, the old heir-
loom, on which was written the origins of former 
strife, when the flood—the rushing ocean—des-
troyed the race of giants. They fared terribly. That 
was a people estranged from the eternal Lord; the 
Ruler gave them a final retribution for that by 
means of the surging of water. So it was on that 
metal plate of shining gold marked, set down, and 
said in runic [or secret] letters, correctly, for whom [or 
by whom] that sword was made, the best of swords 
[that] was first made with a twisted hilt and ser-
pentine patterning.5 
 
As we know from Beowulf’s initial encounter with Gren-
del’s mother, this was an “eald-sweord eotensic” (“an old 
sword made or possessed by giants,” 1558a) that he found 
lying in her mere when his own sword Nægling failed 
him. Although marked as a weapon of a bygone era, this 
“eald-sweord” still proves to be of critical importance. 
With it, Beowulf kills Grendel’s mother and decapitates 
Grendel. Afterwards, the blade melts mysteriously, leav-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 All quotes are from Fulk et al.’s (2008) edition of Klaeber’s 
Beowulf, by line number. All translations are my own. 
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ing only the hilt, now a ruined artifact of past battles. 
 As the remainder of a sword forged among giants and 
unforged among Grendelkin, the hilt is attuned to mon-
strous intersubjectivities and mythological strife. The written, 
spoken, and tactile displays that run across its metallic sur-
faces mark the hilt as a site of ruin. Upon it is “written” 
the story of the Flood, which the poem characterizes as 
“the origins of former strife” (“on ðæm wæs or written / 
fyrngewinnes”). Allen Frantzen points out that “this is the 
only story in Beowulf transmitted in written rather than 
oral form,” and, in evaluating the etymology of “writan,” 
Frantzen points out its associations with cutting and carv-
ing, arguing that the sword is “a text [that] has therefore 
already been ‘cut through’: a ‘pen’ (and engraving in-
strument) has written on the sword, cutting through the 
metal to create a text” (Frantzen 1990, 186–187). What 
inscription, though, is actually recorded? What text might 
actually be read? Despite the poem’s claim to a written 
account of the Flood, the hilt’s markings belie its ties to a 
historically-documented past. Upon its surfaces are in-
scribed “runstafas,” or “secret letters,” that identify the sword’s 
craftsman or owner,6 but which dematerialize in front of our eyes, 
fading from characters “marked” and “set down” into the hilt’s 
metal plates to those “said” by voice: (“gemearcod, / geseted ond 
gesæd / hwam þæt sweord geworht”). These slippages from 
written to spoken modes confuse rather than clarify, 
problematizing further the hilt’s communicative poten-
tial. Its tactile displays are no more reliable. Golden plates 
(“ðæm scennum sciran goldes”), twisted sides (“wreoþ-
enhilt”), and serpentine patterning (“wyrmfah”) invite us 
to touch its material topographies and to look longingly 
at its ancient craftwork, but they contribute no further to 
explaining its history.  
6 “Hwam” is a dative, which affords the translation of both “for 
whom” and “by whom.” See Klaeber 2008, 213n1696b on the 
likelihood of a dative of personal agency in relation to this pas-
sage. 
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 As a memorial to the Flood, the sword hilt amplifies 
the communicative impasse that arises from permanent 
estrangement from God. Its “runstafas,” which identify 
those who are left, broadcast a repeated and urgent mes-
sage of survival in modes that fade into silence. Although 
correctly “gemearcod, geseted ond gesæd,” this secret sign 
will never be received because it circulates among those 
banished from God’s sight, thought to be dead, and there-
fore shut out from the living. As the hilt provides no 
communicative recourse, the blade functions as an alter-
native messenger. However, it announces postdiluvian 
survival by way of violent gestures that dispatch psychic 
misattunement, intersubjective failure, and anti-socia-
bility. Among giants and Grendelkin, this sword practices 
living by way of another’s dying. It proclaims, “I am still 
here; you are no longer.” In Heorot, the hilt’s metalwork 
artfully signals this refrain. Its cross-modal displays invite 
us to engage with it after our own battles are over—now 
that we have survived and can celebrate living together. 
Still, there is danger in approaching what was once a 
sword. Although its weaponry can no longer hurt us, its 
arts can return us to the fight. The hilt’s cryptic messages 
are bellicose gestures that draw us into its ruined and 
ruinous territory: a site of failed transmission; an affective 
domus that marks life as death; a postdiluvian ecology 
incompatible with that of Heorot, a “home” (supposedly) 
of capacious sociability. 
 Hrothgar’s sermon proceeds, syntactically, from its 
exphrastic refrains—“Then the wise one, the son of Half-
dane, spoke. All were silent” (“þa se wisa spræc / sunu 
Healfdenes—swigedon ealle,” 1698b–1699b)—and an 
entire community stands hushed and at attention. Hroth-
gar sets out to advise Beowulf on how to live as a comfort, 
consultation, and courage to his people (“to frofre,” 
1707b), but his mind wanders into the hilt’s territory of 
ruin. Hrothgar turns to recalling Heremod, a Danish king 
whose appetite for violence brought about the persecu-
tion of his own subjects and, in the end, led to his own 
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suffering. Then, he describes an unwise man who, be-
cause of his wealth and prosperity, falsely believed that 
tragedy would never befall him. Rather than sharing his 
fortune, he hoards it only to be killed in the night by a 
spectral slayer. In contemplating the lives of both figures, 
Hrothgar emphasizes that problems in one’s own mind 
lead ultimately to problems in one’s own body. In failing 
to attune themselves to the cross-modal displays of oth-
ers, both men neither thrive, nor live. 
 The stories of Heremod and the unwise man draw 
Hrothgar’s mind into intimacy with Beowulf’s body. They 
anticipate an “active quiet” that would allow for the ex-
pressive cultivation of love, trust, and mutual understanding 
between an old king and his young hero. However, as a nar-
rative re-territorialized according to the hilt’s refrains, 
Hrothgar imagines Beowulf’s human form in ruins: 
Nu is þines mægnes blæd 
ane hwile;       eft sona bið 
þæt þec adl oððe ecg       eafoþes getwæfeð, 
oððe fyres feng,       oððe flodes wylm, 
oððe gripe meces,       oððe gares fliht, 
oððe atol yldo;       oððe eagena bearhtm 
forsiteð ond forsworceð;       semninga bið 
þæt ðec, dryhtguma,       deað oferswyðeð. 
(1761b–1769) 
Now is the glory of your power but a little while; 
presently in turn it will be that disease or the 
sword will deprive you of strength, or the grip of 
the fire or the surging of a wave, or attack of a 
sword or the flight of a spear, or terrible old age; 
or the brightness of your eyes will fail and become 
dim. Suddenly, death will overpower you, warrior. 
Hrothgar’s timing is purposefully overstated; it is simul-
taneously now (“nu”), for a little while (“ane while”), pre-
sently, in turn (“eft sona”), and all of a sudden (“sem-
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ninga”). Hrothgar suspends the presentness of this mo-
ment by weaving together half-lines in quick succession 
with the conjunction, “oððe,” a move that acknowledges 
that the duration of the phrase is the time it takes for an 
intersubjective exchange between two people to occur 
(Stern 2012, 42). The formal structures of Hrothgar’s lan-
guage point towards the potentiality of a shared experi-
ence that could happen between himself and Beowulf. 
Yet, its content does not encourage such an exchange. 
Hrothgar imagines Beowulf’s body as a field upon which 
natural disasters continuously, ekphrastically, erupt. Hos-
tile enemies, sickness, and infirmity encroach upon the 
safe borders of Beowulf’s form, serially, simultaneously, 
and cross-modally. The fire’s grip, the wave’s surge, the 
sword’s attack, and the spear’s flight enact a catalogue of 
protracted physical trauma. Beowulf does not make ges-
tures himself but is a rhetorical palette upon which others 
gesture. The extent of the hilt’s de- and re-territorializing 
powers are revealed in this moment. From the depths of 
the mythic past, the non-communicative displays of this 
monstrous remnant of a sword have sounded out a re-
frain of immense social dysfunction. They re-route Hrothgar’s 
singular attempts at intimacy as a poetic form that kills by 
putting, according to Fradenburg, “this and that [disas-
ter] together in spatial, sonorous, and tactile registers.” 
Rather than signaling an opening between minds, Hroth-
gar’s ekphrasis envisions Beowulf as an art object that, 
like the hilt, has been monstrously transformed into a site 
of ruin. It articulates the limits of death’s throes rather 
than life’s reach.  
 The hilt remains relevant not only to Hrothgar and 
his audience at Heorot, but moreover to Anglo-Saxonists, 
who continue to give it pride of place in Beowulf criti-
cism. Because of its status as an “eotensic” sword (“be-
longing to giants”), many discussions consider the giants 
of Genesis, Anglo-Saxon folklore, or Norse myth (see, for 
example, Bandy 1973, 240; Melinkoff 1980, 184; Clemoes 
1995, 28n59; Taylor 1998, 123–137), and disagreement 
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emerges as to whether the hilt signals their complete de-
struction by flood or affords the possibility of survival 
(Frantzen 1990, 188). The hilt’s “runstafas” solicit a fur-
ther array of possible messages ranging from Heremod’s 
name to a Hebrew inscription (Köberl 1978, 122; Schrad-
er 1993, 141–147); and they point the way towards arti-
factual analogues. Parsing the hilt’s markings has frayed 
rather than consolidated scholarly opinion, and other 
Anglo-Saxonists have chosen to wrestle with its textual 
ambiguities rather than explain them: some argue that 
they articulate a moment in which the oral poem asserts a 
textual (or visual) mode (see, for example, Frantzen, 
1990, 187; Near 1993, 324; cf. McNelis 1996, 175–185); 
others emphasize the flexibility of the hilt as a sign meant 
for open-ended reading (Overing 1990, 61; Lerer 2006, 
589; Christie 2012, 288). Despite these interpretative dif-
ferences, scholars agree that the hilt (re)directs Hroth-
gar’s subsequent narrative. Mary Carruthers (2004, 204) 
calls it the “inventional, ordering instrument” from which 
Hrothgar’s meditation proceeds, and Sean Pollack (2011, 
135) notes that its “wyrmfah” pattern “offers a kind of 
ironic prophecy of Beowulf’s eventual doom” in his fight 
with the dragon.7  
 I bring up the reception history of the hilt and its rela-
tionship to Hrothgar’s sermon not to deride or invalidate 
any of the aforementioned individual discussions, but 
rather to point out that as a body of scholarship, they are 
also caught up in the hilt’s refrains. Just as Hrothgar and 
the audience at Heorot are mesmerized by its diluvian 
story and runic script, critics continue to circle around 
and gaze across the hilt’s artful topographies in order to 
speculate upon its meaning and significance. These con-
versations lead to an array of interpretations, but few that 
agree, and these disagreements highlight methodological 
differences in Anglo-Saxon studies among its philologists, his-
7 On the question of Hrothgar’s ability to read the hilt, compare, 
for example, Gwara 2008, 182–184 and Osborn 1978, 978. 
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toricists, materialists, and post-structuralists. One could 
say that the hilt facilitates scholarly misattunement, 
communicative impasse, and critical anti-sociability 
among its academic readers that is similar in kind to that 
of Hrothgar and Beowulf, but far less deadly in degree. 
Because the hilt’s broken arts have maintained its critics. 
From its displays have emerged some of the most meth-
odologically rich and theoretically variegated streams of 
Beowulf scholarship. Together, they de- and re-terri-
torialize the poem, continuously expanding the entwined 
territory of its arts and the criticism upon those arts. 
 
*  *  * 
 
While ekphrasis forecasts Beowulf’s human death, it 
quickens his objectal form. Beowulf’s body emerges from 
the stories of Heremod and the unwise man as a disaster-
ridden outline that endures, without resistance, a cata-
logue of destructive scenarios. Beowulf is suspended be-
tween the forces of fire and wave, sword and spear. “It” 
acquires dimension with each poetic turn. The words 
“oððe . . . oððe . . . oððe” become a delicate refrain that 
invite tragedy. Like the hilt, Beowulf is transformed into 
an art object that has been ruined in its production pro-
cess. His warrior’s body has been similarly unforged. In 
ekphrasis, Beowulf is a relic that has become, as Fraden-
burg writes, “embellished and artful,” restively alive, in 
death.  
 The intersubjective experience foreclosed to Hrothgar 
and Beowulf is sacrificial, so to speak, in that it allows for 
a greater, expanding intersubjective engagement between 
all those who gaze upon Beowulf’s ruined and reliquary 
body. Beowulf is shaped according to Hrothgar’s lan-
guage. It is ekphrastic: a translation, a creative and partial 
form—an objet a—that emerges according to the rhetori-
cal operations that express Hrothgar’s maladapted desire 
for intersubjectivity. In ekphrasis, the partial descriptions, 
creative acts, and unfulfilled desires of Hrothgar are shaped 
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into cross-modal displays that signal a joint endeavor be-
tween poetic form and polyamorous desire, changing the 
world each time we notice it. In ekphrasis, Beowulf circu-
lates in the protracted present: from death to life, from 
center to elsewhere, in a constant motion that travels 
ceaselessly between then and now. As a form on the move, Be-
owulf seeks interactions. It solicits an intersubjective en-
counter by way of its embodied poiesis. For this reason, 
his body is an active mediator, a rhetorical agent, or act-
ant, that is “in the world” as a “constructer of intersubjec-
tivity” (Joy 2012, 164–165). As we attune our minds to the 
elaborate refrains that penetrate Beowulf’s dying body, 
they de- and re-territorialize it, generating social associa-
tions and a capacious intersubjectivity—a sensuous, felt 
experience of being together—between the dead and the 
living who encounter Beowulf.8 Beowulf, the hero and the 
poem, become, as Fradenburg would say, a twinned site 
of “shared (or spared) experiences,” felt encounters with 
what it means to be human, frail and vulnerable. As 
Hrothgar concludes, “deað oferswyðeð” (“death over-
takes”) all of us, even the most hearty of warriors, and 
although I will most likely never suffer the battlefield in-
juries of Beowulf nor the medical conditions of Anglo-
Saxon listeners, my body will, nevertheless, fall victim to 
disease, violence, or the debilitations of old age. It will, 
one day, be a territory of and in ruin. Beowulf’s ekphras-
tic displays show me not only the interdependency of arts 
and lives that happen to co-exist in the same historical moment, 
but it also expands that moment into a transtemporal, inter-
subjective experience between Hrothgar, the audience at Heo-
rot, the poem’s Anglo-Saxon listeners, and myself, an 
Anglo-Saxonist. 
 Beowulf’s refrains communicate more than simply the 
melancholia of human mortality. Like Achilles’s shield, 
8 Here, Fradenburg’s arguments keep company with those of the 
New Materialists. See especially Latour (2007), Morton (2012), 
Bryant (2011), and Harman (2007). 
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his body evokes the Natal: an illusive, singular ground; an 
unknown homeland that we seek out, find, and return to 
again and again. Specifically, the “home” that Beowulf 
embodies is not Germania (although that is its associated 
geography) but the felt ecology of a lost heroic age. Like 
the poem, his human form is a monument that stands in 
ruins, “haunted by images of destruction and forgetting, 
of the difficulty of preserving and comprehending the 
past, and the disruptive and violent potential of memory” 
(Liuzza 2006, 97). As a haunting presence, Beowulf the 
hero enjoins Beowulf the poem as an open territory that 
invites trauma, the repetitive compulsions of which her-
ald the poem’s many, many translations and popular 
spin-offs. Robert Zemenkis’s cinematic adaptation articu-
lates succinctly the centripetal force of such an invitation 
when Beowulf presents an enemy soldier with the chal-
lenge, “You can’t kill me, I’m already dead” (Beowulf 
2007).  
 Whether announced by Hrothgar’s sermon or in his 
own voice, Beowulf’s vocal displays are a mourning song, 
a refrain that marks the way towards the heroic homeland 
from whence we came and where we are no longer. In 
marking, however, Beowulf’s language also solicits us to 
engage in (im)mortal combat. In this way, it signals pos-
sibilities for going forth, together, depending upon where 
we stand here and now in traumatic proximity to the 
elsewhere of home. James Earl expresses these calls to 
sociability when he writes that the poem’s “system of rela-
tions—of us to Beowulf, of Beowulf to the Anglo-Saxons, 
and of the Anglo-Saxons to us—constitutes the meaning 
of “Beowulf” (Earl 2006, 265). And Mary Kate Hurley 
sums things up precisely when she argues that Beowulf is 
“a living poem” because it is more than a poem. It is a 
“story” and a “performance” that “build[s] a future from 
the remains of a past . . . Beowulf—in a poem, a play, an 
opera or a movie—continues to live only so long as the 
tales goes on, enlarging the ‘we’ who have heard” (Hurley 
2010, §24, §23). Such is the re-homing power of Beowulf. 
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As an ekphrastic literary form, it performs. It displays 
itself cross-modally in print, on stage, in music, and on 
film. Beowulf gets our attention, makes us pause, and 
invites us to join with it as we head towards a home that is 
always lost and therefore always becoming something 
more. 
 
*  *  * 
 
As a poem that is “liquid and supple” (Joy and Ramsey 
2006, xl), Beowulf has always been that ruin to which An-
glo-Saxon scholars turn when we need to make a new 
place for ourselves in the company of English Studies. 
Whether we engage with it as philologists, historicists, or 
critical theorists, the poem is a relic that keeps its Anglo-
Saxonists alive. It maintains our active communications 
within the discipline’s critical networks, and it permits 
discussions between Anglo-Saxonists and other fields and 
sub-fields. Yet, as Beowulf’s forms—its alliterative poetics, 
its manuscript context, and its attendant Anglo-Saxon 
milieu—become unreadable to all but a handful of schol-
ars, Old English can feel like the “runstafas” on the sword 
hilt: arts that are no longer communicative. And as job 
postings in early medieval fields dwindle, we, Anglo-Sax-
on scholars, can feel like postdiluvian survivors who cry 
out into an academic universe that thinks we are no long-
er relevant, or even present. In the world of popular cul-
ture, there is no question of Beowulf’s survival skills, but 
within the Academy the future of its critics appears not so 
certain. (I note briefly the MLA Executive Committee’s 
2013 suggestion that its Old English, Middle English, and 
Chaucer divisions be consolidated into one “medieval” 
category.) Despite alarming institutional moves,9 I join with 
many others in believing that there is cause for real con-
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 The precarious status of medieval literatures in language de-
partments reflects, in miniature, Fradenburg’s assessment of the 
humanities’ position vis-à-vis the Academy at large. 
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cern only if we perceive Old English as a dead language; if 
we understand its poetics as disembodied forms;10 if we 
claim the Anglo-Saxon past as a territory of boundaries 
fixed by periodization rather than of refrains that ripple 
through time and space.11  
 When we pause and consider the ekphrasis of Beo-
wulf’s sword hilt and Beowulf’s dying body, we allow their 
poetic forms to reach out in rhetoric towards us, and we 
respond en face to those who sit nearby: around a seminar 
table, at a conference, in our office hours. Yet, we also 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 I point to a forum called “State of the Field of Anglo-Saxon 
Studies,” which appeared in a 2008 issue of the open-access 
journal, The Heroic Age (http://www.heroicage.org/issues/11/ 
foruma.php). All participants identify that the health of the field 
hinges on the question of communication, and Richard Scott 
Nokes (2008, §41) writes, “There is enough blame for us all to 
share for the segregation of Anglo-Saxon studies, but the result 
is very little conversation going on between Anglo-Saxonists 
and non-medievalists” because, as he states earlier in a post on 
his weblog, “20th Century Americanists can read and under-
stand the work of 18th [sic] British scholars, who can read and 
understand the work of film scholars, but unless they can read 
Old English or Old Norse, or medieval Latin, or Old Whatever, 
there will always be a barrier between us and them. We can un-
derstand them, but they can’t understand us” (Nokes 2007, my 
italics). Nokes advocates, as do co-respondents, Michael Drout 
and Tom Shippey, that reviving Old English might be effected 
by turning English departments towards a shared goal of lan-
guage study. Yet, despite Nokes’ lexicon of  “conversation,” “read-
[ing],” and “understand[ing],” these urgent cries for literary com-
panionship are inevitably foreclosed as he points out the territo-
rial boundaries: the linguistic “self-segregation” and “barriers” 
that keep Anglo-Saxonists in the ghetto and at arm’s reach from 
their institutional Others. For Nokes, Anglo-Saxon Studies, like 
Beowulf, is a field that has built its home in the ruins of dead 
languages. He cannot see a way forward past the linguistic gates 
that separate it from the Englishes of later periods and their 
literary scholars because, as Eileen Joy (2008) points out, he 
does not situate language in the body.  
11 See Davis (2010).  
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recognize their status as reliquary objects that reach out-
side of rhetoric, reforming themselves in “stories” and 
“performances” that exceed the linguistic, literary, and 
temporal contours of Old English poetry. In ekphrasis, we 
concede that the hilt and hero are conceptual forms that 
take on many different shapes, only one of which is found 
in Beowulf. Making a home in Beowulf and living among 
its ruined and ruinous forms is therefore a question of 
companionablity. Which of its forms do we want to in-
clude or exclude? As Fradenburg writes in “Driving Edu-
cation”: “we should, more than ever, understand that eve-
rything becomes part of our work, one way or another, 
and therefore it must always be a deliberate part of our 
work not simply to think critically about the workings of 
our own (embodied) minds, but also to reflect upon, and 
engage, our connectedness to wider communities, because 
they are always in our work” (her emphasis). For Anglo-
Saxon studies, Fradenburg’s statement means that “part of 
our work” about Beowulf—in both our teaching and our 
research—must be to “reflect upon and engage” those 
“wider communities” that invest in its more contempo-
rary forms. This requires an embrace of the popular, the 
non-poetic, and the medieval “-isms” that are often refer-
enced with an undue amount of eye-rolling and heavy 
sighs by some scholars who don’t deem these sorts of re-
flections as “serious” work. It means de-periodizing our 
field and perhaps turning away from the appellation, “Anglo-
Saxon.” Because these O/other B/beowulfs are “always in our 
work” whether we admit it or not. For non-Anglo-Sax-
onists, and especially non-medievalists, Fradenburg’s call 
for interconnectedness means something much more de-
manding—for example, that Old English be re-integrated 
into English departments as one non-precedential version 
of an ever-changing language and its ever-recursive litera-
ture. And that Beowulf be taught by non-specialists as a 
poem valued not as a first, and therefore reliquary ap-
pendage of a literary past, but as an art object of shimmer-
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ing vibrancy that vaults towards the future, inflecting the 
voices of poets and critics, then and now. 
 In my mind, Beowulf is a land bridge between conti-
nents divided by literary period and linguistic coding. 
Like the hilt, Beowulf’s mortal and frail form serve as a 
meta-critical touchstone for articulating how many of us 
across the humanities feel about the health of our profes-
sion. Consequently, I believe that Beowulf (and moreover, 
Anglo-Saxon studies) can help us perform the self-critical 
“work” that Fradenburg charges us to do if we are to stay 
alive in the Academy. My field’s devotion to elegy, its nos-
talgia for ruins and remnants, its investment in the gno-
mic, the runic, and the riddlic—in this academic moment, 
these professional arts can help us feel the ecology of risk. 
They can serve as a poetic looking glass through which we 
pass in order to make a new place for ourselves, together, 
in the Academy. In so doing, we as a profession de- and 
re-territorialize the time zones that separate literary fields 
and remap the past as present. 
 
*  *  * 
 
 “Life’s Reach” underscores ekphrasis as a poetic form 
that is keyed to human performance. It shows us how 
others “commune and communicate” so that we might 
“learn that we love and are loved in turn.” Communion 
and communication are, in many ways, implicit pursuits 
of formalism, a way of reading that couples the pleasures 
of literary aesthetics with the enjoyment of another’s 
company. Like ekphrasis, formalism advocates that we 
take a long and lingering pause in front of a poem’s spa-
cious rhetorical structures. It acknowledges a poem’s 
nowness in our critical habits of writing in the present in-
dicative. It attends to the artful, reliquary status of rheto-
ric, of a poem and of its criticism. Moreover, we maintain 
these habits of reading and writing with the desire that a 
poem’s form and our scholarship about it will keep us in 
the company of others. For this reason, I believe, formal-
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ism, or close reading, remains the dominant method of 
teaching undergraduates how to evaluate a poem despite 
the fact that it often feels eclipsed by other critical meth-
odologies.12 In short, formalism is ekphrastic. 
 To write such a literary criticism is to write ekphrastic 
scholarship.13 It is to be more mindful of the artful ties 
that bind literature to literary criticism. It employs the 
arts—forces that collapse, interrupt and forestall human 
narratives—in order to rekindle intimate social bonds 
and also understanding between scholars past, present, 
and future. Ekphrastic scholarship joins together a re-
searcher and a research community via an acknowledge-
ment of shared description, desire, and sociability. It is 
the act of reflecting upon moments of individual vulnera-
bility, mutual co-operation, and uninhibited expression, 
to name only a few of its modalities. It is a post-factum 
narrative that recounts one’s scholarly self in kindred 
spirit with others and, in so doing, asks implicitly how the 
production of knowledge facilitates togetherness. Ek-
phrastic scholarship reminds us that the role of research 
is not to exclude ourselves from the communities we live 
and work in, but to more fully integrate ourselves within 
them. A much more capacious definition of living emerg-
es here, one that draws no distinctions between academic 
work and life, academic works and lives.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Which is not to say that some are not attempting to re-value 
“close reading” via critical movements such as the so-called “de-
scriptive turn” and “new sociology”: see Best and Marcus (2009), 
Dosse (1999), and Love (2010). 
13 A discussion about the role of ekphrasis in academic criticism 
has been circulating periodically for several decades within art 
history, a field dedicated to the study of objects and their forms. 
See Fort (1996), Wagner (1996), Elsner (2006), and Elsner 
(2010). According to Elsner, scholarly desire for intersubjective 
communion is located at the heart of art history, and ekphrasis 
joins scholars of its philosophical past to those of its profession-
al present in one extended conversation of transtemporal inti-
macy. 
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 Fradenburg’s chapter “Life’s Reach” advocates and 
enacts this. As a sustained, theoretical meditation on ek-
phrasis that extends its arguments from the cross-modal 
arts of both the house on Bonnymede Drive and Achil-
les’s shield towards the proprioceptive activities of inter-
subjective living, its writing “‘places’ me, and by letting 
‘me’ drift out to sea and letting the sea enter me, by turn-
ing ‘me’ into my ecology and my ecology into me, it 
makes living feel like living.” Fradenburg’s arguments are 
intellectually rigorous, but they persuade by way of de-
scriptive, creative, and (at times) poetic language that 
communicates its points frequently by cross-modal dis-
plays of crafted logic. Fradenburg’s chapter has the same 
mesmerizing power of the house on Bonnymede Drive 
and Achilles’s shield, her art objects of inquiry. It makes 
me pause, feel, and consider my own “intensity of becom-
ing” in the plastic spaces of its criticism. Its argumenta-
tive turns make me consider the relationship not just be-
tween art and living, but moreover, the extent to which 
these theoretical lines of flight extend towards and away 
from my own cross-modal displays and my own intersub-
jective processes. In so doing, I recognize myself, simul-
taneously, as a scholar living in the Academy and a per-
son living in the world. And so, I navigate myself, with 
Beowulf, towards (and away from) “home.” 
 
*Research for this chapter was assisted by a New Faculty Fellows 
award from the American Council of Learned Societies, funded 
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In her essay “Living Chaucer,” Fradenburg writes that 
Chaucer’s narrators 
 
help by serving or seeking rather than knowing. 
They never understand what’s just happened, but 
Langlandian frustration is bypassed by their will-
ingness to keep on moving, led, for example, by 
garrulous eagles or puppies so charming as to have 
real ears and enjoy having the tops of their soft 
heads patted by plump little poppets. (Fradenburg 
2011, 59)  
 
Narrative certitude is supplanted here by an epistemolog-
ical spaciousness founded on effort and the good inten-
tion, if not of helping, then trying to help. The proximity 
of these forms of “serving or seeking” to understanding illumi-
nates peripheral ecosystems of thought that rightly remind 
us of the pleasures of psychoanalysis. 
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 As interesting, however, as the affinity between psy-
choanalysis and a Chaucer narrator’s peri-epistemo-
logical style is the relation between the latter and those 
soft-headed, real-eared puppies to which Fradenburg’s 
account of attention somewhat surprisingly and wonder-
fully turns. The cuteness of these puppies is a salubrious 
example of a signifier “living on” (Fradenburg 2011, 42; 
see also Fradenburg 2009), as Fradenburg writes, in the 
host’s mind and body. I wonder to what extent the puppy 
currently living in my head concatenatingly extends the 
life of the puppy in Fradenburg’s and Chaucer’s heads. To 
the extent that I first came to admire Fradenburg’s work 
as a psychoanalyst and only in the past few years of Face-
book discovered her soft-spot and flair for cuteness, I 
wonder about cuteness as a psychoanalytic subject. How 
might thinking about cuteness save the Humanities?1  
Less teleologically—insofar as cuteness, like lyric poetry, 
lives less in plot than in affect and style—how might 
thinking about cuteness sustain our implication in aca-
demic systems, as Fradenburg has so well illustrated in 
this volume, that seem to challenge if not discourage our 
capacity for fortitude and vision? 
 As I was initially composing this in May 2013, my 
computer was cued to Fradenburg’s latest Facebook post-
ing of a baby polar bear in a blue plastic kiddie pool. 
Meanwhile, at the same time, my favorite photo in Anna 
Klosowska’s happily endless stream of Facebook cuteness 
was of a photographer in a field of dandelions, with something 
like a baby deer standing on her back like it’s the Matter-
horn.2  
1 On “the zany, the cute, and the interesting” in the work of the 
humanities, see Ngai (2012). 
2 Caveat: this image may be manipulated (via Photoshop or 
some other such software), and thus the situation and also the 
species we are dealing with here are “fuzzy,” but even as fuzzy 
delusion, this photo tells us something about our relation(s) to 
cuteness. 





Said photographer’s camera looks expensively complicat-
ed, but whatever she’s photographing is subordinate to 
the baby deer, not to mention some other very sweet, 
wombat-looking thing at her side (is this real or Pho-
toshop? does it matter?). The cuteness of the latter is a 
function of its pudgy lean into the photographer’s upper 
arm. It is the expression of being in cahoots. Even as the 
photographer is distracted by this disarmingly photogenic 
little thing, the latter has its eyes on the prize, as though 
its cuteness partially resided in this appearance not only 
of companionship, but bright-eyed apprenticeship. The 
cuteness of the deer-like creature likewise has to do not 
only with how cute it looks, but with the acuity of its 
looking, nearly, but not entirely, in our direction. Its 
slightly less than three-quarter view, like Vermeer’s Girl 
with the Pearl Earring, seems inadvertently emphatic: it’s 
a look either of great courage (which would match the 
Napoleon-audacity of its stance on the photographer’s 
back) or shirking timorousness (as though to confirm our 
suspicion that the animal doesn’t quite know how it got 
himself into so unlikely and declarative a position). The 
deer’s look, crucially, involves us in the photograph’s ge-
ometry, just as the wombat’s look prosthetically involves 
the composition from which the photographer’s camera 
is turned away. 
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The pleasure of the photograph not only doesn’t rely 
on knowing exactly what these animals are (baby deer? 
baby kangaroo? wombat? dik dik?), it may actually attach 
to our not knowing, as taxonomic specificity cedes to 
kingdom and phylum of cuteness. Cuteness, in this and 
most instances, runs adjacent to epistemological form. It 
is illuminated by the knowledge we bring to it, but only 
up to a certain point. Mostly, it’s self-illuminating, and 
more to the point, we’re addicted to these photos because 
this self-illumination illuminates some aspect of ourselves. 
That we respond to cuteness at all proves that we’re still 
capable of responding. The insatiability with which we 
need to be reminded of our responsiveness, like the end-
less streaming of photos on Facebook, suggests that we 
groove to cuteness as though it were something like a 
drive. Somewhere between drive and pleasure principle, 
cuteness’ epistemological fuzziness is inseparable from 
our unappeasable desire for more of it. The mechanics of 
Facebook streaming are fundamental to this system of 
thinking-feeling; this real-time commons is Mystic Writ-
ing Pad writ as group psychology. 
The cute object—as opposed to the good object or bad 
object—sometimes asks that we treat it as though it were 
something like an infant. Sometimes like an infant, it 
seems to communicate a message of desire whose content 
we can only begin to guess. Why are you barking, what do 
you want, talk to me: as often, it is difficult to distinguish 
what cuteness tries to communicate from what we imag-
ine it’s communicating (hence the frequency with which 
the communication of a cute creature ends up being su-
perseded by cuteness-as-communique). That the cute 
object’s wish for love is inseparable from our own amo-
rous fantasies suggests a network of affective risk and ex-
perimentation along the lines of Winnicott’s theorization 
of transitional objects (Winnicott 1971). More than this, 
the Winnicottian blur of both transitional objects and 
good-enough mothers suspends the self-shatteringly brit-
tle agon that arises in the fiction of psychical discreteness. 
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If this blur makes possible the kind of inter-relational, 
inter-generic, inter-disciplinary work in which the best 
versions of the Humanities are invested, as Fradenburg 
argues more than convincingly here in this book, it also 
cozens us into the possibility of the blurring as its own 
counter-intuitive discipline. I’m inclined to think about 
this field of generative peri-thinking in terms of fuzzy 
logic, partly in the spirit of repurposing a charge to which 
our most adventurous and important work is susceptible. 
In the context of Fradenburg’s deceptively simple claim 
in “Living Chaucer” that “even cuteness is about healing,” 
and that it is “inclusive, ‘generous’; it requires gestures 
that invite care and protection” (Fradenburg 2011, 59), 
fuzzy logic likewise conjures the fuzziness that underlies 
so many of our own inclinations toward and perceptions 
of cuteness. And as Fradenburg also writes here in this 
book, in “Living the Liberal Arts,” “if the humanities are 
‘fuzzy,’ and their outcomes and processes difficult to 
quantify, that is because living is ‘fuzzy.’ It demands art-
fulness, experimentation, and hypothesis.” 
As a non-medievalist, I’m in less of a position to as-
sess Chaucerian cuteness than I’m able to note how se-
ductively ahistorical it seems in the context of both 
Fradenburg’s “Living Chaucer” essay and also Chaucer’s 
poetry itself. Even as I wish I were enough of a Chauceri-
an that I could compare how I imagine these puppies with 
however they might be operating in the text, how cute-
ness works in a medieval context is less interesting for me 
than the fact that it does at all. After all, as Sianne Ngai 
beautifully argues, cuteness as we know it didn’t nominal-
ly exist until the early nineteenth century—the Oxford 
English Dictionary’s first citation of “cute” is from 1834 
(Ngai 2012, 59). What were cute things called in advance 
of the word? I’m interested in the migration of a word 
that originally denoted sharpness (perceptual and other-
wise) into a field from which the knives, as it were, have 
been removed. Hypothesizing Chaucer’s investment in 
cuteness in advance of the term somewhat mirrors queer 
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theory’s incorrigible interest in early modern sexuality in 
advance of the great Foucauldian hypostasization of sex-
ual discourse. This resemblance makes sense, since cute-
ness’s flirtation with anachronism—the only slightly du-
bious fantasy that what presently counts as cute would 
have similarly registered across history—both arises from 
and gravitates toward the same questions of investment 
and interstitial being that queer theory continues to help 
us re-articulate. And if this sort of anachronism is deemed a 
particular fuzzy logic by certain academics, then the fuzzi-
ness of theorizing cuteness nearly constitutes a tautology. 
One way out of the tautology is to give fuzziness a critical 
vocabulary of its own, such that when we are accused of—
and more importantly, when we practice—fuzzy thinking, 
our sense of fuzzy is if not less fuzzy, then more articulate. 
This is to also contribute to Fradenburg’s own project in 
this book to demonstrate that “the arts are not fripperies, 
but activities for life,” and that the humanities “teach 
human organisms how best to move, and to keep on 
moving, with maximum power and grace.” 
 
*  *  * 
 
Following Sianne Ngai’s observation that cute objects 
seem to address us in the manner of lyric poems, let’s 
turn to Emily Dickinson, for whom fuzziness and cute-
ness withstand and inspire lyric scrutiny no less than pain 
or posthumousness. If I began these pages with an incho-
ate hunch about cuteness and psychoanalysis, Dickinson 
helps me understand the contours of that juxtaposition. 
Specifically, Dickinson treats cuteness—along the lines of 
most analogously overdetermined psychoanalytic objects—as 
equivocal threshold between affect and interest. This is to 
say that cuteness, like Barthes’s understanding of adora-
bility, seems to arise from our own disposition when we 
most wish it to speak to the external qualities of some-
thing else: 
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[The Adorable] seeks to designate that site of the 
other to which my desire clings in a special way, 
but this site cannot be designated; about it I shall 
never know anything; my language will always fumble, 
stammer in order to attempt to express it, but I can 
never produce anything but a blank word, an emp-
ty vocable. . . . From word to word, I struggle to 
put “into other words” the ipseity of my Image, to 
express improperly the propriety of my desire: a 
journey at whose end my final philosophy can on-
ly be to recognize—and to practice—tautology. The 
adorable is what is adorable. Or again: I adore you 
because you are adorable, I love you because I love 
you. (Barthes [1978] 1996, 19–21)  
 
To the extent that I’m inclined to agree with “this every-
thing” (Barthes [1978] 1996, 19) of A Lover’s Discourse, 
I’m left with the sense that I might, in fact, find Barthes’s 
intro/extrospection smitingly adorable. In this observa-
tion, I’m left with the happy suspicion that adorability is 
more complicated (which is to say, more sophisticated) 
than I’d assumed, and it’s this “residual quality” (Barthes 
[1978] 1996, 19) of complexity that makes me think that 
cuteness and adorability alike might be teased out of their 
stammering fumble. It’s along these Barthesian lines of 
miscible subjectivity and objectivity that the following 
Dickinson poem meditates on the difficulty of adjudicat-
ing cuteness as something that happens in the world, or 
to it: 
 
 Bees are Black—with Gilt Surcingles— 
 Buccaneers of Buzz— 
 Ride Abroad in ostentation 
 And subsist on Fuzz— 
 
 Fuzz ordained—not Fuzz contingent— 
 Marrows of the Hill. 
 Jugs—a Universe’s fracture 
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Could not jar or spill. 
(541, F1426)3 
Sharon Cameron succinctly notes that, “the unex-
pected ‘Fuzz ordained—not Fuzz contingent—’ rescues 
the bee from the triviality to which ‘Buccaneers of Buzz’ 
had almost certainly doomed it” (Cameron 1981, 9). The 
poem, however, seems less interested in rescuing the bee 
than in attending to its escape from the poem altogether. 
The rhyme of “buzz” and “fuzz” renders the latter as con-
sumingly ambient as sound, as though the quality of fuzz 
that describes both the bee and the pollen it feeds on were 
saturatingly intangible as a subliminal message. Every-
where and nowhere, fuzziness describes the poem’s re-
sistance to resolution: one’s attempt to locate meaning 
ends up replicating the bee’s own fuzzy hovering in a field 
of flowers. Or rather, we hover over the poem, but with-
out the bee’s innate feel for pollen. The poem implies that 
how one converts its fuzz into meaning is as surprising—
and transfixingly mysterious—as Dickinson’s own fasci-
nation with the bee, even as it is Dickinson’s own fascina-
tion, rather than the bee itself, we find most alluring. 
After all, the ostentation belongs less to the bees than 
to the poet who turns their stripes into gilt surcingles, 
who consigns them to the forced kitsch of buzz-pirates. 
The fancy ingeniousness of “gilt surcingles” inverts the 
logic of Fradenburg’s real-eared puppies, in that the bee’s 
stripes seem so much less real than the bees that we are all 
the more surprised when it is the former that survive the 
poem as signification floatingly removed from antecedent. 
It is the extent to which the bees are unable to weather the 
metaphors imposed on them that makes the poem, at 
least initially, seem so cute. Dickinson forces her bees into 
bee outfits with the same slightly-off self-indulgence with 
which people sadistically dress up little dogs in bee outfits. 
3 Citations of Dickinson’s poetry are to Franklin’s (2005) edition, 
by page and fascicle numbers. 
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That a bee’s attraction to pollen—or in Dickinson’s 
deceptive alembic, fuzz’s queer attraction to fuzz—is po-
tentially indistinguishable from imagination’s attraction 
to itself returns us to the Barthesian problematic of ador-
ability describing one’s capacity for adoring. Like Win-
nicott’s good-enough mother, cuteness is an adventure in 
non-vituperative counter-transference, as well as, in Fra-
denburg’s words, an “enhancement of sentience in the 
service of relationality,” and “we can neither thrive nor 
survive without minds alert to [such] possibility.” 
 Fuzziness, in this case, isn’t constitutive of the bees’ 
cuteness—it’s, surprisingly, what they (and we) live on. 
Or as Fradenburg writes here in “Life’s Reach”: “Crea-
tures do not live bare lives, if they can possibly help it.” 
The leap the poem makes from the end of the first stanza 
to the beginning of the second reminds me of Fraden-
burg’s accounts, throughout this book, of striving for sur-
vival as it blurs into lyric thriving. We subsist on Fuzz, 
until subsistence, without warning, is eclipsed by an ever-
escalating oddness that survives what Dickinson plan-
gently calls a “Universe’s fracture.” In true Dickinson 
fashion, it’s not the Universe, or even our Universe. The 
indefinite article makes the universe of this penultimate 
line far more fuzzy than the fuzz itself. Few would argue 
that the university as we know it, our universe, isn’t bro-
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ken; but as Dickinson and maybe Chaucer (and also 
Fradenburg) know, our swerving attention to the fuzzy 
world we’re making takes some of the sting out of this 
being the case. 
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W. dreams, like Phaedrus, of an army of thinker-friends, 
thinker-lovers. He dreams of a thought-army, a thought-
pack, which would storm the philosophical Houses of 
Parliament. He dreams of Tartars from the philosophical 
steppes, of thought-barbarians, thought-outsiders. What 




ma gia volgena il mio disio e’l velle 
si come rota ch’igualmente e mossa, 
l’amor che move: i sole e l’altre stelle 

O you who are within your pretty little bark, 
Eager to listen, have been following 
Behind my ship, that singing sails along. 
Turn back to look again upon your own shores; 
Tempt not the deep, lest unawares, 
In losing me, you might yourselves be lost. 
The sea I sail has never yet been passed; 
Minerva breathes, and Apollo pilots me, 
And Muses nine point out to me the Bears. 
You other few who turned your minds in time 
Unto the bread of angels upon which one lives 
And does not grow sated, 
Well may you launch your vessel 
Upon the deep sea. 
Dante Alighieri, Paradiso 

